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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the role that civil society plays in European Union policy-making 
and its democratic effects. It seeks to find out how, why, where and what civil society 
in Wales engages and does not engage in European Union policy-making. A 
contextual political opportunity structure (POS) approach is employed to help 
understand the factors that shape this role. The thesis uses the European Convention 
as an empirical horizontal case study to compare the role of civil society in Wales in 
the Convention with civil society's role in more general EU policy-making. The 
thesis demonstrates that the POS shapes activity, but also that potential opportunities 
are underused and actor-specific variables shape participation. The effect on 
democracy is uneven, with shades of corporatism evident both in the kind of 
organisations involved and in how the POS structures access. The space for a more 
participatory democracy is limited, with the primacy of representative democracy 
being reasserted by the actual nature of civil society's participation and the views of 
policy-makers.
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INTRODUCTION 
WALES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Wales is a small nation of just under three million people located on the 
periphery of Europe (Cole, 2004). Indeed, it is so small and so peripheral that 
the designers of the Eurostat book in 2004 managed to leave Wales off its cover 
of a map of the European Union (EU) (see British Broadcasting Centre (BBC) 
News, 2004). Despite this omission causing much mirth and arguably being the 
best form of Welsh advertisement in Europe that year, it highlights several key 
questions and recurring issues about Welsh-EU relations. Namely, is Wales well 
served under current arrangements in Europe? Would this have happened if 
Wales had been an independent country? Why does a Welsh-EU relationship 
exist at all?
These questions have dogged the Welsh political debate on Wales and its 
role in Europe. Wales' relations with the EU are important for understanding the 
direction of the nation, yet they can also provide insight into how the EU deals 
with and impacts upon stateless nations. Wales' peripheral location means it acts 
as a case that sheds light on the extent of EU engagement in marginalised 
regions. This thesis seeks to illuminate these dynamics by exploring an under 
researched area which both the EU and Wales have recently seized upon to aid 
their democratic legitimacy: civil society. By looking at civil society's 
involvement in EU policy-making, and the case study of the Convention, the 
extent to which Welsh-EU relations go beyond the political elite into the fabric 
of stateless nations will be demonstrated. To situate this discussion this author 
will give some introductory remarks on the research topic: Wales, its civil 
society and their relations with the EU and the Convention.
WALES AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Wales has effectively been part of the English union state since its invasion in 
1282 (Paterson and Jones, 1999), and officially since the Acts of Parliament of 
1536 and 1543 were signed (Richard Commission, 2004). These settlements
provided little room for independence and the traditional institutions that provide 
the loci for civil society in Scotland of the church, education and legal system 
were all steadily anglicised in Wales. This historical legacy has resulted in 
studies of Wales debating what constitutes Wales, Welshness and whether a 
Welsh civil society, as opposed to a British civil society in Wales, can in fact be 
discerned (Day, Dunkerley and Thompson, 2000; Fevre and Thompson, 1999; 
Osmond, 1995:9, 2003a, 2003b; Paterson and Jones, 1999). Welsh civil society 
is distinctive in possessing the following Welsh characteristics: nonconformist 
religion, the Welsh language and high numbers of Trade Union members 
(Bradbury, 1997:10; Day, Dunkerley and Thompson, forthcoming a).
Tensions over Welsh identity are further afflicated by history, geography 
and a rural/urban divide. For example, the antiquated Balsom model of Wales 
splits Wales into "Y For Gymraeg," "Welsh Wales" and "British Wales" arguing 
that these parts of Wales have different levels of cultural attachment and national 
identity (Jones 2002). Such splits in Wales have arguably permeated into civil 
society in Wales and, combined with a lack of a Welsh institutional platform, 
may have stalled the emergence of a widespread civil society with a Welsh 
agenda (Hodgson, 2002). Furthermore, the traditional fabric of civil society in 
Wales that was perceived to have coalesced around community life (Jones, 
1999:18-20) was eroded in late modernity by changes to Wales' economic base 
and religiosity (see Jones, 1999). Thus, without a developed sense of cohesive 
Welshness and changes to Welsh communities, pre-devolution civil society in 
Wales could be seen to be weak.
The process of devolution in the late 1990s was intended to re-energise 
democracy in Wales, which was wanting following the unaccountable 
"quangoisation" of Welsh public services (see Welsh Office, 1997:7). One of 
the hopes of devolution in Wales was also to generate some sort of a Welsh civil 
society (Day, Dunkerley and Thompson, 2000:25). Furthermore, a central tenet 
of the new participative devolved democracy in Wales was to bolster civil 
society and to include it in policy-making (Royles, 2004:101). Indicative of the 
absence of a Welsh civil society, the Welsh devolution movement lacked the 
widescale public and civil society participation so evident in the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention (Curtice, 1999:121; McCrone and Lewis, 1999). 
This, together with the slim majority in the referendum1 for devolution, meant
that the legitimacy of the devolutionary project rested partly on engaging civil 
society in the National Assembly for Wales' (NAW) work (for example Chaney, 
Hall and Pithouse, 2001a: 5, place the Assembly's legitimacy in the hands of its 
engagement of civil society). A further indication of civil society's importance 
to the new devolved structure is the Assembly's statutory requirement of 
partnership with the voluntary and the business sectors and also to promote 
equality of opportunity. Such innovations have led Osmond (2003 a, 2003b) to 
hail the birth of a Welsh civil society occurring around the Assembly structures 
post-devolution. Thus, empirical research exploring the actual post-devolution 
relationships between civil society in Wales with political institutions is both 
necessary and timely.
Studies on post-devolution civil society in Wales (Chaney, Hall and 
Pithouse, 200Ib; Drakeford, forthcoming; Loughlin and Sykes, 2004) reveal that 
devolution has changed the landscape for CSOs (CSOs) in Wales in terms of 
political access, CSOs activities and funding. Cole (2004) also reports that some 
organisations in Wales, with British parent bodies, are now implementing some 
devolution into their running. However, the face of civil society in Wales today, 
as asserted by Hodgson (2002), is still primarily local, with 89% of voluntary 
organisations in the All Wales Database of Voluntary Organisations comprising 
local bodies (Collis, 2003:23).
The study of civil society as a whole in Wales is still a fledgling venture 
with most works concentrating on sectors of civil society. However, substantial 
work has been conducted on civil society in Wales by the Wales Council for 
Voluntary Action (WCVA) and others (Chaney, Hall and Pithouse 200Ib; Day, 
Dunkerley and Thompson forthcoming b; Hodgson 2002, 2004; Nicholl, 2002). 
Yet as Nicholl (2002) remarks there has "little academic research to date on civil 
society as a whole in Wales" (Nicholl, 2002:4).
The WCVA project reported by Nicholl (2002) was part of a wider World 
Alliance for Citizen Participation (CFVICUS) exercise using its Civil Society 
Index to map the space, structure, values and impact of a given civil society. 
From the CIVICUS research, civil society in Wales was given a "medium" 
health tag and was seen to have a broad and active membership and to be good at 
engaging with politics. However, it pointed to two areas for future research 
which are relevant for this thesis. The first research area was surrounding civil
society definitions, admitting that these are contested and suggesting further 
discussions on definitions with civil society would be helpful. Secondly, Nicholl 
called for further research to explore civil society access to different formal 
political institutions, such as the EU, in a system of multi-level governance 
(MLG):
... it would be valuable to investigate which bodies the respondents feel 
more or less able to access and what steps could be taken to improve this. 
(Nicholl, 2002:15)
WALES, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Connections between Wales and the EU increased with the introduction of the 
EU single market, EU cohesion policy and the period of Conservative United 
Kingom (UK) governments (from 1979-1997). Successive Conservative 
governments served to disconnect Wales from the UK2 and encouraged Welsh 
political and public actors to focus on Europe as an alternative means of political 
influence (Bradbury, 1997; Jones, 1997). This process was undoubtedly helped 
by the EU promoting a "Europe of the Regions" in a bid to foster its legitimacy 
through direct local participation with the EU, by-passing the member state 
(Bradbury, 1997). In particular, the requirement of sub-national partnership in 
the delivery of Structural Funds enhanced Welsh actors' European role. Civil 
society actors were also involved in the clamber and delivery for funded EU 
projects. The role of civil society in establishing Welsh-EU links is further 
evidenced as parts of civil society were involved with the Welsh European 
Centre (WEC), which was set up in 1992 in Brussels. Pre-devolution, "the 
European connection helped to make Wales more self-conscious of its political 
identity" (Jones, 1997:66); is it doing the same for civil society post-devolution? 
Thus, a Wales-EU connection involving some civil society members has 
existed for several years. However, academic works have largely focused on the 
role of sub-national authorities and the EU rather than civil society. Equally, 
investigations into the role of civil society in EU policy-making usually start 
from the Member State or at the European level (for example Crook, 2002; 
Greenwood, 2003a). Although it is important to note that attention is shifting to 
the role of regional civil society within EU Structural Funds (Royles, 2004), to 
which this author hopes to add, but from a more generic analysis of civil society
than sector specific. Research into Wales-EU post-devolution connections is 
important following claims that the new Assembly has focused less on the EU 
than the pre-devolution Association of Wales Counties (Loughlin and Sykes, 
2004:5), in order to explore the claim's validity and effects for civil society.
Furthermore, EU-led developments have helped make this a timely piece 
of investigation. The European Commission (200la) in its White Paper on 
European Governance (WPG) has embraced both civil society and the regions in 
its policy-making process as part of its democratic functioning. This research 
will explore whether the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making can 
actually abate the EU's democratic deficit. Empirical research at the sub- 
national level is needed as many works on the EU's democratic deficit are 
theoretical (for example Cohen and Sable, 1997) or focus on the European, 
Brussels (for example Michalowitz 2004) level, by-passing the sub-national level 
that is closest to the citizens and their lives. Research at this level is also 
important because the state of the EU's democracy is interdependent with the 
state of democracy at the Member State level and will help provide some insight 
into how national/regional dimensions may affect civil society's democratic 
potential.
THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE3
Background and justification for the case study
The decision to hold a constitutional Convention was influenced by four 
inter-dependent trends. Three of these trends were: the need to reform the EU; 
the necessity to revitalise the EU's democratic legitimacy; and the failure of the 
Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) to create reform. A fourth trend - EU 
elites' acceptance of an EU constitution arose out of the other three trends.
The 2000 Nice Treaty, produced by an IGC, revealed inherent problems 
with the IGC model of treaty change. This Treaty was able to address only some 
of the changes4 needed to enlarge an EU of 15 into an EU of 25 Member States, 
and another round of reforms was instigated, with another IGC expected in 2004 
to complete the reforms. The Irish "no vote" to the Nice Treaty revealed public 
discontent with the EU project and its lack of democratic legitimacy. According 
to Shaw, Hoffman and Bausili (2003), this may have led some to call for "a more
deliberative forum for grand Treaty reform" (Shaw, Hoffrnan and Bausili, 
2003:11) instead of an IGC.
The Nice IGC failures contrasted sharply with the Convention on the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of 1999-2000. The CFR Convention's 
"perceived success to some degree encouraged the use of the convention method 
to tackle to broader issue of institutional reform" (Bellamy and Schonlau, 
2003:4). The CFR Convention differed from an IGC; as it had a longer time 
frame worked on the basis of consensus to produce the CFR and thereby it made 
a conscious shift from inter-governmental bargaining techniques and negotiating 
deadlocks. (On the CFR Convention see Bellamy and Schonlau, 2003)
A key awakening in EU elites' constitutional consciousness was Josckar 
Fischer's 2000 address at Humbolt University, where he argued for an EU 
constitution (Craig, 2001: 136; Greve and J0rgensen, 2002:6; Possum and 
Menendez, 2003:16). Before this speech, to "speak of a constitution for Europe 
was to be tainted with the 'F' word" (Weiler, 2002:563),5 (although the EU 
already had a constitution of sorts; see Weiler, 1999). Subsequently, momentum 
behind the constitutional course of action gathered. A range of justifications was 
used to promote the creation of an EU constitution: the need to reform and to 
embrace the citizen and the constitutional momentum established by the CFR 
and a string of IGCs since the 1990s (Barnier, 2001; Craig, 2001; Patten, 
2000:11; Vitorino, 2001; 2002; Weiner, 2003:4). In 2005, there seemed to be a 
backlash to EU constitutionalism with academics challenging the need and 
prospect for an EU constitution in the first place (for example Dyevre, 2005; 
Skach, 2005).
The Laeken Declaration in 2001 married these concerns about reform, 
democratic legitimacy and problems with the IGC model and an EU constitution. 
In so doing, the Laeken Declaration convened a Convention. It should be noted 
that the Laeken Declaration did not view an EU constitution as a given 
Convention output, with the Convention merely meant to investigate the 
possibility (Regan et al., 2003:15).
The recent Convention on the Future of Europe also provides an instance 
to investigate civil society horizontally (Kendall, 2004). hi other words, it acts as 
an opportunity to explore civil society across different sectors, providing more of 
an insight into civil society generally and allowing more meaningful insight into
its democratic contribution. Indeed, research has been conducted on this by a 
European Third Sector Network largely at a Member State level (see Will et al., 
2005), with most other research being focused at the European level (for 
example, Borragan, 2004; Lombardo, 2003) rather than the sub-national level. 
Finally, in terms of timing, it can be argued that the instance of the Convention 
(2002-2003) occurring three years after devolution allows investigation into a 
more embedded devolved system, thereby giving a realistic insight into politics 
post-devolution. Thus, academic inquiry into Wales, civil society and the EU 
offers myriad research options on identity, democracy and devolution. And 
although this thesis' central concerns have been discussed in relation to this 
context; what questions does this thesis specifically set out to explore?
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis ultimately seeks to find out what role, if any, civil society in Wales 
plays in EU policy-making. It will look at what kind of groups participate, at 
what stage of the policy-making process and by what means and methods do 
groups participate, why do they participate on what issues, how do they perceive 
the process and any obstacles that occur. The thesis is also concerned with 
discovering why and which groups do not participate in EU policy-making. 
These concerns are combined with whether civil society can aid the EU's 
democracy. The thesis does this by exploring the internal characteristics of the 
groups under study as well as their external participation/non-participation with 
the EU process. The research questions are specified below:
The research question:
  What role does civil society in Wales play in European Union policy-making 
processes and does this contribute to the EU's democracy?
Descriptive objective:
  To use the European Convention as an empirical, horizontal case study in 
order to compare the role of civil society in Wales in the Convention and 
general EU-civil society in Wales' relations.
Descriptive questions:
  Is the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making democratic and 
does it aid the task of addressing the EU's democratic deficit?
  How do the post-devolution Welsh, British and European institutions that are 
involved in EU policy-making compare in their relations with civil society?
  Which parts of civil society in Wales engages and does not engage in EU 
policy-making?
  How does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making?
  Why does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making and does not 
engage in EU policy-making?
  Where does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making?
Explanatory question:
  What factors shape the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making? 
Whilst assuming that both internal and external factors will play a role, this 
author hypothesises that Political Opportunity Structures (POS) will affect 
the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making.
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
The thesis seeks to answer and situate these questions through a mixture of 
theoretical exploration that shapes the deductive and analytical frameworks used; 
a review of the literature, analysis of secondary literature and analysis of the 
empirical research conducted with Civil Society Organisations and policy- 
makers specifically for the study.
Chapter One outlines and justifies how the research on civil society 
groups at the regional/local level of Wales was conducted. In this chapter, this 
author posits that the research area and its setting pointed to qualitative research 
methods interviews. The chapter describes the case study research design, 
sampling, data collection through interviews and documents and their analysis.
Chapter Two explores and sets out the theoretical terrain of civil society 
and democracy and their inter-relationship. In this chapter, this author argues the 
importance of recognising the different conceptions of civil society and 
democracy entertained by different actors and institutions, given that different
conceptions accord more or less space to civil society in policy-making and 
different roles. Chapter Two also derives indicators for assessing whether civil 
society's role in policy-making contributes to EU democracy. These indicators 
cover the internal characteristics of civil society groups because different groups 
have different democratic effects and contributions. Indicators to ascertain 
whether corporatist or pluralist relations exist between civil society and formal 
political institutions are also identified, as these have different implications for 
the EU's democracy.
Chapter Three continues the thesis' theoretical orientation by exploring 
contending frameworks that could analyse and explain civil society's role in the 
policy-making process. In this chapter European integration, MLG, 
Europeanisation, policy process, policy community and neo-insitutionalist 
approaches and studies of European civil society are evaluated. Applying these 
approaches to the research topic would be generally problematic, because the 
topic focuses upon one instance of policy-making, as well as the context across a 
range of policy sectors. However, the thesis will draw upon some aspects such 
as discursive institutionalism and MLG, and it is argued in this chapter that the 
Political Opportunity Structure is an appropriate framework for the thesis. The 
POS approach's emphasis on the context, as well as specific cases, makes it 
particularly compatible to the case study research design employed in this 
investigation. The POS also draws attention to the structures that constrain, 
facilitate and enable collective action, thereby permitting a multi-level 
investigation and the POS can be combined with recognition of agency and 
actor-specific variables.
The fourth chapter focuses upon the relationship between civil society 
and democracy. Firstly it assesses the internal democratic characteristics of the 
CSOs studied. The groups are analysed with regard to what kind of membership 
the CSOs have; whether they are membership, charities, statutory or umbrella 
groups, as most of the indicators are dependent upon the type of CSO 
membership. The groups do largely make a positive contribution to democracy. 
Nonetheless, the different types of membership CSOs - membership, charities, 
statutory or umbrella groups - achieve different results under individual 
indicators. To elaborate, umbrella groups were predominant in EU policy- 
making and these groups generally were strong in external deliberation,

with the other institutions in the EU policy-process suggests that civil society 
will have little scope for influence purely through this avenue. Each political 
level also has different group-institutional relations and discourses on civil 
society and democracy that may restrict Welsh organisations accessing parts of 
the British and European institutions, hi terms of pluralist, corporatist relations 
the picture lends itself more to corporatist relations, although pluralist elements 
are present. The picture is one of the Assembly structuring civil society- 
relations, endowing CSOs with partnership status but, consequently restricting 
the number of CSOs involved in EU issues. The British and European levels 
have some corporatist elements as they appear to be selective in the groups they 
engage with in EU issues.
The second section of Chapter Five analyses the studied CSOs 
participation in general EU policy-making. Findings from the chapter include 
discovering that the CSOs activity is clustered around the Assembly and at the 
implementation stage, with regional policy acting as a devivant case. Groups 
also had higher counterparts that acted as an alternative route to influence EU 
policy. Political structures helped to shape civil society's role, with access easier 
at the Assembly level and barriers created further up the EU process. However, 
cultural and actor-specific reasons are also important for shaping participation, as 
CSOs did not fully utilise the POS and variations in involvement appeared to be 
related to the identity of groups, how groups and parent groups understand the 
role of Wales within the UK/Europe and the degree of devolution within group 
structures and their mobilisation structures. The CSOs involved in the EU policy 
process are able to provide some democratic contributions. However, the role 
that CSOs from Wales are able to play is rather small and at the margins, serving 
to perpetuate representative democracy. Corporatist/pluralist relations did seem 
to vary with the different institutional levels, although the kind of groups 
involved did tend to indicate corporatism.
Chapter Six firstly critically examines existing research and documents 
on the Convention to reveal whether the POS was open to civil society groups in 
Wales. It reveals that the role of civil society in the Convention did seem to 
diverge from interest group-institutional relations in general EU policy-making. 
The chapter demonstrates that whilst opportunities were fairly open to European 
civil society, the institutional opportunity structures offered to CSOs in Wales
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were fairly closed. The chapter also demonstrates the need for research at the 
regional/local level of civil society and the Convention.
Next the chapter reveals the unstable aspects of the POS in relation to the 
Convention and these include: Convention events, other salient issue 
contemporaries, Welsh media coverage, political alignments and UK civil 
society's Convention Forum involvement. This provides a backdrop to the 
researched CSOs' activity and enables discussion as to whether the 
unstable/stable POS helped shape their role. The CSOs mainly reacted 
differently to the Convention than to other general instances of EU policy- 
making, showing the Convention's uniqueness. Specifically, CSO activity was 
lacking and activity was much more passive and indirect, occurring via 
attendance at related events. The POS did play a role in shaping groups' 
participation with the lack of Assembly participation accounting for less 
participation even though potential Convention opportunities for CSOs were 
underused. Chapter Six also demonstrates the importance of actor-specific 
variables in explaining activity such as CSOs' communication, devolution and 
mobilisation structures.
The conclusion sums up the implications of the research findings to the 
research questions in relation to civil society's role and the EU's democracy. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the conclusion reflects upon the strengths and 




The findings of any research project are only as good as the tools and procedures 
used to generate them. Methods and their explanation are thus an integral part of 
understanding and validating any research. This chapter will uphold the claim 
that the research findings are well founded. This will be demonstrated through 
an outline of how the research was conducted with reference to other methods 
and philosophical literature, comparable empirical research and the research 
area. It is also recognised that research does not occur in a world free of error. 
In the process of articulating any such mistakes and this author's subjective 
standpoints, combined with reflexivity towards these standpoints throughout the 
entire research process, it is hoped a much truer picture of the research can be 
gleaned, making the findings more thorough (as advocated by Mauthner and 
Douce, 2003). Firstly a brief summary of the research methods will set the scene 
for this chapter's discussion.
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH METHODS
The research design is a single embedded case study of the Convention. It is 
revelatory, descriptive and explanatory in nature. The design incorporates some 
comparison as the thesis looks primarily at Wales, but also when relevant at 
Scotland. The embedded design means that special attention is given to the 
analytical units of Civil Society Organisations and policy-makers. The main 
research instrument is the semi-structured interview. Twenty-one interviews 
with civil society groups and eighteen with policy-makers were carried out. 
Interviewees were identified beforehand by theoretical and snowball sampling. 
Documentary analysis was also conducted. Analysis was computer-assisted, and 
made use of both deductive logic (frameworks and models derived from 
literature review) and also inductive logic (letting theory emerge from the data 
and discussing deviant examples). With this is in mind, why choose Wales and 
its civil society, EU policy-making and the Convention?
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THE RESEARCH SETTING; JUSTIFYING THE RESEARCH AREA
Devolution has aided the acceptance of Wales as a legitimate area of political 
inquiry. Recent studies by the Institute of Welsh Affairs, University College 
London and the Economic Social Research Council6 explore Wales in its own 
right as a political entity. This research continues in the same vein, viewing 
Wales as an intrinsically important and interesting area for academic 
investigation. As the Introduction demonstrated, Wales' newly devolved 
political institutions have reinvigorated questions of a "Welsh" civil society and 
provided for a potential new role in EU policy-making, thus warranting this 
research.
In the EU's search for democratic legitimacy, both regions and civil 
society are part of the remedy. Research rarely combines these two phenomena, 
yet the regional level of analysis is important when exploring EU-citizen 
reconnection, as it is close to the citizens. Moreover, the recent Convention on 
the future of Europe includes both regions and civil society in its involvement 
and enables an investigation into civil society horizontally beyond sectors 
(Kendall, 2004).
Research on Wales can act as a case in point for other regions, with some 
administrative and legislative autonomy since there has been little research 
conducted on sub-national civil society and EU policy-making (Kendall, 2001). 
Wales as a region has specific environmental factors acting as an interesting case 
study to explore civil society at the regional level and EU policy-making 
dynamics. Wales' limited devolution settlement means it hovers between 
"constitutional regions" (such as Flanders and Scotland) and "administrative 
regions" (for example Brittany). Thus research on Wales provides insight into a 
semi-powerful region's civil society in the EU. Additionally, the analytical 
frameworks deployed notably the POS and the democratic evaluation of CSOs, 
may also prove useful to other studies concerned with the relations between 
political institutions and civil society across governance levels.
Existing empirical studies and their methods
Civil society has been examined in large quantitative surveys in the John 
Hopkins projects, which map out the health of civil society. The WCVA also ran 
a quantitative survey into the shape of civil society in Wales and explores the
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values of civil society, but it is difficult to fully examine values within a 
questionnaire design because most questions have to be closed (Alridge and 
Levine, 2001).
In terms of the methods deployed by comparable studies, the emphasis is 
largely on qualitative interview research with elites (for example Borragan, 
2004; Lombardo, 2003; Loughlin and Sykes, 2004), as Lilleker (2003) notes:
When one reads many works of political analysis it becomes apparent 
that many academics have relied upon the elite interview as the staple 
method for getting inside the subject. (Lilleker, 2003:207)
Sloat's (2002) research into elites' (civil servants, politicians and civil society 
groups) expectations of EU policy in post-devolution Scotland has the most 
affinity with the study. Once more Sloat's research is interview based, gathering 
perceptions and subjective views of the current and prospective systems of 
Scottish-EU governance following devolution.
Thus, this research into Wales offers a novel opportunity to look at sub- 
national civil society dynamics with the EU at a time when both the political 
institutions in Wales and the EU and their relations with civil society are 
changing. The study of civil society issues in Wales lends itself to qualitative 
research methods and specifically, interviews. However, the appropriateness of 
the research design and methods are best judged by assessing what the research 
is intended to reveal.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
Researchable questions may take one of two forms. The first form is the 
research objective. In such a question, there is no specification of 
relationship between variables. The purpose of the research is to find out 
what is going on. Thus, the stated goal is description rather than 
explanation. (Theodoulou, 1999: 144)
The research question and most of the objectives pursue description. Some of 
the objectives can be framed as explanatory questions with variables that assess 
the significance of different factors through the frameworks utilised.
The general research aims have remained by and large the same prior to 
the fieldwork. Two important additions have been the decision to use Political 
Opportunity Structures and to look at CSO communication structures. The
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former arose from a need to have a co-ordinating framework to understand the 
inter-relationship between groups and the myriad of institutions involved with 
EU policy-making. Secondly, it became clear during the fieldwork that many 
groups did not deal with European issues/institutions directly and would leave it 
to their British or European parents and/or networks. Thus, more questions had 
to be asked about communication within an organisation and/or networks. The 
empirical research also expanded to explore Scotland halfway through the data 
collection, with four Scottish interviews conducted. However, as much more 
substantial data on Wales had been gathered it was felt that this author would not 
be able to do justice to the situation in both nations and would be substituting in- 
depth analysis on Wales for a less exacting broader comparative picture. The 
main research question and its components are outlined below to give insight 
into the research's concerns:
The research question:
  What role does civil society in Wales play in European Union policy-making 
processes and does this contribute to the EU's democracy?
Descriptive objective:
  To use the European Convention as an empirical, horizontal example in order 
to compare the role of civil society in Wales in the Convention and general 
EU/civil society in Wales' relations.
Descriptive questions:
  Is the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making democratic and 
does it aid the task of addressing the EU's democratic deficit?
  How do the post-devolution Welsh, British and European institutions that are 
involved in EU policy-making compare in their relations with civil society?
  Which parts of civil society in Wales engages and does not engage in EU 
policy-making?
  How does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making?
  Why does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making and does not 
engage in EU policy-making?
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  Where does civil society in Wales engage in EU policy-making?
Explanatory question:
  What factors shape the role of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making? 
Whilst assuming that both internal and external factors will play a role, this 
author hypothesises that Political Opportunity Structures will affect the role 
of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making.
To answer these questions the research looks at variations in the 
dependent variable (that is, civil society's role in EU policy-making). This 
involves looking at civil society's engagement in policy-making in terms of 
avenues, stage, issues, strategies, rationale and where this might occur within the 
organisation. The research also identifies the interviewed CSOs' and policy- 
makers' levels of Convention and EU policy-making engagement. The 
independent variables will then help to account for this variation and how they 
combine with the range on the dependent variable.
These independent variables comprise institutional discourses on civil 
society and democracy, POS, devolution, the democratic characteristics of 
groups, actor-specific and group resources. The independent variables are 
measured by finding out how policy-makers view civil society's role in policy- 
making, and understand their position in relation to civil society, what they view 
as effective strategies, the level of access, the influence and the importance 
accorded to civil society, both on the Convention and EU policy generally. 
Other pressing EU and political issues during the Convention will be identified, 
together with the media discourse, civil society groups' resources, strategies, 
orientation, awareness and democratic credentials. Upon addressing the research 
aims it is now appropriate to turn to my philosophical approach to knowledge - 
that shaped those aforementioned objectives and the research.
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS
The narratives or stories, scientists tell are accounts couched and framed 
within specific storytelling traditions. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 4)
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The storytelling tradition deployed in this study is critical realism, for the 
research looks both at how people make sense of their world and how the world 
affects their opportunities. Critical realism allows work to be conducted on the 
premise that there is more to reality than its social construction and that there is 
actually something "out there", without privileging the material over the 
ideational (for example Marsh and Furlong, 2002:31 or Wendt, 1999 on social 
realism). Critical realism accepts a plurality of epistemology and ontology. 
Thus, this author takes up the mantel that "the challenge is to present the world 
as it is interpreted by human theory and practice" (Stoker and Marsh, 2002:8) 
and at the same time accept that the findings will be embedded in this author's 
interpretation. Reflexivity towards this author's role in interpretation helps to 
provide a measure of objectivity coupled with rigour throughout the research 
process:
... seeing truth as growing out of the knower's encounter of the world 
and his effort to order his experience with it. (Goulder, 1970: 270)
Although this author is a member of CSOs, this does not challenge the 
research, as she is sceptical of many of the claims made surrounding civil 
society. Nonetheless, it is testimony to this author's interest in the field and may 
have helped her understanding, use of language and how to go about securing 
access with civil society groups. This author's academic status means she is 
more of an outside insider. Equally, she did not interview any of the groups at 
the level of her personal involvement. With these philosophical considerations 
how was what is "out there" discovered?
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
The case study research strategy had the most affinity with this study, containing 
the "how" and "why" questions typical of case study research (Yin, 2003:9). 
The research was moreover searching for detailed answers to a complex area of 
social life to which case studies are well suited. However, the case had to next 
be to defined, which, authors such as Burton (2000:215-216), unanimously 
advocate defining.
At the beginning of the investigation, the option of looking at two "cases" 
of policy-making in different sectors was explored. However, this was
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problematical as it would not enable study of civil society outside of the sectors 
examined, which would detract from the research concerns about democracy, 
institutions and their opportunity structures towards civil society generally. 
Thus, the instance of the Convention was settled upon, as this had the advantage 
of looking at civil society and its involvement horizontally. As Chapter Six 
demonstrates it is a atypical case of EU policy-making, but the aforementioned 
advantages make it an important case for exploring civil society's role in EU 
policy-making. A case can be a group, event or a nation,7 all of which comprise 
parts of the research questions. However, the Convention provides the focus, 
allowing elucidation of the process involving civil society in Wales and EU 
policy-making. The Convention therefore, is the - "case".
The general concerns with EU policy-making and civil society in Wales 
provide the case study's overall context, which are central to an understanding of 
any such case. The different CSOs, policy-makers and the Welsh nation are 
thereby understood as embedded units within the case study design. Any case 
study highlights particular aspects of a case (see De Vaus, 2001: 220-1). Thus 
the embedded design is appropriate with case study research, which typically 
analyses wholes (i.e. a subject in its entirety). The research design is therefore a 
single case, mainly descriptive but also an explanatory case study. The design is 
simplified in Figure 1.1 overleaf.
How robust is a case study as a research strategy? Such an assessment is 
partly based upon the type of case study selected and different authors have 
different takes on the type of case study they prefer. For example, Yin (2003) 
elevates explanatory, instrumental theory testing case studies, whereas Stake 
(1998) appears to be concerned with intrinsic motivations for studying a case. 
There is however a general consensus that a case study is "well suited for 
addressing empirically defined historical outcomes and they are often used to 
generate new theoretical schemes" (Ragin, 1989: ix). It is also a commonly used 
research method in political science (Peters, 1998). Its strengths are its ability to 
look at complex areas in-depth and holistically to understand causal mechanisms 
(de Vaus, 2001:234-5). Further advantages include its flexibility especially since 
it takes into account the temporal and spatial dimensions of social life (Ragin, 
1989:49). These advantages result in case study designs having high internal 
validity. Case studies are most likely to be used when the research has the
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following characteristics: when the case cannot be controlled, and when cases are 
examined in their natural setting and multi-methods are used (Yin, 2003:7; 
Denscombe, 1998:30-1). There are also a number of problems associated with 
case studies, which focus around the limited ability to make generalisations and 
thus have weak external validity. In some disciplines case studies are not seen as 
"scientific":
Case studies have similarly been degenerated as having insufficient 
precision (i.e. quantification), objectivity or rigor. (Yin, 2003: xiii)
Figure 1.1: Summary of the case study research design
CONTEXT - Civil society in Wales and EU policy-making
CASE - <Convention
Wales
Civil Society Policy-makers 
Organisations
(Source: developed from Yin, 2003)
In response to these criticisms, Yin (2003:14) proposes increasing rigour 
by specifying hypotheses and theory prior to fieldwork. On the other hand, 
Gillham (2000:2) advocates that researchers should have no theoretical 
preconceptions before carrying out the fieldwork. Thus the different approaches 
to theory by case study scholars appear to be built upon different epistemological 
bases. As this work rests upon critical realism it is appropriate to theorise 
beforehand and deductively use theory as a tool to guide analysis, combined with 
a measure of inductive reasoning (Hay, 2002) thereby lending exactitude to the 
work.
The charge of weak external generalisation has a number of practical 
defences. Firstly, external validity can be enhanced by increasing the number of 
cases studied, by comparing and contrasting the causal mechanisms and features 
at work and using falsification (De Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2003). However, this is not
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appropriate here as practicalities necessitate a single, albeit revelatory, case. 
Yet it is in the selection of the embedded units and also in defining the broader
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context that external validity can be increased. By using theoretical, purposive 
sampling to partly select the embedded civil society groups and thereby 
increasing the range of groups examined with deviant examples, a greater degree 
of certainty about theoretical generalisations can be established (Silverman, 
2000). Analytical generalisations are what case studies aim for, rather than 
statistical generalisation about a population (Burton, 2000:225):
The purpose of the case study is not to represent the world but to 
represent the case. (Stake, 1998: 104)
The above quote provides a reminder not to focus too much on external 
generalisability as the case is a valuable area of study in itself. It is to the 
methods that the chapter turns to illuminate further the research validity.
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE METHODS
In line with case study research the project makes use of multi-methods, namely 
interviews and documents. They are supplemented and supported by theories, 
other empirical studies and interview material collected for other purposes such 
as House of Commons Committees' Witness Examinations. However, as 
interviews and to a lesser extent documents comprise most of the empirical data, 
these two methods are discussed in terms of their rationale and their 
appropriateness in gathering information that answers the research questions.
Interviews
They are high-preparation, high risk, high gain and high analysis 
operations. (Wengraf, 2001:5)
Interviews are labour intensive in terms of time and in the level of preparation 
needed, to negotiate access, create schedules, transcribe and analyse. Why on 
earth would anyone embark upon research with this method? The answer lies in 
the third element of Wengraf s statement: the dividends. In a short period of 
time (the actual interview) a large amount of data (Lilleker, 2003:208) can be 
collected on people's accounts of their experiences and their views on relevant 
issues (Miller and Glassner, 2004:126). The risk element can also be reduced 
considerably by careful planning, as Lilleker (2003) attests.
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Why use interviews in this instance? The research area justifies the 
method. The research area covers several spatial levels of political analysis and 
encompasses many different political institutions and actors. This thesis also 
wishes to discover perceptions of a recent high-level political event, which can 
only partially captured by political documents:
Through qualitative interviews you can understand experiences and 
reconstruct events in which you did not participate. (Rubin and Rubin, 
1995:1)
Thus, the research looks at the complex, the hidden, the concrete and the 
subjective. Authors credit interviews for exploring all these facets (Gerson and 
Horowitz, 2002; Lilleker, 2003; Miller and Glassner, 2004; Yates, 2004). 
Moreover, the semi-structured interviews give flexibility to discuss with key 
players in the EU/Wales policy process their views in their own words, and allow 
investigation into any unconsidered areas or topics of interest. The Jones 
Commission (2004) also warned that CSOs in Wales were suffering 
"consultation fatigue"; thus access for a wide survey would be difficult to secure. 
One problematic with interviews is whether meaningful data can be 
gathered; whether interviews provide a "true" account or are viewed as 
storytelling constructs (Mason, 2002). This author would argue that it is 
precisely the meanings or the truth people accord to their experiences and create 
(sometimes self-reflexively in an interview) that the research wishes to ascertain. 
However, the more fruitful discussion lies in the steps taken to increase 
authenticity. Validity can be aided in the interview itself, by outlining a remit for 
discussion, asking clear, unambiguous questions and making a conscious effort 
not to lead the respondent in any particular direction (Fontana and Frey, 1998; 
Gaskell, 2000; Moore, 2000). Outside of the interview, triangulation of accounts 
by means of other sources can provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
what actually went on (Lilleker, 2003).
Documentary evidence
Documents provide a superb way of gaining access into 
organisational/institutional settings and for corroborating interview accounts of 
facts (the need for this is articulated by Davies, 2001). However, there are a
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number of potential pitfalls, if not addressed. Namely, it has to be recognised 
that documents do not objectively represent reality, but are produced in a certain 
way and for a specific audience (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004:58). This study 
therefore deploys a critical approach to documents (see Jupp and Norris, 1993). 
Institutional documents can be critically analysed as they demonstrate where 
institutions believe legitimacy resides among social actors and structures at that 
moment in time, as this is presented to the institution and by the institution (Jupp 
and Norris, 1993).
Documents are used to triangulate evidence and to help provide more 
insight into the case and its context. An excellent example is the briefings 
produced by the Inter-Parliamentary Research Network (Regan et al., 2003). 
These briefings list all the debates and speeches in the Westminster and devolved 
deliberative bodies in the UK regarding the "future of Europe".
The discussion thus far has served to illuminate the issues of 
methodological debate and has argued for the research design and methods in 
relation to validity issues and also the research aims. Now the chapter turns to 
how the data collection process worked to stimulate discussion further.
SAMPLING
The selection of interviewees was based on practicalities, concerns for external 
generalisation and the logic of comparison, hi order to compare, it is necessary 
to look at how different conditions combine to produce certain outcomes (Ragin, 
1989:14). Thus this author was concerned with interviewing individuals in 
groups/institutions that had a range of the different variables identified to be 
significant.
The sampling logic applied to selecting civil society groups was, as 
advocated by Silverman (2000), theoretically grounded and purposive because 
this author wanted to make statements about CSOs, not just groups in one sector, 
although different group sectors had to be considered. Other key variables 
identified were the level and actual engagement in the process of the Convention 
or EU policy generally (variation in the dependent variable), the size, function, 
resources, type, size, sector, geographical remit (although this variable emerged 
during data collection) and democratic characteristics. Consequently, a range of 
groups from the following sectors and at a range of levels were interviewed:
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Local Civil Society Organisation by sector: 
Community/heritage
Regional (constituency) Civil Society Organisations by sector: 
Environment Language/community Sport
Wales-wide Civil Society Organisations by sector:
Business Disability Equality Farming 
Intermediary International International Development 
Language Poverty Pro-European Religious 
Trade Union Women's
Scottish-wide Civil Society Organisations by sector (these CSOs are not included 
in the main analysis): 
Trade Union Arts
UK level Civil Society Organisation: 
One CSO
European (EU) level Civil Society Organisation: 
One CSO
Other:
One Wales European Centre Official
These groups are not intended to be representative of civil society in 
Wales at large, but are meant to provide a snapshot of civil society participation 
among a variety of groups along key dimensions to access their perceptions. The 
groups all had varying degrees of involvement with EU policy process and the 
Convention. Efforts were also made to reach out of south Wales, where the 
Assembly is based, with two groups from mid-Wales and three based in north 
Wales.
Generally, there is a slight leaning towards advocacy/representative 
groups (eighteen groups) although many of them had a mixture of functions,
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particularly CSOs' combined advocacy with service-base functions. A British 
and a European organisation were also interviewed to understand how 
organisations take on the views of their Welsh organisational branches. Groups 
were identified through discussions with Welsh experts, searching The Wales 
Yearbook (Balsom, ed., 2003), looking at Convention events/submissions 
in/from Wales, local community group websites and using snowball sampling by 
following up suggestions from CSOs. Contact with interviewees was mostly 
made through written letters, supplemented sometimes with phone calls. Thirty- 
three groups in total were contacted with ten either saying no, or just not replying 
with an affirmative answer, and two that could not meet on the available dates. 
The groups that were not willing to take part were all (except one local body) 
region-wide groups, six were Welsh and three Scottish, and came from a range 
of sectors: consumer, craft, voluntary, sports, civic concerns, disability and 
equality. The main reason cited for refusing to be interviewed was that they did 
not feel they had anything to offer on the subject, that their work had no links 
with policy-making and/or the EU. Indeed, this was the hardest barrier to 
overcome, having to persuade groups that had little or no involvement that their 
voice was integral to the research. After much effort there was a degree of 
success in gaining access to these "voices".
In terms of how individual interviewees were identified the author looked 
at job titles/positions on CSOs websites or alternatively called up the 
organisation and asked if there was anyone involved in EU policy issues and 
addressed correspondence to them. The individuals subsequently interviewed 
occupied senior positions in their organisation as staffer committee members, so 
could be seen as part of an elite. This may have repercussions on the soundness 
of their assessments of their CSO's democratic workings, although this can be 
alleviated by asking questions in an objective manner so that they are not overtly 
defensive, and by cross-referencing through documents.
A WEC Official was also interviewed because at the time of interview9 
some of WEC's members were CSOs, and it provided information, identified 
and acted upon opportunities for its members in Brussels. However, as WEC 
was a corporate body and had a large membership from Assembly Sponsored 
Public Bodies (ASPBs), it is not a CSO. Thus, it is placed in an "other" category.
25
In terms of sampling policy-makers, this author was concerned to capture 
the views of those involved with the range of institutions between Wales and the 
EU, to try and harness different institutional perspectives but also the individual 
accounts of policy-makers. The interviewed policy-makers are outlined below:
Welsh local government policy-maker:
• Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) Official
Welsh Assembly Government/National Assembly for Wales policy-makers:
• Assembly Member (AM) on the European and External Affairs Committee 
(EEAC)
• Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) Official
Scottish Executive policy-maker (not included in the main analysis):
• Scottish Executive Official
Westminster/United Kingdom government policy-makers:
• Member of Parliament (MP)
• MP
• UK civil servant (Wales Office)
• UK civil servant (United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the 
European Union, UKREP)
• UK civil servant (formerly UKREP)
Policy-makers from the institutions of the European Union:
• Committee of the Regions (CoR) member
• European Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) member
• European Commission office in Wales Official
• European Commission office in Wales Official
• European Commission Official
• Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for Wales
• Member of the European Parliament for Wales
• Member of the European Parliament from Britain and Conventioneer
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Policy-makers were contacted through a mixture of sending letters, 
telephoning and some snowball sampling as a few participants provided an 
introductory recommendation to others. Relevant individuals were generally 
identified through institutional websites. Individuals who had changed their 
public role proved to be more difficult to find and were traced by gathering their 
current activities. This author had to be politely persistent to secure some policy- 
makers' willingness to be interviewed into actually settling a date for interview. 
In one instance it took several months between initial contact and the actual 
interview. However only five policy-makers declined outright, another was ill 
and another four did not respond or a suitable time could not be arranged. These 
policy-makers were WAG Officials, MEPs, MPs, Whitehall civil servants, 
European Commission and CoR members. However, as all these sections are 
represented, this should not detract from the research. This author also 
interviewed politicans from five different political parties, covering a large range 
of political opinion.
The policy-makers in particular, provided instances of elite interviewing 
as most of the individuals were senior Officials. Elite interviewing requires a 
high level of preparation to establish the researcher's credibility and to make the 
maximum use of time (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002).
DATA COLLECTION: INTERVIEWS
To be fully prepared, a pilot interview was conducted with the Head of a CSO 
involved in European Objective 1 programmes. This provided information both 
on this author's technique and the content of the questions. As a result, the 
questions were made more specific and the author was aware of the need to be 
more assertive in changing the interview direction. The decision was made at the 
outset to tape record and transcribe interviews rather than take notes, on the 
grounds that the latter detracts from non-verbal communication and listening 
(Moore, 2000:128).
The interviewing commenced in October 2003 firstly with CSOs and then 
with policy-makers, finishing in October 2004. The body of knowledge 
collected from the earlier interviews helped with the potentially more tricky elite 
interviews with policy-makers. In preparation for interviews the author would 
search for any relevant information on each individual on Google and
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institutional/CSO websites, look at any documents they had composed and 
supplement this with any information about the CSO/institution. This helped to 
tailor questions for each interview schedule. Interview questions and interview 
briefs were also sent out beforehand so interviewees could be informed about 
what to expect. Sometimes this would not be read, but this author came to feel 
that it saved time and made people more at ease.
The interviews were on average one hour in length, ranging from twenty 
minutes to three hours, and the expected interview time would often change on 
the day. This meant that there was limited opportunity to gain trust and rapport 
with respondents in order to elicit more thorough answers. However, trying gain 
more time with interviewees would have been impractical as individuals were 
already short of time and such an attempt may have resulted in access being 
denied.
Interviews were carried out in a range of locations convenient for 
interviewees, from cafes to homes to offices. Some of these locations made for 
testing interviewing, hi a restaurant this author had to carefully balance and time 
asking questions, watching for suitable gaps between eating. Most of the 
interviews were carried out one-on-one, but for one interview carried out at the 
start of the research there were two interviewees, which proved to be extremely 
difficult. One interviewee was the line manager of the other and soliciting 
answers from the junior was trying as the line manager dominated; the author 
realises now that she should have asserted more control over the interview.
Thus, the one valid statement on the interviews is that they all had their 
own quirks. The techniques used varied from interview to interview, for the 
"interviewer's intuition is paramount" (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002:311). The 
author found the most effective way of interviewing was to discuss with the 
participant the main themes of the interview that the author was interested in and 
to give them some control by asking them how they wanted to "run" the 
interview (for example some individuals wanted to talk on the issue, with very 
little prompting, while others wanted more direct questions). Prompting 
questions were asked seek to bring the discussion back to the main issues if the 
discussion became too tangential. Quite often interviewees would answer 
several questions concurrently through one answer, requiring a mental revision 
of the schedule.
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This author did start the interviewing with a more traditional approach, 
staying very objective and trying not to be animated and making sure all the 
questions were answered. However, like May (1997:114) this author found that 
there is a trade-off between being objective and subjective. It was practical on 
the one hand to be impartial on the content and wording of questions so that 
people would understand and feel able to voice their views. On the other hand 
being oneself, having a sense of humour, going for quality rather than quantity of 
questions and even occasionally digressing from the subject was important in 
making the respondent comfortable and making the experience much more 
rewarding, although there is a fine line. Positive reinforcement and seating were 
also used to make the interviewee more at ease (recommended by Denscombe, 
1998:119).
It was interesting to note the different dynamics when interviewing 
politicians, civil servants and CSOs. The former find talking very easy and 
therefore the author had to make sure they stayed on the topic. They were also a 
little defensive. Civil servants on the other hand tend to be much briefer, require 
a lot of prompting and are understandably very wary of evaluating political 
actions. Finally, the CSOs required reinforcement that their views were 
worthwhile to keep the conversation flowing.
Some of the questions did cause a little bit of a stir. These questions were 
on what people understood by civil society and democracy and the inter­ 
relationship between them. Mason (2002) derides asking such academically 
worded questions. However, this author does not feel that there was any other 
way to have gone about this, hi order to talk about civil society, civil society had 
to first be discussed and as this author was interested in participants' definitions 
and did not want to impose her definition from the outside (although a working 
definition was given for the rest of the interview). Most of the interviewees were 
taken aback by such questions, however, upon being asked nobody failed to give 
an answer. Moreover, these words were not completely outside of their 
vocabularies as policy documents are littered with such concepts. Finally, this 
author does not believe that researchers should avoid asking difficult questions 
of people if they are clearly worded, as it seems a little patronising to suggest 
that they are unable to answer these. Also, these are questions that they can only 
answer in their own words. Another difficulty encountered was talking about a
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past event. The passing of time made some individuals more self-reflective but 
also meant that some details had been forgotten; indeed this author had to remind 
two people of their role in Convention events!
With regards to the researcher effect10, this was combated in several 
ways; by being objective in the questions that were asked (not leading or offering 
comment on them), suitable dress codes and being polite. Power considerations, 
whereby the researched is intimidated by the researcher, were minimised by 
reassuring individuals that their views were important, giving them some control 
over the interview and by this author's position in society. Indeed, because this 
author is young, female and a PhD researcher, in many instances the power 
differentials were reversed (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002: 311-312) and she felt a 
little in awe of many of the interviewees. Perhaps the power imbalances were 
positive in that some respondents were very open in their views and information. 
Following all interviews a record of the interview proceedings was made with 
regards to content, dynamics, participants' social situation, interview 
environment and rapport. This aided analysis of the transcriptions, providing 
reflexivity of the social context of where and how the answers were produced.
Ethical issues were attended to from the beginning. Interviewees were 
asked previously for their consent to be tape-recorded as well as immediately 
prior to interview. A consent form was prepared detailing the interviewee's 
rights and with assurances of confidentiality. The tape recorder used was also 
very large and visible, but only in one interview did it really play any role when 
one participant was very cautious about what he was saying was on or off record. 
This author also tried to thank individuals for their time by sending them 
information about the EU process in some instances. The most rewarding aspect 
of the interviews was the ability to trigger reflection. As one participants 
commented "speaking to you, things come up that I've never thought about" 
(interview, ECOSOC member, 2004).
The decision to end interviewing was not easy, since more avenues were 
left to explore. The decision was necessitated by realities of time and data 
management, as Gaskell (2000:43) recommends fifteen to twenty-five interviews 
to be carried out by any one researcher. The decision was also spurred on by a 
degree of saturation with regards to the Convention, with accounts repeating the
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varieties already being heard (on the saturation point, see Rubin and Rubin, 
1995:72-6).
Interviews were also supplemented by observation, as Gerson and 
Horowitz (2002) note these are different methods at opposite ends of the scale. 
This author was able to observe the offices of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and policy-makers, which gave some idea of their resources. The author 
also made observations at European events in Wales that she attended, in terms 
of who was present and the issues raised. This helped provide information on 
the wider context.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: DOCUMENTS
Documents were selected to access views of formal political institutions, civil 
society and also to prepare for interviews with individual CSOs and policy- 
makers. Reports and attendance-lists of Convention-related events held in 
Wales, Scotland and to a lesser extent London were also accessed to provide a 
fuller picture of civil society activity outside those interviewed. In order to 
ascertain the media Convention coverage, a content analysis was conducted on 
four Welsh newspapers (Daily Post, Western Mail, Wales on Sunday and South 
Wales Evening Post). These were the newspapers that were accessible via a data 
holding and search engine on the web, Lexus Nexus. The newspapers selected 
were not exhaustive of Welsh newspapers, but they included some of the main 
papers from the region and provide a backdrop to the kind of coverage the 
Convention received from a Welsh vantage point.
On this database this author carried out keyword searches on the terms 
"European Convention", "future of Europe", "Constitutional Convention" and 
"draft constitution", to cover the range of Convention vocabulary. The time- 
scale selected ran from July 2001 to June 2004, to provide a context of pre, 
during and post Convention. By excluding non-relevant articles (for example, 
there were many hits relating to the European Convention on Human Rights) 91 
articles were identified within the time frame. Each newspaper's article was read 
and summarised in chronological order. Upon reading, the main theme of the 
article relating to the Convention was gathered allowing a basic quantitative 
content analysis. The articles were also tabulated under their issue month and 
year; for elaboration see Chapter Six. The extent of TV coverage was not
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examined because the data was not so readily accessible and constraints 
governed the author's time, although it is recognised that TV is the most 
common source of political information for individuals11 (Dunleavy and 
Husbands, 1985: 11 cited in Denver, 1994:118).
DATA ANALYSIS: INTERVIEWS
Analysis is central to concerns about the validity and reliability of research 
findings as it is here that data are turned into conclusions and generalisations. 
The theoretical frameworks from the literature created appropriate analysis for 
case studies being "structured, planned and purposeful" (De Vaus, 2001: 251). 
A typology of democratic characteristics to assess the "democraticness" of civil 
society groups was used (see Chapter Four) and the POS also acted as a 
framework in which to present data in Chapters Five and Six, and specifically the 
institutional discourses provided a reference point for Chapter Four. Thus, the 
data analysis appears to be mainly deductive. Nonetheless, induction comes in 
through comparison and identifying what seem to be the relevant variables of the 
research. Analytic induction is used to explain deviant cases thereby increasing 
generalisation (see Robinson, 1999).
Data analysis has two purposes: to reduce the amount of data and to 
present conclusions (Huberman and Miles, 1998: 180). This requires coding and 
categorisation through relevant themes, without losing sight of the overall 
context and the interview. For the analysis, this author firstly transcribed 
interviews in full, increasing her familiarity with the interview data, and 
significant nuances were recorded (as recommended by King, 1994). All 
nuances were not recorded due to time because the research questions did not 
warrant such excessive detail. A computer programme, NVivo, was selected to 
aid coding. There has been considerable debate over the use of computers in 
qualitative analysis and these apprehensions must be allayed in this chapter.
Seale (2000:155) likens qualitative researchers' distaste for computer- 
assisted analysis to their view of quantitative research as dehumanising. 
Computer Assisted Analysis (CAA) can be perceived as creating distance 
between the researched and the researcher, making it easier to focus on small 
data extracts and to ignore the context and create partial research findings. Lee 
and Fielding (1993:7) attribute such concerns to the fact that the computer is
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culturally defined and being technological it is seen to exclude women and is 
perceived as magic, i.e. the conclusions from data analysis are viewed as 
appearing from nowhere (Alcott and Benson, 1993). These points are heeded 
and steps were taken to reduce these concerns in the process of analysis, as will 
shortly be demonstrated. However, many of these worries in an age where 
information technology is ever-present throughout the research process are 
becoming out-dated.
One of the principal advantages of CAA is that it systematises analysis, 
thereby, making it much harder to ignore or simply forget data extracts because 
all the data is in front of the researcher and thus increases rigour and therefore 
internal validity (Seale, 2000). CAA also means that it is quicker to locate data, 
easier to find contrary cases and the research process is more transparent 
(Fielding, 2002:168; Lee and Fielding, 1993; Seale, 2000). Moreover, by 
transcribing interviews in full and looking at extracts in view of the entire data, 
concerns about partiality of results can be allayed (Alcott and Benson, 1993). 
Finally, it is also a wonderful system for data management (Fielding, 2002:175).
Thus, this author summarised each interview in terms of content, being 
aware of the dynamics of the interview and her role in it. Next all the interview 
transcripts were read in full, allowing emergent themes to be added to the coding 
frame. (The coding frame also consisted of codes dervived from the literature 
and frameworks). Following on from this, the relevant parts from each transcript 
and supporting document were coded on NVivo, with new codes being added as 
appropriate. The coding categories aided comparison of embedded units and the 
exploration of deviant cases, allowing generalisations and conclusions to emerge. 
The NVivo programme was also useful for identifying key quotes, which 
typified these generalisations and conclusions.
CONCLUSION
The empirical study of civil society is a new and interdisciplinary field. As such, 
inquiry into civil society has no cookbook to guide methodological choice and it 
is instead from other comparable pieces of research and the research questions 
that the appropriate methods must be gleaned. The research area and its setting 
pointed to qualitative research and the interview method. By asking for detailed 
assessments on political life the research questions point the research towards
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case study design and the primary use of interviews as a method. The case study 
method using an embedded design provides multi-causal descriptions and 
explanations into a multifarious area of social life. The embedded design allows 
due focus to be given to civil society while researching the case at hand. The 
methods of interviews and documents have the capacity to provide insight into 
the case and the context, and thus the answers to the research questions, and 
being multi-method aid triangulation and increase validity. This research's 
external validity (typically weak in case studies) has been increased by the use of 
its analytical frameworks, through applying purposive and theoretical sampling 
to select interviewees and by means of some limited comparison with Scotland. 
The interviews and documents were collected in a reflexive, critical and 
thorough manner and have been concretely outlined to increase transparency and 
demonstrate the rigour used. The analysis, coming from a critical realist 
perspective, uses both deductive and inductive logic and increases validity 
through systematic analysis, assisted by NVivo, exploring and comparing all the 
data and deviant cases. It is to that logic and the findings, being so justified, that 
the following chapters attend.
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2
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: DEFINITIONS, 
DEBATES AND SETTING THE SCENE
The EU has recently sought to bring civil society into its policy-making 
processes to implicitly revitalise its democracy (Armstrong, 2002:105) (i.e. in the 
WPG, see European Commission, 200la). Such moves are concurrent with 
recent academic and policy-maker debates that accord civil society a 
democratising role. This chapter seeks to expound such views on civil society 
and democracy in order to assess the role that civil society plays in furthering 
democracy, both inside and outside of policy-making.
The chapter initially will establish an analytical handle on the 
"definitional fuzziness" of civil society (Edwards and Foley, 2001:4) by 
outlining different approaches to its boundaries, components and norms. This 
mapping exercise will incorporate civil society debates and history to situate the 
contemporary state of civil society theory. Democracy similarly will be 
discussed hi relation to different perspectives and debates. This will enable an 
exploration into civil society and democracy and their inter-relationship, which 
in turn generate assessment criteria of civil society's contribution to democracy, 
including any policy-making functions. An exploration into the EU's democratic 
deficit will also provide a backdrop into the nature of the problem the EU is 
trying to counteract with the aid of civil society.
The chapter will forcibly argue that there are distinctive positions on civil 
society and democracy and that these have different implications for 
conceptualising each other. Thus, attention must be paid to the different 
conceptions of civil society and democracy shared by actors and institutions in 
order to understand and assess the extent to which they involve civil society 
through policy-making and its impact upon democracy. Finally, a list of 




A brief theoretical history of civil society
A brief tour of the historical evolution of the theory of civil society is important 
in order to understand its contemporary relevance and current civil society 
theories. This latter task is necessitated as academics today highlight key civil 
society theorists pertinent to their perspective. Alexis de Tocqueville, in 
particular, has been the inspiration for much of the renewed debate on civil 
society (for example Putnam, 1993:89; Putnam and Goss, 2002:13). 
Nonetheless, an overlapping consensus can be discerned as to the identity of the 
key figures in shaping the historical passage of the idea of "civil society" 
(Edwards and Foley 2001:4; Cahoone, 2002:211-216, who includes Locke, the 
Romans and the French; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001:3 who also includes the 
French enlightenment). These key theorists are depicted on a simple flow chart 
below:
Figure 2.1: Key historical civil society theorists









Each of these theorists brought something distinctive to the civil society debate 
and definition. Aristotle first separated the active public citizen from the private 
household domain. This private/public distinction was a consequence of the dual 
aim of human fulfilment with effective governance, following village 
partnerships merging into a city-state polis (Cahoone, 2002). The term "civil 
society" only emerges in the modern era with the Enlightenment when, as 
Habermas (1992) outlines, a critical, liberal public sphere and civil society 
emerged from the advent of media, the separation of public authorities from the 
ruler and the privatisation/marketisation of economic reproduction. 
Enlightenment theorists viewed civil society as a means to alleviate concerns that
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modern economics undermined sociability (Oz-Salzberger, 2001:59) as a result 
of ensuing individualism and a division of labour. The Scots Enlightenment 
thinkers, such as Ferguson (1767), viewed civil society as outside of the state and 
as a bulwark in bolstering good citizens:
... they are the most happy men, whose hearts are engaged in community 
in which they find every object of generosity and zeal and a scope of 
every talent of every virtuous disposition. (Ferguson, 1767:58)
Ferguson goes on to argue that it "is in conducting the affairs of civil society, 
that mankind find the exercise of their best talents, as well as the object of their 
best affections" (Ferguson, 1767:155). This "civil society" also incorporates the 
economy with commercial transactions having a civilising effect (Seligman, 
2002:18). Baker (1998:4) points out that moral and theological overtones are 
evident in this understanding of civil society.
Market effects in creating economic inequalities provided the stimulus 
for Hegel's and Marx's writings on civil society. Cohen and Arato (1994) also 
accord Hegel with another motivation: to reconcile ethos with individual 
freedom. Both Marx and Hegel viewed civil society as economic and as a 
specific constellation of the modem era, imbuing the concept with temporal 
novelty (on Hegel, see Keane, 1988:46). Yet they diverge over civil society- 
state relations. Hegel advocated an ethical life comprising of a rational state and 
welfare to combat economic, egocentrism and particularism in civil society 
(Femia, 2001:133-4; Keane, 1988:46). Marx, however, viewed civil society as 
an extension of bourgeois interests and an arena of alienation, not as a separate 
sphere from the state (Habermas, 1992).
Tocqueville's inspiration on civil society came from his visit to the 
United States, hi America he experienced at first hand, democracy and also the 
self-sufficiency of people from the state through their local associations. The 
key element of his treatise seized by neo-Tocquevillians today is that voluntary 
associations acted as a means for men to get things done, to transcend self- 
interest for the common good, to learn civic skills, to stop the tyranny of the 
majority and to limit government power (Deakin, 2001: 67; Galston, 2000; 
Tocqueville, 1862a:128-133; Warren, 2001:29-30). Civil society, or more 
appropriately civic associations, are viewed as actors outside of the state and
37
comprise "commercial and manufacturing companies ... associations to give 
entertainments, to find establishments for education, to build inns [and] to 
construct churches" (Tocqueville, 1862a:128). It must be recognised that 
Tocqueville's book Democracy in America does seem primarily aimed at selling 
democracy to Europeans and, also as identified by Whittington (2001), may be 
Utopian in its understanding of 19th century America. Secondly, with regards to 
many neo-Tocquevillians who focus upon secondary associations and ignore 
political associations, 12 Tocqueville views political associations as the critical 
mechanisms whereby people acquire democratic skills and learn how to 
associate, thereby enabling civic association (Tocqueville, 1862a:138,140):
Political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, 
where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of 
association. (Tocqueville, 1862a:140)
Finally, Tocqueville recognised that association had negative aspects 
(Whittington, 2001) and argued that association should not be left unfettered and 
that complete freedom could lead to anarchy (Tocqueville, 1862a:143; 
1862b:222).
Following on from this 19th century period of civil society theorising, 
Gramsci devised his civil society theory in 1930s Italy, updating Marxism and 
seeking to understand the delay in Communist revolution outside of Russia. 
Here, civil society is understood through hegemony: where one class or historic 
bloc dominates in material, political, social and cultural reproduction via consent 
and coercion (Cohen and Arato, 1994:143-5). Civil society for Gramsci was no 
longer simply about economic or state relations, but included a myriad of actors 
and ideas such as intellectuals, institutions and associations (Cohen and Arato, 
1994:143-4).
In summary, ideas on civil society grew out of changes in economics, 
size and type of polity, technology and societal shifts. They sought to reconcile 
questions of free individuals and liberty in a community, successful democratic 
government and inequalities, and to explain how society could and did operate. 
The discussion on Tocqueville demonstrates how only aspects of these "great 
thinkers" are used currently and civil society in history was recognised as a 
limited panacea. These theories also aspire to universalism, despite being
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Western theories. The capacity of "civil society" to be universally applicable is 
debatable, given that this brief account of civil society's conceptual history 
demonstrates how much the concept has varied over time, in purpose, norms and 
parameters, thereby limiting its universal applicability (see Wiarda, 2003). Is 
this diversity in meaning still evident today?
Contemporary and current debates on civil society
As an idea, civil society experienced a renaissance in the late 20th century, and in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which has continued into the present day, both theoretically 
and in political discussions. The most commonly cited reasons for this re- 
emergence are detailed below:
• Civil society groups' resistance to totalitarianism in Latin America and 
Central and Eastern Europe (Carothers, 1999:1; Galston, 2000; Young, 
2000:154)
• Collapse of communism and crisis of left-wing thought; "the end of 
ideology" (Cohen and Arato, 1994:70; Keane, 1988; Little, 2002:103)
• Concerns in advanced democratic countries of a decline in political 
participation, a lack of community and ensuing alienation (Chandoke, 
2001:4;Nisbet, 2000)
• New kinds of participation and rise of the new social movements (Kaviraj 
and Khilnani, 2001:2; Walzer, 1995a:2)
• In the face of burgeoning inequality, the recognition that welfare and statism 
are ineffective (Cahoone, 2002:218)
Debate still persists over what is civil society: is it an ideal type or a 
sociologically real phenomenon? Keane (1998) appears to use civil society as 
both a theory and an empirical phenomenon, and Cohen and Arato (1994:3) 
present their work as the first systematic theory of civil society. In another essay 
Cohen and Arato (2001:186) and Alexander (2001), discuss how civil society is 
sometimes used in political discussions as a discursive category. Civil society is 
also commonly viewed as a concept, (for example Cox, 2003:1175; Eberly, 
2000:6; Kymlicka, 2002:1; Walzer, 1995b). Given the array of definitions and
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supporters, some have questioned whether even talking about civil society has 
much worth (Pietzyek, 2003:38). Indeed, Chandoke (2001:1) argues that civil 
society's over-identification means that civil society cannot be understood as a 
stand-alone concept.
What can be said most constructively about civil society is that it has 
been theorised, it looks at the real and the ideal of a societal part and it is 
polemic. It is within this contestation that dividends can be made in studying 
civil society (Edwards and Foley, 2001:3; Young, 2000:157), a fact which many 
empirical investigations of civil society fail to recognise. Chandoke's (2001) 
point about civil society's definitional elasticity obscuring civil society's 
meaning is taken on board. However, this chapter posits that by unveiling 
different approaches to civil society and looking at civil society in relation to its 
main defining conceptual part - democracy - civil society as a term is useful. 
Moreover, civil society is an important area of empirical inquiry, only if just in 
response to the political and academic saliency of the term. Keane (1998) 
succinctly encapsulates the continued purchase of civil society:
Rather the language of civil society is used to develop an explanatory 
understanding of a complex socio-political reality by means of theoretical 
distinctions, empirical research and informed judgement about its origins, 
patterns of development and (unintended) consequences. (Keane, 
1998:37)
The notion of difference in defining civil society can be taken one step 
further as the majority of contemporary civil society theorists, like their 
forefathers, view civil society as being part of a normative idea. Many 
approaches now however do separate out different normative conceptions of civil 
society as shaped by different theories, recognising civil society's partiality (for 
example Baker, 1998; Barber, 1998; Cahoone, 2002; Hanberger, 2001; Wiarda 
2003). There are different stresses on what civil society should be and is which 
gives rise to particular normative conceptions both implicit and explicit. This 
permits theories to be grouped together in a classification according to their 
perceived philosophical and political orientation and builds upon the work of 
Barber (1998), Baker (1998) and Chambers and Kymlicka (eds.)(2002), who 
similarly classify different civil society perspectives. Classification acts as a 
means to define and evaluate different civil society projects/conceptions. By
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combining different typologies and making a more rigorous explanation of their 
subjectivity, various forms of civil society are created. These are outlined below:
• Communitarians:
They are concerned with the common good of the community. Civil society 
is the site that binds the community together.
• Neoliberals/libertarians:
Freedom/liberty for the individual hi all areas of life is the central premise of 
this position.
• Liberal egalitarians:
Equality rather than liberty of individuals is the concern here. Civil society 
needs to encourage civic virtue so that all are equal.
• New left:
The key elements are social justice and the prevention of domination. Civil 
society provides the means to do this through tolerance, pluralism, holding 
no particular moral philosophy, or deliberated discourse.
• Radicals (the most heterogeneous):
These theorists place a similar emphasis on social justice, as above, with 
more weight on the economic aspects of social justice. They either question 
the ability of civil society to deliver social justice, or advocate redistribution 
and intervention in civil society, or call for an entirely new system.
From this typology, it is evident in these different conceptions of civil society 
that certain elements of civil society will be elevated and others demoted or 
excluded. For example, intolerant civil society, (such as religious 
fundamentalists), will not help to achieve the aims of a new left civil society. It 
is recognised that these conceptions are ideal types and theories may straddle 
some of these normative positions, hi reality conceptions of civil society need 
not clearly belong to a particular ideal type, but these conceptions will act as a 
rudimentary instrument to facilitate discussion of how formal political 
institutions involved in the Wales-EU political process understand and delineate 
civil society. Theorists recognise that the way civil society is used is selective, 
as "the groups that are singled out as shaping the nature of civil society will
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depend on theoretical commitment" (Post and Rosenblum, 2002:4) and this in 
turn creates boundaries of inclusion/exclusion of what is in, or out, of civil 
society.
Some of the other themes emerging from the contemporary civil society 
literature include a greater scepticism/realism towards civil society (Wiarda, 
2003). A corollary of this trend is that writers such as Keane (1998: chapter six), 
Whitehead (1997) and Chambers and Kopstein (2001) give attention to the bad, 
uncivil components of society. Indeed, Warren (2001) and Fung (2003) 
demonstrate the importance of looking at different types of association within 
civil society, rather than using the simplified maxim that all associations are 
good. Greater recognition of the role/need of the state in organising civil society 
is evident (for example Chandoke, 2001, 2005:56; Edwards and Foley, 2001: 13; 
Walzer, 1995b), rather than viewing civil society as a realm simply outside of the 
state. Finally, civil society as a universal project is questioned and the 
significance of context in shaping civil society (Mohan, 2002) and civil society's 
temporal specificity is acclaimed today (Jenkins, 2001:251; Post and Rosenblum,. 
2002:1).
hi summary, contemporary debates on civil society have some overlap 
with the questions posed by historical theorists. Other themes in the current 
literature point to a more sceptical audience on the promise of civil society, with 
research delving into uncivil society and starting to identify the roles of different 
parts of civil society. The universalism of civil society is also challenged, 
permitting a typology of key normative uses of civil society to be derived. The 
context within which civil society actually operates, together with conceding the 
influence of the state towards shaping civil society is another latent trend within 
civil society studies. The debate on what is civil society does not stop here, 
given that "civil society has both empirical and normative meanings" (Barber, 
1998:12), and that analytical boundaries are also shaped by normative 
considerations. Attention must now be paid to the issue of what is civil society 
in order to explore the effects of normative considerations and to research civil 
society empirically.
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Civil society's external boundaries
Civil society's external boundaries are set out in relation to the state and the 
economy and latterly sometimes in relation to the family and a political sphere. 
Currently there is a consensus of sorts, particularly in empirical studies, which 
Anheier (2004:20) evokes: that civil society is not state, nor economic, and 
usually not familial:
... a perception of individuals squeezed between the Scylla of the state 
and the Charybdis of corporations, (Lomasky, 2002:51)
This conception admits that in practice all of these perimeters do overlap and yet 
they are understood to be analytically distinct. This has not always been the 
case, which the historical twists and turns of "civil society" aptly demonstrate. 
Indeed, some of the normative approaches outlined above deviate from this view, 
and they diverge on the extent of civil society's inter-dependence and the 
rationale for viewing state, civil society, economy, family and political spheres 
as distinct entities. These divergences will now be discussed.
Cohen and Arato (1994), on the new left perspective, unfold a complex 
model where civil society is the third realm between the state and the economy, 
with a mediating sphere operating in and between all three institutions. Civil 
society is situated in the reproduction of the structural differentiation of the 
cultural-linguistic lifeworld and between public and private spheres. The state 
and civil society are separate to both conserve civil society's critical potential 
and at the same time to enable the state to implement change championed by 
civil society. The state guarantees law, but this is agreed and validated in civil 
society. Similarly, for Chambers (2002), state and economics are separate from 
civil society because of their competing logics of power and money, which 
otherwise could colonise the lifeworld and block communication.
Liberal egalitarians reinforce civil society's independence from the state 
as the state uses non-voluntary means of compulsion, unlike civil society. At the 
same time they recognise that the state creates the framework for civil society 
and may need to intervene in civil society to realise goals and to minimise 
inequality Walzer (2002:35, 49). Walzer (2002) includes marketplace 
associations and companies, but it is questionable to what extent these are
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voluntary and non-coercive, given that people's wellbeing is incorporated with 
them and membership is not necessarily voluntary.
Libertarians/neo-liberals call for the state to be curtailed as it is expansive 
and limits liberty, although some government is needed to stop anarchy. Civil 
society is a realm of freedom and is only limited by minimal, negative rights 
upheld by the state. This perspective includes the market and forms of economic 
association in civil society, arguing that liberalism does not decide which kinds 
of association are better than others (Lomasky, 2002). In neo-liberal approaches, 
civil society is seen as a necessary precondition for the current market order (see 
Fukuyama, 1995), thereby arguably subordinating civil society to the needs of 
the market.
Radicals such as Laclau (2000) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) believe 
that society cannot be separated from the state because state-civil society 
relations is uneven and particular and they are integrated through hegemony and 
neither the state nor civil society are homogenous. They do not discuss the 
economy, suggesting it may be subsumed into civil society, as they perceive that 
the "distinctions public/private civil society/political society are only the result of 
a certain type of hegemonic order" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:185). Moreover, 
as Little (2002) and Cox (2003) call for a different economic order to emerge 
from civil society, it does appear that the two may be intertwined. Nevertheless, 
the fact that they refer to entities of state, civil society and the economy means 
that they must have some analytic utility through being distinct from each other.
Communitarians view civil society in contradistinction to the state:
... civil society describes the associations in which we conduct our lives, 
and that are our existence to our needs and initiatives rather than to the 
state. (Dahrendorf, 1998:81)
According to Etzioni (1997, 2000), the state needs to be limited, reducing its 
coercion through rights, and civil society should instead set the moral tone 
through sanctioning certain kinds of behaviour and moral suasion. Taylor 
(1995) also puts forward a persuasive case, shared by Etzioni (2004), that 
deliberations in civil society should direct state activities. The economy is far 
less obvious in communitarian accounts, although work seems to be a key part of 
the communitarian agenda. Taylor (1995) includes the market economy whereas
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Hollenbach (1995) and Spragens Jr (1995) separate civil society from the 
economy.
Some theorists (Himmelfarb, 2000) now include the family in their 
conception of civil society, responding to feminists' concerns that women's 
"public and private statutes are inextricably linked" (Rosenblum, 2002:152) and 
the fact that family forms in the West are more fluid and easier to choose. 
However, families are never entirely free and constitute a special set of 
emotional ties bound up in kinship, myth and economics, and many theorists still 
leave the family out of civil society. Consistent with this argument, the family 
will be left out of this examination of civil society.
Cohen and Arato (1994) also outline a political society where the state 
interacts with civil society, viewing deliberation as taking place between these 
two in political parties, electoral mechanisms and state's legislatures. This may 
also be useful in describing civil society.
Towards a definition of civil society
Thus, civil society approaches again diverge on where to locate civil society on a 
macro level. The reasoning for this and the nature of relationships between 
barriers is partly shaped through normative commitments. Whilst these 
differences have been outlined in order to operationalise civil society and 
empirically study it, the research will focus on civil society as non-state, non- 
economic and non-familial interaction. This functional definition allows 
exploration into what is distinct about civil society, whilst recognising that there 
is some overlap between these spheres. However, where the economy protrudes 
civil society in the form of representative associations, whilst not being strictly 
profit-making these associations will be understood as economic society13 and 
therefore will be part of the ensuing discussion. Nonetheless, the different 
stances taken by institutions and theories as to where civil society resides with 
respect to the state and the economy will be discussed in the rest of the thesis. 
Still to be resolved is what are constituent parts of civil society and what can be 
taken to be a unit of analysis.
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The unit of analysis for civil society
Theoretical approaches understand civil society broadly as a societal realm 
whereas empirical research on civil society usually focuses on Civil Society 
Organisations (for example Blair, 2004; Yishai, 2003). Nonetheless there are 
some studies that look at the overall health of civil society and social capital, 
instead looking at structural macro indicators, (for instance Beetham et al., 
2002a, use this approach to analyse civil society's contribution to a country's 
democracy). The associational/organisational aspect of civil society similarly is 
usually elevated in theoretical discussions. What different authors elevate as key 
civil society components will now be discussed.
Taylor (1995:185) emphasises the voluntary association of civil society, 
whereas other approaches (Cohen and Arato, 1994:492; Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985) underscore new social movements as the pivotal components of civil 
society. Communities are also understood to be part of civil society. However, 
as many of these communities are created through associations (Hollenbach, 
1995), this will not be used as the unit of analysis. The public sphere/media is 
another component of civil society and also has not been subject to much 
empirical inquiry under the auspices of civil society-EU connections, although 
research is beginning to emerge (see Porta, 2003). What all these approaches 
and parts of civil society have in common is that they view civil society as a site 
of possible interaction. This study will therefore study civil society by using 
CSOs, as organisations bring together one or more individuals to interact. 
Secondly, it will focus on CSOs over other alternatives because these cover a 
whole gambit of interacting social life, whereas social movements are largely 
sectional in nature and only compromise some sectors. Thirdly, the European 
Union discusses civil society in terms of its organisational components and it is a 
tried and used unit of analysis.
This section has demonstrated that different conceptions of civil society 
exist today and have existed in the past. These conceptions have a normative 
component, which has enabled five separate ideal type conceptions of civil 
society to be discerned. The conceptions also have different views of where civil 
society lies externally and to a lesser extent internally. This means that it is 
important to view civil society as a "Heinz 57" political term, subject to different 
theoretical shapes and forms. The various conceptions of civil society will be
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important in subsequent chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six in particular) in 
order to understand how different institutions and actors construct the term. 
Another important theme is the recognition that the state is the key in shaping 
civil society and this will be returned to in later chapters. However, as an 
analytic concept civil society will be understood as resting between the state, 
the economy and the family, and will be explored through Civil Society 
Organisations.
Civil society's re-emergence in political theory and in governance has 
been bound up with concerns about democracy (Baker, 1998). Thus it is to civil 
society's democratic potential that the chapter now turns. A preliminary 
sidetrack into democracy is the first imperative. This will reveal that democracy, 
like civil society, is a problematic theory and term. These different democratic 
understandings are similarly important for analysing civil society's contribution 
to democracy:
The various notions of civil society and democracy are inter-related: one 
notion of civil society makes a certain notion of democracy. (Hanberger, 
2001:222)
DEMOCRACY: DEBATE AND DEFINITIONS
Currently, as Dahl (1989:213) point outs, "democracy" has widespread appeal 
across the globe. This dominance transcends all shades of the political spectrum 
in the search to secure governmental legitimacy,14 (Held, 1987). Thus 
democracy is rendered as amorphous and in danger of coming to stand for 
everything and therefore nothing (Satori, 1987:4). The various uses of 
democracy as a real and ideal value and procedure and way of life, and as a way 
of peacefully choosing leaders, exacerbate this latent tension. Different theorists 
separate out different strands of democratic thinking; for example Held (1987) 
identifies eight ideal types which include for example, participatory and 
representative democracy.
The key debate or cleavage in democratic theory has been between 
normative views of democracy; viewing democracy as an ideal to aspire to (as 
used by Crouch, 2004), juxtaposed with the view of democracy as it is in 
contemporary "democratic" systems (for illustration of this debate see Lively, 
1975; Mansbridge, 1988; Wintrop, 2000). Running the risk of simplification, the
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former emphasises democracy as active participation beyond periodic voting and 
usually as a set of ideal democratic norms. The latter focuses on democracy as 
procedures for the effective running of power based on empirical observations of 
political systems (Schumpeter, 1944). The basic conditions for this minimal 
democracy are identified by Dahl (1989) in polyarchy, these are described in 
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Institutions of polyarchy
Institutions of Polyarchy
Elected Officials
Right to run for office
Associational autonomy





Following on from Arblaster (1987) and Manent (2003:114) the key 
premise of both of these positions can be found in "the idea of popular power, of 
a situation in which power, and perhaps authority too rests with the people" 
(Arblaster, 1987:8). This gives rise to a concern with equality, so that the people 
broadly speaking are equal in the exercise of that power. Some liberty is 
similarly desirable in order that people are free to exercise power. It also gives 
rise to the need for legitimacy in that the use of political power should arise from 
consent of people and further requires accountability so that people can grant 
theu: consent. Democratic approaches can therefore be seen as divergences 
concerning how best to operationalise and conceptualise the exercise of popular 
power in the face of empirical and theoretical challenges.
The representative democracy approach appears to be under sustained 
criticism following dissatisfaction with current systems of democracy. 
Symptoms of dissatisfaction can be found in declining voter turnouts and the rise 
of many alternative approaches that seek to supplement or supplant 
representative democracy (for example Dryzek 2000; Hirst 2002). Of particular 
interest are deliberative democracy, radical democracy and associational 
democracy. All of these approaches take issue with increasing pluralism in civil 
societies of advanced democracies and call for more citizen participation.
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Associative democracy has many crossovers with liberal representative 
accounts. Working upon the premise that democratic states are losing 
effectiveness and legitimacy through a failure to deliver goods (Hirst, 2002: 411- 
412), legitimacy and effectiveness are restored by mainly voluntary associations 
providing for different welfare needs and by decentralising the state (Bader, 
2002:1, 2). Deliberative democracy perspectives are more in line with 
participatory civic republican views and focus on the educative aspects of 
deliberation. Deliberation endows citizens with the critical capacities to realise 
their own interests and accommodate others.
Arguably, deliberative democracy is "not a proper 'model of democracy' 
at all but only an ingredient of one" (Squires, 2002:133-134). Accordingly, 
Habermas (1998) views deliberative democracy as rational deliberation in the 
public sphere, supplementing liberal representative democracy. The idea is that 
through informal public spheres, public opinion is forged through reasoned 
discussion in those spheres and this will then be transmitted onwards to 
institutional will formation (i.e. parliaments/assemblies) via elections. Dryzek 
(2000) outlines another, more critical kind of deliberative democracy in response 
to criticisms raised towards deliberative democracy that does not treat all 
participants equally (Miller, 2002). The deliberative approach has, in particular, 
been popular amongst scholars of EU democracy (for example Cohen and Sabel, 
1997). Finally, radical democracy calls for "a hegemony of democratic values" 
(Mouffe, 2001:526) across spheres based on pluralism, made possible by 
different antagonistic particular struggles against inequality recognising their 
equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). To conclude, the extent to which 
participation is open will be important for realising the political equality function 
of democracy.
This discussion has demonstrated changes in democratic thought and a 
myriad of democratic standpoints. With this in mind, this thesis will seek to 
explore the effects for democracy of civil society's involvement/non- 
involvement in policy-making, by recognising the spectrum of democratic 
positions. This move is further warranted as the different formal political 
institutions involved in structuring civil society's involvement understand and 
deploy the concept multifariously, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four. Not 
forgetting that different democratic models accord civil society with different
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roles (Fung, 2003) provides another rationale for illumination later in this chapter 
and thesis.
The European Union's democratic deficit
In the first instance, the EU's democratic deficit must be considered, so that the 
nature of the problem can be understood in relation to the vaunted solution: civil 
society. Given that the democratic benchmark for the EU varies with the type of 
democracy at hand (Grande, 2000; Karlsson, 2001), there are four main ways of 
conceptualising the EU's democratic deficit, 15 which are summarised below:




Lack of scrutiny, accountability and representativeness of 
institutions/procedures.
Demos No collective identity between members, or sense of 
belonging
• No deficit EU as an inter-governmental organisation. Democracy rests 
with the member states.
Participation Lack of opportunities for citizen participation/deliberation
In the standard perspective, as Katz (2001) reveals, the problem is that 
the European Parliament (EP) is the only elected EU institution, yet it has few 
powers. Its representatives are also voted on national platforms, rather than truly 
European ones (Katz, 2001). The European Commission, the initiator and 
monitor of European legislation, suffers from a legitimacy deficit as its members 
are civil servants and appointees by the national governments. The main 
decision-making body - the Council of Ministers - consists of national 
representatives but conducts most of its meetings in secret, thereby 
compromising its accountability (Karlsson: 2001:64-66). The standard 
democratic deficit argument rests upon a procedural, representative 
understanding of democracy and, as Karlsson (2001:27) argues, it is predicated 
upon a model of democracy compatible with nation-states. The deficit is one of
50
disconnection, lack of effective scrutiny and accountability rather than 
participation. Solutions focus on improving representation by the EP and on 
output legitimacy.
However, Moravisck (2003) believes that the EU does not have a 
democratic deficit. He argues that the democratic benchmarks used to evaluate 
the EU are Utopian and that adequate accountability, limited powers and checks 
and balances keep the EU under democratic control. However, his analysis is 
weak when refuting the need for active citizens, resorting to comparing citizen 
activity to parliamentary debate (this seems inappropriate in light of citizen 
activity in many other arenas) and stipulating that people would simply not get 
involved. He thereby sides-steps the important issue of needing to get involved 
by looking at the barriers to and the likelihood of citizen participation.
The demos perspective argues that any democracy needs its citizens to 
view themselves as a collective, enabling a harmonious aggregation of interests 
(or common good):
Without any form of demos there will always be democratic deficits 
(Zurn, 2000:98)
Common identity is lacking in the absence of a common European language, 
media and history all of which mitigate against the creation of a public sphere 
allowing people to communicate, understand and recognise each other's views 
(Greven, 2000). Seidentop (2000) and Habermas (2002) both propose solutions 
to the lack of a demos. Seidentop (2000) views a European identity as possible 
with English being the lingua franca and having a moral common identity in 
liberal Kantiansim and Christian ancestry. However, this is likely to alienate 
many of Europe's citizens, as the furore over inserting a reference to God into 
the failed European constitution shows. Habermas (2002) instead argues for a 
post-national democracy where people consciously shift their loyalties to the EU. 
The failed constitutional referendum shows that this still requires some 
motivation for citizens to make this happen.
The final perspective on the deficit, and one of the most recent 
(Smismans, 2003:473), is that the EU citizens have little opportunity to 
participate directly in European affairs or to deliberate on European affairs 
(Nentwich, 1996) and this exacerbates the sense of disconnection from the EU
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project (symptomatic in the failure of some EU national referendums and low 
election turnout). This perspective overlaps with Magnette's (2003a) view of the 
deficit as one of governance. Ultimately it rests on the idea that the EU is not yet 
a superstate, not simply an inter-governmental organisation and therefore 
existing modes of representative democracy designed for nation states are not 
appropriate for a polycentric organisation; Warleigh (2003:2) refers to this as the 
"functional-ideational gap". Instead, representative democracy must be 
supplemented by participatory democracy (Berger, 2004:1) - which entails 
greater public participation and deliberation - although some perspectives view 
this as eventually aiding aspects of a European demos. The EU institution's 
recent desire to embrace civil society (De Schutter, 2002) means this model has 
application to the EU. It highlights input legitimacy (Michalowitz, 2004:146) 
which rests more easily with democracy understood as popular control of power, 
but also highlights that the political and democratic side of integration has not 
kept apace with economic integration (Habermas, 2002; Seidentop, 2000). Civil 
society is seen as part of the solution to this deficit, with some accounts still 
calling for reform to the EU institutions (Warleigh, 2003).
Explicit and implicit in many of these discussions is that it is European 
civil society that is meant to reconnect the citizens (e.g. Rumford, 2003). Yet 
there are some caveats to this in that national/regional/local civil society can sit 
alongside and does constitute a "European" civil society (Armstrong, 2002:113). 
Moreover, meaningful civil society interaction must also occur at the lower 
levels of civil society for Europeanisation and citizen participation to occur, as 
the polity must come from below (Chryssochoou, 2000:228). Indeed, as Reale 
argues the "participatory model is conceived as a bottom-up, rather than a top- 
down model" (Reale, 2003:3). Thus, this study proposes to explore an under- 
researched area: that of EU-civil society interaction from a regional 
vantagepoint.
Crucially, the state of the EU's democracy is inter-dependent with 
democracy at the Member State:
National and European democracy problems exacerbate each other. On 
the one hand, the democratic deficit within the European Union is rooted 
in pre-existing problems at the national level. On the other hand, the
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undemocratic nature of European governance has been said to 'pervert' 
the functioning of our national democracies. (Verhoeven, 2002:59)
Given that there is widespread alienation from politics nationally and the EU 
cedes sovereignty and democratic control away from the nation state, this 
situation can be said to occur. Indeed, in the UK generally and in Wales 
specifically, civil society is also advocated as part of the solution to waning 
democracies. Therefore, a study that seeks to explore the EU's democratic 
deficit must also explore civil society activity across these inter-dependent levels 
to consider how national/regional dimensions may affect civil society's 
democratic potential. Evaluation of the EU's democratic deficit from the 
vantagepoint of one Member State admitedly limits the completeness of any 
evaluation. On the other hand, by taking into account member state/regional 
dynamics it will help fill a gap in the literature, which concentrates on exploring 
the democratic deficit from the Brussels level.
In summary, the EU's democratic deficit varies in focus depending on the 
criteria of democracy used. There are arguably democratic deficits which are 
procedural, institutional, demos and participatory in nature. Civil society 
appears as part-solution for the last perspective on the EU's democratic deficit. 
However, even within this account it is not understood as a cure-all. This 
suggests that the role that civil society can play in aiding democracy within EU 
governance is limited. The democratic role played by civil society in the EU has 
been under-researched from the regional perspective. This lacuna needs to be 
remedied because of the inter-dependence of democracy among levels of 
European governance and to explore the extent to which European participation 
has spread to the grassroots. Now the chapter must turn to the means by which 
civil society can aid democracy.
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY
The connections between civil society and democracy
Civil society's re-emergence cannot be seen in isolation from the state of 
democratic play in advanced and emerging democratic systems. The Central 
Eastern European revolutions endorsed civil society as the key agent for
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democratic change and advanced democracies advocate civil society as the 
solution to ailing representative democratic systems. This suggests that the two 
concepts of civil society and democracy are closely intertwined. However, as 
Torpe (2003:330) comments, how civil society actually aids democracy needs 
further empirical research. Indeed, different democratic theories accord more or 
less space to civil society. Therefore, it is important to explore the way in which 
different civil society and democratic theories view civil society's democratic 
role. This section will also argue, and this was touched upon previously, that 
CSOs must be examined both individually and collectively in order to assess 
their democratic role within/outside of policy-making. A discussion of the 
external democratic role that civil society can play in policy-making will serve as 
a means to explore civil society's actual role within the EU policy-making 
process. An examination of groups' democratic functions outside of any policy- 
making role is further warranted since the EU and increasingly British and Welsh 
institutions now subject CSOs to appraisals of internal democratic characteristics 
before a seat at the policy table is given. Moreover, civil society's democratic 
role in policy-making is also conditioned by other democratic factors, not just by 
the extent/shape of involvement or non-involvement in policy-making.
Employing an approach used by Hanberger (2001) and Fung (2003), this 
author shall now outline how different democratic and civil society approaches 
conceive of civil society. Elite democrats have little to say on how civil society 
contributes to governance, bar viewing civil society as consisting of ruling 
groups which are perpetuated in government. Schumpeter (1944:283), by 
viewing human nature as irrational and easily manipulated, questions the need 
for greater citizen participation in any case. However, Mosca endows civil 
society with the capacity to check expansive government by taking on some of 
its functions (Wintrop, 2000:37). Neoliberals/libertarians echo this perspective 
with freedom of association being the central ingredient of civil society and 
democracy. Active participation is not needed as to force it would be 
undemocratic and civil society is free from state control (Lomasky, 2002). Thus, 
civil society is meant to be largely voluntary and to play a minimal role in 
democratic governance.
More procedural accounts of representative democracy view civil society 
as a means to extend people's representation, to put relevant issues on the agenda
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and mediate public opinion to policy-makers (Dahl, 1989; Held, 1987). Other 
accounts of representative democracy, following Tocqueville, view Civil Society 
Organisations as important for active citizenship. The basic premise put forward 
by Putnam (1993:87-90) is that democratic institutions need to be complemented 
by social capital that spurs on civil engagement, tolerance, reciprocity and trust 
to make a civic community. Civil society, notably vibrant voluntary 
associations, generates and self-sustains these attributes of their members. This 
perspective has been criticised by several accounts for ignoring other kinds of 
organisations and institutions, over-emphasising the good aspects of association, 
that there are other mechanisms more important for civic socialisation and for 
downplaying the social economic status of participants (Malonely, 1999; 
Mistzal, 2001; Rofiteutscher, 2002). Thus, civil society enables civic 
socialisation and creates solidarity.
Putnam's views have some crossover with liberal egalitarian and 
communitarian perspectives of civil society, for liberal egalitarians' civil society 
is a school of citizenship that encourages public spiritedness, toleration and 
participation (Walzer, 2002:38). This view also concedes that civil society 
consists of inequality and that the democratic state must also try to weed out such 
inequalities. Communitarian perspectives, on the other hand, concentrate on the 
solidarity effect of civil society in the community. However, communitarianism 
can be seen as axiomatic to democracy, as it advocates a specific good life, is 
non-voluntary and does not encourage democratic norms (Barber, 1998:22-33).
The more participatory accounts of democracy previously outlined do 
create more space for democracy, for example associative democracy views 
CSOs contributing to self-governance, service provision and increased pluralism. 
Deliberative democracy accords civil society with a range of democratic 
functions including carrying issues to the political realm and providing a space 
for discussion, thereby mediating public opinion from groups to create public 
policy (Habermas, 1998). Civil society is also charged with fostering civic 
dispositions for democracy and producing counter knowledge. This is similar to 
new left views on civil society and democracy, where civil society is the site of 
democracy that aids discourse, educates people into a democratic political 
culture, stops domination and democratises the state, civil disobedience and the 
economy, and shapes and is guaranteed by law. However, civil society must be
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internally democratic and needs egalitarian institutions to work. New leftists 
understand civil society as complementary to representative democracy (Cohen 
and Arato, 1994:412). Radical approaches to civil society and democracy 
similarly want to increase democracy through all spheres but are less 
comfortable with the representative model of democracy. Civil society 
facilitates self-management (Baker, 1998:199) and participation, and provides a 
counter-hegemonic balance, making political decisions through dissent and 
deliberation (Mouffe, 1993).
Thus, we can see the various approaches to democracy give different 
space to civil society, particularly in regards to civil society's relation to the 
state. Moreover, different civil society approaches also have different notions 
and roles for civil society in democracy. Therefore when assessing civil society 
involvement in democracy, one must be attentive to the notion/shape of civil 
society at hand as well as the view of democracy. This author hypothesises that 
the space for civil society involvement in EU policy-making will therefore, in 
part, be conditioned by institutional and actors' views of what is civil society, 
democracy and their inter-relationship. This will be the subject of analysis in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. It is also evident that civil society is accorded a 
range of democratic effects from individual skills to governance. However, 
many of these effects are inter-related, in that one necessitates the other. 
Moreover, what comes through strongly from the above discussion is that civil 
society's relation to the polity/state is the key in shaping democratic relations.
Civil society's democratic contributions in policy-making
Policy-making is one such instance of civil society interaction with the 
polity/state. As stipulated previously, the research focuses on this area as this is 
the site where the European Commission claims to embrace civil society. The 
input of civil society in policy-making is also central to this idea of a more 
participatory democracy. Civil society's role in policy-making moreover 
encompasses some of the public debate functions and socialisation of individuals 
accorded to civil society in democratic theory. Groups give individuals the skills 
to participate in policy-making and also contribute loosely to policy-making 
through shaping public opinion and the issues on the agenda, as well as actively 
interacting with political institutions to create policy.
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Civil society and state relations in matters such as policy-making have 
been analysed through democratic theories of interest groups: pluralism and 
corporatism. These will now be explored with discussion of their democratic 
implications together with other democratic functions given to civil society in 
policy-making and the limits/problems of civil society in policy-making.
Issues abound over what corporatism and pluralism actually mean. The 
former term came into academic prominence in the 1970s with the failure of 
pluralism to account adequately for civil society-state relations (Grant, 1985:1). 
Taking its basis from inter-dependent governmental co-operation with peak 
business and trade union organisations, corporatism's definition and usage has 
expanded according to the subject at hand. Schmitter (1979) articulates this 
traditional definition: 16
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberative representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange from observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supporters. (Schmitter, 1979:13)
Similarly important is that groups in corporatist arrangements are involved in 
decision-making and that this is a process of exchange with the state (Cawson, 
1985:6-7). On the other hand, pluralist accounts, believe there are greater 
numbers of groups involved in the policy process and that this involvement is 
weaker:
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organised into a number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, nonhierachically ordered and self-determined (as to the type 
or scope of interests) categories which are not specifically licensed, 
recognized and subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership 
selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a 
monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. 
(Schmitter, 1979:15)
Thus, corporatism and pluralism can be fruitfully understood as two ends 
of a continuum of civil society-state interaction. Pluralism is seen as an essential 
part of democracy, whereas the democratic credentials of corporatism are less
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well defined. Corporatism, this author would argue, places its "democraticness" 
largely in the hands of output legitimacy, in that effective outcomes as a result of 
corporatist relations justifies the means (similar views are expressed by Cawson, 
1983:179). However, as Dahl and Lindbolm (1976:508) point out, large 
corporatist organisations do not represent the interests of everybody, and in big 
post-industrial, complex societies, national interests cannot be defined by a few 
organisations (Eriksen, 1990). Cawson (1983) alternatively argues for 
corporatist groups to "encourage widespread participation in their internal 
decision-making" (Cawson, 1983:183), aiding input legitimacy. Corporatism 
also reduces the importance of parliamentary representatives in making 
decisions. However, as Grant (1985:27) and Haddow (2002:69) point out, at 
least it does allow for some citizen participation in policy-making, and therefore 
aids some input legitimacy.
Pluralism, on the other hand, provides both input legitimacy and output 
legitimacy. Pluralism is seen as a key part of democracy, particularly in 
American accounts (Wiarda, 2003). hi this perspective, groups help citizens 
achieve their goals by maximising preferences in policy-making and institutional 
openness, which means marginalised views can be taken into account (Held, 
1987:191; Michalowitz, 2002:39). However, in practice democracy does not 
operate like that since there are imbalances between groups in terms of resources 
and influence (Held, 1987:195).
Neither of these approaches was designed to test the ideal of democracy, 
yet they provide another useful heuristic device for exploring civil society-state 
interaction and understanding the different effects for democracy. The key 
aspects in separating out the two perspectives are found both at the policy- 
making level and at a group level. For the former, access and openness of 
political institutions shapes the degree of inclusion/exclusion. The kind of 
participation - whether simply consultation or decision-making - also helps to 
separate the corporatist-pluralist dynamics. Finally, the numbers and types of 
actors (in how do they fare in internal democracy/membership participation and 
independence from the state) are also important. Nonetheless, as Michalowitz 
(2002:41) argues, these approaches have limited utility for exploring the EU 
context, since the EU is not a state. However, as the EU has "state-like 
institutions" these can serve as the site for exploring civil society-state relations
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at the EU level. Michalowitz (2002) also argues that pluralist and corporatist 
civil society-EU relations occur at different points and times in the EU policy- 
making process. This research is sensitive to these differences but pluralism and 
corporatism will provide a rudimentary device for exploring civil society-state 
relations more generally, outside of individual policy sectors.
Civil society can more broadly contribute to democracy in a range of 
ways through policy-making. Civil society groups can represent interests, 
thereby conveying to government the intensity of public opinion on an issue or 
representing the views of the marginalised. Civil society, as previously stated, 
could also keep government in check and scrutinise policy, ensuring policy is 
relevant to people's needs. Groups similarly provide information, resources and 
in some cases increase the legitimacy of policy by including the voices of those 
directly affected. CSOs can also contribute to public debate and mediate public 
debate on policy issues and be a site of resistance. Civil society can participate in 
consultation or even decision-making and implementation of policies and as 
Cooke (2002) argues, participation in policy-making can also lead to increasing 
the rationality and fairness of outcomes. The extent that democratic theories 
view civil society's involvement in policy-making as important depends on 
where they reside on the participatory-representative continuum and whether 
democracy in part requires output and/or input legitimacy. Moreover, it also 
depends on how theories perceive the nature of civil society groups, to which the 
chapter now turns.
Indicators of Civil Society Organisations' democratic contributions
The forms, purposes and memberships of associations determine the 
extent to which they make these various contributions to democracy. 
(Fung, 2003:517)
The earlier discussions on civil society theory and democracy highlighted that 
different groups have different democratic effects and contributions. This 
reasoning underwrites Warren's (2001) theoretical study into how associations 
contribute to democracy, making it worthwhile to describe Warren's study. 
Warren (2001) argues that broad assumptions on how associations contribute to 
democracy are meaningless. Instead he conceptualises a middle-range theory of 
how different associations may further radical democracy. 17 He defines
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associations along their ease of exit, their medium and also their constitutive 
goods. Constitutive goods are understood to comprise the status of the 
association, interpersonal identity, individual material, exclusive group identity 
and inclusive social and public material. In other words, to what extent does the 
group bring material benefits and shape identities with respect to the rest of the 
polity? This allows him to trace associations' democratic effects in terms of 
individual development, public sphere and institutions. He also looks at the 
extent to which different logics (money, power and social) are present in the 
associations, but this ignores the structural context (for example the 
attitude/relations with political institutions) that can constrain civil society's 
contribution; this must also be alluded to.
Following from Warren (2001), and by gathering the key 
characteristics/democratic roles attributed to civil society across approaches, it is 
possible to look at individual groups' democratic contributions. This allows a 
comparison of the "democraticness" of the groups involved/not involved in the 
EU policy-making process. The extent to which groups are voluntary also needs 
to be explored, for some perspectives only see voluntary groups as capable of 
democracy. Functions and goals must also be looked at to see whether groups 
are uncivil and because their goals will affect their types of democratic 
contribution, if any. By looking at groups' membership it will be possible to 
gauge whether civil society groups can give voice to the marginalised and 
whether bonding social capital is occurring. The extent to which 
members/stakeholders participate in a given group is important to a group's 
accountability and legitimacy and for its representativeness and whether 
individual members' civic and political skills are being created. By examining 
the internal democratic credentials of an organisation this will identify whether 
the structures are in place for the organisation to be accountable and have 
legitimacy. The extent of internal and external deliberation will also be 
addressed to explore whether individual skills and public sphere effects are being 
created such as reflection, tolerance and critical faculties. Finally, the wider 
context that the environment the CSO is operating in, must be investigated to 
delve into the extent to which the borders between the group and/or the economy 
are porous, determining its independence and its critical capacity to hold
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government to account. This can be ascertained through a group's resources, its 
orientation and funding.
Civil Society Organisations' democratic indicators:
• Functions and goals
• Internally democratic
• Internal and external deliberation
• Member/stakeholder participation
• Member status
• Resources and independence
• Voluntarism
By looking at these aspects together it should be possible to help discern whether 
civil society can and is contributing to the EU's democracy via involvement/non- 
involvement in EU policy-making, whilst recognising that not all approaches 
assume civil society's involvement in policy-making is positive for democracy:
If we can develop a good account of the associational ecology of the 
developed liberal democracies, we should be able to predict what kind of 
adjustments, inducements, laws, policies, movements, and other forces 
might, in aggregate, be good for democracy. (Warren, 2001:13-14)
There are of course different ways to assess civil society's democratic 
contributions. Some use macro indicators such as the freedom of the media 
(Beetham et al., 2002) or for example levels of associational membership (Torpe, 
2003). However, the unit of analysis here is the Civil Society Organisation - thus 
it makes sense to assess the democraticness of the organisations involved not 
involved in policy-making than the wider sphere of civil society. Democratic 
assessments based on organisations do exist (for example, Blair, 2004) and 
whilst these tend to focus on one or two indicators (for example, Taylor and 
Warburton focus on legitimacy), for the sake of democratic completeness and not 
privileging one type of democracy over another this study uses six.
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CONCLUSION
Concepts of civil society (including discussions of boundaries and norms) have 
varied throughout history. This has allowed five normative types to be identified 
(communitarians, neoliberals/libertarians, liberal egalitarians, new left and 
radicals). Democracy is also multifarious in meaning, with the key dividing line 
being between participatory and representative types. These different 
interpretations of democracy mean that the EU's democratic deficit similarly has 
no one definition or cause, with civil society offered as only part of one solution. 
Civil society approaches diverge on the roles of civil society in a democracy and 
different democratic perspectives also accord more or less space and different 
roles to civil society. This means that attention must be paid to the notion and 
shape of civil society deemed to contribute to democracy, and also to the 
democratic notion. As the state is the key in shaping civil society and 
democracy, it was therefore hypothesised that how different actors and 
institutions understand civil society and democracy will shape the space 
accorded to civil society within EU policy-making.
Policy-making encompasses a range of democratic functions that civil 
society can play at the governance, public sphere and individual levels, thus 
attention must be directed towards these as well as basic involvement/non- 
involvement in policy-making. Civil society-state relations in policy-making can 
be explored from the dualistic perspectives of corporatism and pluralism. Each 
perspective has its own democratic strengths and weaknesses; in particular the 
corporatist civil society-state relationship may be problematic for the EU's 
democratic deficit. Corporatism emphasises output legitimacy, whereas the 
participatory paradigm on the EU's deficit highlights the need for input 
legitimacy from civil society. Thus, the extent to which civil society-EU policy- 
making is characterised by, broadly-speaking corporatist or pluralist 
arrangements will provide another indicator of civil society's role in the EU's 
democracy. This discussion also directed the need to explore civil society's 
access to policy-making, the openness of political institutions and the degree of 
inclusion/exclusion as well as the extent of civil society participation in the 
policy process. Indeed, the different organisations and type of actors were 
stressed as important variables. Thus, in order to compare the effects of those 
CSOs included in policy-making, attention must also be paid to the CSOs not
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included in policy-making; to compare and see if the organisations involved are 
contributing to democracy, whether there are any implications of certain 
organisations being left out and again to assess pluralist/corporatist relations.
An important factor in this discussion has been that the role of civil 
society should not be over-valorised. Theorists both old and new have 
questioned civil society's democratic role. This research hopes to add to this 
debate with fresh empirical insights into their inter-relationship through policy- 
making. By recognising the differences in civil society and democracy it is 
hoped that this will also add to a new theoretical framework that recognises the 
conceptual complexity of these terms rather than "a one size fits all" approach. 
This research also seeks to describe civil society's role more generally in EU 
policy-making and to reveal the key factors conditioning that role. Thus, in 
order to fulfil these aims and understand as well as analyse the democratic role 
that civil society plays through EU policy-making - the rest of the broad 




DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: POLICY- 
MAKING, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
There is no one framework for exploring civil society (Fowler, 2004). Given 
civil society's recent return into the academic scene, it is a relatively new and 
multi-disciplinary area of inquiry. The thesis has already drawn upon civil 
society and democratic theory in Chapter Two to explore their inter­ 
relationships. Yet this is not the end of the study's theoretical story, for the 
thesis seeks to place, analyse and explain civil society's role in the EU policy- 
making process. Thus, this chapter will evaluate relevant approaches to civil 
society and policy-making, with a view to their utilisation in this study.
The academic terrain that could potentially guide such an inquiry 
encompasses several disciplines, including policy-making, interest groups and 
European integration. After exploring these standpoints this chapter will argue 
that the POS approach, adapted for the study, provides the necessary organising 
framework to situate, analyse and explain the role of civil society in Wales in EU 
policy-making.
In order to demonstrate the relevance of the Political Opportunity 
Structure, the chapter will first review the literature that either akeady is, or 
could be, used to explore civil society's role in EU policy-making. It will 
elaborate upon contending theories of the policy process, such as policy 
networks and new institutionalism, as well as Europeanisation. The chapter will 
also discuss interest groups approaches and civil society studies and the 
applicability and limitations of these methods to the area of inquiry will be 
assessed. Finally, Political Opportunity Structures - their uses, emergence, key 
elements, limitations and applications to the EU context - will be explored.
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CIVIL SOCIETY, POLICY-MAKING AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
VARIOUS APPROACHES
What approaches can be used to explore the pheonemon under investigation: 
civil society in Wales and European Union policy-making using the case of the 
Convention? This section evaluates some of the approaches and outlines the 
context of the EU polity.
Following increased sub-national activity involvement in EU policy- 
making particularly through structural funds, a new perspective on the EU polity 
emerged - Multi-level governance. MLG views policy-making as diffuse and 
shared among a range of actors (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). MLG is derived 
from observations of EU structural funds, where nation states do not dominate 
policy-making and decision-making competencies are shared by actors below, 
above and outside of the nation-state. In turn, different levels of governance are 
interconnected and the sub-national can interact directly with the supra-national 
bypassing the nation-state. MLG validates this thesis's research area by 
suggesting that sub-national actors can have direct relationships with the EU. 
Moreover, although MLG studies assume the involvement of sub-national actors, 
they tend to concentrate on sub-national authorities overlooking sub-national 
non-governmental actors (George, 2004:122-3), which further warrants more 
research on the latter (for exception see Constantelos, 2004). Equally, MLG 
studies typically focus on matters of low politics, and research into areas of high 
politics such as the Convention, will help explore MLG's broader applicability to 
the gambit of EU policy-making (Jordan, 2001:12). Thus, this thesis can be 
situated against the backdrop of MLG and may help to shed light on the 
existence of MLG outside of sub-national authorities.
Multi-level governance has similarly been used in approaches of 
Europeanisation (see Bache and Marshall, 2004). Europeanisation is the new 
approach towards the study of the EU, that looks at "the impact of European 
integration on Member State policies, practices and politics" (Schmidt and 
Radaelli, 2004:183). This has been applied to interest representation: how the 
EU affects national interest groups (for example Constantelos, 2004; Fairbrass 
and Jordan 2002). Europeanisation studies, however, predominantly focus on 
the effect and the input of the Member State, not on the sub-national component 
part of the Member State (for exception see Constantelos, 2004). Nonetheless,
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Europeanisation requires longitudinal analysis outside of one instance of policy- 
making and thus has limited value to this study, which is focused on the 
Convention.
As Richardson (2001:5) notes, the dominant approach to EU policy- 
making and indeed the role of groups within that approach, has been the policy 
network/community perspective. In policy networks power is dispersed among 
state and non-state actors, who make policy. Networks consist of a limited 
number of inter-dependent actors and they help structure action by setting the 
rules of the game and issues on the agenda (Rhodes, 1997:9-11). As such, they 
lie outside the formal structure of government (Considine, 2005:126) and tend to 
be issue/sector specific (Marsh, 1998:15). They vary on a continuum from 
policy communities (which are fairly stable, exclusive, have a limited number of 
actors, and participants' identities are likely to change) to issue networks (which 
are more fluid and have a greater number of actors) (see Marsh, 1998:16). 
Policy is made in networks because of actors' inter-dependence and incorporates 
co-operation with "exchange of resources between the actors" (Marsh, 1998:9). 
However, this research seeks to look at civil society groups across a range of 
sectors, which limits the dividends that policy networks can bring to this study.
The most frequently-cited approach to EU policy analysis is the garbage- 
can model. Here three streams of problems, politics and policy can sometimes 
coincide with windows of opportunity and the drive of policy entrepreneurs to 
create change (Richardson, 2001). The three streams refer to the fact that 
problems have to be identified for policy to be created, political events can 
change policy agendas, and policy-making is affected by the method of selecting 
policy (see Winn, 1998:123). Unclear technology, problematic preferences and 
fluid participation characterise this situation of policy-making and as such seem 
to have applicability to the complexity and unpredictability of the EU. The 
garbage-can model seems particularly suitable as to how policy items get on the 
agenda and evolve. However, in this study, which covers a range of policy 
sectors and where the Convention's agenda was already partly pre-determined, 
and which is focused on one type actor - CSOs - the garbage-can model seems 
to be less useful.
Neo-institutionalism has also made much impact in EU studies, 
particularly in relation to institutional adaptation and change (Bulmer et al.,
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2002; Knill, 2001; Pierson, 1996). It has also been applied to policy change and 
policy-making (Hall, 1992; Immergut, 1992). Neo-institutionalism is a vague 
perspective, encompassing several sub-types. The key tenet is that "institutions 
matter" (Knill, 2001:20) and institutions are one independent variable that serve 
to structure and control action. However, in neo-institutionalism there is much 
divergence on what an "institution" means. In essence, new institutionalism 
varies from old institutionalism by viewing institutions not only as formal 
organisations but also as compromising informal aspects (Peters, 1999). 
Moreover, there does appear to be consensus that institutions are rule-based. For 
example, Thelen and Stenimo (1992:2) go on to define the institutional context 
as "the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations 
among various branches of government and the structure and organisation of 
economic actors like trade unions".
Institutions affect policy-making as they shape the policy-making setting 
and are not neutral (Warleigh, 2002:7). Institutions also influence actors by 
delimiting power and interests and ideas:
On the one hand, the organization of policy-making affects the power that 
any one set of actors has over the policy outcomes. On the other hand, 
organizational position also influences an actor's definition of his own 
interest, by establishing institutional responsibilities and relationship to 
other actors. (Hall cited by Thelen and Stenimo, 1992:2-3)
Such an approach arguably downplays the role of agency (Warleigh, 2002:8). 
Agency is an issue in the EU context, where there are EU institutions such as the 
European Commission and EP which serve to shape and control behaviour, but 
who are sometimes accorded recognition as institutional actors in their own 
right; which begs the question: when does an institution become an actor? 
Logically extending institutionalism towards society implies that CSOs can 
likewise be construed as institutions, shaping and reinforcing the behaviour of 
their members.
Thus, institutionalism does direct attention to how features of political 
life structure action and, broadly speaking, appear to be useful to this study, 
situating the political institutional context within which civil society groups find 
themselves. However, there are issues over the catch-all nature of 
institutionalism and the ability to apply it fully here. Indeed, scholars like John
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(1998:9) argue that over-theorising frameworks can sometimes detract from 
sound empirical analysis, which can speak for itself. Like empirical 
institutionalists, this thesis believes that institutionalism dividends can be made 
by focusing upon formal political institutions (see the discussion in Peters, 
1999).
However, approaches that explore the role of interest groups, and in 
general policy-making in the EU, similarly outline the rules of the policy-making 
process, the prescribed roles of formal political institutions and consequently the 
power amongst actors (for example, Mazey and Richardson, 1993a), suggesting 
that neo-institutionalism has some weight and is used even if it is not so-called. 
Interest group studies, which highlight the role of groups in relation to the 
political system can be applied to analysis of civil society in policy-making, as 
civil society is partly composed of groups.
Studies of European civil society, or civil society gathered around the 
EU, using civil society as a unit of analysis in its own right, are comparatively 
recent (despite the phenomenon dating back to the European Coal and Steel 
Community: Greenwood, 2003 a), and are mostly of a theoretical nature (for 
example, Machivelli, 2001; Rumford, 2003). Two empirical studies apply 
elements of social movement theory (Lombardo, 2003 and Ruzza, 2004). Ruzza 
(2004) uses frame analysis and political opportunities to analyse European civil 
society as movement advocacy coalitions (MACs) 18 and their impact on policy- 
making. Frames are used examine the fit between institutions and the MACs on 
key issues/actors and to explain social movements' success in policy-making. 
Ruzza (2004) also considers the institutional structure of a policy area, 
movement resources, presence of elite allies and movement institutional- 
interaction in explaining MACs successes. However, as Ruzza's (2004) research 
is based on using three sectoral MACs as case studies, this study explores only 
part of civil society, whereas this thesis intends to explore civil society more 
widely.
This emphasis on framing resonates with another trend evident in policy- 
making analysis, namely that the discursive and ideational can also shape policy 
and involvement (for example Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). It directs attention 
away from purely interest-based approaches to the role that values and concepts 
can play. In the study of the EU, Smismans (2003:474) employs discursive
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institutionalism to explore how EU formal political institutions have "developed 
a discourse on civil society and civil dialogue". Whereas, Schmidt and Radelli 
(2004) understand discursive institutionalism as situating an institutional actor's 
policy discourse on the basis of the institutional setting, i.e. how power is 
organised. Regardless, both approaches view that discourses can shape/reflect 
institutions and in turn the views of then- actors. This perspective is reinforced 
by Ruzza's (2004) evaluation of the POS applied to MACs, when he calls for 
exploration into the fit between institutions and MACs discursively and on their 
civil society perspectives:
In particular it is necessary to analyse the emerging views of civil society 
by the different families of actors as these views shape the 'rules of 
engagement' between MACs and institutions. (Ruzza, 2004:172)
Thus, this perspective gives credence to the hypothesis in Chapter Two 
as to how, in particular, institutions and, in turn, actors understand/articulate civil 
society as a discursive category will partly shape civil society's role in policy- 
making:
In other words, the manner in which the term [civil society] is used 
signals who has the right to participate and exert influence in policy- 
making (and who has not). (Goehring, 2002: 120)
Institutional perspectives will be outlined in Chapter Four and their compatibility 
and effects further tested in Chapters Five and Six.
The academic landscape of EU policy-making and civil society contains a 
range of approaches. This section has striven to outline and evaluate these in 
relation to the research questions. Due to the study's focus on one particular 
instance of policy-making, together with seeking to explore the general context 
of policy-making across a range of sectors, the usual approaches to policy- 
making and networks/communities have less utility here and no one approach 
will neatly serve as a framework. There is, however, much crossover with MLG, 
and MLG further serves to legitimise the study by reinforcing the need for 
additional research into sub-national actors beyond the state. It has also been 
argued that policy analysis has moved away from solely realist, rational-oriented
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explanations and that ideas may play a role. Thus, the thesis will work on a 
"pick-and-mix" premise to outline the phenomenon:
The complexity of the EU policy process means that we must live to 
learn with multiple models and learn to utilise concepts from a range of 
models in order to help us describe it as accurately as possible. 
(Richardson, 2001:23).
This thesis works on the assumption of multi-level governance (i.e. that it is 
possible) and will use discursive institutionalism to explore formal political 
institutions' views on civil society and democracy. Moreover, like all studies of 
the policy process, it will explore policy-making through the role of actors, 
institutions and ideas. Finally, the last approach that investigated civil society 
provides particular dividends as it allows the possibility to explore civil society 
across sectors. However, framing will not be used in this analysis because of the 
indirect nature and non-involvement of some of the civil society groups' studies, 
but it is used in a loose sense to explore the compatibility in conceptions of civil 
society and democracy. Instead, the rest of the chapter will argue that political 
opportunities have particular promise for this study.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Background
The idea of Political Opportunity Structures arose out of the political process 
theory of social movements (MeAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Initially 
applied to new social movements (see Kitschelt, 1986), this perspective viewed 
political conditions as a key factor in explaining the emergence, shape and 
outcomes of collective action across nations:
The central tenet of the political opportunity approach to collective action 
is that mobilisation is not a direct reflection of social structural tensions, 
problems and grievances, but is mediated by the available opportunities 
and constraints set by the political environments in which mobilising 
groups ... operate. (Koopmans, 2004:451)
POS is still used primarily in investigations on social movements, but 
increasingly studies have applied POS to studies of civil society groups, citizen 
participation, policy outcomes, the international context and even inaction
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(Malonely, Smith and Stoker, 2000; Meyer, 2003; Nentwich, 1996; Pickvance, 
2001). The broadening-out of the applicability of POS could be explained by the 
breaking-up of the indistinct conceptual divide between civil society and social 
movements as individual social movement organisations become 
institutionalised. Yet as Marks and McAdam (1996:96-97) point out in relation 
to the EU context, interest groups and social movements both constitute 
challengers and the EU's contested "polity" status means that nation-state 
concepts become less applicable in the EU. This means that the POS could have 
some utility to this study of CSOs.
The POS has been used as an analytical framework and as an explanatory 
concept. However, it alone cannot explain collective action (Koopmans, 
1999:100). Indeed, some scholars supplement analysis with mobilizing structures 
and/or framing processes. Each of these approaches is resource-consuming, and 
as a result McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:7) point out that most analyses 
instead focus on one aspect.
The emphasis on mobilisation structures highlights the role of the social 
movements themselves and their internal organisation as a barrier/facilitator to 
collective action. Joachim (2003) includes international constituency, 
entrepreneurs and experts. However, this author contends that mobilisation 
structures are best thought of as resources at the movement's disposal, which can 
include people, experience and finances. Yet Tarrow (1994) defines 
mobilisation structures much more broadly, including the type of organisation. 
This author argues that wider factors, such as the type of organisation, are more 
appropriately subsumed under a heading of "actor specific", with mobilizing 
structures as a subtype. Kreisi et al. (1995), and Marks and McAdam (1996) 
both highlight such actor specific variables without labelling them as mobilizing 
structures. Indeed, an important realisation by POS theories is that opportunities 
have to be recognised by social movements and can also be created by them 
(Meyer, 2002:15; Marks and McAdam, 1996:120).
Framing processes describe how movements construct meaning and 
articulate issues to the media, public and politicians. This thesis does not 
explicitly explore framing processes as the focus is on groups and the political 
system interaction or inaction in policy-making. Framing processes is an 
approach which is not viable here because Chapters Five and Six demonstrate
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that many groups do not have sustained interaction on a policy with policy- 
makers, nor is this research longitudinal or focused in one sector to explore 
"frame" change. Frame analysis does present an avenue for further civil society 
research.
Key elements of the Political Opportunity Structure
The dimensions of political opportunity vary depending on the question 
one is seeking to answer. (McAdam, 1996:29)
There is no wholehearted consensus on what the concept of POS should contain 
and what are its key explanatory tenets. However, the central element is access; 
how accessible are all the parts of the POS to groups? Tarrow's (1994) 
definition is often taken as the POS definitional departure point. This stresses 
the openness/closure of the political system, the institutional structure, state 
repression, elite alignments, influential allies and elite divisions. As such, it 
includes both stable and dynamic aspects of the POS. Kreisi (1995) repackaged 
Tarrow's definition to incorporate analysis of formal institutional structure of the 
political system, informal procedures and prevailing strategies and configuration 
of power. Applied to this current study, this allows an examination not only into 
the legal/formal set-up of the state hi relation to EU policy-making/Convention, 
but also into the existing relations between groups and the state and the informal 
ways in which policy is made, informed by a discussion of power among the 
actors at different stages of the policy process. Thus, it lends itself more to 
conceptualising civil society's role in policy-making than Tarrow's definition, 
which seeks to explore social movements as challengers who wish to get their 
contested issues onto the political radar.
The study will also incorporate Koopmans' (2004) insight that the POS is 
both institutional and discursive:
The political opportunity structure consists of an institutional side, which 
includes the structure of the political system and the composition of 
power in the party system and a discursive side, which includes 
established notions of who and what are considered sensible and 
legitimate. (Koopmans, 2004:451)
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This premise will be used to inform discussion of the POS relating to existing 
relations between groups and the state, by adding the institutional discourses on 
what they perceive to be civil society and with which CSOs they have policy 
relations. Similarly, as the study encompasses more than one level of 
governance, attention will have to paid as to what extent the different institutions 
are nested in each other; the more integrated they are, the less autonomy they 
have, which "reduces the strength of local actors and limits the range of policy 
alternatives" and affects openness (Meyer, 2003:24). In other words, to what 
extent do the different institutions at the different levels have power to make 
policy independent of each other?
Concern has been aired that POS is an over-malleable concept (Gamson 
and Meyer, 1996:275) and it focuses upon political opportunities that are not 
structural (Rootes, 1997). However, this study separates out the role of civil 
society groups, and by highlighting actor-specific factors suggests that civil 
society can act independently of the POS. Moreover, culture, an important part 
of political opportunity, is kept outside of the POS. Nevertheless, it will feature 
when applicable in the analysis, particularly in how the Welsh media served to 
frame the Convention. Furthermore, structure is very loosely defined from the 
vantage point of a civil society group:
If opportunities are configurations of options, chances, and risks 
originating outside the mobilising group, then, from the point of view of 
the movement, any such opportunities appear as structurally given that 
cannot be influenced - at least not in the foreseeable future - by 
collective action. (Koopmans, 1999:99)
However, in Chapter Six on the Convention there will be a blurring of structure 
and agency, as the institutional and political actors' activities will need to be 
outlined as they affect the political context. Such actions will be subsumed in 
the POS, as they are outside of the group and partly provide the informal ways 
that policy is made, thereby affecting opportunities for groups. It is also 
recognised that groups could have made these opportunities and can affect the 
POS.
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The Political Opportunity Structure framework: a summary
This thesis will utilise the below POS framework in the following chapters:
The Institutional Struc
Includes: legal, formalities "
"
of policy-making power/autonomy of institutions in the policy-making 
process. Some discussion of systemic factors. 
I Informal procedures and prevailing strategies: 
• Includes: patterns of interest group mediation, institutional
conceptions/discourse, informal procedures of policy-making. 
j Informal unstable components: 
' Includes: political alignments, events, adhoc avenues.
Limitations and applications to the European Union level
It has been suggested that the idea of POS has more explanatory power in cross- 
national analysis where the macro/systemic variables of the POS are highlighted. 
Whereas in single case study there is more emphasis on unstable elements and 
the effect of actors needs to be noted, nonetheless, the POS acts as a useful 
organizing strategy for the study. Moreover, the concept of POS is normally 
applied to the national level, yet the presence of some research by Nentwich 
(1996) and Marks and McAdam (1996) demonstrate that it can be used with the 
EU.
Nentwich (1996) focuses on different opportunities for citizen 
participation, generally examining the structural properties of each channel in 
turn. Marks and McAdam (1996) in contrast see EU opportunities towards 
social movements/groups as shaped by the relative structural access groups have 
to EU institutions and policy receptivity of the European Commission to issues 
salient to the group. They also concede that groups have to realise these 
opportunities. Therefore Marks and McAdam (1996) look at the internal 
characteristics of groups and the extent to which they are wedded to the national 
context. Thus, this thesis aligns itself along similar lines to Marks and 
McAdam's analysis, by looking at the opportunities for CSOs' access to the EU 
institutions, recognising the policy specific dynamics and type of policy process
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and finally conceding that the groups themselves may play a role in defining 
their opportunities.
CONCLUSION
Other frameworks for analysing policy-making and the role of civil society in the 
EU proved to be problematic for this study as it covers a range of sectors and 
focuses on one recent event. The study will however draw on some aspects in 
particular discursive institutionalism and MLG in conjunction with the POS .
... the [political] opportunity structure is a context-sensitive tool par 
excellence (Koopmans, 1999:102).
This means the POS is extremely useful in a detailed case study where the 
context is a key part of the analysis. It will act as framework and a explanatory 
tool to compare the difference between how the political context structures 
opportunities for CSOs in policy-making in terms of avenues (access points), 
what are the influential strategies and when should they interact with how CSOs 
actually do interact. Thus, we are able to demonstrate the extent to which their 
actions in policy-making are in part shaped/limited by structures and are 
appropriate. Moreover, as the POS will be used together with analysis of 
individual civil society groups and their mobilizing structures, it allows an 
examination into the importance of actor-specific factors in shaping policy- 
making involvement, helping to alleviate concerns that the POS is over- 
malleable and downplays the role of groups themselves. It is however, 
recognised that the POS could have less explanatory power in this instance 
because of the single case study design. This study has defined the POS so it can 
be appropriately applied to this investigation offsetting some of its weaknesses.
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4
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANISATION'S DEMOCRATIC CONTRIBUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES AND PRACTITIONERS'
VIEWS
This chapter builds upon the literature explored in Chapter Two by further 
investigating the relationship between civil society and democracy in practice. 
As such it will help to identify whether the role of civil society in EU policy- 
making is democratic and what space institutional and practitioners views on 
civil society and democracy create for civil society in EU policy-making. In 
order to do achieve this the chapter will cover three areas:
• An assessment of the democratic contributions of individual CSOs
• Institutional discourses on civil society and democracy
• Practitioners' views on civil society and democracy
ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS' DEMOCRATIC 
CONTRIBUTIONS
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the democratic contributions of civil society 
depend upon the characteristics of each particular CSO. This section will assess 
individual democratic contributions of CSOs using the indicators outlined in 
Chapter Two. The assessment will enable discussion of the contribution that civil 
society groups can and do make by their involvement/non-involvement in EU 
policy-making to democracy. The assessment will also allow further analysis of 
the existance of corporatist or pluralist relations in respect of the type of CSOs 
involved.
Outlining the assessment
It must be stressed at the outset of the chapter that any democratic assessment is 
subject to limitations in that it will be subjective (Beetham, 2004). Moreover, 
rather than assess groups from one particular democratic paradigm, groups will
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be assessed according to an amalgam of indicators that combine the key 
democratic characteristics/contributions accorded to civil society groups in 
political theory. A second note of caution must also be raised. This democratic 
assessment of CSOs is not definitive, as it is based on the information gleaned 
from one-off interviews and on secondary organisational data. This is valid for 
the purposes of this study, which seeks to look at the role and contributory 
factors of civil society in Wales in EU policy-making, of which input-side 
democratic characteristics are meant to provide only part of the picture. Only the 
groups from Wales will be assessed here. This leaves out the British and 
European CSOs interviewed, for these CSOs were interviewed primarily to look 
at their communication structures with Welsh subsidiary/child groups. WEC is 
also omitted because it is a corporate body serving the needs of both ASPBs and 
CSOs, and thus straddles the civil society/governmental realms.
To ensure confidentiality and clarity, the groups will be labelled 
according to their membership. This differs from the majority of the thesis where 
the Welsh CSOs are labelled by sector and the British and European CSOs by 
their geographical coverage. Labelling CSOs this way has merit because most of 
the indicators are dependent upon the type of CSO membership. Thus the groups 
are categorised into umbrella groups (groups whose members are groups or other 
organisations), charities, statutory bodies (public sponsored but independent 
bodies) and membership organisations (groups that are made of individual 
members). Where charities and umbrella have some form of individual 
members, the postfix (mem) follows their status. Three umbrella groups are also 
registered charities. However, as their members are groups who have control 
over the organisation and two classified themselves as membership 
organisations, these shall be classified as umbrella groups with the postfix (c). 
This categorisation accrues credibility via Blair's (2004: 81) use of a similar 
typology of CSOs (membership-based, constituency-based and trustee) in his 
assessment of civil society for democracy programmes in Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
Subjective ratings (extremely, very, fairly, slightly, poor) will be given 
for each indicator and group and finally tabulated to allow comparison of the 
engaged/non-engaged groups in EU policy-making. 19 Where aspects are "not 
known", that aspect will not be assessed. Initial analysis demonstrated that
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umbrella groups are mostly engaged in EU policy-making; in comparison only 
two membership groups are involved and two out of the three charities have 
minimum involvement (see Table 4.1 below).
Table 4.1: Summary of Civil Society Organisations according to European 




•^Umbrella (2 mem, 3
3 Charities (2 mem)
EU policy-making Recipient of EU funding 
engagement
2 engaged (1 limited)
3 engaged (2 limited)
3 engaged (1 limited)









If associations are "political culture's mirror" (RoBteutscher, 2002:515), it is 
worthwhile to briefly take stock off the current climate regarding the democratic 
characteristics of CSOs, as generated by civil society itself. As will be illustrated 
later in this chapter, political institutions are steadily adding criteria to CSOs 
before they engage with them, by stipulating that CSOs need to be representative 
and possess a basic structure. The Assembly's Voluntary Sector Partnership 
Council (VSPC) has not been immune to this trend and has debated the voluntary 
sector's democratic credentials during the Convention period. For example, in 
March 2002 a report was published on how networks communicated with their 
constituents and their methods of nominating network representatives, which was 
intended to promote best practice (VSPC, 2002a). Similarly, a voluntary code of 
conduct for UK voluntary organisations working in Wales was drawn up in 2002 
(see VSPC, 2002b) which together with a section in the WCVA's (2002a:14-17) 
"Devolution in practice -an Update" document, encouraged and showed UK 
organisations how to devolve both their activities and structures. Also, in 2004 
the WCVA together with National Council of Voluntary Organisations started a 
consultation with the voluntary sector with a view to compiling a code of
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governance for voluntary organisations (WCVA, 2004). All this suggests that 
CSOs are under greater pressure to appear and be "democratic".
How the civil society groups fare under the democratic indicators will be 
examined through each indicator in turn: internal democracy; voluntarism; 
member status and member/stakeholder participation; deliberation; resources and 
dependence; its functions and goals.
Internal democracy
As mentioned above, the internal democracy of a group is significant for many 
policy-makers. Internal democracy is also important because it shapes CSOs' 
accountability and thereby legitimises CSOs' involvement in policy-making and 
their actions aimed at holding policy-makers to account:
If legitimacy is essentially about what gives third sector organisations the 
"right" to influence policy, accountability is how they demonstrate this 
legitimacy. (Taylor and Warburton, 2003:324)
Internal democracy has two key tenets: decision-making and organisational 
structures. These have some overlap with the member/stakeholder participation 
and internal deliberation indicators. To assess this indicator this section will 
explore the transparency of CSOs' structures and their decision-making 
mechanisms and the ability of groups to set their own direction with respect to 
parent groups.
All of the CSOs do have structures and decision-making procedures, 
testifying to a degree of transparency and therefore accountability. Each group 
had a board/council/executive committee, which gave overall direction to their 
organisation. This means that on a basic procedural level all the groups could be 
seen to be democratic.
The ability of many groups to set their own agenda was often diluted by 
more powerful decision-making bodies higher up in their organisation, at the 
Welsh, British, European or even the International level. Three umbrellas (one 
mem, c), two charities (one mem) and the statutory body had tiers of decision- 
making bodies at the national, European and even international level, which were 
more significant in setting their overall direction than the Welsh part. For 
example, one umbrella (mem, c) group saw its policy objectives "as mainly
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dictated or suggested by European [group's name]" (interview, umbrella group 
mem, c, 2004) and the statutory body perceived that "the objectives that we've 
got, Wales hasn't really had an input on them" (interview, statutory body, 2004). 
Nonetheless, largely all these dependent groups had links through representatives 
who could influence the agenda of their parent organisations.
Interestingly, among the same cohort of CSOs, two umbrella (one mem) 
and one charity (mem), were keen to stress their relative independence in 
decision-making, as devolution kicked into their organisation decision-making 
structures. Indicative of this, one membership group was set up following 
devolution to add a Welsh dimension to the CSO, and the statutory body was 
attempting to gain devolved decision-making powers from its Welsh tier. Three 
membership groups similarly stressed their independence from parent groups, 
stipulating that they set their own agenda:
With [parent group's name] local group, the local group is independent of 
the actual organisation, we can do what we want to do, within certain 
bounds like as long as it is not unethical or brings the name of [parent 
group] into disrepute, but we are asked to participate in [parent group's 
name] campaigns and it's up to us to decide. (Interview, membership 
group, 2003)
Members of local CSOs were reticent to participate in decision-making in their 
higher organisational tiers.
All the groups apart from two unknown had Annual General Meetings 
(AGMs) or some kind of annual meeting. These generally catered for the 
turnover of board representatives and sometimes acted as an opportunity to set 
policy direction. The different types of groups however had distinctly different 
decision-making procedures.
The charities had a board of trustees to oversee their running and to 
varying degrees provided mechanisms for members/volunteers to participate in 
decision-making. The limits to any such member/volunteer participation were 
conceded by one charity as the charity is "led by our trustees, so our supporters 
are encouraged to join with us rather than direct us" (interview, charity, 2003).
Umbrella groups had a different kind of board selection process, with 
people frequently having to be nominated from the member groups or sections of 
member groups, and then elected by member quotas. All the boards (apart from
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two unknowns) were elected yearly, and all bar one were elected through an 
annual meeting/conference. This nomination process seems anti-democratic, yet 
as one umbrella suggested it may actually increase legitimacy:
And it's then up to individual [groups] to come to our conference and 
make decisions or put up people for election onto our committees and 
stuff... that's how it's all democratically accountable, then so we don't 
have like individuals that are not representative of their members, 
coming up and making decisions on behalf of their [groups] which they 
can't do. (Interview, umbrella group, 2004)
All of the membership groups had yearly committee elections at AGMs. 
One protest membership group stated that negative media coverage of any 
disagreements at AGMs stopped AGMs being their key decision-making/policy- 
making forum. Instead the committee was forced to meet in secret, with 
"meaningful discussions and disagreements happen[ing] behind closed doors 
where the press and the media don't know what's going on" (interview, 
membership group, 2004). Thus, what seems to be an undemocratic method of 
making decisions is entailed by the nature of the organisation and arguably is 
countered by its democratic contribution of dissension and the creation of 
counter-knowledge. Membership groups were also the keenest to articulate their 
democratic credentials, with four out of six pointing out that they created 
decisions in a democratic manner:
Well, [group name] is a democratic organisation and I've never worked 
with an organisation that is so, that really does stick by that so much. 
(Interview, membership group, 2003)
The final internal democracy aspect examines how decisions are made 
on a daily basis. It must be borne in mind that this question was asked of 
individuals who were most able to discuss their organisation's role in EU policy- 
making. Thus, their answer reflected how they went about their ordinary work 
and was affected by the kind of work they carried out. Nonetheless, some 
patterns emerged among organisations who engaged heavily in the political 
process. These CSOs dealt with broad decisions and strategy differently from 
their day to day and ad hoc issues. In particular, the staffed organisations, 
(predominantly the umbrella organisations) were largely able to take decisions
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independent of their board. However, many umbrella bodies were keen to stress 
that the overall confines of policy were determined by their boards. Moreover, 
some umbrella organisations ran some government consultations and possible 
responses by their members. This situation illustrates the inevitable trade-off 
between democratic decision-making (in other words the full involvement of 
members) and efficiency. Taylor and Warburton (2003:333) similarly found this 
tension in their investigation into UK Third Sector organisations' involvement in 
the policy process and legitimacy. This trade-off arguably could be offset by 
another democratic function; that of providing effective policy input:
And frequently because of the speed that is required in producing 
documents, the [groups] have to put a great deal of trust and integrity in 
the people that they give because inevitably you can't go through all the 
[groups] if you want to get to a decision, that would be too lengthy, 
(Interview, umbrella, c, group, 2003)
In summary, the groups on a basic level are internally democratic, as 
they all have structures and mechanisms in place for taking decisions, which is 
the case generally in Wales according to the Civil Society Diamond Index 
(Nicholl, 2002). The type of organisation in relation to membership gives rise to 
the kind of internal structures and decision-making mechanisms that CSOs have 
in place. Membership organisations fare better in this regard than umbrella 
groups, and umbrella groups better than charities. Also significant in separating 
out their democratic characteristics is the extent to which they can make 
independent decisions, hinged on the degree of devolution within the 
organisation together with the opportunity for members to be involved in 
decision-making, both on a grand and an informal basis (which is linked to the 
organisation's structure on the hierarchical/decentralised scale). This is because 
membership participation means decisions will be more accountable and 
representative of their membership and this indicator will be discussed 
subsequently.
Voluntarism
Freedom to associate is a fundamental liberal democratic principle (Pietzyek, 
2003: Fung, 2003). Voluntarism is also an important ingredient for social capital 
theorists who have valorised the contribution of voluntary organisations to
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healthy democracies (Putnam, 1993). Thus, this section looks at voluntarism in 
terms of how easy it is for individuals to leave/enter an organisation and also at 
whether or not the group has volunteers and or/staff. This is informed by Warren 
(2001) who points out that ease of exit "is in turn determined by the extent to 
which an association controls the resources individuals need for security, 
livelihood, or identity" (Warren, 2001:96).
The membership organisations encompassed a variety of membership 
sizes, ranging from fifteen thousand to ten members. Four of the membership 
groups had low financial entry barriers of small subscriptions, with no data being 
available for the other two. The largest membership group had high entry and 
exit barriers because it was a private vested interest organisation defending 
members' livelihoods. Two membership groups also had minor identity 
resources for its individuals, in other words their focus partly shaped their 
members' identity, thereby creating minor barriers for members to leave this 
organisation. Three membership organisations were entirely run by volunteers, 
two had one staff member each and one had a larger body of staff. Barriers to 
taking on volunteers by staffed organisations were voiced by one membership 
and also one umbrella group:
... people come to me and say I want to volunteer, so it's not possible to 
take everybody, just what's available, space, and you know building up 
volunteers, teams of volunteers. (Interview, membership group, 2003)
Entry to some umbrella organisations is harder in comparison to 
membership organisations simply because in order to qualify for membership a 
member has to be a group. Added to this, out of the seven umbrella 
organisations only three (one mem, c) did not have any staff members, being 
entirely voluntary. Even in the volunteer-run umbrella groups, bar one, all of 
their members represented other groups. These member representatives were 
often salaried staff who in turn were de facto paid to represent their employer on 
the umbrella organisation. Most of the other umbrella groups had a few staff 
(the most was four); one umbrella group had a large cohort of staff (hundreds). 
Umbrella group subscriptions were considerably higher than membership 
groups, ranging from £5 to £400, creating some high entry costs. Three of these 
umbrella groups also had high exit barriers, being concerned with promoting
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their members livelihoods (for example, protecting workers' rights). Volunteers 
were less present here although many volunteers were used to stand on 
committees etc. Introducing paid staff and thereby reducing voluntarism does 
increase the efficiency of an organisation; as one umbrella group pointed to their 
lack of staff as causing their demise. However, having staff has the effect of 
adding a little bit of economic rationality to the organisation, which a volunteer- 
run organisation does not possess to the same degree:
Now when you get salaried staff in place, they got two agenda[s]; they 
got working for the organisation's clientele but also in keeping their 
own job going. (Interview, umbrella group, mem, 2004)
The statutory body had paid staff, with some volunteer experts. The 
charity groups all had sizeable staff numbers - from eleven to forty-five - but 
they also had plenty of volunteers and multiple volunteering roles available. 
These groups generally had very little exit or entry costs for their volunteers.
In summary, voluntarism within an organisation depended on the type 
of organisation at hand and seemed to also be related to numbers of salaried staff 
employed. The charities bucked the trend by having a large number of salaried 
staff but at the same time having a considerable volunteering component. Some 
of the umbrella groups had greater exit/entry barriers reducing volunteerism. 
However, some of the umbrella groups were actually run by volunteers, as were 
half of the membership groups, and another two membership groups were almost 
entirely run by volunteers. Membership groups also had some exit/entry 
barriers, which largely were not as high as the umbrella groups' barriers.
Member status and member/stakeholder participation
Members' status in a given CSO is important in establishing its democratic 
functions, because participation needs to come from different segments of 
society for the equality function in democracy to be realised. Moreover, the type 
of members involved influence the creation of bridging and bonding social 
capital, whether like bonds with like, or like builds bridges with the dissimilar. 
Survey data reveal that education and wealth, as a reflection of British culture, 
shape people's involvement in civil society groups:
84
Those people with higher household incomes and with a university 
education dominate much political action and also much organised 
associational life. (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2003:632)
Having only middle or upper class members does not make a group any less 
democratic but does affect its democratic potential and group status will also 
inform subsequent discussions on the groups' function.
Information on the groups' member status or backgrounds is patchy, 
because due to time constraints this was not discussed with every group. The 
people interviewed were from a range of backgrounds however; most were well 
educated and belonged to the middle/professional classes. It was in the 
membership groups that membership appeared to be the most diverse as at least 
three membership groups had members which included young people and/or 
those from a range of educational backgrounds. Three groups (two membership 
and one umbrella) conceded that their core membership consisted more of the 
middle class, one even commenting that "let's be fair, middle class people are 
the type that get involved in these kinds of things" (interview, membership 
group, 2004). Despite this, the same three groups were at odds to stress that 
people from all walks of life were involved.
Member and stakeholder participation is an extension of member status. 
The member and stakeholder participation indicator shifts the focus from which 
members are participating in the organisation, to what extent (if at all). Does this 
enable a CSO to be representative of its constituency? Participation is also 
important for creating social trust, reciprocity, tolerance and solidarity (Esthtain, 
2000), and in communitarian accounts for creating moral values and sustaining 
communities (Etzioni, 2000). The degree to which participation is face-to-face 
and its scope is important for creating such values.
Member/stakeholder participation fell along the same lines as the 
opportunities to get involved in decision-making and the extent to which the 
group was decentralised or hierarchical. Members in membership organisations 
could get involved in a range of activities and had the most opportunities and 
resultant participation. The three larger membership groups, which were Wales- 
wide, had structures and mechanisms in place to collect their members' views at 
the local levels, and to get them involved at the higher levels if they so wished, 
even on policy type issues. Concerns about involving stakeholders' (i.e. those
85
who the organisations purported to represent) were not raised as these groups 
represented their members and not a wider constituency. Four CSOs commented 
upon the centrality in their CSO of specific individuals or smaller groups really 
making a difference to their group.
The charities' members did not get involved to the same extent as those 
in membership organisations but there were forums, assemblies and AGMs in 
which volunteers and stakeholders could partake. It was clear that the charities 
were much more concerned to reach out of their organisation, to engage the 
people (stakeholders) that they were meant to be providing services for:20
... and sometimes I think people, because I'm not [part of the 
constituency] myself, think you don't understand ... I try to tap into the 
grassroots and say look these are the people I am talking about, I spoke to 
someone yesterday, I went along to this meeting and this is how I know 
what I am talking about. (Interview, charity, mem, group, 2004)
However, two charities, one umbrella (mem, c) and membership group pointed 
out the already active members tended to be more involved:
As with all of these things you see certain people all the time and then 
certain people you don't. (Interview, umbrella, mem, c, group, 2004)
The umbrella groups were Wales-wide groups and therefore were more 
disconnected from the individual members at the bottom of the membership 
chain. The umbrella Wales-wide groups relied on their member groups to 
consult with their members in turn, as required. Yet there were some 
intermediate structures connecting members with umbrella groups. These 
included: forums, committees and road shows. It was the Wales-wide umbrella 
groups who brought up concerns or statements about whether they were 
representative. For example, two umbrella (both mem, c) groups merely stated 
that they were representative and also another umbrella group who involved 
stakeholders were concerned there was too much representation:
In a way really, we talk about how these decisions get into Europe; how 
often do voices, or the true representations of people who actually [are 
the constituency] get up there into [European group] Brussels and then 
into the Commission, I don't know, but there's an awful lot of filtering 
going on. (Interview, umbrella, mem, group, 2004)
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This hierarchical dimension of an organisation may be necessary, as Keilbart 
(2001) identifies hierarchy enabling a CSO to act effectively. Moreover, the 
creation of hierarchy and bureaucratisation of an organisation may be merely 
reflective of groups who seek and are able to affect the economic and state 
systems (Cohen and Arato, 1994:561).
Thus, there is not enough information to be definitive about group 
membership (therefore this is not included in the overall assessment), but the 
information does point to membership groups as having the most diverse 
membership. Whilst that might similarly be true for the groups involved in an 
umbrella group, it is not true of their group representatives at the umbrella level.
In terms of member participation, membership groups gave members the 
most opportunities to participate, whilst recognising that key individuals 
sometimes make the most of those opportunities. The charities' membership 
base had a subsidiary role in their running, and charities seemed to be the most 
concerned with grasping the voices of their stakeholders. Finally, umbrella 
groups had the least opportunities for member participation as a whole but tried 
to overcome this by having reach-out mechanisms in place to make them 
representative. Perhaps this is indicative of the armchair participation that 
Malonely and Jordan (1997:118) describe where individuals and groups contract 
out the participation function to salaried staff and/or activists and do not directly 
participate.
Deliberation
Deliberation - the act of exchanging ideas and viewpoints among equal 
individuals and coming to a consensus - is another important aspect of 
democracy and civil society's contribution. Civil society deliberation can give 
individuals skills, create a space for a public sphere and shape government 
agenda through reasoned discussion. It is most prominent, not surprisingly, in 
deliberative and participatory accounts of democracy (Cooke, 2002; D'Entreves, 
2002; Habermas, 1998; Dryzek, 2000). It is also mentioned in other versions, in 
its fostering of individual skills and values such as civility and reciprocity 
(Barber, 1998), although criticised by communitarians for not discriminating 
between the kind of organisations doing the deliberating (Etzioni, 2000).
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Internal deliberation arguably needs face-to-face interaction21 and it 
would therefore be expected that the membership organisations encourage this 
the most widely among their members, given their high member/stakeholder 
participation. Internal deliberation is closely linked to the ability of people to get 
involved, and how groups make decisions and participation. As this has already 
been covered in internal democracy and member/stakeholder participation there 
is no need to go over it again. Suffice to say that a couple of the membership 
groups reported educative effects of their groups; one by encouraging 
examination of local issues from a global view (Keilbart, 2001 also found this 
when researching local groups of International NGOs) and another group by 
organising academic talks on its topic.
Therefore, this section will focus upon external deliberation. External 
deliberation is significant because it looks at what deliberation is occurring 
outside of the actual CSO with other groups and individuals in the public sphere. 
External deliberation needs to be examined with a view to who is participating, 
for example, speaking to people who do not agree with you as well as those who 
do agree with you may foster reflection, tolerance and critical debating faculties. 
Focusing on deliberation in this way leaves out the deliberative process of 
consensus-creation but it does provide a key insight into discussion with others 
outside of the organisation, which is a central tenet of deliberation.
All the groups did liaise with outside bodies and individuals. Indeed the 
notion of partnership with other groups seemed strongly embedded in CSOs, 
particularly among the larger groups:
In Wales we have pretty good partnerships and umbrella organisations, so 
that there really are opportunities for organisations to form their own 
partnerships. (Interview, membership group, 2003)
Groups also did reach out and engaged in discussions with groups and people 
who did not agree with them at public events and meetings. The frequency of 
these appears related to the size and resources of the group although this needs 
further research.
Resources and independence
Resources and independence are integral to the democratic contributions of a 
CSO. Civil society groups need some kind of resources to survive, but the 
question of the source of these resources is essential. Too much dependence on 
the economic or governmental realm will mean penetration into civil society of 
the logics of money and power, possibly resulting in monetarisation or 
bureaucratisation. This can result in "creating a new range of dependencies and 
destroying both existing solidarities and the actors' capacities for self-help and 
for communicatively resolving problems" (Cohen and Arato, 1994:450). 
Additionally, if civil society is to be a counter-balance to government by adding 
independent ideas to policy-making and holding government to account, then 
CSOs and their resources need to be both independent from the state and the 
economy. Yet authors recognise that there will be some diffusion of these into 
civil society as state and the economy in part constitute and permeate civil 
society's "fuzzy" boundaries (Chandoke, 2001). Indeed the danger is, 
particularly in this study which concentrates on the policy-making function, that 
any organisation that spends time trying to influence either sphere will end up 
echoing their structures in order to be successful (Cohen and Arato, 1994). 
Perhaps this is a an inevitable and necessary price to pay.
Membership organisations were the second least dependent upon funding 
from companies and government agencies. Three received funding from 
government agencies and one of these also took donations from ethical 
companies. All the governmental contributions were for specific projects groups 
ran and for two of these groups was outside of their core work. Most of the 
membership organisations' funding came from members' subscriptions, 
donations and fundraising, and if they were part of a larger UK/International 
group, then funding would also be received from them. Thus, it would lead to the 
expectation that, these membership groups were all fairly autonomous from 
government and the economy, and hints at strong financial accountability to their 
members. However, being financially independent did have drawbacks, chiefly 
in limiting activities and for some "money is a constant worry and a problem for 
us" (interview, membership group, 2004). One group even mentioned they had 
considered applying for charitable status but decided against it because they 
feared charity status would curb the group's political activities.
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The charities having no paving members relied on grants, donations and 
money coming from their Wales/UK/International parents. Two of these 
charities received grants from public/governmental bodies, including EU monies. 
One conceded this state of affairs resulted in their sponsor partly shaping their 
activities, but accepted that it was a trade-off with being effective and able to do 
things:
Whereas ten or twelve years ago we didn't have that base to represent the 
[sector] and work with, now we've got a tremendous base, a tremendous 
opportunity, and the chance to go on and lobby more effectively. 
(Interview, charity, mem, 2003)
The other charity in receipt of public body money commented upon the need for 
expertise to gam EU funding and that smaller charities may struggle with this, 
limiting the ability for new players and thus new needs and changes in society to 
emerge and be successful. The charity not in receipt of public/governmental 
money did point out that they were an exception in not receiving Assembly 
funding and that most voluntary organisations in Wales are in receipt of such 
funds.
Charities' independence is further constrained by charity law, which 
governs their involvement in political activities. Charities can wholly focus their 
activities on campaigning or advocacy, defined as: public awareness raising, 
education, influencing public attitudes and some political activities. However, 
political activities "i.e. seeking to advocate or oppose a change in the law or 
public policy" (The Charity Commission, 2004:4) must a) be in line with 
furthering the purposes of the charity, and b) not become the dominant 
component of the charities' work. Further guidelines are also given to the 
charities with implicit sanctions on certain kinds of behaviour:
Events such as demonstrations and rallies can also present real problems 
of control for a charity ... These complexities mean that there is 
increased potential for the commission of an offence by the charity, its 
officers, or those taking part compared with other campaigning activities. 
(The Charity Commission, 2004:7)
The umbrella (c) bodies were largely independent, notwithstanding being 
subject to the same legal boundaries mentioned above. Two umbrella (one mem,
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two c) had currently or previously obtained funds from their larger 
UK/International parent groups. In these instances, their only other income was 
through membership monies. The other umbrella (mem, c) group did receive 
money from public/governmental agencies, notably the Assembly, but also from 
the EU; however this CSO was largely a channel for those funds as it distributed 
funds to other CSOs.
The other umbrella organisations (who were not charities) were the most 
independent from governmental resources, receiving funding from members, 
their larger branch of the organisation, fundraising and also from business 
investments. Additionally, one umbrella group reliant upon membership and 
larger group monies found that their lack of resources crippled the organisation, 
killing it off at the end of 2003. This same group made a similar decision to the 
aforementioned membership group, to not "go for charity status in case it 
inhibited what we could say politically" (interview, umbrella group, 2004). On 
the other hand, one umbrella group actually represented economic agents, thus 
was dependent on the economic realm. This same CSO and another umbrella 
group were also involved in monitoring committees of EU structural funds.
Resources are of vital importance to the work that CSOs can do, and the 
type of work that they actually do. As demonstrated, umbrella organisations are 
perhaps the least dependent on outside means of funding. Instead the majority of 
umbrella organisations are dependent upon member subscriptions, other internal 
ways of gaining revenue or their higher organisational branch. An exception to 
this rule is an umbrella (mem, c) group, who was a self-termed "conduit" for 
distributing government/public money to projects. Combined with its charity 
status, such distribution would curtail its independence. Charities were the least 
independent of the groups, as having no membership monies they were instead 
reliant upon grants, donations, fundraising and their parent organisations. Many 
of these grants were of a public/governmental nature, however this dependence 
must be offset by their ability to be active because of grants. Successful charities 
- hinted at by one charity - were those that were apt at filling in forms to gain 
grants. Thus within the charity field, one could not expect too much dynamism 
or change in who are the successful and large groups. Finally, membership 
organisations were fairly independent. Only one's core work was affected by 
public/governmental grants; the rest of the groups relied on membership,
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services, donations and fundraising. However, this independence came at a 
price, with low finances often curtailing their potential activities. The statutory 
body was entirely government funded, making it very dependent on the hand that 
feeds it. Indeed, the statutory group representative commented that when 
choosing courses of action, potential government reaction to that action was 
considered.
Functions and goals
The functions and goals of a given CSO are not readily transferred into a 
statement of their democratic contributions (therefore these are not included in 
the overall assessment because these cannot be evaluated). Indeed, particularly 
individual democratic effects concerning individual development and skills 
creation are unintended consequences of a group's agenda. This setting shall 
accompany the discussion on CSOs' democratic contributions.
There is no consensus on how best to classify groups according to their 
functions. Perhaps the only consensus is that there is diversity. However, to aid 
clarity and comparison the groups have been accorded one of five functions, 
drawing on a framework utilised by the World Bank (2000) in its civil society 
consultation guidelines. There have been two alterations. Firstly, the World 
Bank has a technical expertise category for CSOs that give information and 
advice, and lobby on particular points (which includes think-tanks and advocacy 
organisations). As this study looks at organisations that might challenge 
technical rationality, the term advocacy will instead be used to describe groups 
who lobby the political system, but who may or may not give advice. Secondly, 
under the World Bank definition community groups were placed under "service- 
delivery", but community groups may have different democratic effects to some 
service-deliverers, specifically in bringing the community together, and may or 
may not carry out service-delivery functions, as in the case of town twinning 
societies. Therefore, this section will also use the label "community groups" as 
well as service-delivery. What these labels mean in terms of functions as well as 
democratic effects is described below. Individual effects are however much 
harder to discern through functions as they depend on how the organisation 
operates, but they have been included in social and community organisations as 
their local proximity assume some individual participation.
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• Advocacy (organisations that may provide information and advice, lobby on 
particular issues) 
Democratic contributions:
a) Governance - lobbying government/holding it to account, influencing 
policy/law, and resistance.
b) Public sphere - counter-knowledge and raising awareness.
• Capacity building (organisations that provide support to other CSOs' 
including funding) 
Democratic contributions: 
a) Public sphere - creating and fostering civic culture, deliberation.
• Representation (organisations that aggregate citizens voices) 
Democratic contributions:
a) Governance - lobbying government/holding government to account for 
sector, influencing policy/law, resistance.
• Service-delivery (organisations that implement projects or provide services) 
Democratic contributions:
a) Governance - implement policies, effective welfare provision direct 
governance for members or wider public.
• Social (groups for social purposes) 
Democratic contributions:
a) Governance/public sphere - pleasure of voluntary association.
b) Individual - social capital.
• Community (group for community purposes) 
Democratic contributions:
a) Governance/public sphere - socially integrative, bind community 
together.
b) Individual - social capital.
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The CSOs are listed by their functions in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 Summary of the Civil Society Organisations' functions by membership 
type
CSO membership type Main functions
6 Membership
4 Umbrella
3 Umbrella (2 mem, 3 c)
4 Advocacy, 1 representation, 1 community
4 Representation
2 Representation, 1 advocacy
3 Charities (2 mem) 2 Service-delivery, 1 advocacy
1 Statutory ijM 1 Service-delivery
In summation, groups cater for a range of democratic functions, 
particularly advocacy and representation functions which have public sphere and 
institutional effects. The charities mostly carry out services and umbrella 
groups' representation. Democratic and civil society approaches such as 
deliberative, pluralist, new left and to a lesser extent liberal egalitarian 
approaches (as five groups represent minorities/underprivileged citizens) and 
associative democracy in direct governance would be happy with these results. 
It is now important to look at those indicators according to engagement in EU 
policy-making overall to get a picture of who is involved in EU policy-making, 
and how this aids democracy. Chapter Six will explore CSOs' democratic 
effects in relation to the Convention.
Overall assessment
By collating the results regarding groups' contributions to the indicators, it can 
seen that the groups engaged are on the whole very democratic, and the extent to 
which they contribute to democracy is largely similar to those who are engaged 
and not engaged in EU policy-making (see Table 4.3). This is good news for the 
EU's democratic credentials and participatory democratic vision as regards to 
involve civil society in policy-making. However, as the discussion concerning 
each indicator demonstrated, the type of group is also important for fulfilling that 
democratic criterion; thus attention must be paid to the character of the groups 
involved/not involved and whether all the democratic indicators fare equally.
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2 Very limited engagement 2 Fairly/Very
1 On monitoring committees 1 Fairly/Slightly





From Table 4.4 (overleaf) it can be seen that the umbrella groups are 
predominant in EU policy-making, although the charities are engaged in a very 
limited manner as well. Most of the membership groups, on the other hand, are 
not engaged. Amongst the umbrella groups, the biggest democratic problems 
were in terms of voluntarism and membership participation, and they were 
strongest in terms of resources and independence. These groups were also most 
heavily engaged in representation functions. In this study, the groups who are 
involved with EU in policy-making consist largely of the more hierarchical 
umbrella groups, which by their very nature have less participation from 
members; this limits their ability to foster democratic skills and values such as 
trust and reciprocity. The engagement of civil society elites in EU policy- 
making thus questions their ability to reconnect citizens with the EU and the 
democratic deficit. Further, the umbrella bodies were all Wales-wide, bar the 
one that did not contribute to EU policy-making; thus they are one step removed 
from local roots. It does appear that in the trade-off between participation and 
effectiveness, effectiveness is what the umbrella groups engaged in the sample 
rather aspire more to. Equally, this finding may give credence to Cohen and 
Arato's (1994) argument that organisations seeking to influence a particular 
realm ultimately echo their structures when they become bureaucratised.
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Table 4.4: Groups EUengagement by Group membership type
Groups EU engaged
4 Engaged Umbrella, 2 umbrellas (mem, c), 1 membership
4 Limited engagement "*^»1|1 2 Umbrellas, 1 umbrella (c), 1 membership
limited engagement |B 2 Charities (1 mem)
lonitonng committee Statutory
6 No engagement,,,, Umbrella, 4 membership, 1 charity,
However, this argument should not be overstated. Umbrella groups' 
members can filter information and participation further down their 
organisational chains. Secondly, the umbrella groups also had a strong aspect of 
external deliberation with hostile voices. Moreover, their independence and 
considerable resources means that they can act as effective scrutinisers of 
government and are able to bring alternative information. The engaged umbrella 
groups also provided for interest representation in governance and thus would 
aid more traditional accounts of representative democracy and also the more 
participatory accounts as well.
The charities were notably lacking in terms of being independent in terms 
of their resources and from higher organisations. The charities, to a lesser extent, 
were also weak with respect to voluntarism and membership participation. This 
limited their ability to hold government to account and to perform educative 
functions. They were stronger in deliberation and having internal decision- 
making structures in place, and thus accountability was evident. Out of the two 
charities involved to a very small extent, one carried out services and the other 
was an advocacy organisation. The one not involved had similar characteristics 
to the other two charities and was a service-delivery group.
The membership groups perhaps fared the best across the democratic 
indicators, being innately more voluntaristic and participatory with regards to 
their members. There were some concerns with resources, as they received some 
funding from government. As most of their functions were advocacy related, 
this meant that they performed a lot of governance contributions, yet their 
involvement and proximity to their members meant they also aided political and 
civic socialisation. Perhaps membership groups "may be too dispersed and
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trivial to set agendas and effectively energize democratic politics" (Post and 
Rosenblum 2002: 18). (Reasons for non-engagement will be discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six.)
The deviant CSOs are the umbrella group who is not engaged and the two 
membership groups actually engaged in EU policy-making. Were these different 
in their democratic contributions? The engaged membership group was the 
largest of the membership groups and it also followed the trend of the other 
umbrella groups in that its prime function was representation. However, being a 
private interest group, it also had high exit barriers for its members. 
Nonetheless, it did have many mechanisms in place to inform and engage 
members. The other membership group that was less involved was did very well 
on this democratic assessment, being voluntarily run by its membership. The 
umbrella group that was not engaged was the smallest umbrella group but its 
democratic credentials were no different to the other umbrella groups.
Some groups were also recipients of EU funding and a larger proportion 
were involved in administration and monitoring Structural Funding programmes. 
Under current EU Structural Funding 2000-2006, parts of Wales currently have 
Objective 1, 2 and transitional Objective 2 and 5 status and all regions are 
eligible for Objective 3 funding such as the European Social Funds. Whilst 
being a recipient is not explicitly part of the policy-making function that the 
study seeks to explore, it is worthwhile to give due attention to groups along this 
measure and their democratic contributions (this information can be viewed in 
detail in Table 4.5). The CSOs who are EU recipients form a minority of the 
CSOs under study. Their democratic ratings are on the lower end of the scale.
In terms of whether the CSOs involved in EU policy-making evokes 
corporatist and pluralist relations, the picture is largely mixed. Corporatist 
elements are evident in that among the CSOs studied, umbrella groups comprise 
the largest group of participants and are peak organisations that have less 
membership/stakeholder participation. The very limited involvement of charities 
that are circumscribed by law and are dependent on resources from government, 
also evoke shades of corporatism. On the other hand, pluralism is also present, 
with umbrellas groups generally having strong independence from government 
financially, and all groups having basic internal democracy and some member 
participation.
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Type of organisation Democratic
contribution
1 engaged
1 very limited engagement
1 non-engaged______







4 limited engagement 
1 monitoring committees, 
5 non-engaged
6 membership









Not Known; 1 engaged





Internal characteristics however, provide only part of the democratic equation of 
civil society's role in democracy. Chapters Five and Six will look at civil 
society's external role in the policy-making process and its effect on democracy. 
The rest of this chapter will look further in depth into discourses on civil society 
and democracy to explore what conceptions institutions and practitioners have in 
mind, to investigate the discursive and normative space accorded to civil society 
in a democracy and policy-making.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES 
INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES
As stated before, civil society's role is not only structured by procedures but also 
by the use of words as signifiers for inclusion and exclusion, shaping discursive 
opportunity structures. Thus, what the different institutional levels understand as 
democracy and civil society in practice and in theory must be attended to as this 
will shape civil society's role in policy-making. This section builds upon 
analysis of primary sources, texts as well as academic studies (see Annex One) to 
summarise the various institutional understandings of civil society and 
democracy. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 overleaf summarise the various institutional 
discourses.
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Discussion of inter-relationships and resultant space for civil society
By and large, the civil society perspectives concentrate on less radical 
conceptions of civil society that lend themselves more to traditional 
representative democracy, which is also the central thrust of the institutional 
democratic discourses. As a result, civil society is not envisaged with changing 
the status quo radically, rather aiding the existing system. Thus there appears to 
be more space for civil society under a representative democracy but within 
service delivery and particularly in the British, Welsh contexts' local and 
community participation. Civil society's relation in respect to policy-making is 
very much a consultee who brings bargaining chips to the table.
It is also interesting to note that the institutions largely frame their 
"democracy" in terms of participatory versus representative democracy, rather 
than the more theoretical labels discussed in Chapter Two. The British 
institutions also would appear to leave the least space for civil society within 
policy-making, as their view of civil society and democracy concentrates upon 
freedom and participation at the local level and seems to fit more into the picture 
of associative democracy (perhaps unsurprisingly given the crossovers between 
the third way and this perspective; for example Hirst, 1994; 2002). Also the 
democratic criteria placed on CSOs before being given a place at the policy table 
warrants an examination into CSOs' democratic characteristics and again 
emphasises the primacy of representative democracy, with clear lines of 
accountability.
The tables also demonstrate that the EU in particular has a different "civil 
society" discourse from the British and Welsh institutions, although the British 
and Welsh institutions similarly have a different discourse from each other. 
Thus, we can expect that different aspects of civil society may have different 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: THE PRACTITIONERS' VIEWS
In Chapter Two, the importance of understanding different definitions of civil 
society and democracy was demonstrated. This foundation was subsequently 
built on in this chapter where the different institutional discourses on civil 
society and democracy were outlined. The discursive picture is developed 
further by exploring what the individuals involved in CSOs and/or EU policy- 
making actually understand as civil society and democracy. This section will 
also identify whether the interviewees' perceptions bear some semblance to the 
discourses of the institutions they work in, and will discuss its implications for 
civil society in Wales' role in EU policy-making. Furthermore, the chapter 
allows an inquiry into the compatibility of views held by policy-makers with 
those of CSOs, and will address whether CSOs implicitly desire a more active 
role in policy-making and democracy. Finally, this section will facilitate a 
comparison of what actors perceive as civil society, democracy and civil 
society's democratic role with the actual involvement of CSOs in policy-making 
covered in Chapter Five. First a short backdrop into the topic must be given.
hi Chapters Two and Three it was argued that institutional discourses on 
civil society and democracy structure civil society's potential role in EU policy- 
making. This works on the premise that institutions and discourse structure 
action (see Considine, 2005):
The institutional context is constituted by the vast range of rules - formal 
and informal, laws as well as social and political norms and conventions 
that set actors' common frame of reference and help shape not only 
actors' perceptions and preferences, but also their modes of interactions 
(see Starve, 1997). (Schmidt and Radelli, 2004:197)
This section seeks to examine to what extent institutional discourses are 
embedded in the minds of policy-makers involved in EU policy-making. The 
chapter will also identify whether policy-makers possess a common frame of 
reference and if so, is this shared by CSOs?
Research conducted by Hooghe and Marks (2001) provides some pointers 
as to whether institutional discourses will be shared between individual policy- 
makers. This section will briefly outline their research and its relevance to this 
thesis. Hooghe and Marks' study explored the assumption that the European 
Commission as an institution espouses supra-nationalist views on integration, by
102
examining the views of individual European Commission Officials on EU 
integration. It was discovered that some European Commission Officials' views 
did diverge from the assumed institutional discourse, and that Officials in fact 
held a mix of supra-national and inter-governmental views (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001: 145). Significant factors in shaping Officials' views on integration 
included the length of time they worked in national administrations, the kind of 
nation-state hi which they were brought up, whether they had strong national 
networks and where in the European Commission individuals worked. Thus, 
wholesale adherence to an institutional discourse is unlikely. However, it may 
also be possible that among civil servants working in national/regional 
administrations, there may be less divergence - as nationality is one of the key 
variables shaping European Commission Officials' views. This means people 
who work in national administrations will generally have less conflicting 
loyalties. Moreover, political alignments are also important for shaping political 
action, as identified by works on the POS (for example Kriesi et al., 1995). Thus 
political parties may also shape policy-makers' frame of reference as to what 
constitutes civil society, democracy and their inter-relationship.
Moreover, what is understood by "civil society" is rarely asked of groups 
or policy-makers operating in this sphere. It is this author's hope that by asking 
those involved in its construction, a more thorough understanding can be 
gleaned. The concepts of civil society, democracy and civil society's role in a 
democracy shall now be explored in turn through the responses of CSOs and 
then policy-makers. Additionally, any practical criteria that policy-makers gave 
to CSOs will also be elaborated upon. This will then allow comparison and 
further analysis of conceptions as they stand between the different camps of 
policy-makers, CSOs and political institutions internally and externally. When 
relevant, occasional comments from the Scottish Executive Official will also 
appear. The CSO responses in this chapter include the British and European 
CSOs, but not the Scottish CSOs. Due to time constraints in interviews not all 
interviewees were asked for their views on civil society, democracy and civil 
society's role in a democracy. However, as responses were elicited from CSOs 
across the key variables (geography, size, EU participation) and from policy- 
makers across governance and institutional levels this limitation should not 
detract too much from the ensuing discussion.
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What is civil society? The view from Civil Society Organisations
Awareness of "civil society"
CSOs exhibited different levels of awareness, with many being hesitant before 
answering. There were only four people who said outright that they did not know 
anything about it or did know what it meant, and these comments came from 
three small, local Welsh groups and one Wales-wide group. Another three 
Wales-wide groups were unsure about its definition, hi total, fourteen CSOs 
were aware of the concept. The British and European group interviewees were 
the most informed about the theoretical and academic understandings of civil 
society, thus an advanced understanding of "civil society" may arise with an 
individual's distance from the grassroots and specialisation.
Significantly, three Welsh groups brought up the WCVA's conception of 
civil society, two of which stated that WCVA first introduced them to the term. 
This is due to a WCVA (2002b) "Civil Society, Civil Space" manifesto launched 
to promote civil society and the voluntary sector's role in providing a wider 
perspective on the contribution of volunteering. Thus it appears that the WCVA 
may have been very important in increasing awareness of the term. However, as 
one group commented, awareness may merely be concentrated higher up the 
organisational chain, with the WCVA survey (Nicholl, 2002:15) finding that 
most groups were unaware of the concept:
I've got a sneaky feeling that most voluntary and community groups are 
probably acting and operating as per a civil society and so on but they 
don't actually know that they are doing that. (Interview, 
language/community group, 2003)
Internalisation22 of "civil society "
Most of the groups framed their understandings of civil society through their 
group lenses and their role using terms such as "our view" or discussing their 
group's role in civil society:
that's really as a [group name] person how I understand civil society. 
(Interview, disability group, 2004)
But yeah civic society is very important and I think the faith dimension to 
that is very, very important. (Interview, religious group, 2003)
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... the [larger group] of course knows a lot about civil society. (Interview, 
women's group, 2004)
Ten groups framed their answers in this way, tailoring their definition in relation 
to their CSO rather than offering their view as a private citizen.
Functional definitions of "civil society"
When detailing the meaning of "civil society" the groups described its 
component parts. The largest number of CSOs' responses viewed civil society as 
comprising groups (eight interviewees). However, the majority of CSOs also 
identified other components of civil society, such as "individuals" (four 
interviewees), "institutions" (two interviewees), "way of life" (one interviewee), 
"realm" (two interviewees) and communities (four interviewees). As might be 
expected in the Welsh context, where the last section revealed the Assembly had 
a partly communitarian understanding of civil society, four groups mention 
communities.
Two groups understood civil society as outside or separate from 
government, but as including the economic realm, which lends itself not only to 
the liberal approaches of civil society, but also the radical perspective. Four 
groups not only depicted civil society as non-governmental but also as a non­ 
profit sector. As one commented, civil society is:
... a way of acting that is certainly not government as in politics and it is 
certainly not private sector as in MacDonalds and so forth. (Interview, 
linguistic/cultural group, 2003)
This non-profit/non-government conception is shared in communitarianism and 
new left thought. Moreover, the non-profit, non-commercial also fits in with the 
WCVA civil society definition where civil society is "located between the 
family, the state and the market" (WCVA, 2002b:l). This indicates the diffusion 
of WCVA's definition to other CSOs. One group also viewed civil society as 
apolitical. Interestingly, when interviewees defined civil society's boundaries, 
these were inclusive of their particular group. For example, the trade unions 
specified that they were part of civil society being not for-profit, and the business 
group defined civil society as non-governmental.
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Purpose/values of "civil society"
The CSOs attributed a range of purposes and values to civil society. Their 
individual CSO and role informed this discussion, as many interviewees 
highlighted values and purposes that their organisations were trying to espouse, 
although this was not always the case. One interviewee in particular was 
suspicious of the concept of civil society, talking about how it was used, rather 
than why it should be valorised. Instead, the person viewed civil society, not 
unlike Gramsci, (on Gramsci see Cohen and Arato, 1994:146) as a means to 
perpetuate power, and also like a radical, hi that civil society through civility and 
other means stops antagonism:
Now well civil society for me ... is a term that I am uncomfortable with. 
In a way we have to be careful with terms like that, because sometimes 
it is invented by the people who hold power in order to say, 'Look we 
still want to hold power but there's civil society out there' and we can 
get right-wing fundamentalist groups ... saying 'God loves you folks! 
And behave yourself and you'll get your rewards in the next world and 
not in this one'. (Interview, poverty group, 2004)
The remainder of the groups who ascribed purposes and values to civil society 
visualised a more favourable conception of "civil society". They placed a strong 
emphasis on liberal values such as rights and freedoms. Two groups posited that 
civil society could have a range of roles, values and responsibilities, and needed 
to be considerate to others. This perspective has crossovers into new left and 
liberal egalitarian perspectives with a concern for speaking for the 
disenfranchised and ensuring fairness:
... civil society is about fairness and involvement and making sure that 
everyone is treated fair or reasonable and not discluded because of age or 
whatever. (Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
The same groups who regarded civil society as responsible for social justice had 
a practical role in delivering and promoting that agenda. One group mentioned 
that part of civil society agenda "is that you should have a moral, equitable 
community" (interview, religious group, 2003) which is communitarian in the 
sense that it is up to society to promote moral behaviour (Etzioni, 2000). Two 
groups also commented that civil society was the realm where things simply 
"happened", thus suggesting efficiency but not stressing any particular value as
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such. Finally, three groups highlighted civil society's relations with government; 
one in terms of helping create and deliver policy, another as a partner and a 
check on government and the third as not being an instrument of the state.
Summary of Civil Society Organisations 'perspectives
The one thing that can be taken for granted about civil society "is it means what 
you want it to mean ... depending on who you are and where you are" 
(interview, poverty group, 2004). The civil society groups interviewed had no 
common definition of civil society. The groups that attempted definition did so 
in a way commensurate with their organisation and their role, which means that 
the conceptions solicited can be taken as shrewd indicators of what these groups 
perceive as civil society. Awareness was uneven, with the smaller groups more 
in the dark than the larger, Wales-wide groups. Secondly, it was notable that 
some of the groups brought up WCVA's efforts on civil society, using this as a 
reference point to illuminate their definition. This could indicate an emerging 
common discourse among CSOs in Wales and should be tested through further 
research. Among the interviewed CSOs, a shared discourse did not exist; 
however, some commonalties can be discerned. For example, civil society is 
understood to be about groups and to a lesser extent the individuals who form 
those groups, and also about communities. Civil society's boundaries moved to 
include the group who was doing the defining. However, the most frequent 
understanding was that civil society rested in between the state and the economy, 
suggesting new left and also communitarian approaches have some purchase 
here. In terms of values and purposes, diversity again was apparent. Liberal 
concerns about freedom and rights were manifest and were more strongly 
supplemented by justice and equality concerns and civil society endorsing a 
more new left/liberal egalitarian civil society.
What is civil society? The view from policy-makers
Awareness of "civil society"
Awareness was much stronger here, with all the policy-maker interviewees (bar 
one whom was not asked) able to give definition of civil society. This suggests 
that civil society does have a fairly strong degree of resonance among policy-
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makers and within their institutions. The representatives in Europe displayed 
strong levels of awareness and it was evident that their role brought them into 
contact with the concept. The policy-makers also exhibited the same hesitation 
in defining the term as civil society group interviewees, but they were also 
concerned about the "correctness" of then- answer. It is probable that uncertainty 
is due to the fact that these people work with civil society on a day to day basis 
and civil society is part of tacit, implicit knowledge:
To me it is fairly obvious what constitutes civil society, but defining it is 
quite difficult. (Interview, UK civil servant, 2004)
I think it would have been sort of helpful if before we apply this 
particular phrase that we were all agreed on what it means and I am not 
sure that we do. And so I think rather than saying this is civil society or 
that is civil society I think it is much better if we talk about the interface 
that I have as a parliamentarian. (Interview, MEP, 2004)
Internalisation of "civil society"
Internalisation of the concept was by no means uniform. Notably, elected 
representatives or politicians in contrast to the civil servants were much more 
likely to structure their answers in terms outside of their institution:
... my definition coincides with that of the Commission because that's 
what I've been working with. (Interview, European Commission Official, 
2004)
I've got a vague memory of civic society being defined by Hegel, but I 
try not to operate with that one in government! (Interview, Scottish 
Executive Official, 2004)
The civil servants were, however, more likely to articulate an individual 
perspective than CSO interviewees. Some politicians' views on civil society 
were related to what they thought their political party would perceive as civil 
society:
... that is the definition that Plaid Cymru would put on civil society. 
(Interview, MEP, 2004)
Thus, civil society has made inroads into the policy-makers' camp and awareness 
of the concept is much stronger here than among the CSOs. Internalisation is
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made more complicated by the multiple roles that these individuals play in 
policy-making, with politicians more likely to have their own view framed by 
their political parties and also by the level at which their interaction occurs. The 
civil servants did offer some individual perspectives, particularly when their 
institutions' conception was harder to glean (for example the UKREP civil 
servant), but when a more explicit understanding was in place, as in the case of 
the European Commission, then their institutional view seemed to prevail.
Functional definitions of "civil society"
On balance, there was more discussion in interviews on civil society's external 
boundaries than on its constituent parts. When pinpointing what was "civil 
society", the majority (ten interviewees) mentioned "groups", similar to the 
CSOs. Civil society was also viewed as "community" (one interviewee), "arena" 
(one interviewee), "society" (one interviewee), "people's voices" (one 
interviewee), "blocks'V'sectors" (two interviewees) and as a "set of 
assumptions" (one interviewee). Interestingly, there was little mention of 
community, unlike the CSOs and as might be expected from the Welsh and 
British policy-makers, given the Assembly and UK governments' institutional 
discourses have some communitarian overtones. This suggests that institutional 
conceptions may not be commensurate with the views of the individuals in those 
institutions. However, some policy-makers may have used Wales as a 
replacement for community in that as many as four of the policy-makers talked 
about civil society with regards to perspectives within Wales or held by the 
Welsh nation.
Moreover, both the WAG Official and the AM referred to "the three 
golden blocks, if you like, in the Welsh context, of the local government, of the 
voluntary sector and the business sector" (interview, WAG Official, 2004) as 
civil society. This definition of civil society is also found in Peter Hain's 
speeches on devolutionary politics in Wales. Thereby, its presence among the 
Assembly policy-makers perhaps points to a shared vision of civil society in and 
around the Assembly. The WLGA Official concurred with local government 
being "in the equation", as did the CoR member. This is an unusual view of civil 
society theoretically because parts of the state are positioned in the this realm of 
civil society, and perhaps attests to viewing civil society as fluid, and
109
functionally equates most with the radical perspective of civil society. 
Moreover, it may be an attempt by the Assembly to formalise and structure local 
government's input and by treating it as an external agency in civil society. It 
does seem that local government is treated as another interest group through its 
WLG association in EU policy-making. Thus, whatever constitutes "state" and 
"civil society" depends on the vantage-point from which the political community 
is viewed. The inclusion of government in civil society is further reinforced as 
some Welsh policy-makers in the European context would likewise similarly 
include regional governments and associations in "civil society". The inclusion 
of the business sector by two Assembly policy-makers suggests a 
libertarian/liberal egalitarian view of civil society. However this perspective is 
untenable as the Assembly policy-makers also include local government in civil 
society. On the other hand, libertarians/liberal egalitarians would place 
government outside of civil society.
There was nevertheless considerable mention of civil society being non­ 
governmental (seven policy-makers: one MEP/Conventioneer, two MPs, two UK 
civil servants and two European Commission Officials). This suggests that those 
attached to the British context (MPs and UK civil servants) and European 
context (European Commission) have different views than the regional 
representatives/civil servants in Wales. The view of civil society as non­ 
governmental lends itself to libertarian, liberal egalitarian, communitarian and 
new left perspectives on civil society. How policy-makers perceive civil society 
in relation to the economy will assist a deeper understanding of their perspectives 
on civil society.
Only one European Commission Official explicitly referred to civil 
society as being non-profit. This view diverges from the ECOSOC's (1999) 
definition of civil society (which the European Commission advocated), which 
included market players. The European Commission Official explained that he 
excluded market players from civil society because they were instead engaged in 
the social partnership. One MP also talked about employer representatives as 
being part of civil society, he did not mention the businesses themselves.
It does appear that the people engaged in the Assembly have the most 
all-embracing view of civil society. This stands in stark contrast to the dominant 
civil society view articulated by the CSOs, which places much stronger barriers
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between civil society and the government and the economy. Significantly, the 
Welsh Assembly's view of civil society is not shared by the British or by some 
of the European representatives and may testify to the new Welsh devolutionary 
arrangements with partnership in ascendance. This also suggests that CSOs are 
more in tune with the sentiments proffered by the European policy-makers, as 
they presented a more liberal view of civil society with some new left elements. 
There was surprisingly little explicit mention of "community", suggesting that 
there is a disjuncture between the communitarian perspectives identified in the 
British and Welsh contexts in the literature review, in policy-makers' discourse 
and in civil society groups' views. These claims must be put to further 
examination by exploring the purposes/values accorded to civil society by 
policy-makers.
Purposes/values of "civil society "
The policy-makers were more forthcoming on the purpose of civil society, than 
on defining civil society's values. However, policy-makers mentioned the 
purpose and values of civil society less than the functional components of civil 
society. Values were mentioned in two quarters: a) by a CoR member and b) by a 
European Commission Official. The former stressed the public/societal benefit, 
leaning towards liberal egalitarian, new left and communitarian views that were 
found across the institutional discourses. The European Commission Official 
accentuated a shared Welsh nature and set of assumptions in creating their civil 
society:
We're [the Welsh people] of a temperament that is social, that is 
engaging in a way that is without criticism; it is very convivial and it is 
not mean or mealy mouthed, it can be critical and it can be gossipy. 
(Interview, European Commission Official, 2004)
He also stressed "equality it's about equality", a view that adds fuel to the 
argument that the WAG is creating a "clear red water" from Westminster (as 
described in Chapter Five) and also to the position that there is a Welsh civil 
society. The stress on equality is characteristic of liberal egalitarian and new left 
thought.
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The other response focused on the perceived purpose of civil society, 
notably its governance functions in relation to democracy. Here an MEP, MP 
and the WLGA Official viewed civil society as aiding democracy through 
participation, people organising themselves and allowing debate. One UK civil 
servant believed civil society should be or is involved in policy-making. The 
ECOSOC member perceived civil society as representing different views in 
Wales and the WAG Official identified civil society as having a stake in how 
society is run.
On purposes and values there is not the same divergence of views as the 
functional definitions revealed. This may simply be down to the lack of 
responses. It is notable that the governance/policy-making functions of civil 
society were identified across tiers of governance, demonstrating the acceptance 
of some role for civil society in policy-making. Nonetheless, the emphasis on 
policy-making/governance functions of civil society may be attributable to 
policy-makers' proximity to the policy-making process. The mention of civil 
society values such as public good and equality have a crossover with values 
mentioned by CSOs. There was also little mention of the service delivery 
function that civil society can fulfil that was found in the literature review to be 
emphasised by the UK government and in the Welsh context. The purposes are 
not in line with radical or libertarian views of civil society which, bar the UK 
government, does not feature in institutional discourses, suggesting some parity 
among policy-makers and their institutions.
Summary of policy-makers 'perspectives
Awareness of "civil society" is greater amongst policy-makers than CSOs, 
demonstrating that the term has taken a deeper hold. This may reflect that it is 
often easier to define the other (for policy-makers) than define "us" (for civil 
society). Internalisation of the concept by policy-makers along their institutional 
lines was weaker than the CSOs, but was stronger amongst civil servants than 
elected representatives. Politicians instead looked to their political party as well 
as their own views, suggesting discourses of formal political institutions will be 
less prevalent amongst politicians. With regards to functional definitions there 
was general acceptance that civil society meant "groups", but there was an 
absence of references to community that might well have been expected amongst
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British and Welsh respondents. The Assembly policy-makers had a different 
perspective of civil society, similar to the Assembly institutional conception: that 
civil society was about partnership and included the local government sector and 
the business sector. The European civil servants, British elected representatives 
and UK civil servants instead conceived civil society as merely non­ 
governmental. The inclusion of "for profit" is in line with the British and 
European functional and practical institutional discourse but goes against the 
grain of the main CSOs' perspective. There was less discussion of values and 
purposes, and those discussed focused around the public good, equality and also 
the role that groups could play in governance and democracy. There was no 
commonality within institutional tiers. The chapter now turns to how the CSOs' 
practitioners understand democracy, and the resultant space there is for civil 
society.
What is democracy? The view from Civil Society Organisations
Awareness and internalisation
All the CSOs who were asked "what they understood as democracy", supplied an 
answer. Some interviewees exhibited consternation when asked this question, 
with one respondent saying: "that's like a 'who wants to be a millionaire 
question' " (interview, intermediary group, 2003). There was not as much 
internalisation of answers as CSOs. However, four groups did refer to civil 
society, or their group's activities in their answer, suggesting some 
internalisation. The limited examples of this suggest that the answers given were 
more informed by their individual/private citizen perspectives.
Conceptions of democracy
The conceptions of democracy given by CSOs cover three sets of views:
a) the equal voice of individuals in representative democracy (three 
interviewees),
b) call for more participatory democracy supplementing representative 
democracy (six interviewees) and
c) participatory democracy in active communities (one interviewee).
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It should also be added that many of the five interviewees were critical of current 
democratic arrangements and hinted at the need for change, thus idealising their 
views of democracy. Equally, it is worthwhile to note that all the responding 
interviewees stressed the participative function of democracy, from minimal 
voting to actively taking decisions.
The first set of CSOs viewed democracy as individuals having an equal 
voice in a system of representative democracy. This perspective was 
supplemented by two groups stating that individuals had a responsibility to 
participate in this system as it was "a two sided contract" (interview, 
intermediary group, 2003) between individuals and government. This view is 
justly accepting of current democratic representative arrangements in a nation- 
state and does not automatically equate towards encouraging civil society to have 
more involvement in policy-making.
The second grouping who viewed democracy as centred on participation 
and supplementing representative democracy were fairly heterogeneous in the 
kind of participation required and their reasons for it. The religious group was 
critical of majority democracy, contending that it makes decisions on the basis of 
public opinion. Instead, this group called for a moral view to inform the public, 
which has tenets of elite democracy. The environmental group wanted more 
elections and referendums and similarly brought up the issue about how to 
achieve consensus amongst conflicting views. This was echoed by the disability 
group who wanted government to take into consideration the concerns of both 
the active and non-active. The pro-European group conceived of democracy as 
part of a political culture fostered by active civil society, with the freedom to 
discuss ideas. However, the trade union was critical of too much argument, 
instead advocating that people should work together on what they agree and was 
critical of adversarial/majoritarian democracy (this "Welsh" dislike of debate is 
described by Chancy and Fevre, 2001). The trade union representative felt 
democracy should be local and engage citizens.
There were two interesting perspectives from the European CSO and the 
British CSO. The representative of the European Civil Society Organisation 
(ECSO) detailed his response on democracy reflecting on the EU's democratic 
deficit and the EU's attempts to bring in civil society to stimulate participatory 
democracy. The ECSO representative envisaged two issues:
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1) that participatory democracy could not be the EU's only democratic regime 
and
2) that institutions would have to invest in building civil society's capacity. 
He also commented that other ECSOs were concerned that participatory 
democracy entailed more consultation but not effective participation. The British 
CSO viewed democracy in classical liberal terms as freedom from state 
interference and having competitive market individualism. This was also 
tempered by some concern for communitarianism, and called for the creation of a 
common view on governance and a good active society, "a society in which 
people are actually decent and not out to rob one another" (interview, British 
CSO, 2004). This seems a clear third way take on democracy and in tune with 
the sentiments of the UK government. There were only two groups who 
perceived participation and decision-making in communities as the key to 
democracy.
Thus there are a number of democratic conceptions to be found among 
the CSOs. The more radical democratic theoretical projects as detailed in 
Chapter Two are hardly mentioned, but more participation or voice within liberal 
representative democracy seems the order of the day. There are different takes 
on what form the participation should take and the rationale behind that. The 
ECSO offered an insight into ECSO's perspectives on the EU's new 
participatory democracy and its limits. The British CSO's view was also 
interesting for its complexity and crossover with that of the third way 
perspective. What these standpoints mean is that there is a receptive audience 
for participatory democracy to be offered by the EU as long as representative 
structures still stand. Will the policy-makers echo these views?
What is democracy? The view from policy-makers
Awareness and internalisation
Eleven out of sixteen were able to respond to the question of what they 
understood as democracy, showing a strong amount of basic awareness. As with 
the CSOs, the question caused some concern. Most of the civil servants 
answered this question through reference to their own role, making their 
response more likely to represent their institutional view:
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I think as a civil servant, it's a very limited answer. (Interview, Scottish 
Executive Official, 2004)
Conceptions of democracy
The policy-makers tended to give much more neutral, procedural conceptions of 
democracy and were concerned for accountability and to protect minorities in a 
majoritarian system. They were therefore describing the present system of 
representative democracy where accountability is ensured through free and fair 
parliamentary elections. There were a couple of exceptions to this. Firstly, a 
nationalist politician argued the EU's democratic deficit existed because stateless 
nations did not have EU representation and because there is a lack of 
answerability in the EU with no constitution. Another politician called for 
subsidiarity.
The ECOSOC member articulated a Rousseaunian view of democracy 
as representing the "will of the people", but saw this as impractical because 
people cannot be consulted all of the time, therefore the current arrangements of 
representative government stood. One European Commission Official presented 
democracy in relation to the measures introduced by the new draft European 
constitution, articulating the Draft Constitutional Treaty's (DCT) view of 
participatory democracy. Another European Commission Official also 
mentioned participatory democracy, whilst discussing the current democratic 
arrangements of nation-states, suggesting that these two Officials are in tune with 
their institution's views.
Thus, it appears that innovative democratic projects relating to civil 
society have not permeated into policy-makers' understandings of democracy, 
and in the main, representative and electoral systems provided the cornerstone to 
this discourse. This suggests that civil society will have little legitimacy within 
this system and also little role. It also questions the extent to which the rhetoric 
of the EU's participatory democracy has gained widespread acceptance. 
Nonetheless, the EU's DCT does state that it is founded on representative 
democracy, a view conceeded by both the European Commission and the 
ECOSOC, supplemented with participatory democracy. This indicates that 
policy-makers may in fact be in line with EU thinking here and that the 
ECOSOC and European Commission representatives do largely share their
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institution's views. Furthermore, policy-makers have a vested interest in the 
running of the current system and in particular politicans may be hostile to 
giving up their monopoly on legitimacy:
So democracy is always seen as a good thing by the people in power 
'cause they define what is democracy. (Interview, trade union, 2004)
Nonetheless, before this argument can be qualified it is necessary look at what 
role policy-makers think civil society should play in a democracy. For despite 
representative elected democracy being at the front of policy-makers' minds, 
there may yet be scope for civil society:
... if lots and lots of people want to join an organisation like the RSPB 
and Oxfam and are willing to give them time and money to it and or 
Greenpeace or Trade Unions ... then it's absurd for anybody in public 
life and in particular for elected politicians to ignore them. (Interview, 
MEP/Conventioneer, 2004)
Role of civil society in democracy: the view from Civil Society Organisations
Internalisation
CSOs continued to make reference their group's and their group's activities here 
when discussing civil society's role in democracy. Seven of the groups 
illustrated their answers through their own groups' work and one interviewee 
offered a private citizen's perspective.
Civil Society Organisations 'perspectives on civil society's role in a democracy 
Most groups viewed civil society as essential for democracy with two groups 
stating "civil society is that which makes democracy possible" (interview, pro- 
European group, 2004). This sense of a positive relationship was not 
unanimously shared, with three groups casting doubt on this assertion. One 
group did so because it was concerned that CSO campaigns could force 
something upon people, and two other groups questioned whether groups should 
have more of a say than individuals. One CSO also did not necessarily think 
civil society should be contributing anything to democracy, but that democracy 
merely gave civil society the space to occur.
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Eight groups highlighted the policy-making/governance functions of civil 
society, such as lobbying, policy-making, speaking up for marginalised groups, 
criticising and scrutinising government, representing people, solving problems 
outside of government, partnering with government, social integration, 
empowering communities and creating services. Three groups identified public 
sphere functions such as giving people voice, educating the press and media, and 
deliberation: "pulling thoughts out of people's heads and making them public 
property" (interview, equality, 2004). Finally, seven groups also brought up 
individual effects of civil society towards democracy, particularly that of 
educating individuals to empower them by giving them political/civic skills to 
engage with government or to change their lives.
Discussion of Civil Society Organisations' views
Civil society's role in a democracy follows a similar pattern to the CSOs' views 
on civil society and democracy, in that there is no consensus shared by the 
groups. Civil society's democratic potential was even challenged by a couple of 
groups. However, CSOs identified strongly the policy-making/governance 
functions of civil society and also their individual effects in democracy. The 
policy-making/governance functions bode well for a range of democratic 
projects, including associative democracy, participatory democracy and 
deliberative democracy, and also for civil society projects; to a lesser extent 
liberal egalitarianism, greater extent communitarian, new left and radical civil 
society projects. The individual effects would aid participatory and deliberative 
democracy and liberal egalitarianism, communitarianism and new left civil 
society projects. The business group commented that their group as civil society 
aided the economy, not democracy, and therefore only mentioned the emphasis 
on civil society as a realm of freedom contributing to democracy. The foregoing 
demonstrates that libertarian views of civil society in democracy are very sparse, 
but nonetheless present, among the interviewed CSOs. The emphasis seems to 
be on civil society engaging in the democratic process through policy- 
making/governance, as well as providing individual democratic skills. It seems 
then that CSOs would approve and be receptive to moves towards participatory 
democracy.
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Role of civil society in democracy: the view from policy-makers
Internalisation
There was little explicit internalisation of the concept by interviewees to their 
institutions here. One MEP referred to the EP in his answer and a European 
Commission Official discussed European Commission policy.
Policy-makers' perspectives on civil society's role in a democracy 
The policy-makers focused almost entirely on civil society's policy- 
making/governance functions with minor reference to public sphere roles. This 
would suggest some internalisation of this both to their institution and role, as 
these individuals are at the heart of the policy/governance process. The majority 
of the answers mentioned civil society lobbying, putting forward views from 
sections of society and being involved in policy development. The ECOSOC 
member used the term "stakeholders" to describe civil society in policy-making, 
highlighting that only parts of civil society can legitimately engage here. Civil 
society was seen by an MP as giving voice to sections of society, which could 
also tangibly be perceived as a public sphere function as well as a governance 
function. Another MP also raised the point that community activity was a check 
and balance on government, suggesting a liberal perspective of democracy, and 
that civil society could indicate where public opinion lay on a particular issue. 
Indeed, civil society as pressure groups or as representing sectors was frequently 
raised across levels, which may be problematic for organisations with a wider 
agenda or not necessarily representative of a particular sector.
European and UK policy-makers also talked about the need to listen to 
civil society views but recognised that these were sectional, and saw themselves 
as needing to have a wider view enabling these to be judged, suggesting that 
their understanding of their role was partly informed by a measure of liberal 
neutrality:
By definition most pressure groups are one eyed, that is they see their 
own part of their area and they ignore the big picture ... They are 
important, they must be given respect, but they must be put into context. 
(Interview, MP, 2004)
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Finally, two policy-makers (UK civil servant and European Commission 
Official) viewed lobbying government or becoming elected representatives as the 
only means by which civil society could be engaged in the democratic process as 
it stands:
The processes that we have at the moment, they really are your two 
options; either to lobby political institutions or to get into them. 
(Interview, UK civil servant, 2004)
Notably, current liberal representative democratic systems provided the reference 
point for all of these answers, indicating either acceptance of current modes of 
democracy or realism towards the current situation and perhaps reluctance to 
drastically change the status quo.
Discussion of policy-makers' views on civil society's role in a democracy 
Policy-makers, perhaps due their proximity to the policy-making/governance 
system, overwhelmingly attributed governance functions to civil society groups, 
with some public sphere functions as well. The effect of civil society upon 
stimulating individual democratic effects was not mentioned. This suggests that 
policy-makers are not aware of the individual functions and effects that civil 
society can have in creating a healthy democracy, and that they have different 
views of the civil society groups themselves. Moreover, viewing civil society as 
pressure groups engaged in lobbying, or as sectoral representatives, questions to 
what extent policy-makers truly understand civil society and whether it is just a 
convenient term to cover what traditionally was understood as pressure groups.
There was also little explicit internalisation of policy-makers' views on 
this topic with that of their institutions, making it hard to relate their views to that 
of their institutions. One European Commission Official did discuss the 
European Commission's approach of dealing with only ECSOs in Brussels and 
was not in tune with this view, indicating institutional asymmetry. The 
agreement that civil society should be involved in policy-making/governance via 
lobbying does suggest some space for participatory democracy to emerge and for 
civil society's involvement in policy-making. However, European and UK 
policy-makers recognise that civil society is also sectional and politicians are
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instead left to interpret the common good, as a result civil society may be 
listened to but their views might not necessarily be taken on board.
Practical criteria applied to civil society
Previously in this chapter it was demonstrated that while institutions may have 
initially very broad conceptions of civil society, these are supplemented by 
practical criteria. In the previous discussion of civil society's democratic role, it 
can be seen that "civil society" was whittled down as the concept was applied to 
practice. The discussion now turns to how policy-makers deal with civil society 
in policy-making, to see if they apply any criteria and whether their practical 
conception differs from their more theoretical one.
Most policy-makers said that they had no criteria for dealing with civil 
society groups. As one remarked:
I listen to everybody, I talk to everybody. (Interview, AM, 2003)
Three (ECOSOC member, CoR member, European Commission Official) clearly 
identified those with whom they would be uncomfortable in dealing with. For 
the CoR member (2003) this was "very-right wing groups", a view shared by a 
European Commission Official who saw these groups as in contravention of EU 
founding principles and the CFR. The ECOSOC member specifically cited the 
British National Party as an example of groups with whom they would not 
engage with. The UK civil servants were concerned to appear open to the 
general public and generally accentuated the fact that they would not be making 
decisions about policy direction. Representativeness was also a factor listed by 
one MEP and one MP, with the MEP commenting that because the 
representativeness of groups was not assured, groups' representations were not 
given precedence over individual views. Professionalism, the ability to be 
constructive and the concerns of established voices were also remarked upon by 
the WLGA Official, MEP and MP (again these practical concerns can be found 
in the European and British institutional discourses). Whilst the European 
Commission Official said that he would listen to groups that were not properly 
constituted, this against the larger institutional grain. Other factors mentioned by 
an MP and an MEP were personal contact and established relations (this was
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found across the institutional discourses). The relevance of policy-makers' 
subject responsibilities was also commented upon as a factor for dealing with 
CSOs. Finally, whilst politicians were open to views, they did admit that their 
own world-views, particularly those of their politics and political party (and 
some also mentioned benefit to Wales or their constituency), would shape how 
they would take on board civil society concerns.
On the whole there seems little practical criteria applied to civil society 
groups before engaging in the democratic process. This may simply be a 
reluctance to impart biases by policy-makers. However, viewed positively, it 
may demonstrate that civil society has a receptive audience in policy-makers at 
all levels, with little criteria attached, a finding that runs counter to the 
institutional discourses discussed previously. However, there were a few 
expressions of de facto criteria based on professionalism, existing contacts, 
constructive advice and established bodies; although these were not concentrated 
at any one particular level (UK or EU), they were not offered from the Assembly 
based policy-makers. The civil servants were also much more reluctant to add 
criteria than were the politicians. Indeed, the politicians did confess to 
translating civil society views through their own personal and political 
paradigms:
I have to balance this [civil society group's] argument in the context, in 
the way in which I view issues politically myself in order to come to a 
proper judgement. (Interview, MEP, 2004)
Are the conceptions of civil society and democracy compatible?
Do policy-makers, civil society groups and political institutions have agreed and 
compatible conceptions of civil society, democracy and consequently civil 
society's role in a democracy? Although there is certainly no consensus, there 
are general patterns and dominant themes, which will be discussed here.
Civil society groups and policy-makers mainly perceived civil society as 
constituted by groups of individuals. There was also some crossover in 
attributing the values of fairness to civil society (both new left and liberal 
egalitarian views), but policy-makers placed more emphasis on the common 
good than the CSOs. The largest difference with respect to civil society was 
over its external boundaries. For example, some Welsh policy-makers included
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parts of the state and the economy in civil society, which differed from the main 
CSO view of civil society as non-profit and non-governmental. Civil society 
was seen by the other policy-makers as non-governmental (liberal, new left and 
communitarian) and by a European Commission Official as non-profit.
The almost complete omission of civil society as "community" by policy- 
makers is another significant departure, since a number of civil society groups 
mentioned "community". The result is that policy-makers are largely operating 
with different functional definitions of civil society compared to organisations 
within civil society itself, hi some instances (such as Wales) "civil society" 
definition is cast wider than a large cohort of civil society groups would 
understand as civil society and is also missing significant components such as 
community. Arguably this suggests that the communitarian view of civil society 
is not applicable amongst those engaged in the high politics of EU policy- 
making: instead, the practical criteria placed by British and Welsh institutions of 
preferring large groups may be more relevant. Policy-makers appear to operate 
with more liberal views of civil society in mind, which although shared by civil 
society groups is tempered by their communitarian preferences (albeit with a 
dose of liberalism) and perhaps is testimony to the diversity and sectionalism 
within civil society itself. These results also indicate that the European 
Commission may be more in touch with civil society in Wales than their Welsh 
counterparts. However, the differences should not be overestimated as policy- 
makers and civil society groups do seem to share the centre ground, with 
libertarian and radical perspectives not making much headway.
On democracy, CSOs emphasised the participatory components whereas 
the policy-makers emphasised the procedural/system aspects. Both organisations 
located themselves within current representative democratic systems, the policy- 
makers more so with some civil society groups mentioning democracy within 
communities. The view from the latter gives more room to not just civil society 
but also to citizens within the political system, in comparison to policy-makers 
(bar two European Commission Officials who referred to the participatory 
democracy project). Again, there is some disagreement, but it is played out on 
common ground, with the understanding that democracy should be conducted 
within current systems of representative democracy. This perhaps minimises the
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space for a very active civil society in policy-making and curtails its input to a 
consultative role.
Civil society attributed individual, public sphere and policy- 
making/governance democratic functions to civil society. Policy-makers 
attributed policy-making/governance and to a lesser extent, public sphere 
functions to civil society. Notably, these policy-making/governance functions 
were constrained by the preference for the current system of representative 
democracy.
Civil society groups and policy-makers do fare differently in then- 
perspectives, but there is shared ground particularly in their preference for the 
current system of representative democracy and envisaging civil society 
contributions within this system. Consequently, this standpoint limits civil 
society's potential role in a democracy, and casts doubt on civil society's role in 
policy-making being able to change markedly, as both policy-makers and CSOs 
accept current democratic arrangements (despite civil society wanting more civil 
society participation than policy-makers). As such this creates a less benign 
environment for civil society's involvement in a participatory democracy and 
consequently challenges the reconciliation of the EU's democratic deficit 
through this method.
Moreover, the subtle differences in the understandings of civil society 
and democracy presented by policy-makers from different spheres of governing, 
as well as CSOs, indicates the lack of a common EU-wide political culture 
(Verhoeven, 2002:47). A common political culture is arguably one requirement 
for the formation of a post-national European identity, which the demos 
conception of the democratic deficit could be seeking to create.
The addition of limited criteria by policy-makers to civil society groups, 
reduces the space for alternative projects to arise and new elements of civil 
society to be heard by policy-makers. This conceivably reduces the amount of 
input legitimacy that civil society can bring to the EU's democracy, if only 
certain societal "voices" are being listened to. Civil society and policy-makers 
also diverge on the space given to communitarian conceptions of civil society 
and on the role of civil society in a democracy.
Policy-makers' internalisation of concepts was uneven, thus one would 
expect asymmetry between institutional discourses and their views. Did this
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occur? The lack of direct mention of "community" is surprising and deviates 
from British and Welsh institutional discourses. The reference by some Welsh 
policy-makers of public, private and voluntary sectors in civil society does 
concur with the Assembly's institutional discourse. One European Commission 
Official diverged from its institutional discourse, despite being well versed in 
them, by being willing to speak to non-constituted groups and also depicting 
civil society as non-profit. This anomaly may be explained by this individual's 
significant role (a senior role in the European Commission) and having more 
autonomy than other civil servants. However, a Brussels European Commission 
Official's answers coincided with European Commission views entirely. The 
ECOSOC member also framed his answers with reference to the ECOSOC 
definition of organised civil society. The emphasis on democracy as largely 
representative (although both the European Commission Officials mentioned 
participatory democracy) is completely in line with institutional views, which 
place democratic legitimacy in their representatives and representative systems. 
The practical criteria placed towards civil society in policy-making of 
professionalism and established voices were equally present in both the 
institutional discourses and interviewee definitions. It was surprising that the 
policy-makers left out service delivery functions of civil society, a view found in 
most institutional conceptions.
On the whole, civil servants tended to share these institutional views and 
internalised their views with reference to their institution, whereas politicians 
were more likely to have private citizens' perspectives or be informed by their 
political parties, as they internalised their views less to that of their institutions. 
Political party affiliations in these instances appear to have more directing power 
than that of their institution. Civil servants on the other hand carry out the work 
of their institution as directed by governing politicians and are therefore much 
more likely to express and perpetuate the institutional view of civil society, 
democracy and their inter-relationship. However, the deviant case of one 
European Commission Official suggests that the power of the civil servant to set 
his or her own agenda, within limits, must be taken into consideration.
Some credence to the idea that institutions do articulate and are able to 
reinforce conceptions of civil society, democracy and civil society's role must be 
given in the compatibility of many conceptions with their wider institutional
125
context. Thus, it would be expected that policy-makers do operationalise these 
concepts and that they will therefore structure civil society's role in the EU 
multi-level system. It must also be commented upon that if politician's political 
parties and world-views shape their conceptions, then these too may be expected 
to shape civil's society role, with certain political parties and individuals 
preferring particular civil society groups. This is evident in the different 
standpoints of the British Conservative party as compared to the British Labour 
party towards trade unions (see Grant, 2000). The examination of policy- 
makers' views also revealed that different governance levels operate with 
different conceptions of civil society in mind, particularly with regard to its 
boundaries. This is turn creates incompatibility and a degree of non-uniform 
filtering between levels in accessing civil society's view.
There is also an issue in regional and local governments being seen in the 
European context as civil society. If civil society is subordinate to the concerns 
of elected representatives then regional and local governments' concerns may 
also be subordinated to other elected representatives and decrease their political 
opportunities.
The almost wholesale internalisation of civil society conceptions by civil 
society groups suggests that groups can also be seen as social institutions with 
their own value and identity structures (much work has been done on this field, 
particularly on social movement organisations, see for example Herzog Jr, 1993). 
For the purposes of this study this means that the responses elicited from civil 
society groups on civil society, implies that the views of the CSO were accessed 
rather than personal views.
CONCLUSION
The first part of the chapter highlights the need for democratic assessments to 
consider the democratic characteristics and contributions of individual CSOs. 
The framework utilised here could be easily transposed to other studies wishing 
to explore CSOs' democratic contributions. This section also demonstrates that a 
key variable in CSOs' democratic contributions is their type of membership - 
whether they are umbrella, membership, statutory or charity groups. It does 
appear that what some CSOs lose by one democratic indicator, they gain by 
another. Thus, the involvement of predominantly umbrella groups in EU policy-
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making in this study need not be a bad thing for democracy per se, particularly as 
those groups not involved received a similar democratic rating as those involved. 
However, if the EU's democratic deficit is to be reconciled via participatory 
democracy with CSOs providing input legitimacy and reconnecting EU 
institutions with the citizens of Europe, then the lack of membership 
participation in these umbrella CSOs is worrying. The participation of umbrella 
groups highlights the existence of corporatist relations being peak organisations 
with less member/stakholder participation. The corporatist elements are further 
confirmed with the limited involvement of charities that are constrained by law 
and dependent on government resources. However, some pluralism is evident 
with umbrella groups exhibiting strong independence from governement and all 
groups possessing basic internal democracy and some member/stakeholder 
participation.
It is also evident that institutions' discourses on civil society and 
democracy limit the space for civil society's involvement in policy-making. 
Notably, practical criteria applied to civil society before engaging with them 
would appear to limit which civil society members can participate in policy- 
making. Differences in discourse are notable between the different institutional 
tiers, thus leading to the idea that different kinds of group may fare better or 
worse at different institutions involved in EU policy-making. Both institutional 
perspectives on civil society and democracy highlight the primacy of the status 
quo with representative democracy being supreme and civil society's 
contributions envisaged as aiding the existing system, particularly via service 
delivery in the British and Welsh perspectives.
Policy-makers both demonstrated divergence and parity with the 
institutional discourses. The politicians presented more personal views, some of 
which were shaped by their political party and sometimes were compatible with 
that of their institution. Civil servants more strongly internalised and replied 
with institutional discourses. The example of the European Commission Official 
suggests that the power of individual civil servants and freedom for their own 
views must also be taken into account when exploring the fit between 
institutional and individual perspectives. The result is that the people who 
operationalise these concepts do go some way in sharing these with their 
institutions. Therefore some structuring of civil society's role in policy-making
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along the lines of institutional discourses can be expected, although this will be 
further tested in Chapters Five and Six. Another important finding was the 
presence of different views of civil society held by policy-makers at different 
levels, suggesting that some aspects will be gained and/or lost at these different 
levels if civil society seeks to work through them in order to influence the course 
of EU policy-making. Moreover, the primacy of representative democracy 
perspectives among policy-makers and even CSOs indicates that civil society's 
role in policy-making will be on the margins. Does civil society in Wales' 
involvement in general EU policy-making echo these sentiments? It is to this 
area that the study now turns, to examine how civil society groups operate 
generally in regard to EU policy-making and whether institutional discursive 
opportunities play a formative role.
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THE CONTEXT: EUROPEAN UNION POLICY-MAKING,
CIVIL SOCIETY IN WALES AND POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
This thesis now moves to an analysis of civil society's general engagement in 
EU policy-making. This chapter will provide the context to the case study on 
"The Convention" in Chapter Six. The POS will be applied to the subject matter 
at hand, EU policy-making23 and Wales. This chapter will firstly outline the POS 
in relation to where, how and when civil society in Wales can and should be 
involved in EU policy-making and will highlight the structural factors 
constraining CSO's participation. Secondly, the chapter will illuminate where, 
when, how, why and which CSOs under study engage and do not engage in EU 
policy-making. Consequently, civil society's actual success in the EU policy- 
making process can be estimated and compared with the empirical research 
findings. The factors that shape and explain civil society's policy-making role 
will also be analysed.
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: FROM WALES TO 
THEEU
This section will outline the more stable aspects of the POS by divulging the 
institutional opportunity structure (the legal, procedural and power dynamics of 
institutions involved in the policy-making process from Wales to the EU) and 
informal procedures and prevailing strategies (interest group relations with 
institutions and institutional conceptions/discourses) by means of other studies, 
literature, documents and interview material. The exploration into interest group 
institutional mediation will also provide some basic analysis on the possible 
existence of corporatist or pluralist relations.
One additional caveat, the EU policy process to Wales is variegated along 
two dimensions: a) the sector/issue (Wallace, 2000a), and b) the type of 
policy/legislative instrument. The former not only outlines where responsibility
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for competency lies, but also gives shape to the type of policy community and 
informal ad hoc procedures deployed in creating policy. The policy/legislative 
instrument is similarly fashioned by the sector, as the European Community (EC) 
Treaties dictate the procedure for formulating legislation in a given sector/area. 
The procedure affects institutional power dynamics, determining who is involved 
and to what extent. Equally, the type of legislative instrument also determines 
regional involvement/discretion in implementation. As an overview of the EU 
process, providing the context to the Convention case study, this chapter 
recognises these different factors but will not explore these in depth.
The chapter will first explore the institutional opportunity structure: how 
the different political institutions are engaged in the EU policy-making process. 
This will illuminate the different institutional roles and constraints and enable an 
understanding of civil society's activities in EU policy-making.
Institutional Opportunity Structure
The legal basis for Welsh involvement in European Union policy-making 
One of the arguments put forward for devolution by the pro-devolution 
movement in Wales was the prospect of a more active, independent voice in 
Europe (Bulmer et al., 2002:146). Thus, it would be expected that the devolved 
Assembly24 would have some input into EU policy-making. However, the EU 
remains a reserved matter for the UK government. Nevertheless, the Assembly 
must abide by EC obligations, has the power to implement EC policies (106.1 
Government of Wales Act) and can create subordinate legislation to carry out 
that implementation when European orders have been designated to it under 
section 2 (2) of the European Community Act of 1972 (Miers, 2002:34). The 
Government of Wales Act also entitles Wales to have representation in Europe 
and to have a standing European Committee. Thus, the scope from the 
devolution settlement for the Assembly to impact EU policy is rather minimal.
Fortunately for the Assembly, that is not the end of its European story. 
As many of its devolved functions are strongly affected by the EU (NAW, 
2003a) (Annex Two outlines the crossover of areas), the UK government does 
involve the Assembly in EU policy decisions that affect devolved areas and 
Wales, as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding and Concordats:
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... the UK Government wishes to involve the Assembly Cabinet as 
directly and fully as possible in decision-making on EU matters which 
touch on devolved areas (including non-devolved maters which impact 
on devolved areas and non-devolved matters which will have a distinctive 
impact of importance to Wales). (B2.3, NAW, 1999:2)(Italics added)
From the above excerpt, the WAG cabinet is positioned as the key Welsh actor in 
negotiating EU policy. However, it is important to note that this concordat, 
Memorandum of Understanding and other concordats (concluded between 
different Whitehall departments and the WAG) are not legally binding, but are 
only codes of good practice. This inter-governmental process is seen to be 
functioning well under current party political alignments, but this has yet to be 
tested by the presence of a different governing party in London to Cardiff (Scott, 
2003:276). These arrangements also create a high degree of nesting (from the 
viewpoint of the Assembly) and low autonomy, and decrease the Assembly's 
potential to create different EU policies and consequently civil society's ability 
to press competing claims (on the effects of nesting see Meyer, 2003).
The legal settlement is complicated by two further matters: a) changes in 
the Assembly set-up and b) the original basis of the settlement. The Government 
of Wales Act and Concordats were intended for a corporate NAW model with 
executive power invested in the whole of the Assembly. The separation of the 
NAW from the WAG in 2001 has complicated matters and changed procedures 
(for further elaboration see Osmond, 2003a). This state of affairs is exacerbated 
by the messiness of the original Welsh devolution settlement. Unlike Scotland, 
Wales was not given overarching areas of competence; instead, Wales has 
certain powers in aspects of devolved areas based on the former Secretary of 
State for Wales' powers. In other words, whilst Scotland has responsibility for 
culture, Wales has only certain powers to change aspects of cultural policy; the 
rest is kept with the UK (this problem is outlined in Mike German's evidence to 
the Richard Commission, 2002). This legal situation places a premium on 
Assembly-UK government relations:
Consequently, if that influence is to have an impact at EU level much will 
depend on the relationship between the administrations of the regions and 
its member state. (Scott, 2003:281)
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EUpolicy-making: procedures, functions and process
Welsh institutions
This section shall discuss the involvement of the committees, the NAW and the 
WAG in turn in EU policy-making. Some areas of the Assembly are more 
affected by the European dimension than others, making lobbying at certain 
committees and departments more likely:
Most of what the Welsh Assembly Government has responsibility for is 
affected by decisions taken at EU level - particularly so with agriculture; 
economic issues such as Structural Funds, state aids and transport; 
environmental legislation and to a lesser degree areas like health, 
education, youth policy and culture. (First Minister for Wales, 2003:1)
In the EEAC (NAW, 2004a) discussion of the NAW's scrutiny procedures, the 
European dimension was viewed to be most prominent in two subject 
committees: the Economic Development and Transport Committee, and the 
Environment Planning and Countryside Committee.25 However, Committees 
themselves have limited powers. Initially expected to be decision-making fora, 
they now scrutinise Cabinet Ministers (formerly called "Secretaries"), legislation 
and have some powers of policy development through reviews and discussions 
(Lang and Storer 2003). In the current working arrangements the Assembly's 
executive powers are invested in the First Minister and the Cabinet.
It is the Ministers who lay proposals for secondary legislation, firstly to 
the Business Committee and then to the Legislative Committee who decide 
whether it should go on to individual subject committees, a plenary or be 
approved. In the first course of action, the subject committees can suggest 
amendments and the proposal then goes plenary where it can be passed, amended 
or refused. This system creates secondary legislation, which is sometimes 
needed to implement EC obligations, which allows the Assembly to influence 
EU policy-making at this late stage. Thus, power in this process is concentrated 
among Cabinet Ministers, then among subject committee members and finally 
among ordinary Assembly Members in the subordinate legislation process and in 
decision-making generally:
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Instead of corporate, cross-party decision-making the reality was a much 
more centralised model of decision-making with Alun Michael [former 
First Secretary of the Assembly] in a key role. (Bulmer et al., 2002:106)
However, passing subordinate legislation to implement EC obligations has 
limited scope to shape policy as: a) regulations do not need to be transposed as 
they automatically take effect, b) sometimes uniformity is needed across the UK 
and the same legislation is passed in Wales or is passed for Wales by the UK 
government (although Mike German has argued this can increase Wales' 
bargaining power, Richard Commission, 2002), and c) margins for change at this 
stage are small (NAW, 2004a:l).
The NAW and WAG have a role to play in policy formulation and 
development. The NAW's subject committees are meant to consider and 
scrutinise European draft proposals with relevance for Wales but this often was 
"patchy" (NAW, 2003b:7). An exception to this was the structural funds debate 
having "been very comprehensive" (NAW, 2003b:7). Yet sometimes 
committees can run reviews and consultations, such as on the Mid-Term Review 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, and feed into WAG and also 
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs that way. The CAP 
and Structural Funds are of extreme financial importance to Wales, being the 
largest EU programmes that Wales manages (WAG, 2002a). Wales also has 
different interests to the UK on these issues, thus their treatment reflects their 
importance to Wales. The subject committees are also meant to hold WAG 
Ministers to account, but this is problematic in EU policy-making since WAG 
Ministers are bound by confidentiality in formulating the UK line (Bulmer et al., 
2002:99). The NAW has the EEAC, which is a standing committee that provides 
overall co-ordination on NAW-EU relations. The committee has a membership 
that includes Welsh representatives in the EU, and EU representatives in Wales 
as part of the "team Wales" approach to EU issues.
Concerning
the role of the Ministers, WAG is able to influence EU policy through the UK 
government. WAG also runs consultations both for, and independently of, 
Whitehall departments on EU proposals (it may also do this on the 
implementation of EC directives). Most EU policy is actually dealt with by 
Whitehall departments, one taking a lead and consulting the WAG Cabinet,
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usually firstly at official (i.e. civil servants) then at ministerial level, depending 
on the department concordat. If the administrations have difficulties in agreeing, 
then the Joint Ministerial Committee Europe (JMC(E)) is meant to act as a 
conflict resolution device and/or the Secretary of State may intervene (although 
the JMC(E) is steadily becoming an information forum - Bulmer et al., 2006:83). 
Sometimes the Cabinet Office takes the lead in important and cross-cutting 
issues, and here the Secretary of State for Wales (or the Deputy) represents 
Welsh views as mediated through an UK government minister. Once proposals 
are in draft, the lead Whitehall department will consult with devolved 
administration Officials to write an Explanatory Memorandum detailing the 
effects of any legislation, including any effects on Wales (NAW, 2003a:2). 
Thus, through this avenue the WAG can exert pressure. WAG can continue to 
press its perspective even when the UK line is decided, although it must abide by 
that line, through the UK government's United Kingdom's Permanent 
Representation to the European Union (UKREP) and the WAG's office in 
Brussels. At the Council of Ministers (the key decision-taking body at the EU) 
WAG Ministers can attend as part of the UK delegation.26 WAG Officials in 
Europe can also sit on Council Working groups for the UK (NAW, 2003a:l). 
The WAG Brussels' office can furthermore have informal relations with the 
European Commission, informing the European Commission of the Welsh view, 
and has close relations with UKREP, being part of the same UKREP "family" 
(interview, civil servant, 2004).
Constraining factors are that Wales has a small policy capacity (Kay, 
2003:54), few AMs, and the power of the Assembly government is relative to 
Whitehall (Richardson Commission, 2004:164). There is no legal requirement 
for the UK government to take on the Assembly's views, only recognition that it 
will make for better implementation and happier government (and a united 
Labour party) if views are taken on board. Even then as the situation with match 
funding at the start of the Assembly's life shows, relations are not always 
harmonious (see Royles, 2003:135-137). Moreover, internally there are different 
party alignments, with Welsh Labour aligning itself towards "old" Labour and 
desiring to be different to the UK Labour party. Such sentiments were 
symbolised by the First Minister's call for a "clear red water" in Swansea in 
December 2002 (for the coverage of this speech see Shipton, 2002) which may
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also present an opportunity for civil society groups in Wales. It can be argued 
the UK government's involvement of and acquiescence of some of the devolved 
administrations demands is merely an expedient measure to limit calls for further 
to curb devolution and nationalism (interview, UK civil servant, 2004). Bar this, 
the Assembly has very limited scope to influence the UK, with most of the 
bargaining chips on the UK side, as demonstrated by the few Wales-only bills 
passed by the UK parliament (presently four, with four in the pipeline):27
Wales is at best low on the legislative radar of Westminster. (Jeffery, 
2004a: 3)
Wales also has other links to the EU, through the CoR (two AMs and two local 
councillors are representatives) but this body only has advisory status and is not 
treated as having serious weight hi the EU policy/legislative process (for 
example Greenwood, 2003a:65). Another important avenue for Welsh influence 
is through networks of regions, and via this route Wales can have a different 
policy to the UK Member State. In effect, regional associations are subject to the 
same constraints as other interest groups seeking to influence the EU policy 
process.
Nevertheless, the Assembly does play a role in EU policy, with different 
parts of the Assembly being involved in different stages of the policy process. 
Across the board, it is notable that the WAG is more important as opposed to the 
rest of the AMs. Not to be overstated, this is constrained by the need for 
consensus (a key part of devolution was that it was to operate differently from 
the Westminster model and in Wales the small majority in favour of devolution 
means actors have to be kept on board) and coalition government (until the 2003 
election), and AMs can also ask questions in plenaries and force amendments. 
Assembly influence is further considerably hampered by time and resources as 
there are only sixty AMs, many of whom have several committee duties, thus 
limiting time devoted to "European" issues. Furthermore, the UK government is 
the most important avenue for the Assembly to influence the process (Thompson, 
1999); however this influence is far from guaranteed, with the Assembly being 
very tightly nested into the UK.
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United Kingdom institutions
Wales' involvement with Europe does not begin and end with the 
Assembly (Clifford, 2002:44)
What we need in Wales is a clearer understanding that the Government of 
Wales Act 1998 set up a legislative system in which both the National 
Assembly and Westminster play a role. If pressure groups wishing to 
influence policy fail to recognise this, they fail to pull the correct levers 
to influence the political process in Wales. (Memorandum submitted by 
lan Lucas, Evidence 87 House of Commons, 2003:117)
The above quotes direct attention to the importance of the UK context to Wales 
generally and the first quote specifically to EU policy. Highlighted is the role 
that Wales/the WAG can play in the British context and also recognition that 
Welsh civil society groups can go directly to the British arena. Therefore the 
role and importance of the different part of the British institutions in EU policy- 
making must be considered in order to understand the opportunities for CSOs in 
Wales to influence this arena. What will now be explored is the British procedure 
for attending to EU policy, identifying opportunities, key actors and the power of 
the UK governmental machinery in this EU process.
Member State governments have more involvement in some EU policy 
areas and procedures than others. The main institution for Member State 
involvement is the EU Council of Ministers, which has various working groups 
and tiers of Officials from Member States including the UK. This has the power 
to make decisions about whether to amend or proceed with a policy, but in 
practice Member States will have been consulted before the policy was being 
formulated (Nugent, 1999). The Council can also initiate policy by means of 
Article 208 where it can ask the European Commission to examine policy areas 
through its European Council; and when a Member State gains the Presidency, it 
can steer the EU's overall policy direction (Nugent, 1999). Co-decision has 
limited the power of the Council of Ministers, by dividing its decision-making 
role with the European Parliament. UKREP deals directly with the European 
institutions, particularly the Council of Ministers.
There are other British representatives in Brussels, on the EU's ECOSOC 
(two of which live in Wales) and the CoR. The Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) select these representatives, but the devolved administrations are
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asked to nominate representatives for the CoR. Briefing is also carried out by 
the FCO to British MEPs, ECOSOC and CoR members. British influence in the 
EU is aided by being a large Member State, but obviously limited by other 
Member States (creating some nesting), new EU procedures such as co-decision, 
the need for compromise and the decline of the Member State veto with many 
decisions made on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV) rather than 
unanimity.
UK civil servants view UKREP, FCO and the Cabinet Office as the 
"golden triangle" in EU affairs (interview, UK civil servant, 2004). Thus, in 
Britain, it is the European Secretariat Cabinet office together with the FCO that 
takes strategic overview, and the Secretariat acts as a co-ordinator by bringing 
together differently affected departments and highlighting issues to Ministers 
through a system of cabinet and official committees (Spence, 1993). The FCO is 
involved as the "post-box" (Spence, 1993:61) of all EU correspondence and on 
the day-to-day running of EU issues. The FCO's parliamentary relations and 
devolution department briefs the devolved nations and now has a Partnerships 
and Networks Development Unit. The Whitehall department whose area the 
particular EU policy falls under discusses any implications with the European 
Secretariat Cabinet and then is kept in the loop by their minister's involvement. 
Thus, in the Westminster political system it does appear that the executive and 
civil service are the key players in British engagement in EU policy-making. 
Tony Blair's increasingly presidential style of government and the importance of 
European Councils in setting EU orientation aids executive control (Bulmer and 
March, 2003); executive power should not be overstated, as Rhodes (1997) 
argues that the UK is moving away from the Westminster model to the 
differentiated polity model where policy communities of a range of actors arise 
around specialisations.
Westminster too has a role to play in the EU process, albeit confined 
mostly to scrutiny. In the House of Commons, the European Scrutiny 
Committee (ESC) meets once a week to sift EU policy proposals and white 
papers prior to their being sent to the Council of Ministers. The ESC then can 
choose to send them to specific EU committees to assess and debate in detail the 
political and legal importance of any documents (Hood, 2002). It also receives 
all Whitehall intelligence and can question Ministers. Bulmer et al. (2002:73)
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describes these as strong procedures in comparison to other EU governments.28 
Westminster possesses a scrutiny reserve whereby the UK government cannot 
agree to a proposal until it has been satisfactorily scrutinised by the Commons 
committees. However, one MP pointed out the limits to the ESC's influence in 
that firstly, with co-decision agreement can be reached at an early stage 
secondly, on the scrutiny reserve the government does not need to take on its 
concerns, and finally the general stage at which the Committee receives EU 
policy "is sort of, you know, trying to shut the door once the horse has bolted" 
(Interview, MP, 2004).
The House of Lords runs a similar scrutiny method where documents are 
sent to sub-committees for further scrutiny. The House of Commons is 
furthermore responsible for scrutinising the implementation of EC obligations 
and passing EC legislation. The House of Commons is a member of the 
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of 
the European Union (COSAC), but apart from this they have little direct access 
to the EU institutions. However, as Wales still retains MPs, the views of civil 
society groups in Wales could be fed through these representatives to the House 
of Commons' EU committees. Finally, implementation of EU policies is also the 
prime responsibility of the lead Whitehall department with the European 
Secretariat and FCO taking oversight. Welsh potential impact at this stage is 
limited because some directives need uniformity across the UK, which means 
that the UK is the arena to influence regarding the implementation of some 
directives.
European Union institutions
Which are the key avenues/institutions for influencing EU policy-making at the 
European level? The answer to that question depends in part upon how the 
European construction is viewed: as a supra-national body or an inter­ 
governmental club of states. Nonetheless, common features about the policy 
process can be discerned. Broadly conceived, the European Commission is 
responsible for drawing up proposals and overseeing the implementation of EU 
policy:
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For this reason it is target for everyone who wants to influence the 
content of policy. (Wallace, 2000a:15)
The proposal stage is central to influencing the shape of policy, as Hull (1993) 
estimates that after the proposal stage the scope for change is only around 20%. 
However, the European Commission is constrained by needing to take on board 
the concerns of many actors. This is because the European Commission has to 
consider the Council and/or the EP's reactions, as legislation has to be approved 
by the Council and/or the EP. Further considerations are the ability of proposals 
to work across European Member States and the perception of the European 
Commission as having a legitimacy deficit because it consists of unelected 
Officials:
Policy initiation in the European Union is a multi-actor activity ... the 
Commission holds the pen but is subject to pressures from many actors. 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001:14)
The European Commission also has an Office in Wales, primarily responsible for 
monitoring and awareness-raising, as it is part of the European Commission it 
does present an avenue for policy influence (interviewed policy-makers testified 
to this). Under certain EU procedures the ECOSOC and the CoR may also be 
consulted and requested to produce opinions, but these opinions are not binding 
and the institutions are perceived as lightweight European bodies. These 
institutions are restricted by the availability of other EU avenues to their 
members (Nugent, 1999: 284-8).
Proposals then fall to the EP, which is a co-legislator with the Council in 
co-decision. During this procedure the EP can force amendments or refuse 
legislation (in all other procedures the Council is required to consult the EP on its 
common position and in the co-operation procedure it can suggest amendments). 
EP committees are central to the EP and study policy areas in depth. This careful 
policy examination, combined with EP veto-power in co-decision, makes it hard 
for the Council to completely disagree with the EP. The EP's elected mandate 
increases its policy negotiating power, although low European election turnouts 
question MEPs' representativeness. Indeed, the EP may prefer to amend rather 
than block legislation in order to get something passed, reducing its power 
(Dodd, Ware and Weston, 1997).
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The Council of Ministers has already been discussed with respect to the 
UK. However, the power of any one Member State has been reduced by QMV 
and the norm that the Luxembourg Compromise (Member State veto) should not 
be used, thus Member State Officials must build up coalitions to block or 
promote policy (Mazey and Richardson, 1993a), Equally important is the fact 
that many of the Council of Ministers' decisions are made in working groups of 
Officials and do not reach ministerial stage (Wallace, 2000a: 17-8).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is another avenue for influence as it 
can sanction Member States' failure to implement EU legislation. An additional 
aspect of the EU policy process is that around particular sectors and policies arise 
policy networks, with appropriate rules of behaviour (Kochler-Koch, 1999), and 
this also plays a factor in structuring opportunities.
Summary
This review of the procedures and legal workings of the EU policy process 
identifies several avenues and key actors for civil society influence. Some are 
more significant than others, but with a degree of nesting to be found among all 
of them with no institution or actor being completely autonomous. The 
Assembly has a role throughout the policy-making process, but ultimately the 
significance of this role rests in the hands of the UK Member State. Here, 
Whitehall departments and Officials are pivotal in EU policy-making. Yet 
particularly with co-decision one Member State cannot control outcomes alone. 
Among the European institutions the European Commission is especially 
important in shaping policy and is susceptible to outside interests. The role of 
the different political institutions and actors also vary with the policy stage, with 
the proposal stage with the most potential for policy impact. The procedural 
aspects of the POS demonstrate that the EU policy process is a multi-level POS. 
However, the political institution a CSO chooses to engage with on EU policy 
also depends on the civil society group at hand, their aims and also how much 
space an institution and its actors accord civil society groups. Thus it is to 
interest group relations and institutional discourses that the discussion now turns.
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Institutions' relations with interest groups
Welsh institutions' relations with interest groups
There has been little research conducted on civil society in Wales post- 
devolution and the EU. Therefore, this discussion will concentrate upon general 
Assembly-group relations, with reference to the European dimension where 
possible, as this will set the general context for Assembly-group relations. It is 
logically expected that Wales will be an important arena for CSOs in Wales on 
EU issues, for commentators conclude that Welsh groups following devolution 
have transferred their policy lenses from Westminster (evidence given by lan 
Lucas to the House of Commons, 2003; Loughlin and Sykes, 2004:1). This is 
reinforced by Kriesi's (1995:170) view that decentralisation increases groups' 
access to the political process. However, as EU policy is not devolved to the 
Assembly there is a high degree of institutional nesting, resulting in less scope 
for groups to influence the Welsh institutions on EU policy. This chapter will 
more fully explore which expectation prevails.
The Assembly has a statutory duty to consult with local government, 
business and the voluntary sector in the name of partnership, further 
encapsulating the Assembly's uniqueness. This duty is partially fulfilled through 
partnership councils. Thus, structures and legalities echo (or create) the 
Assembly's conception of civil society as encompassing public, private and 
voluntary sectors. These partnership councils will now be discussed in turn.
It is discernible that from the outset, among the Government of Wales 
Act and partnership council founding documents there is less discussion of the 
Business Sector Partnership Council (BSPC) as opposed to the VSPC and the 
Local Government Partnership Council (LGPC). This suggests that the BSPC 
has less of a role to play than the other two. The plans for local government are 
the most extensive; both in the LGPC and the VSPC there is discussion of shared 
principles. With the BSPC there is a sense of a slow start, as testified by 
business being unprepared for devolution (Thomas, forthcoming). It is only 
when the framework plans for the council is developing that a Business Wales 
forum emerges. In all three of the partnership councils there is an acceptance 
that much of the duty to consult will occur outside of the partnership councils, 
through day-to-day contacts and other fora. The partnership councils instead will
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monitor the statutory duty and bring up issues of general concern. However, the 
LPGC also has working groups, where Assembly and local government Officials 
consider policy matters in detail (this is however not binding, NAW, 2004b: 16).
The BSPC includes representatives of business organisations, trade union 
representatives and social economy representatives who have a legitimate 
interest in business across the board. In practice these consist of Wales wide 
networks. Nonetheless, there are arrangements to engage with local businesses 
through regional economic fora and the regional committees. This is however 
cast in the dark shadow of the Assembly's regional committees' unrealised 
promise as they have had limited ability to contribute to policy and have not 
removed the perception "that the Assembly is biased in favour of Cardiff and the 
south east" (Richardson, 2003:235).
The Voluntary Sector Partnership Council is kept in check by a yearly 
review of the scheme. Recently the Jones Commission (2004) carried out a 
review of scheme and highlighted that voluntary groups are concerned that the 
VSPC was viewed as the forum to consult the voluntary sector and therefore the 
statutory duty is fulfilled. Local groups in the review were also being depicted 
as being on the margins of the VSPC and often not aware of the scheme. This 
finding is backed up by research conducted by Hodgson (2004:91). Twenty-one 
sectoral networks, set up by the WCVA, are intended consult smaller 
organisations.29 The review found this network consultation wanting, with local 
groups often being in the dark about policy and the voluntary sector scheme. 
This corresponds to the forthcoming discussion on institutional discourse, which 
places an emphasis on large bodies. Positive sentiments were issued overall by 
the review:
There is now a greater quantity and higher quality of dialogue at all 
levels, from strategy to policy development and service delivery. Greater 
mutual trust, based on more understanding of each other's needs and 
constraints, has begun to lead to greater effectiveness on the ground. 
(Jones Commission, 2004: 30)
However, this stands in stark contrast to Cole's (2004) more negative findings on 
the other councils:
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Insiders criticised the superficial character of this neo-corporatist 
ambition. Businesses resent the Assembly's demands on its time and 
perceived its influence over policy to be limited. Local government 
suspected the Assembly of aggrandizement at its expense. Only the 
voluntary sector was positive. (Cole, 2004:359)
These criticisms must be placed in context of Loughlin and Sykes' (2004:3) 
argument that business has lost special treatment enjoyed with the Wales Office 
and local government's power relations with the Assembly. These criticisms 
may however suggest that within civil society as perceived theoretically that the 
voluntary sector is key.
The European dimension receives varied coverage within the Partnership 
Councils. A brief search of LGPC 2001-2004 documents for explicitly European 
content revealed that there was some limited discussion of the EU in the areas of 
best practice of working time directives, UK consultation of implementing EU 
employment and race directives, funding and partnerships, derogation of EC 
rules and European Social Funds at the time of Foot and Mouth disease, and 
transport. These instances represented a small amount of local government 
partnership council's work. The BSPC had the most extensive coverage of 
European issues. A review of its 2001-2004 documents revealed substantial 
discussion of the European Structural Funds, mainly regarding business 
involvement in the l/3s partnership principle, but also in the mid-term evaluation 
and review. There was some discussion of CAP and of EU regulations as they 
affected particular programmes. Finally, there was a paper and discussion on the 
imminent introduction of Landfill Directive in 2004. The VSPC, like the LGPC, 
has few references to European issues. When the EU has come up, this has been 
concentrated on structural funds (with regards to capacity building, country 
voluntary council partnerships, request for a report on EU structural funding, and 
progress of a particular fund) and these were generally discussed in reference to 
other issues. This is worrying, given the Jones Commission's warning that there 
was "a danger of the VSPC being perceived as the sole forum for voluntary 
sector issues" (Jones Commission, 2004:95). This warning does seem to be the 
case for European issue as earlier in 2002 Tom Jones, Chair of WCVA, 
suggested that VSPC discussion could be "transferable to the EU and its
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institutions" (WAG, 2002b:12). This suggestion has evidently not been taken up 
bytheVSPC.
Where else does civil society group-Assembly interaction occur? There 
are several locations, including formal consultations by subject committees 
and/or WAG, attendance at subject committee meetings, working groups, task 
and finish groups, monitoring committees, forums and seminars. Stakeholder 
groups to develop policy seem to be becoming more common and in the main 
consist of well known, Wales-wide groups. Informal contacts with groups and 
Officials and AMs also exist and as Betts, Borland and Chaney (2001:65) 
suggest, these may also be pivotal. The voluntary sector scheme review revealed 
that there was no uniformity in relations among Assembly divisions (i.e. the 
departments) and the voluntary sector, with the Assembly divisions using 
"mailing lists of 50 or more voluntary organisations to the use of WCVA only" 
(Jones, Commission, 2004:62).
Culturally, the concept of Assembly is bound up with such frames as 
inclusivity and partnership. Indeed, evidence points to a culture change in 
Assembly-groups relations, with groups enjoying more open and accessible 
government. By the same token, limiting factors are present as to whether this 
partnership equates with influence (Nicholl, forthcoming, discovered that groups 
found it easier to get issues on agenda than to influence policy). Larger groups' 
or stakeholders' engagement is stressed as much as general public participation 
in the NAW (Hazell, 2003:287), reducing the suggested community involvement 
inherent in the NAW conception of civil society (see this chapter, last section). 
There is a further difficulty in the conundrum facing many groups, whereby they 
are lobbying the hand that pays for their group's existence (Drakeford, 
forthcoming). In the first year of the Assembly, Fevre and Chaney (2000) also 
raised concerns that dissension and debate were discouraged, with consensus 
being the rule of the day, limiting divergence.
How much of this interest group-Assembly relations is transferable to EU 
policy? Firstly, as Loughlin and Sykes (2004:5) note, "Cardiff has become the 
most important reference followed by Westminster and Brussels", while Europe 
is several places away geographically as well as on the agenda. European Union 
funding is in a different situation, with the NAW evoking the l/3s principle of 
partnership (of public, private and voluntary/community) in structural funding
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programmes and also on monitoring committees (Royles, 2003). The voluntary 
sector is involved this way, as is the business community (although Royles, 
2003, contends the public sector is still de facto hi charge).
On other EU policy issues it is up to the individual subject committee 
and/or Minister. However, cross-cutting European issues are evident in 
discussions of the Euro and enlargement, where the NAW set up a preparation 
committee for the Euro and a working group on enlargement. The membership 
compromised some of civil society in Wales, who were Wales-wide 
organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors. The Euro 
Committee included Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Wales, Farming 
Union of Wales, WCVA, Welsh Consumer Council, Wales Development 
Agency (WDA), National Health Service, Welsh Language Bureau, Wales 
Tourist Board, Wales Local Government Association (WLGA), Wales Trades 
Union Congress (WTUC) and a few others. Suggested membership of the 
enlargement group covered similar territory compromising Elwa, Higher 
Education Wales, WDA, the Federation of Small Businesses, the CBI and the 
WCVA.
It was expected that public, private and voluntary sector involvement 
would be harnessed on generic European issues through the Wales European 
Forum (WEF) which would also include Welsh European representatives. This 
group met in 2000, 2001 and in February 2002 to discuss European 
governance.30 The WEF importantly was part of the " 'all Wales' approach to 
EU policies" (WAG, 2002a:l). The convening of the WEF in February 2002 to 
discuss the European Commission's White Paper on Governance (for more 
information see WAG, 2002b) is a pertinent example of how Wales would deal 
with EU issues without the confidentiality and strictures entailed by maintaining 
the UK line. The EEAC invited seventeen organisations to submit written 
responses as consultation on their European Governance approach. These 
organisations encompassed many of the groups mentioned in the above working 
groups. The WEF continued this pattern, having in attendance from the 
NGO/media sector: WCVA, Age Concern, WTUC, Welsh Centre for 
International Affairs, Institute of Welsh Affairs and BBC Wales (interestingly no 
explicit "business" representation). This means that in this instance
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governmental access was structured, made exclusive and restricted to those 
organisations who the state wished to invite.
There was also an emphasis on partnership through European 
representation via the WEC, a collection of mainly Assembly Sponsored Public 
Bodies (ASPBs), universities and some large voluntary groups. WEC engaged 
groups and delivers information to them on European policy/legislation.
In terms of whether this situation evokes corporatist or pluralist relations, 
the picture is mixed. The partnership council structures as Cole (2004: 354) and 
Chaney and Fevre (2001:38) comment evoke neo-corporatism as they formalise 
and rein in civil society groups' participation. These councils also have a degree 
of hierarchy, with groups representing their whole sector. However the 
Assembly is seen to have opened up access to groups since the Welsh Office 
(Chaney, 2002:29), increasing pluralism. Although Nicholl's (2002: 19) 
stakeholder survey on civil society discovered that on "whether CSO have good 
access to the legislature ... [s] lightly more respondents gave a negative reply to 
the question than positive". With respect to cross-sector EU policies, it does 
appear that the Assembly does restrict, whether out of concerns for efficiency, or 
practical realities, civil society participation to a few well-known large groups 
again conjuring up corporatism. Nonetheless, on more specific policy matters, 
the Assembly's hallmark of accessibility may be evident. It is hard to discern the 
extent to which groups transcend consultation to become full decision-makers. 
However, many of these CSOs involved in the WEF and Assembly working 
groups are also engaged in the practical administration of Structural Funds policy 
and are "partners". Moreover, the Assembly funds many of these groups which 
reduces their independence from the state. For example the Assembly funds the 
WCVA and helped to finance a Wales Social Partners Unit between Business 
Wales and WTUC to monitor the Assembly.
United Kingdom institutions'relations with interest groups 
Civil society groups in Wales have two options when it comes to the British 
political arena: a) get involved themselves, or b) get involved with 
networks/partner organisations at the British level.31 The first option may be 
tricky if there is a decidedly "Welsh" policy articulated by groups on a devolved 
issue, in which case Whitehall departments may expect such representations to
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be delivered and mediated through the Assembly, even on reserved issues. The 
first option is also problematic in the conclusion of a compact concluded 
between the UK government and the voluntary and community sector in 
England. There are best practice guides and arrangements for consultation by 
Whitehall departments but this is among English groups, not Welsh ones, as 
remarked upon by the Jones Commission (2004) review of the Welsh voluntary 
sector scheme:
There is currently no formal relationship between the UK government 
and the voluntary sector in Wales on non-devolved issues. Whitehall 
departments are not therefore under any obligation to engage with the 
voluntary sector in Wales on policy issues affecting it. (Jones 
Commission, 2004:41)
Thus, option b may be the only solution and this author will focus upon the 
experiences' of UK groups in general. The voluntary sector compact suggests 
that voluntary organisations should be consulted on issues affecting it, but as 
Burt and Taylor (2004:72) comment, there is great variation on its use. Yet 
Labour has increased consultation with the third sector and been keen to harness 
groups in partnership "all of which draw voluntary organisations into complex 
policy communities intersecting national, regional and local levels." (Burt and 
Taylor 2004:73)
However, is this the case in the area of high politics of the EU? Indeed, 
as Spence (1993) describes the UK government/civil service-EU machinery, it is 
evident that interaction is meant to occur at Whitehall department level, although 
he reserves UKREP desk officers with special lobbying status so ensuring "much 
of the machinery is inaccessible to private sector lobbyists" (Spence, 1993:68). 
Thus, arrangements at the British level depend upon existing relationships with 
Whitehall departments and their engagement in policy communities/networks. 
In a review of the FCO's stakeholders in late 2002 among the "other" group 
some organisations did not feel they had much impact on proposals and that the 
FCO deals with a few select groups/individuals (Jackson and Hoyller, 2002).
Yet Richardson (2000) recognises that whilst stability is prevalent in 
many of the EU's low-key, technocratic issues, the EU actually creates instability 
in interactions between groups and policy-makers and so disrupts policy 
communities. Indeed Richardson (2000) points out that as the EU and its
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institutions increase in power, groups are steadily reorienting their lobbying 
efforts from the national government towards the EU institutions themselves. 
However, in contrast, Statham and Gray (2004), when looking at the claims 
made by British actors on Europe, see the British debate as dominated by elite 
actors with civil society groups not substantially engaged:
This shows that for the moment at least British civic actors see Europe as 
an issue of national concern to be dealt through the normal channels of 
interaction with the national government, rather than as a new 
relationship to a supranational polity. (Statham and Gray, 2004:22)
Such findings have some resonance with Reilly's (2004) examination of 
responses to the European Commission's WPG, where he reveals that the UK 
government's response is silent on the role of broad civil society in European 
governance:
No reference is made to civil society in the UK government's response, 
the exception being that 'consumer and business representatives should 
be fully consulted' (UK Government, 2001:annex). No mention is made 
of the use of either existing civic forums in the UK or the role that 
regional assemblies in the UK can provide as channels with wider civil 
society. (Reilly, 2004:143)
This suggests that although the UK government under Labour may have 
enhanced consultation with civil society groups generally, on European issues 
economic groups prevail, as outlined in the institutional discourses (see Annex 
One). Instead, civil society in Britain is extensively involved in implementing 
and devising EU funded projects (Etherington, 2002). Their role appears more 
confined to service-provider than advocate, and suggests the UK conception of 
civil society is confined to community politics, and rather more restrictive in EU 
policy. Indeed Fairbrass and Jordan's (2002) study of EU policy in the field of 
biodiversity and landplanning and UK environmental groups shows the 
difficulties new groups face in influencing EU policy. In this case, UK 
environmental groups went to the EU level in order to effect change because of 
difficulties they faced in accessing closed policy communities in the UK; while 
the smaller environmental groups worked through their British parents and/or 
networks.
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Due to the centralised nature of its policy-making the UK is seen to 
exhibit fairly pluralist relations with interest groups (Porta, 2003). Access is 
however hard to gain in EU policy-making, as much of the machinery is not 
public and is particularly difficult for groups in Wales. This limits the extent of 
group's involvement but increases the notion that pluralism is present, 
particularly as there are no formal partnership structures like the councils in 
Wales. However, the UK government appears to be selective concerning the 
groups with which it engages on EU issues, indicating some corporatism.
European Union institutions' relations with interest groups 
The EU encompasses many venues and working arrangements. This is similar to 
the other levels of government in that there is no one pattern of civil society- 
institutional interaction; instead, the EU policy process is characterised by 
uncertain outcomes (Greenwood, 2002:24). This has been further complicated 
by the expansion of the EU, making it hard for arrangements to bed down and 
stabilise. However, as groups "are the 'natural constituency' of the European 
Commission in particular" (Greenwood, 2003b:2), the European Commission is 
the site of much interaction, with the European Commission dependent on 
groups for information, support and legitimacy. The European Commission even 
as far back as 1993 favoured Euro-groups (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b:v), yet 
as Mazey and Richardson (1993a:22) point out this was not realisable in practice, 
because Euro-groups were short of resources, reactive to proposals and slow to 
react due to differences in members' agendas. It is questionable to what extent 
this still remains the case, as European groups have burgeoned and the European 
Commission set about creating such groups over the years. Indeed, the European 
Commission has created a database of Euro groups and a code of conduct for 
working with them. The European Commission generally is perceived as being 
very open to groups (Richardson, 2000:1015), particularly to those who can 
follow and feed into the process with relevant information (Mazey and 
Richardson, 1993b).
National/regional groups can make inroads with their specialist 
knowledge of the situation on the ground, together with their role in 
implementing EU programmes. The European Parliament is amenable, 
particularly to public groups, and recently business/producer interests have made
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some headway (Greenwood, 2003a:63). Environmental, equality and human 
rights groups have also used the ECJ to good effect to secure implementation at 
the domestic level (Mazey and Richardson, 1993a:15). However, Warleigh 
(2001:630) found that national groups concentrated their EU work on national 
actors and instead small NGOs in effect contracted out EU work to European 
umbrella organisations.
The type of group engaged and favoured at European level may be 
changing as EU powers grow, but the private interests of business are still seen 
to be the pivotal players (Grant, 2000). Civil dialogue to accompany the social 
dialogue is an indication that public interests of NGOs may be gaining ground 
with a potential change in culture following the WPG (Greenwood, 2002:27). 
Yet such dialogue has no legal status. Rucht (2001) in his study of the 
environmental sector perceived certain kinds of behaviour as being more 
appropriate when dealing with the EU. In this case lobbying was more effective 
than protest. Equally, consensus is the key to co-operation among participants 
(Wallace, 2000b). Much policy interaction depends on informal relations as 
Helfferion and Kolb (2001:148) find in the case of the European Women's 
Lobby. Moreover, frame match with policy-makers and the nationality of any 
policy-maker are also important in shaping civil society's interactions with 
political institutions (interview, civil servant, 2004; Ruzza, 2002). Groups can 
also be involved in committees linked to the Council or the European 
Commission and the European Commission may run consultations.
The EU can be perceived to have some elements of corporatist relations 
with interest groups. In particular the presence of the ECOSOC (consisting of 
membership among largely peak economic groups), the social partnership and 
interest group membership of European Commission committees backs up this 
view. However, Michalowitz (2002) views EU policy-making as having 
corporatism and pluralism in different stages of the process and under different 
procedures, with the European Commission in particular being open but at the 
same time structuring and limiting participation.
Summary
The EU policy process from Wales to the EU consists of many inter-dependent 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































suggests that civil society will have narrow margins for influencing change 
purely through Welsh institutions. Whilst decentralisation has created greater 
access overall for civil society to influence Welsh institutions, it appears that on 
purely EU issues there may be an exclusive cohort of key groups. Institutional 
and actor inter-dependence points to the importance of multi-avenue approaches 
by groups and the need to get involved in EU policy-making early on. The 
different relations among institutions, and civil society, together with their 
discourses, also suggests different strategies may be needed to deal with 
individual institutions and that groups may be implicitly excluded from certain 
arenas. In particular, Welsh groups may face obstacles to accessing parts of 
British and European institutions. Informal considerations as to where British 
and Welsh institutions/policy-makers believe it is appropriate for groups in 
Wales to engage, in the absence of any clear rules/structures in the UK, may also 
be important. On the other hand, the multiple access points in the POS also 
suggest that a range of routes among groups wishing to influence the EU policy 
process as well as being desirable may be possible. By discussing the procedures 
for dealing with EU policy it is hoped that the most pertinent institutional actors, 
as well as strategies and timing, will have been identified (see Figure 5.1) and 
that this will serve to inform the following discussion on where civil society 
groups in Wales actually engage in EU policy-making.
THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CIVIL SOCIETY IN WALES AND 
EUROPEAN UNION POLICY-MAKING
This section analyses the interview evidence to identify the role that the civil 
society in Wales plays in EU policy-making generally.
Where is civil society involved in European Union policy-making?
As the last section described, CSOs in Wales have a number of options by which 
to participate in EU policy-making. This next section will focus primarily on 
two. Firstly, CSOs can deal directly with political institutional actors, and 
secondly, CSOs can feed their thoughts to their parent groups and parent 
networks. These channels are focused upon as they are the chief ones mentioned 
by CSOs in interviews and any other channels are further explored in the section 
on strategies. Thus this section will outline the CSO's use of each avenue in turn.
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Political avenues for Civil Society Organisations to participate in European 
Union policy-making
Figure 5.2 summarises the political routes that the CSOs used generally, as 
discerned from interviewees' discussion of EU policy-making and through 
available secondary literature. The particular political institutions/actors that 
CSOs interact with depend on the issue at hand and will therefore vary. This 
section instead summarises CSOs' participation generally.
Figure 5.2: The political avenues through which Civil Society Organisations 
engage in European Union policy-making32
EU institutions in continental Europe
Assembly representatives in continental 
Europe
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European representatives in Wales 
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Number of EU engaged CSOs
Political avenues: the Assembly
As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, CSOs have most interaction with the Assembly; that 
is with the Assembly's politicians and Officials. These findings lend some 
weight to the argument of a civil society centred on the Assembly and also 
demonstrate the Assembly's impact. Secondly, this finding concurs with 
Loughlin and Sykes' (2004) conclusion that groups in Wales post-devolution
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have switched then* policy lenses to Wales. Significantly, bar one, all the groups 
with direct EU policy-making involvement are large Wales-wide groups 
(matching the practical component of the Assembly's discourse on "civil 
society"), with many of them being involved in the Assembly European 
initiatives discussed in the last section.
Much of the CSOs' interaction with the Assembly was based on formal 
relations, for example contributing to consultations. CSOs, particularly Wales- 
wide, Cardiff-based groups, also highlighted the significance of informal 
activities with the Assembly; for example, meeting politicians at events. These 
CSOs painted a picture of a close-knit Welsh political community:
I mean Wales is relatively small and so you know go to these sort of 
events and you will come across the politicians and in fairness you get 
the opportunity to talk to them. (Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
The engaged CSOs also recognised and worked within the Assembly's POS. 
This is evidenced by all the CSOs involved in EU policy-making33 bar one, who 
identified the need to speak to key actors within the Assembly; that is the 
relevant Ministers and Officials, the Committee Chairman (as he was deemed to 
have influence over the Minister) and the political party subject spokesman. 
Moreover, interviewees confirmed the assessment of this part of the POS in 
earlier in this chapter, that the Assembly was accessible.
Other political avenues
Figure 5.2 also demonstrates the importance of location, with more CSOs 
engaging with British and EU representatives and Officials in Wales, than in 
these representatives' institutional homes in London or in continental Europe. 
Nonetheless, the participation of three CSOs across the Welsh, UK and European 
Union arenas indicates that some groups are aware of the multiple avenues for 
EU input (whether these are the groups more affected by the EU will be 
discussed later in the chapter). Equally, the presence of an additional three 
groups who participate in EU policy-making via the British as well as the Welsh 
political spheres, demonstrates that these CSOs have not forgotten the magnitude 
of the Member State in EU policy-making.
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There were further differences within the political avenues used by CSOs, 
notably the type of actors with whom CSOs had interaction with; for example, 
contacts with European representatives in Wales consisted mostly of MEPs. 
Very few groups knew about, let alone had any involvement with, the CoR or the 
ECOSOC. CSOs moreover had considerably less involvement with MPs as 
opposed to the Assembly on European issues. Regular interaction with 
Whitehall departments/Officials was also rare, and confined to a few well- 
organised groups.
CSOs also interact with European representatives in Wales on awareness- 
raising European issues, which are not strictly part of the formal policy-making 
process, but may be a tangential route for informal limited influence. Equally, 
European representatives in Wales may have informal contact with Welsh groups 
on "non-European" issues, which may indirectly affect EU policies.34 Finally, 
Figure 5.2 conceals the fact that individual members could and did have contact 
with European Welsh representatives on European Union issues independently 
of their CSO. This was the case in two CSOs: the environmental group and the 
international group.
Civil society avenues for Civil Society Organisations to participate in European 
Union policy-making
There are number of civil society avenues that CSOs can use to participate in EU 
policy-making (see Figure 5.3 overleaf for an overview). Firstly, CSOs can 
channel their input through Welsh, British and European parent35 groups and 
networks. These parent groups and networks can then go on to influence EU 
policy-making either at the Member-State or at the EU level. Secondly, groups 
may use lobbyists or consultancies to represent them at higher levels36 (this was 
the case in three instances). Thirdly, an umbrella group has a further civil 
society avenue because it can relay concerns to its member groups who in turn 
input into their parent groups and networks.
Furthermore, these avenues do not exclude the formation of ad hoc 
coalitions with other civil society groups on policy issues. However, this section 
on civil society avenues will concentrate upon EU participation via WEC and 
parent groups and networks, as groups have more sustained interaction with 
these groups. Equally, it will also be shortly demonstrated that CSOs in Wales'
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relationships with their parent groups and networks effect their EU policy- 
making role.
Figure 5.3: Civil society avenues
-Civil Society Organisation in Wales
WALES LEVEL 
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UK LEVEL
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Parent/sister CSO and/or 
network
Most groups did in fact have parent groups/networks (see Figure 5.4) or a 
UK sister group/company. Only two CSOs did not have additional representation 
and these were "Welsh" groups with Welsh concerns. For one of these "Welsh" 
CSOs, the absence of any civil society route resulted in them lobbying directly 
all political levels involved in EU policy-making. Did the CSOs with parent 
groups and networks engage with their parent groups/networks in EU policy- 
making?
No one pattern of child group-parent group interaction on EU 
issues/policy existed. The use of the parent groups generally by CSOs in Wales 
appeared to be dependent upon the degree of devolution within individual CSOs 
and communication structures between parent and child group and the extent to 
which a CSO orients itself as a local, Welsh, British or European group:
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The [British group] accepts now and again that devolution and all that 
sort of business that we will be a law to ourselves now and again because 
we have to respond to [members] in Wales. (Interview, trade union 
2004)
It's a question of adding value largely to the big push that taken by 
[group name] GB, [group name] International, so CAP, there is a Welsh 
angle there and we would hope to increase the pressure. (Interview, 
international development group, 2003)
... so you are always working with agencies in Wales, you have to be 
clear what level of devolution they are operating at. You know I can 
agree things with others in partnership with others, they can be give and 
take, because we have an element of devolution, we don't have to be 
exactly the same position as colleagues in England. (Interview, 
international development group, 2003)
Things which are devolved the [British group] they come to us. 
(Interview, disability, group, 2004)






D No parent 
group/network
Note: the CSO with company on the diagram does not have any parent group or network. The 
diagram does not show the number of CSOs whom as well as having parent groups or networks 
may also use lobbyists and consultancies. n=17.
Moreover, most CSOs did have parent groups and/or networks across Welsh, 
British and European governance levels (see Figure 5.5 overleaf). However, the 
CSOs had different relations with parent groups and networks depending at 
which level their parent group and/or chief network resided at: whether Welsh, 
British or European. These different types of parent-CSO in Wales connections 
will now be explored in turn.
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Wales-wide Civil Society Organisations with British parent groups 
The interviewed sample comprised eight such CSOs (this includes the Wales- 
wide groups with a British sister). CSOs' links with British parent groups is 
particularly important given that British parent groups provide a potential 
mechanism to input into the Member State's EU policy-making process. Indeed, 
among these CSOs they shared an expectation that their British parents would 
engage more in EU policy-making both by mean of direct contact with political 
institutional actors and with their European networks; for example:
... [on EU policy-making their British group] has a reasonable amount, 
[Welsh group] has a fairly tangential part to play. (Interview, business 
group, 2003)
Figure 5.5: Civil Society Organisations' representations through parent groups 
and network at different geographic levels.
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Note: this diagram includes CSOs who are akeady organised at the Welsh level as having 
representation at the Welsh level. The CSOs who have European representation includes the 
situation where their British parent group/network has membership of a European group/network. 
n=17.
The extent to which Wales-wide CSOs were engaged in EU policy- 
making via parent bodies varied. At one end of the spectrum, three groups had 
no real liaison with their British group on EU policy with "it's not consultation 
that comes through its information" (interview, international group, 2003). The 
remaining CSOs used or were used by their parents to engage in EU issues via 
members, committees, meetings, the parent groups' ESCO membership, and 
dialogue with other officers in England. These relations were unsystematic, with 
some CSOs feeling occasionally "out of the loop". Significantly, the decision of
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whether or not to substantially engage in this way depended partly on assessment 
of what each level of CSO could achieve:
London who deals with the central issues because they are there on the 
doorstep and they've got a bigger department than us. (Interview, 
disability group, 2004)
A further constraint facing CSOs in Wales wishing to influence their 
British parent group was described by the British CSO: the presence of the 
another three UK nations:
... we try to arrange for something like an equal representation from the 
four nations. But in my job in particular, that cuts against a particular 
reality and priority which is that 90%, 95% of the population of the UK is 
English ... So those two have to be balanced up, the four nations against. 
And as devolution has meant that the Scots do their own thing largely and 
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future because that's where the 
action is and the same is true for the Welsh. (Interview, British CSO, 
2004)
The same British CSO also described the differences of ideology that informed 
EU perspectives between the Scots and the Welsh, who are more Socialist than 
the English. This is another problem for British CSOs trying to take forward 
their Welsh CSO's perspectives, and challenges how CSOs from Wales can 
effectively translate then- interests through UK parents/networks. A Brussels 
office of a British parent group constitutes another potentially important avenue 
for CSOs, as these offices have direct contact with EU institutions in Brussels. 
Three of the CSOs have British parent groups with such Brussels offices, yet 
only two referred to this and occasionally used it.
All the Wales-wide groups with British parents had membership of 
European networks via their British parents. Only three Welsh groups 
mentioned this connection and two stated that they were directly involved in 
European networks. One CSO "would try our best to send delegates to that level 
of dialogue so that we are informed and informing at the level of government" 
(interview, religious group, 2003), and the other met with the European networks 
independently from their British parent CSO. The implicit assumption was that 
the British parent groups were responsible for inputting into the European 
networks. Moreover, some ECSOs require their members to have Member-State
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coverage, with regional coverage not being adequate, which means some CSOs 
in Wales have to go through their parent groups. The ability of any one national 
group to pursue their agenda via European networks is minimised by the need for 
other members to agree. However, a ECSO representative suggested that 
national parent CSOs can influence ECSOs:
Because the European networks like the Social Platform can't do 
anything without the input from the national level because they have the 
expertise down there. So if the Social Platform for example, wants to take 
any action, they need the input of national members. Because they can't 
say we are campaigning on this and that they don't know what's actually 
happening on the ground. (Interview, ECSO, 2004)
Wales-wide Civil Society Organisations with European parent groups/networks 
Three "European" Welsh groups were interviewed. These comprised two Welsh 
subsidiaries of Euro groups and one Welsh branch of an International group on 
European issues. Amongst the former two, their British forum was not as active 
as their CSO in Wales and they could directly input into their European parents' 
policies; for example, through Brussels AGMs. The latter group's connections 
with its International and European groups were less direct, but had stronger 
links with their British group. These "European" Welsh groups recognised that 
both themselves and their parent bodies were trying to influence the EU's policy 
agenda, and, like some Welsh groups with British parent groups, divided up the 
political arenas:
There are levels of competency. The European [women's group] has a 
staff. It's a small staff in Brussels, they will lobby the European 
institutions, then the Council of Ministers, and the parliamentarians and 
the commission and the committees. And we then lobby nationally, either 
the national government or the Wales Assembly. (Interview, women's 
group, 2004)
Local Civil Society Organisations with parent groups and networks
The local groups (bar one who did not discuss this), similar to the Wales-wide
CSOs, shared an expectation that European issues would be dealt with above the
local organisation, with only one local CSO level directly involved in this
process.
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Civil Society Organisations in Wales with WEC membership 
Finally, two groups had WEC membership and they found WEC to be very 
useful in gaining Brussels contacts and arranging meetings. Non-members on 
the other hand perceived WEC's function to be "marketing Wales to the rest of 
Europe" (interview, women's group, 2004), and not for civil society. Instead 
WEC was "strictly for business" (interview, poverty group, 2004). WEC used a 
range of avenues for influencing policy from informal relations with AMs and 
WAG Ministers to, in particular, relations with the European Commission in the 
policy formulation/agenda setting stage. To a lesser extent, they discussed issues 
with MEPs on specialist committees during the co-decision procedure. At the 
time of interview WEC shared a building with WLGA and the WAG European 
office and used those relations. WEC also had a lot of discussions with other 
regional representations, particularly those the Assembly had concluded 
association agreements with, for example Silesia and Brittany, with the aim of 
sharing best practice and increasing the relevancy of their lobbying to the 
European Commission. However, the WEC Official conceded that members 
sometimes lacked interest in EU policy development, but recognised that it was 
WEC's role to engage them:
If I was to sit at my desk and wait for the phone to ring with countless 
hordes from Wales asking me crucial questions about European policy, I 
would have a very quiet day, every day of the week, 24/7, 365 days a 
year. People in general, people only call me when they've got a problem. 
... And my job is to make them aware of the fact that there are a series of 
policy developments, policy proposals being thought about in Brussels 
that in ten years' time will be very significant to them, or whoever is 
doing their job. (Interview, WEC Official, 2004)
If you extend this problem of engaging interest in the EU's policy development 
to CSOs in Wales who are not even signed up to such an organisation like WEC, 
then civil society participation can be expected to be very small in EU policy- 
making. Thus, there are different dynamics between CSOs in Wales and parent 
groups and networks that affect CSOs in Wales' EU policy-making role via this 
avenue. Did the interviewed policy-makers have much interaction with civil 
society on EU policy?
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Policy-makers: their European Union policy-making avenues and civil society 
Policy-makers did interact with civil society on EU policy and this contact was 
unsurprisingly greatest among policy-makers around the Assembly, given that 
"it's all about distance" (interview, trade union group, 2004). The AM viewed 
the EEAC as one forum for listening to civil society's views, and argued that 
Europe could not be seen in isolation from the rest of the Assembly's work. He 
reserved the partnership councils (or part of the partnership) and round table 
discussions as the mechanisms used to gather civil society views on EU policy:
I think the way that government will probably take its view would be 
from the wider consultative processes which we have here in the National 
Assembly. (Interview, AM, 2003)
However, given the findings in the last section that the VSPC (the partnership 
councils are some of the Assembly's consultative processes) in particular do not 
deal with EU issues frequently, civil society's input via this avenue can be 
expected to be small. Instead, perhaps the partnership councils highlight to the 
Assembly who are the necessary players in European issues, as many of the 
groups mentioned in European working groups earlier in this chapter are also 
representatives on the partnership councils. The AM identified WEC as 
important in bringing in civil society's views "because there are things which 
government cannot do in terms of partly funding searching undercover work, or 
particularly bringing people together in a way which is suitable to specific 
agenda which is of particular interest to the voluntary sector for example" 
(Interview, AM, 2003). The Centre's close will therefore create a considerable 
gap in Welsh civil society representation.
European representatives on the whole have less engagement with CSOs; 
this is especially true of the ECOSOC member and the CoR member. The 
former as an individual tuned into several organisations, but had not received any 
policy representations from CSOs, and the CoR member had a small amount of 
CSO engagement. However, the MEPs identified a range of CSOs who lobbied 
them, but one MEP admitted that many people did not know who they were. 
This situation matches the interviewed groups' activities. Moreover, this finding 
echoes the POS in the limited influence of the CoR and the ECOSOC and their 
lack of CSOs' policy interaction. Yet it appears that groups were not aware of
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these individuals and their roles, as highlighted in several interviews, rather than 
CSOs strategically assessing the POS. The European Commission Office in 
Wales was active in liaising with civil society groups, although not necessarily 
on policy issues (although that did occur as well), again concurring with group's 
experiences.
The British MPs had little involvement with CSOs on European issues, 
outside of funding, despite their role on EU committees:
I can say as an MEP and as a MP there's very little direct interest in how 
Europe impacts upon people personally or collectively. (Interview, MP, 
2004)
The Wales Office equally had little civil society contact, as it is not responsible 
for policy decisions, although in practice the Welsh Office MPs had some CSO- 
interaction. This demonstrates that the Secretary of State, despite being 
"responsible for representative Welsh interest on all legislative matters being 
considered by UK government" (Bulmer et al. 2002:58), takes the Welsh interest 
largely from the Assembly Government (requiring civil society engagement 
here). The Secretary instead acts as a conflict mediator between UK government 
and the Assembly. This implies that the CSOs who wish to influence the British 
position should instead go directly to the Whitehall departments, although one 
CSO did state that the Secretary of State could raise Welsh matters for them with 
UK cabinet members. One MP also articulated the view that the UK government 
saw the EU as quintessentially inter-governmental, with the role of the regions 
and civil society to be contained within the Member-State on EU policy:
... the last Conservative government as well as this government has 
always you know basically put forward a view and ensured that in 
practice as far as possible Europe would be always about inter­ 
governmental co-operation. So there's been a lack of enthusiasm then for 
others outside of the loop to be involved. You know Europe is not for 
them is it? They should be working through the national government, 
why are they bothering? (Interview, MP, 2004)
The UKREP civil servants perceived that UKREP did engage with civil 
society. Although one such UK civil servant (2004) pointed out that 
representations were generally made from British CSOs that had Brussels' 
offices, or through European networks. However, due to limited personnel in
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Europe, one UK civil servant believed that most civil society involvement should 
be carried out in the UK. The WAG European office (part of UKREP) was also 
amenable to groups but implied it should be dealt with at the Assembly level:
The Assembly back in Cardiff has a clear set of arrangements for 
engaging with the voluntary sector and civil society; we're always fairly 
open to talking to people here. (Interview, WAG Official, 2004)
Similarly, in an interview with a European Commission Official in Brussels, it 
was revealed that regional groups do talk to them but that this was not perhaps at 
the right level:
I would say that regional and local group as such we will never tell them, 
okay you cannot come, the door is always open, but in terms of regular 
consultation, the right partner, there is the central authorities in their state 
and maybe less the European Commission. (Interview, European 
Commission Official, 2004)
This cultural informal norm shared by policy-makers that civil society EU policy 
involvement should be carried out in Wales, or at least in the UK, reduces the 
POS available to groups. This idea also matches with the CSOs actual activity 
being concentrated in Wales.
Accessibility of political institutions to Civil Society Organisations 
Access by no means equates to influence, but it shows with what ease groups can 
enter into discussions of EU policy through the various avenues. The CSOs 
generally concurred with the statement "the Welsh Assembly is extremely 
accessible" (interview, trade union, 2004) and viewed the Assembly as easier to 
influence than Whitehall and Westminster. Some CSOs even had regular yearly 
meetings with the First Minister. AMs would sometimes approach CSOs; but 
this was less true for important Assembly Ministers, hi comparison, access to 
Whitehall and to a lesser extent, MPs, was more difficult, with one CSO 
articulating the policy-makers' norm that Assembly is where civil society 
interaction should occur:
I also think that the UK government's view is that it will go through the 
Assembly and therefore any consultation is down to the Assembly. 
(Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
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Equally, among CSOs who had contact with the EU's institutions in Brussels, the 
EU was seen as accessible, in one instance more than the UK. This view was 
shared by the TUC in their submission to a House of Common's inquiry:
In the TUC's experience access to and involvement in public policy- 
making is more systematically available at the European level than in 
Britain. For example, the processes of involvement are clear and 
transparent rather than informal and lobbying-based. (House of 
Commons, 2002a:l)
However the Institute of Directors (who had close relations with former PM 
Margaret Thatcher, who was a Euro-sceptic) suggested they found the cards 
reversed:
We see a huge contrast between the influence we can bring to bear and 
the ease of access we have to the institutions of national government (for 
example, meeting with Ministers and Civil Servants and access to UK 
Consultation Documents), on the one hand, and the remoteness of, for 
example, the Commission and its alien (non Anglo-Saxon) way of 
operating, on the other. (House of Commons, 2002b:l)
This again indicates a role for political parties and ideology in shaping CSOs' 
involvement (Chapter Four discovered the importance of this for discourses on 
civil society) and illustrates the necessity of looking at the role of ideas in policy. 
However, geographic distance from the EU inevitably factored, reducing the 
accessibility of the EU institutions, and the EU was seen by some as "remote" 
(interview, international development group, 2003). There was also recognition 
that policy-makers may privilege some groups in policy-making, and in 
particular in Wales, the WCVA was mentioned.
Policy-makers stressed their open credentials and were accessible to this 
thesis' research. Considerations of granting access to CSOs included policy- 
maker's subject responsibilities and the legitimacy of the claim upon their time. 
Some of the Welsh politicians did try to reach out to groups, as did the European 
Commission Office in Wales. In practice however, existing reliable contacts and 
webs of contacts were used on policy issues, although apart from the European 
Commission, this was not done systematically. The Assembly's method is 
described below:
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At the moment the way that Wales tends to do things is to use the 
representative organisations as the bodies who speak for their members 
and let them do their own representing back down the line. (Interview, 
AM, 2003)
This echoes the practical part of the Assembly's institutional discourse on civil 
society reifying Wales-wide groups.
With respect to the UK, despite some groups perceiving the UK as more 
difficult to access, Whitehall departments would contact some of the CSOs for 
consultations, and following devolution one CSO viewed Whitehall as more 
open. One MP also highlighted the UK Parliament's inability to have a rational 
UK European debate, as debate rather revolved around whether Britain should 
stay or leave the EU. This may be one reason why groups are more reticent to 
engage here.
The WEF, meant to draw "team Wales" (European representative, Welsh 
politicians and civil society) together was "forgotten about ... it was so 
insignificant" (MP, 2004). This avenue, not in use since February 2002, was 
recently re-convened for the review of regional policy in 2004. At the February 
2002 meeting, participants pointed to input side problems of civil society 
participating in EU policy-making, and that civil society needed to broaden its 
horizons outside of Wales and Britain, with the Assembly lamenting the lack of 
civil society responses to the WPG consultation (WAG, 2002b: Annex 4, 5). 
This latter point demonstrates that civil society's role in EU policy-making is not 
only shaped by political structure but by the ability and willingness of individual 
CSOs.
Discussion of Civil Society Organisations' avenues to engage in European 
Union policy-making
As always, shifts in power are noted and acted upon by interest groups, 
who act as a type of weather vane for the locus of political power in 
society. They quickly retarget their influence, once they realize the 
decisions -which affect them has moved to a new institution or to new 
actors. (Mazey and Richardson, 1993b:v)
In devolved Wales, it does appear that groups have focused their policy attention 
on the Assembly, with respect to EU policy, as demonstrated by the cluster of 
activity here. However, with regards to CSOs basing their actions upon rational
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power-based calculations, the concentration of activity around the Assembly 
makes this unlikely. This may reflect that this is where CSOs feel best able to 
get the "Welsh" point across. This state of affairs raise the question of whether 
groups who focus mainly or solely on the Assembly are missing out on potential 
influence with political institutions of the UK or the EU. In turn, these political 
institutions are missing out on these CSOs input and a source of input legitimacy.
Moreover, for some CSOs' much of their EU policy-making is subsumed 
in everyday work with Assembly, rather than seen as "EU" policy issues per se. 
This may demonstrate how European policy-making is engrained and integrated 
into domestic politics. Another factor for groups is that not all of the Assembly's 
subject areas are tied up with Europe to the same extent. As well as external 
factors, actor-specific dynamics impinge on civil society's EU policy-making 
behaviour. For example, how a group with connections spread across many 
levels understands and structures itself will in turn shape that group's EU policy- 
making involvement through the civil society avenue. This is of course in turn 
dependent upon assessments of where groups believe they can have the most 
impact within their available resources, showing the POS to have some influence 
on behaviour.
The POS, whilst offering more access points to groups in Wales, does 
leave scope and access (albeit constrained) for CSOs wishing to influence the 
UK Member State. Yet some groups and policy-makers operate with the tacit 
assumption that CSOs' input should occur at the Assembly level, thereby 
potentially reducing CSOs' impact. Furthermore, as CSOs lack awareness of 
other European Welsh representatives outside of the MEPs, with the ECOSOC 
and CoR being underused, CSOs may be missing out on alternative avenues to 
get their voice heard in the EU. The European Commission Office in Wales, 
although not strictly concerned with policy issues, may also act as an important 
way for groups to feed into the European Commission, with the Brussels' 
European Commission discourse favouring ECSOs. Nonetheless, even if groups 
may have good access to institutions, this does not necessarily translate into 
influence. The ability to influence policy depends in part upon the stage that 
policy is at. The discussion therefore now turns to the policy stages when CSOs 
engage in EU policy-making.
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When do Civil Society Organisations engage in European Union policy- 
making?
There is a consensus that the policy-making stage with greatest potential for 
impact is when the European Commission's proposal is still in draft, the "soft 
pencil stage " (Dr Wright cited in Scottish Parliament, 2002:10) (NAW, 2004a:l; 
Hull, 1993:83; interviews, UK civil servants 2004). One UK civil servant (2004) 
detailed how CSOs could get involved: by looking at the Commission's Annual 
Policy Strategy, working out the responsible DG and "then you phone up them 
and you go 'I'm interested in this, can you tell me who's likely to be looking at 
this in your DG?'. They're normally quite open. They'll tell who's doing it. 
And then you just need to keep in touch with them and ask them for any 
information, and find out if there's a UK person working close to them because 
you can actually have a frank discussion [in the same language]" (interview, UK 
civil servant, 2004). Generally getting in early at any stage is important 
(interview, women's group, 2004).
Yet sustained interaction across the policy-making process is important. 
Indeed, Dr Wright perceives the most successful Scottish groups to be those who 
"interact with different forms and levels of government throughout the policy 
process and come back to the Executive at the implementation stage, when the 
Executive is quite powerful" (Scottish Parliament, 2002a: 10). The Assembly 
similarly is responsible for implementing much of EU policy. By extension, as 
CSOs concentrated efforts at the Assembly, it would be expected that groups 
would be most engaged at the implementation stage.
A couple of policy-makers argued that CSOs in Wales did not engage 
early enough and only engaged when the policy was going to affect them in 
implementation:
somehow it's easier to carp afterwards rather than engage and try and 
influence the process. (Interview, MP, 2004).
The European Commission Official in Wales did state that regional policy was a 
special case where CSOs knew of the timetable, but outside of regional policy 
people were ignorant of EU policy-making procedures and timings.
CSOs were mainly engaged in policy-making when directives were being 
discussed by the Assembly, with the policy formulation and decision-making
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stages being tackled by their parent bodies. However again, regional policy was 
an exception to this, with some CSOs being drawn into the WAG consultations 
before the policy has been decided. Outside of this, women's, farming, 
intermediary and international development groups were also involved in 
decision-making and/or formulation stages.
Outside of influencing/participating EU policy-making, groups engage 
much more strongly in having informal relations with EU players and also in 
actually implementing policy through monitoring EU funded projects (seven 
CSOs) or running them (four CSOs). Moreover, one local environmental group 
acted as an EU watchdog, in one case where they used a EU Directive to get 
change on a planning decision. Such broader connections merit further research.
WEC admitted it too focused upon the formal implementation stage but 
in practice that there was overlap between policy stages:
... policy forming and implementation merge into each one and another 
at different points in the policy cycle ... You need a knowledge of the 
policy drivers to be effective to be looking at the processes of 
implementation and you need a knowledge of the implementation in 
order to fed into the policy-making. (Interview, WEC Official, 2004)
However, it is questionable whether CSOs, who are non-WEC members, are 
aware of and consciously engage in implementation as policy formulation. 
CSOs in Wales may still be on a learning curve, with AMs in the review of the 
voluntary sector scheme perceiving that a "cultural change was needed [for the 
voluntary sector] to become 'reliable and active partners' rather than receivers of 
support." (Jones, Commission, 2004:46). This is partly reinforced by the fact 
that two of the three CSOs who carried out EU funded projects were not engaged 
in EU policy-making.
Concentration on the implementation stage means that groups have 
limited chance to influence the shape of the policy. This also means that some 
CSOs are not making the most of the available POS. This appears to be a result 
of a lack of awareness of the EU process, as well as internal structures, although 
it could be a concern for appropriate behaviour with policy-makers calling for 
CSO participation to occur in Wales or the UK. Moreover, this activity may 
reflect the fact that the Assembly is where CSOs have other types of policy 
involvement and have invested in building relationships:
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Whether the Assembly actually has the power or the responsibility or not, 
people tend to think well this is our group so let's deal with our group 
sort of thing. (Interview, language/community group, 2003)
Regional policy is an exception, with some CSOs being engaged here across the 
policy process; therefore attention must be paid as to the particular policy issues 
in which CSOs participate.
Why do Civil Society Organisations participate in European Union policy- 
making? With which policy issues are Civil Society Organisations 
concerned, and are these raised at the appropriate political levels?
This section will explore why CSOs wish to participate by looking at the kind of 
concerns and issues they are seeking to have addressed in EU policy-making. 
The CSOs under study were concerned with a range of EU policy issues. What 
this section seeks to ascertain is whether these issues broadly have competence at 
the levels they seek to influence, with a view to assessing groups' efficiency in 
the policy-making process and establishing whether this legal aspect of the POS 
structures CSOs' behaviour. Several CSOs also shared concerns on regional 
policy and to a lesser extent on agriculture and employment (a few CSOs had a 
range of EU policy issues with which they were involved, explaining the 
multitude of policy issues below). Policy-makers attributed regional 
policy/structural funds with most relevance for CSOs "because that's the major 
way that people, the people of Wales see Europe" (AM, 2003). Further, one 
policy-maker argued that "Welsh groups are mostly concerned with money" 
(interview, MP, 2004) and that the British are "practical Europeans" (Main, 
2003b: 4). The First Minister for Wales also argued that EU engagement by 
regions should be viable and relevant to regions:
interest in the [EU's] institutional structures is defined by our duty to 
ensure that we can bring influence to bear on policies in our sphere of 
competence and that directly effect the lives of our citizens. (First 
Minister's points summarised in NAW, 2002b:l).
The EU policy issues that CSOs are engaged in at the Assembly level are listed
below:
Agriculture - CAP, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)
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Asylum and human trafficking
Employment







Women and social policy
Are these issues raised at the appropriate level? On specifically EU 
issues like enlargement, European governance and the EMU, the Assembly has 
very little competency to engage legislatively, as they are reserved matters to the 
UK government. However, in general non-binding policy discussions, the 
Assembly can play a role, as shown by its response to the European 
Commission's WPG. The Memorandum of Understanding gives WAG the 
opportunity to be involved in reserved matters that affect Wales. The Assembly 
also has a lot of responsibility for agriculture, and to a lesser extent the Welsh 
language. Issues like regional policy and social inclusion can be dealt with under 
the Assembly's economic development, transport, social services, health and 
housing competencies. In terms of the Assembly's competencies and their links 
with European issues, most areas of the Welsh settlement do have an EU 
dimension, although with overlap concentrated in specific areas of agriculture, 
structural funds, environment and transport (First Minister for Wales, 2003:1).
A review of the Wales Legislation Online portal backs this up,37 with the 
Assembly's provisions under the European Communities Act of 1972 mostly of 
an agricultural, food and environmental nature. There are also provisions to 
implement EU funded schemes, for which the Assembly devises programmes 
that include: Objective 1, 2, 5c and the rural development plan LEADER. Thus, 
the focus on the Assembly by CSOs with regional policy and agriculture 
concerns is well placed, as Assembly provisions in these areas seem large (there 
are 107 Acts relating to agriculture and the Assembly). Moreover, the UK 
government intends to consult WAG on EU policy on devolved areas, even if
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they legally do not have competence to enact it. This makes other issues like 
social policy, where there is some EU legislation, also relevant. Equally, the 
Welsh language and to a lesser extent, employment and trade, and justice can be 
fitted into some of the Assembly's functions, making engagement here 
appropriate. However, generally in these areas, together with EMU, 
enlargement, European governance and asylum/trafficking, the competence lies 
with the Member State and the EU, thus making it appropriate that some of these 
CSOs' concerns are carried over onto the British state either directly by Welsh 
groups or independently, or mediated by their British/European counterparts 
(although with less frequency):
Welsh Civil Society Organisations' issues taken to British/European parent
groups and networks:
Agriculture















Women and social policy
The issues taken to the EU by CSOs are largely concentrated in areas in which 
EU has great effect (see below):
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Women and social policy
On the issues of regional, agricultural, and women and social policy 
(including equal opportunities), the Member State and the EU have shared policy 
responsibility. Social inclusion has less policy involvement (taken to mean 
poverty issues with health, education and welfare) at the EU level (Nugent, 1999: 
347). European governance is generally a non-binding EU issue unless parts are 
taken forward in the dying constitution and will be decided by Member States.
What about the groups not involved; do they have issues that could be 
tackled more forcibly in EU policy-making? Notably, the environment and 
broad economic issues are EU domains. Equality, disability and international 
issues also have an EU dimension. The language group, which challenges the 
status of Welsh in Britain, has to go through the Assembly and ultimately the UK 
government, therefore the EU is not really able to help, especially as cultural 
issues are conducted through inter-state co-operation in the EU. Thus, it appears 
that the groups engaged in EU policy issues are engaged at levels appropriate to 
their issues. However, among the non-involved groups there are some whose 
issues are dealt with hi part by the EU, which suggests space for involvement 
and other reasons, apart from the legal POS affecting these non-involved CSO's 
behaviour. This assessment within groups seems less important than looking at 
the degree of devolution within organisations and where they perceive the correct 
level required within the organisation to target policy. Equally, it must not be 
forgotten that many of these CSOs, whilst not explicitly engaging on EU policy 
issues, may have some contact on general issues which have an implicit 
European dimension.
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Are these "Welsh" issues?
In interviews there was some discussion of whether CSOs felt they were 
concerned with "Welsh" issues. This was partly to ascertain whether there was a 
need among groups in Wales to have a voice in EU policy. Most groups (and 
this is perhaps reflected in their subject areas) viewed themselves as not 
necessarily concerned with Welsh issues, but instead with local ones. The same 
conclusions were reached by Day, Dunkerley and Thompson (2000:34) who 
recognised that many of the issues Welsh groups were pursuing were generic to 
UK groups, although the distinctive set-up of Wales, vis a vis women's status, 
regional policy, agriculture and language was noted by some CSOs and policy- 
makers interviewed. This may be illustrative of the differences in Welsh 
identity, but moreover appears as a reflection of how groups (and some policy- 
makers) understand Wales' role within the UK in terms of their group, placed on 
an ideological continuum of nationalism to unionism. In turn, this may partly 
shape how these issues are dealt with inside groups and networks, and taken to 
institutions, including the EU:
Political actors are constituted both by their interests by which they 
evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their 
identities and political institutions. (March and Olsen, 1998:952)
Indeed, CSO interviewees expressed sentiments such as "I have a nationalist 
perspective" (interview, international development group, 2003), which may also 
create a pull towards greater devolution and "Welshness" within their 
organisation or conversely if CSO members/staff are Unionist.38
Most of the Welsh organisations with British parents had injected, or 
were going to inject, some measure of devolution into their organisation, 
although some had only been set up after devolution, with a recognition that 
things might be done differently in Wales, as found by Cole (2004:359). To put 
this in context, one Welsh CSO with a British parent had a sister Scottish 
organisation that was effectively independent of the same British parent group 
even before devolution, whereas the Welsh group was still part of the same 
organisation. This partly reflects the different paths and strengths of the Scottish 
and Welsh civil societies. Welsh "European" organisations also had some 
devolution from their organisation. Local groups similarly had some autonomy
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from the centre. This move towards devolution within groups may encourage 
more recognition of a specifically Welsh dimension within Europe. As such, a 
further inquiry into group identity and group structure presents a challenge for 
future research concerned with the emergence of a "Welsh" civil society.
What strategies do Civil Society Organisations use to engage in European 
Union policy-making? Are these the strategies that Civil Society 
Organsiations should use?
Choice of strategy to influence the political process is never entirely without 
constraint and as this chapter has sought to argue, the POS institutions may shape 
groups' repertoire of strategies:
Both initiative of participation and the choice of groups consulted remain 
firmly in the hands of the institutions. (Magnetic, 2003a:150)
Indeed, earlier in this chapter it was identified that groups need to be targeting a 
range of institutions across policy stages and also need to adapt to a consensual 
style of policy-making at the EU level (and increasingly more so in Britain and 
Wales with the rise of partnership working). There are also issue-specific 
windows of opportunity that may structure strategic choices.
Among the engaged groups, a range of themes emerged. The first was 
that the strategy depended on the issue at hand. The second was that the more 
actively involved CSOs' groups were aware of the spread of competencies across 
levels of governance and the need to influence all, with a multi-avenue strategy:
... [Lobby] not just to Assembly Members but to Westminster as well. So 
never lose sight of the two; Westminster of course has certain powers that 
have not been devolved to Wales. (Interview, poverty group, 2004)
most of the time, it is just bombarding MEPs, MPs and government 
Ministers. (Interview, women's group, 2004)
The two European Commission Officials in Wales also backed up the need to 
influence all levels of governance, but one questioned to what extent this was 
widespread amongst CSOs in Wales:
essentially there is gross ignorance about the whole system of 
governance in which we live and... people don't know about the different
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layers and how they interact with each other. (Interview, European 
Commission Official, 2004)
Actively engaged CSOs also recognised that different institutions 
required different approaches to influence, hi particular, organisations stressed 
the use of email to contact Assembly Members and Officials, but not for MPs 
(for example interview, religious group, 2003). Groups in contact with the EU 
would work through their ECSOs, or through WEC, and in one case would 
identify the European Commission Official responsible for a policy and directly 
contact them. Groups' strategies to influence specific policies included letter- 
writing, meetings, emails, consultation responses, involvement on working 
groups and networks, of which the interviewed policy-makers described letter- 
writing, phone-calls, emails and general events as appropriate from groups. 
Groups equally had methods of staying in contact with politicians (AMs, MPs 
and MEPs) to build up long term relationships (although this was not just on 
European issues). Some issued briefings, went along to events and organised 
conferences/seminars etc. Building up a long-term relationship with individuals 
does suggest some reciprocity:
... we impress them with our knowledge, we develop a positive 
relationship with them which is on the basis of mutual, mutual aid. 
(Interview, WEC Official, 2004)
Building upon this, groups and a policy-maker also attested to the importance of 
individuals in policy-making. For example, the farming group recognised the 
importance of rapport with a European Commission Official, even when a policy 
was with the Council of Ministers:
I mean it's all so personality driven these things as well because it 
depends on who you get on with and who you talk to. (Interview, 
European Commission Official, 2004)
[What member groups] tend to do is bend the ear of the politician they 
like. (Interview, religious group, 2003)
The WEC and the farming group highlighted the use of the media and PR to 
publicise meetings and get results:
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Let's say if we are going to organise a meeting at a Brussels level, and we 
have a good reception and we say 'well constructive meeting'. And so 
these politicians and others, which are geared up and want to be seen to 
be meeting and seen to be engaging with people, they play along with it. 
So PR, you know I think if you are an organisation and you didn't have 
any PR and you go along, you toddle along, and you know have a good 
chat and come from there, nothing more is heard of it. (Interview, 
farming group, 2003)
Finally, in terms of lobbying content, CSOs and policy-makers highlighted that 
they should frame things in policy-makers' language and interests, be precise and 
provide information and options:
... provide them with some information about [issue and Welsh context] 
but also try and have a clear picture of what we want to say to them. 
(Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
Information was particularly important to the European Commission, with WEC 
framing the Welsh context with that of other regions increasing its relevancy:
It's about understanding not just of their own constituency ... but 
understanding the needs in a European setting. So that you've understood 
what these needs are, you can identify the coincidence between your 
constituency and what you are trying to effect into the needs of that 
organisation and those policies. (Interview, European Commission 
Official, 2004)
There are two anomalies among the engaged CSOs as one CSO only 
intermittently engaged on one issue through Welsh networks and another was 
concerned with awareness-raising of the EU in Wales and occasionally 
participated in broad policy campaigns.
It is noteworthy that all of these strategies mentioned are conventional 
strategies and are "acceptable". This indicates that the POS is open and 
accessible to groups and they do not have to resort to unconventional means. 
The CSOs not involved encompassed a group who used non-violent direct action 
to generate media coverage "to turn an issue into something people are aware of 
and turn that into a political hot potato" (interview, language group, 2004). 
However, this CSO did not see "what more is to be got out of Europe" so did not 
wish to engage further, indicating that their radical nature was not a result of the
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EU-Wales POS. Non-engaged groups also made similar observations about the 
importance of personalities, using networks/partnerships and the difference 
between being able to contact AMs through email as opposed to MPs in 
UK/Welsh policy issues.
Are Civil Society Organisations' strategies influential?
Whether these strategies are successful depends on the criteria policy-makers 
place on groups and other considerations they may entertain, such as the views of 
their political party/government in deciding policy. What does seem evident is 
that groups should take into account all aspects of the opportunity structure and 
engage in policy early, build up long-term personal relations, have a multi- 
avenue strategy, frame their concerns into policy-makers' language/interests and 
recognise policy-making is more consensual in the EU. CSOs also need to 
consider the policy-makers' tacit understanding that most civil society 
consultation should be taken in Wales. Conventional styles of lobbying probably 
have more impact, as policy-makers cited these as effective strategies:
I think if people can get opinion across as an insider pressure group that 
does have access to government, I think that is usually more effective. 
(Interview, CoR member, 2003)
Other considerations affecting CSOs' influence were: issue-specific, that CSOs 
should be proactive, be representative, or the number of voices a group carries 
(this was found across governance levels):
I mean looking at the extent to which you take a group seriously on a 
given point depends on whether you think on this point they speak with 
the weight of the whole, of many, many voices focused in, and they'd 
thought about this quite hard. Or is this just really 'I am the European 
starwatching organisation representing five million starwatchers all over 
Europe and we think proposition'; well do you? (Interview, 
Conventioneer/MEP, 2003)
One European Commission Official described how groups in the women's sector 
in Wales had really embraced European legislation and projects and responded to 
Europe, in effect developing a reputation for best practice, and this then carried 
weight for their lobbying activities. Another European Commission Official also 
pointed out that Wales collectively had made a difference in regional policy.
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Groups perceived their influence to vary according to the issue, and at all 
levels questioned whether consultation really meant participation. Despite this, 
CSOs felt their influence was strong at the Assembly:
There's only so much we can do to influence the European Union or 
Commission or more so with the Westminster, but at the Assembly level 
- we're well in there to be honest. (Interview, trade union, 2004)
The Assembly; we are finding it much more easier, much easier really to 
influence the Assembly. (Interview, farming group, 2003)
There were also a couple of groups who were critical of the UK government's 
relations with civil society. Influence in Wales was limited by other 
considerations, notably an appreciation of Wales' fragile and small role in the 
European Union policy process (by groups engaged on EU policy), but also 
limited by how complicated the EU process was and its focus on the Member 
States, thus testifying to the significance of the POS:
... we really need to be influencing France and Germany. (Interview, 
international development group, 2003)
Europe is where stuff has been set in concrete, changing it is very 
difficult, getting to it when the concrete is still wet is pretty difficult. I do 
not know what all those lobby groups are for in Brussels. If they changed 
anything it would be illegal. (Interview, British group, 2004)
[The UK government] they are lobbied from all sides, it's a very, very 
slow process I mean its drip feed, drip feed all the time. (Interview, 
women's group, 2004)
I mean devolution is fine, but ultimately [on] those sort of issues the 
European Commission and everything else deals with the UK 
government, they don't deal directly with Scotland and they don't deal 
directly with Wales. (Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
With a range of conventional strategies used by the groups engaged in the 
process, it is clear that there are differences across levels, in particular in dealing 
with AMs and MPs. As we would expect from the POS, this testifies to the 
Assembly being more open to groups than the UK's institutions. However, the 
most actively engaged CSOs perceived that they needed to target a range of 
institutional actors, hi terms of strategies, it appears non-structural concerns are
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the key with personalities and framing concerns in the right kind of language and 
building up long-term relationships. The conventional strategies groups used 
were seen to be the most effective by policy-makers; however, as identified 
before, there are gaps in the chain such as under-use of other Welsh 
representatives in Wales and other potential avenues and simply not getting to 
policy-making early enough.
Which Civil Society Organisations are engaged in European Union policy- 
making?
This section shall look at the groups under study and their macro traits - their 
sector, size, and geographic base - in relation to their EU policy-making 
involvement. For perspective, policy-makers engaged with a range of CSOs 
mentioned, covering businesses to environmentalists to local government. 
Voluntary sector representation through the WCVA was mentioned several 
times, as were voluntary groups engaged, or wishing to engage, in EU funding. 
The social partners, and in particular the trade unions, were seen as active and 
effective. The European Commission Official in Brussels praised local and 
regional organisations. Another European Commission Official also attributed 
farmers and women groups with success. These groups are in the main Wales- 
wide, umbrella organisations. Variations in representations from CSOs to 
policy-makers also fell along politicians' parties and remit:
I have very many approaches from business organisations. That is 
because I'm a conservative politician so they naturally feel that I am 
interested in economic development. (Interview, Conservative politician, 
2004)
In this study, ten CSOs in Wales were involved in EU policy-making 
(this included the pro-European group who was largely concerned with 
promoting the EU construction although occasionally engaging in matters of 
policy). There is a match between the sectors specifically pointed out by policy- 
makers and those sectors involved, although the language/community, 
international development, poverty and religious groups were not mentioned by 
policy-makers. However, three of the non-mentioned groups have some of the 
least EU policy involvement. All of the engaged CSOs are Wales-wide groups,
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bar one that had the least amount of involvement with EU policy-making (being 
fairly intermittent and also mediated). Groups are also further delineated by the 
level and directness of contact with the farming and voluntary groups and to a 
lesser extent the poverty group, these being the only groups directly engaged 
with EU institutions in continental Europe. The former two are also CSOs 
whose EU concerns do fall under the auspices of the Assembly and these 
concerns are also heavily Europeanised. For the poverty group, competency at 
the Assembly and the EU level is less marked, yet the EU too, does play a role in 
this field. Perhaps this CSOs' EU involvement is rather best explained by the fact 
that it is a Welsh "European" group, with a specifically European focus.
It is interesting that among the CSOs most involved with EU policy- 
making (bar one) they did not see EU policy-making as taking up much of their 
time. This demonstrates the problem of making assessments of the extent to 
which CSOs are involved and shows perhaps the small extent of attention that 
groups pay to EU policy-making (as a percentage of their overall work).
Thus, it does appear that groups engaged in EU policy-making are for the 
most part Wales-wide. There is also an emphasis, particularly in Wales, to 
engage the social partners and WCVA, which echoes the Assembly's partnership 
council structures. It also shows that the normative and the functional (in relation 
to civil society consisting of community groups) conceptions of civil society held 
by the Assembly and UK government do not fully correspond to the groups that 
are actually engaged in EU policy (apart from the voluntary groups). However, 
there is some crossover with the functional conception at the EU level. The 
practical criteria that institutions place on civil society are more successful in 
accounting for which groups are active, with an emphasis by the UK and Welsh 
institutions on large groups whom they have established relations. Similarly, 
parts of the EU's practical criteria towards civil society is in play here, with one 
group being part of a European network, another group working through a 
European network to express its views to the European Commission and the last 
group being an expert in its field. The substantially engaged groups being large 
Wales-wide "representative" groups back up the interviewed AM's idea that the 
Assembly engages the representative groups and expects them to represent down 
the line. Moreover, only two CSOs are not based in the South East of Wales, but 
one of these had an Assembly liaison officer and the other did not have an office.
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The groups not involved in EU policy-making directly are a more mixed 
set. They encompass all the small, local and regional groups (bar one), and most 
of the groups outside of South Wales, suggesting geographical location may 
present a barrier for civil society participation in Wales. However, all these 
groups do have some interaction with policy-makers, but not on EU policy 
issues, signifying that there may be some scope for an EU dimension to their 
activities. The sport CSO had the least interaction with its local authority, yet on 
the other hand the environment group's leader had just been invited to sit on a 
local authority community committee. The Wales-wide groups not involved in 
EU policy-making, who are perhaps the most interesting anomalies - particularly 
the language group which does not have any British parent subsidiaries (and this 
therefore leads to expectations that the pull factor into Europe would be greater) 
- all similarly have policy engagement with the Assembly and some with MPs. 
In order to facilitate an understanding of some of the reasons why specific CSOs 
do not engage with the EU policy process, the chapter must now turn to CSOs' 
mobilising structures and resources.
What kind of mobilising structures do the Civil Society Organisations have? 
This section seeks to look at the extent to which resources, individual 
experts/entrepreneurs and allies may also structure groups' behaviour, realising 
that the POS could potentially represent only half the equation:
Opportunities to participate are not so much determined by the structures 
of the policy process as by the information, resources and credibility of 
particular groups or actors. (Wallace, 1997: 13)
Staffing did seem particularly important in explaining involvement, with only 
two groups - the ones that were most substantially engaged - having a European 
officer. Only three of the engaged groups did not have any staff. However in 
one of these groups had powerful allies that may have meant that they were able 
to engage, another had expertise and in the other instance, no staff meant their 
eventual demise and lack of activity:
what happens is like so many voluntary organisations that are short of 
money, an awful lot of energy and time is spent trying to keep ourselves 
going or fundraising, or writing to the national lottery or to governments
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to get money. It takes from the time that one ought to be doing to job of 
[fighting poverty] ... Now the [group] has folded largely because there 
has never been enough money to have an office and salaried 
administrators. (Interview, poverty group, 2004)
The exceptions to this situation are the non-engaged CSOs who were organised 
on a Welsh level with staff, who perhaps can be viewed as more likely to be able 
to participate in EU policy-making. However, these CSOs did not engage in EU 
policy-making partly because the degree of devolution within their organisation 
and agreement over where the European agenda should be pursued resulted in a 
lack of direct participation. Furthermore, two of those Wales-wide organisations 
each only had one staff member who was responsible for a range of tasks.
Many of the engaged CSOs also had other human resources in the form 
of well-educated entrepreneurs who were also connected to other organisations 
and key EU policy-makers. WEC had its share of experts both through its staff 
(organised on a portfolio basis) and its clients, whose ideas it would promote in 
EU policy-making. The need and importance of resources becomes clear when 
Richardson (2003) describes their effect in dealing with the Assembly at large:
Organised interests with substantive resources behind them have been 
able to engage quite actively with the Assembly on policy-making. They 
have responded to an abundance of consultation documents and 
questionnaires circulated by the Assembly as part of its 'open 
government' policy and have often been quite successful in negotiating 
with the Government...
On the other hand, interest groups, organisations and individuals 
without the resources to dedicate the time and energy necessary to 
building a relationship with the Assembly Government have complained 
of consultation saturation and found it difficult to engage with what they 
would regard as 'inclusive polities'. (Richardson, 2003: 235)
This dilemma is magnified in EU policy-making with its multi-avenue, complex 
POS. It is to the obstacles that groups and policy-makers perceive and to their 
participation and their reasons for non-engagement that the discussion turns.
Obstacles and reasons for Civil Society Organisations' non-engagement
By exploring some of the barriers that groups and policy-makers perceived, the 
factors conditioning some groups' involvement/non-involvement can be 
understood. At the outset it should be mentioned that many groups were content
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with their level of engagement in EU policy-making. However, five of the seven 
non-involved CSOs wanted to get involved, and two of those expected to 
become involved in the near future. Also, CSOs generally stated that if they 
knew that they could make a change to EU policy, then they would participate.
There are two dimensions to groups' reasons for non-involvement and 
obstacles: those barriers internal to the organisation and barriers external to the 
organisation. Attending to the former, internal actor-specific obstacles were 
most readily identified by both policy-makers and civil society groups. CSOs 
placed the most emphasis on material and human resources such as money, the 
need to fundraise, lack of staff/members, lack of an office, expertise, people 
retiring, time and dynamic leadership:
If you had a really powerful and charismatic chairman of the [UK group 
name] then things might be different. (Interview, pro-European group, 
2004)
And so it's not down to the fact that I don't think we should get involved, 
its down to the fact that there's simply not the time and the resources 
there to get involved. (Interview, disability group, 2004)
Okay, well on an internal level, a lack of resources, a lack of people in 
Wales ... that's from the [group name] view, the constant obstacle of 
having my own time stretched in so many different arenas, that I would 
love to concentrate on only the political side and somebody else have the 
media side, and someone else have the education side etc. That's an 
obstacle, that's the major obstacle. (Interview, international group, 2003)
Two policy-makers also shared this view, both stating how expensive it was for 
civil society organisation to actually influence EU policy. One policy-maker saw 
these groups in competition with better financed companies:
... the problem in the European Union.. .was that the voluntary agencies, 
whosoever they represented, could never have the same kind of impact as 
lobbying groups. I mean you know Sky TV who lobbied me ... are in a 
far better position and with more funds at their disposal and more 
lobbying power than voluntary organisations who can't afford the visit to 
Brussels, you know. (Interview, MEP, 2004)
The main obstacle that policy-makers perceived was levied at the organisations 
themselves for not being aware of the relevance and the processes of EU policy-
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making. In part this is backed up by the CSO's focus on the implementation 
stage. This is supplemented by considerations such as what kind of organisation 
it actually is, and as discussed in the last chapter, charities and statutory bodies 
have limits on their political activities. There is also the fact that some 
organisations are not explicitly geared up to lobbying but instead are service- 
based organisations. Furthermore, to reiterate, decisions based on where it was 
appropriate for groups to engage in policy, if at all, were in part shaped by 
devolution within their organisation and a sense of what the organisation was 
about at their level, their identity:
... the practicalities of running an organisation at the sub-national level is 
a question of allocating influence on European policy-making when we 
have a Brussels office with all the experts to do. It is to look upon the 
members, the members pay out bills and our staff; our job is to actively 
influence here in Wales for our members. (Interview, business group, 
2003)
... we're just to do the local area, we're not interested in the big picture, I 
mean our group is locally based and it's for local members to enjoy and 
get enthusiastic about. (Interview, community/heritage group, 2004)
Furthermore, the extent to which groups perceived the European dimension as 
important to their work being issue specific (and the extent to which the issue has 
resonance with policy-makers), together with an assessment of whether they 
could influence (based on external factors), was another reason for engaging/not 
engaging with the EU and acted as an obstacle:
If I felt we could make a difference, then I'd be there like a shot. 
(Interview, international development group, 2003)
Within a European context, the impression we've had is that the Welsh 
language is in the higher bracket of languages that are seen as most 
successful, as it were. (Interview, language group, 2004)
the things that really concern NGOs: the European Union seems 
almost incapable of changing its mind. For instance, the Common 
Agricultural Policy, which is an absolute disgrace and has remained 
intact despite its manifest injustice and despite the efforts of the most 
powerful NGOs. (Interview, British CSO, 2004)
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One group also drew attention to the fact that its members did not have direct 
experience or affinity with Europe (instead having links for example with Africa 
and Asia), making it less likely for them to focus upon EU policy. This shows 
how groups' decision to engage/not engage is also founded on cultural 
constraints as well as on strategic choices. Moreover, the same group directed 
attention to how the internal was shaped by the external, stating how the lack of 
attention that London paid to Wales for many years meant that only recently was 
there a Welsh dimension to their work.
In terms of the external dimension, Wales' limited power and place 
within the EU was seen as key by CSOs, particularly in weighing up whether 
they could have any influence:
... people in Wales have spent years campaigning to get Europe to 
recognise Welsh as an official language; thirty years and it's not... Being 
as we haven't got any power through, or representation and so on it's not 
going to happen. (Interview, language/community group, 2003)
Ideally, but how would Welsh groups, Wales being a very small part on 
the periphery of Europe, have a genuine say, be genuinely consulted? 
(Interview, international development group, 2003)
One CSO in Wales mentioned the problem that the European Commission only 
deals with European CSOs, as did a European Commission Official. Another 
CSO stated that there was a lack of readily available information about the 
procedures, and structures were not in place to get their views. This becomes 
more problematic given the implicit assertion by many policy-makers that groups 
should come to them, if not directly then through the mechanisms in place.
There was also a cultural component to the external obstacles that groups 
and policy-makers perceived. These revolved around the nature of Wales, 
conceptions of Europe, the role of the media and British politics. Two groups 
referred to the Assembly as insular, preventing it looking out to the EU and 
further afield, and one CSO identified that in Wales there was not the arena for 
debate that would allow civil society to take its views into Europe. The equality 
group perceived this state of affairs as bound up in Welsh history, and considered 
problems with its identity with Welsh internal divisions more pressing than 
commonalties. It also viewed the Assembly as not having civil society behind it,
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challenging how widespread an embryonic Welsh civic society was becoming. 
Two additional groups mentioned the lack of the media in generating a Welsh 
debate. British Euro-sceptism was also put into the equation by an MP, CoR 
member and by the equality group:
I think Europe, European Union is a tremendous switch-off to many 
people. (Interview, CoR member, 2003)
All we can get in British politics is this fucking argument over how much 
we hate Europe, over how cucumbers have to be straight, a lie you know, 
and you think "we can't get a debate that's better than this"? And for 
Wales to have a positive debate around [Europe] with London can't even 
get beyond waving a pound coin in the air and saying you know if Labour 
wins then this will go. (Interview, equality group, 2004)
However, the European Commission Official said of Wales' view of Europe as 
opposed to England that "you don't come across this fissural antagonism" 
(European Commission Official, 2004), with some groups also perceiving that 
the EU was more receptive to Welsh views than the UK. Yet some CSOs felt the 
EU was complex and far away, "out there", and there was a sense amongst some 
organisations that European issues dealt with in Wales or in Britain (apart from 
specifically European policies like enlargement) were then Welsh and British 
policy issues. The trade union raised the spectre that British political culture did 
not encourage civil society and co-operation, but instead adversarial party 
politics.
An external material dimension was added to the CSOs' reasons for not 
getting involved that of the EU's output legitimacy.
Europe has been popular in the past because it has delivered the goods. If 
Europe isn't seen as delivering the goods, it's not seen to be so popular. 
(Interview, MP, 2004)
Indeed, the equality group again reinforced this claim, suggesting that problems 
with the way that structural funding had been handled because the money had 
gone on short-term projects resulted in the EU being construed negatively. 
Finally, the language group came across the use of European legislation by 
policy-makers as a barrier, which links back to the internal problems of not 
having the expertise to challenge the claim:
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But really when people tell us "that goes contrary to European 
conventions or you can't do that because the European Union wouldn't 
allow it"; we don't really know that, it hasn't been tested, it's something 
that people throw sometimes to shut you up, or when they can't be 
bothered to look into the question themselves they just say "oh it goes 
contrary to European law". (Interview, language group, 2004)
CONCLUSIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCE FOR DEMOCRACY
In summation, groups who engaged hi EU policy issues varied in the extent to 
which they did so, with the more active groups sharing particular characteristics 
(being Wales-wide and respected organisations) and the most active deploying 
strategies that reached across political avenues, hi the main, CSOs' involvement 
in EU policy-making occurred at the Assembly and was focused around 
implementation, with regional policy acting as a noted anomaly. Groups too, 
whilst not being involved in the policy-making aspect of the implementation 
stage, were involved in the monitoring and carrying-out of EU funded projects 
(with some groups overlapping all three). The engaged CSOs (bar one) also had 
Welsh/British/European and even International parent counterparts that also 
acted as an alternative route to influence EU policy. There were variations in the 
extent to which the Welsh groups were able to feed into their network. These 
variations appeared related to the identity of groups, how groups (and parent 
groups) understand the role of Wales within the UK/Europe (which has 
ideological overtones) and the degree of devolution (both locally and on a Welsh 
level) within group structures. This demonstrates the importance of focusing 
upon individual actors in researching civil society's involvement in policy- 
making as well as political structures.
With respect to the POS, it appears that access was more readily found 
within the decentralised structures in Wales, with many EU issues being 
subsumed into the Assembly's general sectoral work. This does in part back up 
post-devolution findings of civil society groups switching their policy lenses to 
Wales. However, as the criteria and the Welsh policy-makers' discourse 
highlighted, it was the large, Wales-wide groups who in the main engaged here. 
This is further to be expected with some policy-makers reinforcing the view that 
groups should come to them, whereas non-engaged groups shared the contrary
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view. Thus, the engagement of already active groups appears self-culminating, 
regardless of the existence of open structures. Fewer groups tried to access the 
UK and those who did found it harder to gain influence and access, although 
those who had established relations in a policy area appeared to have easier 
access (in line with the idea that British policy-making revolves around policy 
networks). The lack of involvement here may be symptomatic of the extent of 
effective relationships between the UK and Welsh Assembly Governments. 
However, this is unlikely following the idea that one of the obstacles to groups' 
EU engagement was the lack of Welsh power vis a vis the UK. Instead, policy- 
makers, one CSO and the lack of an UK-Wales voluntary sector compact, 
presented the idea that the UK government/Officials had built up an informal 
norm that civil society in Wales should deal with the Assembly, providing an 
additional consideration to the POS. Ideas and policy-maker frames also provide 
further explanation for civil society in Wales' policy participation, such as 
political parties and political ideologies.
Fewer groups still went directly to the EU institutions in Brussels' and 
among those who did, one did not have membership in any of the umbrella 
groups, two were involved in WEC and one was a Welsh branch of a European 
group. Here access was possible, although one of these CSOs brought up the 
barrier also articulated by a European Commission Official in Brussels, that the 
European Commission preferred to deal with Euro-groups, thus limiting their 
influence. The more active groups also matched the ones identified by the 
policy-makers as successful. Moreover, another understanding was unveiled by 
a UK policy-maker that domestic civil society groups should influence in the 
UK, not in Brussels, with EU policy still labelled as foreign policy. Furthermore, 
prevailing Euro-sceptism, particularly prevalent among the British political 
institutions and British political discourse cannot be discounted as a disabling
factor.
This chapter has highlighted that structures are important in shaping 
behaviour as some groups recognise the measures warranted by the POS. For 
example, some CSOs view the Assembly's limited role in EU policy-making as a 
limit and barrier to participation. In particular, the practical aspects of the 
institutional discourses on civil society are evident. A lack of awareness of the 
EU policy-making process and institutions also limited CSOs' participation.
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However, it appears that in this instance, cultural and actor-specific reasons also 
shape involvement, with many instances of opportunity in the POS remaining 
underused:
Opportunity has a strong cultural component and we miss something 
important when we limit our attention to variance in political institutions 
and the relationships among political actors. (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 
279)
In terms of the implications for democracy, the good news is there is 
some activity on EU policy-making which can act as a check on government 
expansion (Grant, 2000). However CSOs in Wales have rather little influence, 
with voices being filtered through layers of government and organisations. 
Raising the concerns of those under-represented and excluded is partly evident 
with the poverty and women's groups involvement (although the poverty group 
has since disbanded). The traditional democratic role accorded to groups 
bringing the intensity of public feeling on an issue is unlikely because much of 
EU policy is technocratic and specialised. The way that civil society in Wales 
engages with policy may be deliberative and participatory in some instances 
when stakeholder groups are set up, or policy-makers engage with individuals 
from the group informally (but this limits the extent to which this is passed on to 
the rest of the population). However in the main, traditional representative 
democracy reinforced with civil society was able to influence only proactively 
and through the margins. This may be fine where representative arrangements 
are in the ascendance, notably in the UK and Wales (and even then there are 
issues surrounding EU policy where the UK Parliament and the NAW play a 
minor role). However, in the context of the EU, where civil society engagement 
is arguably needed to legitimise the EU, then discouraging regional groups and 
requiring their voice to be filtered through groups and governments, each with 
their own agenda, will not make policy more acceptable to people or provide 
input legitimacy. This is further complicated by participation being limited on 
the ground, concentrated among large Wales-wide umbrella groups.
Moreover, the continued role of British Euro-sceptism and the dominance 
of British political elites in British-EU debate according to Statham and Gray 
(2004) "have failed to open up debate over Britain's relationship to Europe in a 
meaningful way" (Statham and Gray, 2004:23). There is also an issue in that
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some policy-makers perceive CSOs as mainly concerned with money and 
carrying out services, which may reduce the critical function of civil society to 
enhance participation beyond elections and also its ability to forge a sense of 
European identity. Yet it also appears that not all groups, despite having some 
imperative (the issues they are concerned with having an EU policy component) 
to engage in EU policy-making, are willing or able to engage in EU policy- 
making. Indicating that CSOs capability as it stands may not be sufficient to 
engage in EU policy-making and bring the EU input legitimacy.
In terms of whether corporatist or pluralist relations exist, Michalowitz's 
(2002) argument that either of these can be in ascendance at different times of 
the policy-making process seems pertinent, given the different approaches by the 
institutions. In terms of access and openness most groups felt the Assembly was 
the most open. Nonetheless, the kinds of groups participating here and across 
tiers of EU policy-making were Wales-wide "representative" bodies. The British 
institutions were seen to be less open and the EU fairly open. Yet the EU was 
also perceived to be "remote" and the process was exclusionary by its 
complexity, preventing participation even before it could have begun. Thus, in 
the kind of groups participating and in terms of the POS structuring civil 
society's participation, corporatism appears to be on the ascendant at this time. 
Nonetheless, much of the CSOs' actions appeared to be lobbying activities rather 
than a role in decision-making.
This chapter has covered the broad swathe of EU policy-making activities 
that CSOs engaged or did not engage in. Does this differ greatly from their 
Convention participation? This thesis now turns to focus on the specific case of 
the Convention to explore their role further.
191
THE CASE STUDY: THE CONVENTION, CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN WALES AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Never before had EU governments gone so far in sharing the tasks of 
plotting constitutional change as in the Convention. (Norman, 2003:3)
The Convention was in numerous ways an event of many firsts. It was certainly 
the first time that civil society had been formally involved in discussions on EU 
treaty change. It was also a first in its working methods, tenure, agenda and 
outcome. Therefore, the Convention can be seen as part of a trend towards a new 
way of EU working, following the WPG. As such this author argues that the 
Convention provides a prime site to explore civil society-EU dynamics.
This chapter will firstly further draw upon secondary literature and 
documents to demonstrate the Convention's uniqueness, unveil the institutional 
aspects of the Convention's POS and situate the empirical findings. Secondly, 
the unstable aspects of the POS will be assessed through documents and 
literature. Finally, the concrete Convention experience of the CSOs in Wales' 
interviewed will be analysed, together with the policy-makers interview findings. 
This chapter differs from the other empirical chapters by exploring in-depth one 
particular instance of "policy-making", whereas the previous chapters have 
illuminated upon the context of the case study.
UNIQUENESS OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
In order to detail the Convention's novelty, the Convention will be 
contextualised by comparing it to other types of EU policy-making from the last 
chapter. Secondly, the requirements of a constitution-making debate will be 
described. This will generate further criteria with which to assess civil society's 
role in the Convention. Next, the institutional opportunity structures of where, 
how and when, civil society should have partaken in the Convention will be 
unveiled. Furthermore, an examination of the role of the different political
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institutions and their degree of nesting, institutional discourses of civil society 
and groups' institutional relations will depict the institutional opportunity 
structures and interest group - institutional relations. This will also enable an 
assessment of whether pluralist or corporatist relations were in evidence. 
Finally, the POS in the previous chapter will be compared with the Convention, 
to demonstrate the Convention's originality.
This review of existing literature on civil society and the EU Convention 
will show that whilst opportunities were fairly open to European civil society,39 
the institutional opportunity structure offered to CSOs in Wales was fairly 
closed. This section will also demonstrate that there is paucity of research on 
civil society-Convention interaction at the regional/local level. Such research on 
this level is imperative due to the functions accorded to civil society by the 
Convention and in constitutional law perspectives.
Constitution-making requirements
What are the essential ingredients for constitution-making and does civil society 
constitute one of these? There are three caveats surrounding this appraisal. 
Firstly, there are different understandings of constitutions that give rise to 
different criteria on constitution-making. Secondly, some authors view the 
constitution-making process as irrelevant for the constitution (for example Szach, 
2005; Mollers, 2004). Finally, as the EU is not a nation-state, questions abound 
over applying the same criteria used towards national constitution-making to the 
EU's constitution-making process.
Addressing the matter of different understanding of constitutions, there 
does appear to be a conceptual shift from viewing constitutions as a bill of 
negative rights to that of more positive legal documents, whose norms and values 
have to be shared by society (Weiner, 2003). In this perspective the constitution 
must come from the people:
A proper constitution should not, according to democratic criteria, be 
made unless it has been mandated by the people and been subjected to 
public debate and ratified through proper legitimate processes subjected 
to judicial review. (Eriksen, 2004:35)
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Civil society arguably should be central in aiding such public participation and 
debate. Equally, civil society's involvement in constitution-making may also be 
important (as in general policy-making), to articulate contending views and to 
enable issues to be addressed and included. Closa (2003) contends that civil 
society, in the context of the Convention, could play another role, acting "as 
receivers of information and as a public" (Closa, 2003:15). Such activities could 
aid the acceptability and legitimacy of a constitutional document. The 
opportunity to debate and listen to others' views, which civil society could 
facilitate, is also imperative for those approaches which stress that a constitution 
should go beyond the lowest common denominator (Magnetic, 2003b: 28-29).
However, academics like Szach (2005) and Mollers (2004:134), who 
base their evaluations upon constitutional conventions and constitutions in 
history, argue that although today's democratic states did not have open, 
deliberative constitution-making processes, yet these states are nonetheless 
democratic. This may the case for nation-states with a sense of national identity 
and a demos where a constitution codifies pre-existing shared values and bonds. 
However, in the EU, where it was hoped that the constitution-making process 
would create such bonds between the citizen and the EU, the degree of citizen 
participation in the constitution-making process cannot be ignored. This chapter 
now moves to the specific process of the Convention, to situate it among other 
types of EU policy and law-making deeds.
Novelty of the Convention
Situating the Convention in relation to other policy- and law making modes is 
important to aid understanding of the case study and its context and shall be 
attended to now. The EU prior to the Convention relied on the IGC as a means of 
negotiating treaty change. As previously mentioned, an alternative was found in 
the CFR Convention. Thus, some direction for the Convention existed from 
IGCs, the CFR Convention and from general EU policy-making. However, 
despite some limited continuity with IGCs, EU policy-making and even the CFR 
Convention, the Convention was a unique process. This originality and 
continuity shall be explored in terms of the Convention's mandate, composition 
and process in comparison to mainly IGCs' and EU policy-making and also in 
part the CFR Convention.
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The Convention had a very broad mandate to "consider the key issues 
arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various 
possible responses" (European Council, 2001:3). This is different from an IGC, 
the CFR Convention and ordinary EU policy-making, given that the latter 
concentrates on issues of low politics which are often technical (Richardson, 
2001) and the CFR Convention concentrated upon a discrete area. Divergence 
from an IGC is also evident, as many issues are agreed before the IGC summit 
occurs (Hoffrnan, 2003:75) and an outcome of a treaty is assumed. In contrast, 
the Convention's mandate only posthumously evolved towards producing a draft 
constitution. At the same time, the Convention shares some IGC characteristics, 
as described by Smith (2002): flexibility, ambiguity, drift and indirection.
The composition of the Convention was dissimilar from both an IGC and 
regular EU policy-making and slightly different from the CFR Convention (with 
one additional European Commission representative and more institutions having 
observers at the Convention; see Bellamy and Schonlau, 2003:17). The 
Convention had representatives from national parliaments, national government, 
EP, European Commission, and observers from the CoR, ECOSOC Social 
Partners and European Ombudsman with a Praesidium to oversee the process 
and also a Secretariat to keep its work going smoothly (see Table 6.1 overleaf). 
Normally, the EU institutions, national parliamentarians, regional representatives 
(outside of the CoR) and civil society do not have a seat at the IGC table 
(Hoffrnan, 2003:77), unlike the Convention. The Convention's composition also 
differed from EU policy-making as national parliamentarians, regional 
representatives (outside of the CoR) and civil society were formally included. 
However, shades of inter-governmentalism were apparent in the selection of 
President Valery d'Estaing who was perceived as unlikely to drastically shift the 
status quo of EU integration (Hoffrnan, 2003:80-81).
The President of the Praesidium, Valery d'Estaing, reduced ambiguity 
surrounding the Convention's progression by making it clear that there would be 
three phases to the Convention's work (on the stages see Miller, 2003:7; Shaw, 
2003a:63). There was a listening phase held until July 2002, to explore people's 
expectations of the EU in the future. This was followed by a study phase from 
July to the end of 2002 to consider in-depth the Laeken Declaration's issues. 
Finally, there was a reflection stage, where proposals were discussed and agreed.
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This time-frame is much longer than an IGC to discuss deep-seated values and to 
arrive at solutions (Eriksen, Possum, and Menendez, 2003: 10).
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At the initial stage, perception seemed to be largely positive that the 
Convention would work differently from IGCs (for example Puder, 2003). With 
the Conventioneers as representatives of the Convention, not as sectional 
representatives per se, the Conventioneers could focus on the common good and 
deliberate rather than resort to bargaining. Thus, the Convention was described 
as a "constitutional moment" (Lenaerts and Gerard, 2004:291). The Convention 
plenaries, conducted on general topics, were publicly broadcasted. On the other 
hand, the Praesidium continued to meet secretly, like the IGC negotiators, 
although in response to criticisms minutes of these meetings were sent to the
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Conventioneers (Miller, 2003:9). However, the lack of media spotlight on the 
CFR was credited with aiding its success (Scott, 2002:5). Thus, the Convention 
appears to be radically different from the IGC:
Beyond the importance of lessons learned, a new culture of bright 
sunlight, public discussion, and dull communication loops holds the 
promise of finally relinquishing the democratic deficit, recipes of polity- 
building by stealth and elite bargaining that have for so long dominated 
the integration projects. (Puder, 2003:1570)
The latter stages of reflection and ultimately decision-making were 
characterised by more traditional inter-governmental bargaining. In the 
reflection stage, working groups and three discussion circles studied areas in 
detail and produced reports. These working groups were able to call upon 
expertise similar to traditional EU policy-making made with epistemic 
communities. However, the Convention differed from EU policy-making 
because the institutional actors were equally involved in all the stages. Working 
groups were "flexible" (an IGC characteristic) with the six envisaged original 
groups expanding out to eleven. The working groups were not open to the public 
(Shaw, 2003b:55), in consequence the Convention's hallmark of transparency 
was curtailed. In the decision-making stage, traditional cleavages opened up on 
certain issues along the fault lines of pro/anti integrationists, left/right wing and 
large/small states (Kohnstamm and Durand, 2003; Magnetic, 2004:215). 
Institutional actors also promoted their institutional interests, such as the 
European Parliamentarians and European Commission (Stuart, 2003:18), as well 
as the "common good" (Dobson and Follesdal, 2004). Foreign ministers were 
brought in at the last minute and government 'hard lines' were introduced (Goler, 
2004:281-2) and in some cases actively encouraged (Magnetic, 2004:217). 
Thus, the logics of individual political institutions were evident in the 
Convention. Decisions were made by consensus (unlike much of EU policy 
made by QMV) and Giscard D'Estaing made it clear that a minority could not 
stop the majority creating a consensus (Magnetic, 2004:214). In the end, Stuart 
(2003:23) questioned to what extent this consensus was collectively forged in 
contrast to being imposed by the Presidency.
The Convention's novelty was limited in that it was a top-down process 
(Brunkhorst, 2004:94) and its Conventioneers were demographically
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unrepresentative of EU citizens (Dobson and Follesdal, 2004:3). Furthermore, 
authors working from a deliberative standpoint have challenged the Convention 
with not fully meeting its deliberative potential (for example Magnette, 2004). 
To assess whether the Convention fostered public participation one must 
examine its involvement of new players, for instance civil society, as a link to 
public participation in the Convention. Civil society involvement will help 
gauge to what extent the Convention differed from the IGC elite model (where 
there is no official civil society participation) or from general EU policy-making 
that consists of Officials and experts (Wallace, 2000a:540).
In summation, the Convention represents a departure from both IGC and 
general EU policy-making in terms of its mandate, process and composition (see 
Table 6.2).
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Some continuity, particularly with the IGC and CFR models, are evident. 
However, the Convention breaks with the CFR Convention in terms of its broad 
mandate, greater publicity and also a little in composition. Some parallels with 
IGCs are evident, particularly during the latter stages of the Convention, with 
interests, bargaining and cleavages coming to the fore. The Convention is thus a 
novel event in the EU's history, warranting special attention. Its originality also 
means that it provides an exemplary opportunity to explore the EU's relations 
with civil society following the WPG, as civil society is for the first time 
accorded a role in treaty reform. Moreover, as authors such as Magnette (2003b) 
charge the Convention with aiding the EU's democratic legitimacy, and 
constitution-making perspectives accord civil society a potential role to 
legitimise the treaty, the Convention acts as a key area to explore the research's 
concerns with civil society participation in the EU and democracy.
The Convention's Political Opportunity Structure
To aid comparison with EU policy-making this section explores the more stable 
institutional and interest group-institutional mediation aspects of the Political 
Opportunity Structure: formal avenues and procedures, power, autonomy, role of 
institutions, as well as informal aspects, patterns of interest group-institutional 
mediation, institutional conceptions and ad hoc avenues, procedures and 
strategies. This omits the more unstable aspects such as related events and 
political alignments to be analysed further on in this chapter, although there will 
be some overlap. It is also conceded that the Convention's "stable" POS 
elements in the Convention's POS, are more unstable than in general EU policy- 
making because of the Convention's evolving mandate and novelty. This section 
will provide a backdrop as to where, when and how civil society from Wales 
should and could have been involved in the Convention. It will also explore the 
degree of openness of the institutional components of the opportunity structure 
towards civil society. The chapter will now attend to the institutions with which 
CSOs should have been involved in the Convention, by examining the role of the 
different institutions in the Convention process, the degree to which they were 
nested and their significance. It is important to look at institutions' activities 
because it will affect the space and energy they were able to give to civil society
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and their views. Moreover, this discussion will demonstrate where, when and 
how civil society should have interacted with the different political institutions.
The Convention's Institutional Opportunity Structure
Procedures, Junctions, processes: the role of Welsh institutions in the Convention 
The Assembly had no formal place at the Convention and initially the outlook 
for regions was not good (Jeffrey, 2004b:9; Gruber, 2002:4). The Laeken 
Declaration did give regions their first formal role in treaty reform via six CoR 
observers to the Convention. Given that observers merely had speaking, not 
voting rights, "all insiders know [the observer role] is of little significance" 
(Jones, 2002:7). Moreover, none of these observers, their six alternates and the 
CoR's special working group members contained any Welsh members. 
Nonetheless, Welsh CoR members would have had the opportunity to debate the 
issue with their Convention delegates at regular plenaries and some of the CoR's 
Convention delegates were British.
The other formal Convention regional avenue was found in the 
arrangements to include civil society. Despite the President of the European 
Commission declaring that a "clear distinction must be drawn between such 
democratically elected bodies ... and civil society" (Prodi, 2002:1), the 
Convention put civil society and regions together in both the Internet Forum and 
in the civil society plenaries. In respect to the regions' Convention predicament, 
McLeod (2002) called for regions to use multi-strategies:
It is necessary for them to establish as many different lines of 
communication (both formal and) as possible, thus enabling some level 
of engagement with the Convention debate. (Mcleod, 2002:3)
What avenues did the Assembly use? The WAG was more active in the 
Convention than the NAW, using regional groupings and their relationship with 
the UK to influence the Convention. During the Convention's listening stage the 
WAG was engaged in the WPG debate although they tried to link this with the 
Convention (e.g. WAG, 2002a:3). Specifically, the First Minister combined the 
signing of the Trans European Declaration on the WPG in May 2002 with other 
EU regions, together with meeting the European Commissioner and Praesidium
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member, Bamier, to discuss the document and the Future of Europe (NAW, 
2002a). WAG was also a member of the Group of Regions with Legislative 
Powers (REGLEG), and the First Minister signed a REGLEG Convention 
Declaration in November 2002 (NAW, 2002b). The Conference of Peripheral 
and Maritime Regions (CPMR) was another regional grouping where the 
European Convention was discussed and WAG Ministers were present (NAW, 
2002c). The approach taken by WAG, perhaps hi response to regions' limited 
formal role, focused on specifically regional concerns, the place of regional 
governments in the EU architecture, and policy process and subsidiarity:
Naturally we are interested in changes in the big picture but we have a 
special interest hi subsidiarity. (First Minister for Wales cited in NAW, 
2002d:l)
The UK government was the most important avenue for WAG 
engagement. The UK-EU devolution machinery was used for the Convention 
right from its beginning, with the First Minister being briefed and consulted on 
the Future of Europe debate by the Foreign Secretary at JMC(E) on the 8th of 
November 2001. However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, Wales is 
tightly nested, with little power in the UK government-devolved administrations 
EU arrangements. The First Minister also met with Peter Hain, the government 
representative on the Convention and also a Welsh MP, on the 26th of April 2002 
and no doubt on other occasions (NAW, 2002e). The WAG European Office 
and European and External Affairs Department (BEAD) in Cardiff would have 
also played a role, giving advice and facilitating arrangements for WAG 
Ministers on the Convention. WEC similarly monitored the Convention.
However, the most significant opportunity for the Assembly's input 
occurred at the end of 2002, in the reflection stage. At this stage, the collection of 
views should have been completed. The Convention regardless announced it 
would hold another plenary to debate regional concerns and that the contact 
group of regional and local authorities would meet again. The Deputy First 
Minister for Wales at the time, Mike German, argued that this was a "response to 
sustained lobbying from the Regions with legislative powers and others" (NAW, 
2003c:3).
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In preparation for the regional debate, Scottish and Welsh devolved 
administrations drew up a paper on the role of the regions. This paper was 
subsequently discussed in the JMC(E) format and a joint UK paper was agreed 
(NAW, 2003c:3). Peter Hain then submitted the paper to the Convention and 
spoke at the regional plenary on the 7th of February 2003. Main's intervention 
received reinforcement with a subsequent speech from the President of Baden- 
Wuttenburg, a powerful regional voice (see Clifford, 2004). This "Hain" paper 
compromised many of the devolved administration's points. Such receptivity to 
the devolved administrations concerns by the UK government appears to be 
exceptional, as the First Minister describes that this success "so far as I can 
recall, unique in the course of our devolution experience to date" (WAG, 
2003:1). In this paper Hain (2003a) called for:
• Procedural recognition of the role of the regions in policy
• Inclusion of regions in early warning systems on EU legislative proposals
• Setting standards to include regions in consultation at the pre-legislative 
phase
• The use of tripartite contracts
• To reform, rename and to give the CoR full participant status in the EU.
The UK therefore has obviously taken on the concerns of the regions, but within 
limits, as a parliamentary committee in 2002 stated that it "would not support 
new rights that undermined the position of Member States by making sub- 
Member State authorities competitors in the EU" (Miller, 2003:75). Moreover, 
Jack Straw (see Straw, 2002) and Peter Hain had previously come out in favour 
of subsidiarity and this brings into question the extent of Assembly influence at 
this time. Hain's paper was received well by the Convention (interview, 
European Commission Official, 2004), particularly as the UK had never 
appeared to be a supporter of the regions (NAW, 2003d: 82). This regional 
debate had real dividends with the constitutional draft treaty recognising the 
regions. It compromised WAG's main input into the Convention and certainly 
was its most influential:
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This represents a major achievement for Wales in taking forward our 
European agenda and, in the process, securing the weight of the UK 
Government in support of our ideas. (First Minister for Wales in WAG, 
2003:2)
The NAW was a back-seat driver to many of these WAG initiatives, with 
the EEAC's approval often being sought prior the official signing of 
contributions. Their Convention interventions similarly came late in the 
Convention's play, having been heavily involved in the WPG. The First 
Minister, who was Chair of the EEAC at the time, met with the UK's European 
Committee Chairs and UK Convention representatives on the 22nd of April 2002 
(NAW, 2002e). The EEAC similarly met with Convention MP representatives 
(NAW, 2002f) and Peter Hain (NAW, 2003e), and supported CALRE's 
Declaration in January 2003 that was submitted to the Convention (NAW, 
2003f). A few Assembly plenary questions were related to the Convention - and 
there was a short debate as the Convention drew to a close on "Wales and Future 
of Europe" on the 4th of June 2003 (NAW, 2003d:75-83).
Part of the explanation for the limited Assembly activity at the 
Convention's start may be found in their perception of the Convention and other 
more pressing concerns. When the Convention began a Cabinet briefing (WAG, 
2001:3) and the First Minister stressed that "the Convention is not a decision- 
making body" (NAW, 2002g:20). Jones (2002) also notes that the dispute over 
WEC40 may have taken up these institutions' attention, as well as the debate on 
European Governance that overlapped with the Convention's first few months 
(Mcleod, 2002).
In summary, it appears that the Convention was at the outset not very 
open to regional input, with the Welsh Assembly resorting to its relations with 
the Member State through traditional UK-devolved administration EU machinery 
to influence the proceedings (also showing some continuity with general EU 
policy-making). Wales' window of opportunity in the Convention came late in 
the day and despite having little leverage over the UK government, the devolved 
administrations were able to pursue the regional agenda through the UK 
representative in the Convention. The WAG - its Ministers and Officials - once 
more appears as the key actor in Assembly-EU relations and with the NAW 
seeming to be less active on the Convention. The timing and nature of the
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Assembly's concerns, together with the structural limitations facing regions (and 
specifically Wales) in the Convention, suggest that there is very little scope for 
civil society input and influence through this route.
Procedures, functions, processes: the role of United Kingdom institutions in the 
Convention
All the EU and accession Member States, including the UK, sent one 
government Minister and two national parliamentarians, together with their 
alternates to the Convention. The UK also had a number of MEPs and a CoR 
member. Overall it was the French who had the largest "national" delegation41 
(Shaw, Hoffman and Bausili 2003:15). Nonetheless, this section will focus on 
the role of UK institutions and their Conventioneers: namely, Westminster, 
Whitehall and the UK government, not on UK Conventioneers representing EU 
institutions.
One of the British National Parliamentarian Conventioneers, Gisela 
Stuart (MP), had a central part to play, being selected to sit on the Praesidium 
which chaired the Convention's course and was its "drafting body" (Stuart, 
2003:19). This status meant that she was the Chair of the working group on 
national parliaments, enabling her to set the working group's direction a little 
(Shaw, Hoffinan and Bausili, 2003:16). Nonetheless, as her reflective pamphlet 
"The Making of Europe's Constitution" details, towards the Convention's close 
many members of the Praesidium did not have the time to debate and change 
parts of the constitution, with the impetus instead coming from the President and 
also from the secretariat Head John Kerr. This, reduced the collective role of the 
Praesidium. In this expose, Gisela Stuart also describes the national 
parliamentarians as the least effective group, being the most inexperienced in 
European matters, and who instead "supported what the European Parliament 
wanted and in the working of the Convention they were not treated a distinctive 
constituency"(Stuart, 2003:18). British civil servants and counsel from the 
House of Commons also supported her (Stuart, 2003:21-22). Thus, her impact 
was variable and the significance of the other national parliamentarians was
questionable.
The government representative and initially Minister for Europe, Peter 
Hain, was an important player in the Convention, nicknamed the "shadow
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President" (Magnette, 2004:217) and "Hain the Pain" (Buchanan and Atkinson, 
2003:13). His appointment was viewed as an indication that the "British 
government made the decision early on to take the Convention seriously" 
(Guerot, et. al. 2003:8). A further sign of the UK government taking the 
Convention in earnest was the public publication of a draft constitution in 2002 
(Keohane, 2002:1), making it the first government to do this. The weight of 
government representatives in the Convention was greater than the other 
representatives because any Convention agreement would have to be validated 
by Member State governments. A further sign of Member State governments' 
significance was that Convention President d'Estaing kept in regular contact with 
the Heads of State (Stuart, 2003:19). The importance of any one Conventioneer 
was limited by the existence of another 104 Conventioneers and the consensual 
working methods.
Peter Hain was involved in the subsidiarity and social Europe working 
groups with his alternate on the Charter for Fundamental Rights, Baroness 
Scotland of Asthal. It appears that as the Convention progressed Hain found it 
more difficult to affect changes (Guerot et. al., 2003:8), or he was less willing to 
compromise, although he was seen to be generally influential. He kept his 
Foreign Office team with him and would have received briefings/support from 
the UK civil service in Brussels. More generally, the UK ran briefing meetings 
for all its delegates, including the MEPs, prior to plenaries, lending influence to 
the UK civil service and UKREP.
The key Convention issues for the UK government included: securing an 
efficient Europe, increasing national governments' and parliaments' role in the 
EU's architecture, safeguarding the spread of QMV to politically sensitive areas 
and putting Member States at the heart of the EU project:
Europe is the voluntary coming together of member states. (Blair, 
2002:6)
The main areas of contention are the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights into an EU constitutional treaty; harmonisation of 
taxation; ensuring EU defence policy does not undermine NATO and 
reform of the European Council and Council of Ministers. (Keohane, 
2002:1)
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Such issues seem to again accord little space for civil society, or their concerns.
Westminster, one stage removed from the proceedings, did have some 
Convention participation. The UK's Convention national parliamentarians 
regularly gave evidence to both the floor of the House of Commons and to a 
special standing committee set up on the Convention. In this committee, pro- 
and anti-Europe debates carried the day (interview, MP, 2004). The ESC, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Lords Select Committee on Europe 
also held evidence sessions with Conventioneers and Ministers. Both Houses' 
European committees conducted inquiries into Convention related matters. The 
ESC focused on the role of National Parliaments, democracy and scrutiny 
(Regan, et al., 2003). In comparison, the House of Lords' European Select 
Committee followed the Convention's work more closely, producing detailed 
reports on the Convention's working groups. The floor of the houses also had 
some limited engagement:
During 2002 there were 84 parliamentary questions about the Convention 
in the Commons and 37 in the Lords. In the Commons, although the 
Convention was raised in the twice-yearly debates on European Affairs 
and in adjournment debates on a constitution for Europe, and democracy 
in the European Union, there was only one Commons debate dedicated to 
the Convention, itself, on 2 December 2002 on a Government motion on 
its strategy in the Convention. (Miller, 2003:12)
In essence, the UK government and subsequently its civil service was a key actor 
in the Convention. The national parliaments debated the Convention and its 
issues. However, the focus of contention on institutions may have endowed little 
space to civil society (this statement will be upheld later in the chapter, when the 
views of civil society are attended to).
Procedures, functions, processes: the role of European Union institutions and 
the Convention in the Convention
Much of the working methods at the EU/Convention level have already been 
outlined. To avoid repetition this section will focus upon the role of the 
European institutional actors: the EP, the European Commission and others. This 
section will also reiterate some of the Convention's power dynamics and stages. 
The MEPs were full Convention members and were geared up for the European
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Convention. Moreover, given that they were used to working in Brussels and 
with each other, they were key players early on in the Convention (Hoffinan, 
2003:82-3). However, despite some MEP unity there was "active caucusing in 
the European party federations" (Shaw, Hoffinan and Bausili 2003:17).
The European Commission on the other hand had a much smaller 
Convention delegation, yet both of the Commission's Conventioneers were also 
on the Praesidium powerhouse, thus increasing the European Commission's 
importance. The European Commission also managed the futurum and Forum 
websites.
The ECOSOC and the CoR, being observers, had a lesser role. They 
were charged with aiding the national debates and the ECOSOC in particular had 
responsibility for engaging civil society (this will be elaborated upon in the 
chapter shortly). Their role was limited by not being part of the consensus- 
making. Observers were members of working groups and able to send 
amendments to the Praesidium on draft texts.
There are disagreements in the literature over the role of the Praesidium 
(compare Rupp 2003; Magnetic 2004; Shaw, Hoffinan and Bausili 2003:16). 
Nonetheless, it is fair to state that this body set much of the direction:
But, it is true that in the Convention the Praesidium, so headed by Valery 
Giscard D'Estaing as you know, composed by 12 members was the most 
important forum, if I may say so, and that they made a lot of pre- 
decisions I would say before submitting them to the whole Convention. 
(Interview, European Commission Official, 2004)
Moreover, as stated previously, any one Conventioneer' or group of 
Conventioneers' dominance was curtailed by the number of actors, the working 
methods of consensus, the power of argument and the need to bear in mind the 
reactions of the Member State governments to proposals. Thus, the Praesidium 
was crucial and there was some scope for the other actors, notably the European 
Commission and the EP, to have greater influence.
Interest groups-institution relations and institutional discourses on the
Convention
The focus of this section will be on the European Convention/EU level, in order 
to understand how the Convention set the parameters for civil society's
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involvement and structured its POS. As a result of the paucity of 
research/literature on British and Welsh interest group-Convention relations, this 
will instead be more fully analysed via documentary and interview evidence hi 
the rest of this chapter. This section will analyse the British and Welsh 
institutions' role, and address whether they ran any formal consultations and how 
this affects opportunities. The institutions' more general relations and discourses 
as highlighted in Chapter Four will also be kept in mind when analysing civil 
society-institutions' relations.
European Union institutions/Convention relations with interest groups and 
institutional discourses
This section will review the existing literature to demonstrate how civil society 
was involved on the Convention. This section will also help to identify where, 
when and how civil society should have participated in the Convention. Finally, 
the role accorded to civil society in the Convention will be discussed. Civil 
society's formal participation in the Convention as envisaged by the Laeken 
declaration was a means for citizens to have voice their concerns in the 
Convention process:
In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all citizens, a 
Forum will be opened for organisations representing civil society (the 
social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, 
academic, etc.). It will take the form of a structured network of 
organisations receiving regular information on the Convention's 
proceedings. Then- contributions will serve as input into the debate. Such 
organisations may be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance 
with arrangements to be established by the Praesidium. (European 
Council, 2001:5)
Civil society was also charged by Conventioneers and the ECOSOC with aiding 
the debate over the Future of Europe and bringing citizens' views to the 
Convention's attention and subsequently with translating the Convention's work 
to the citizens (ECOSOC, 2002a:2). Moreover, the importance of the 
Convention being open and receptive to civil society's views was conceded at 
the Convention's beginning, to aid its success (The European Convention, 
2002a:2; Jose M. Aznar in The European Convention, 2002b:4). Equally, 
emphasis was placed on engaging not just European (Brussels-based), but
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national and sub-national civil society, via the national debates (The European 
Convention, 2002c:5). Nonetheless, at the start, and this continued during the 
Convention, (Scott, 2002), uncertainty abounded on how civil society would 
contribute, thus impeding civil society's participation.
hi formalising civil society's participation, Jean-Luc Deheane (the Vice 
President in charge of relations with civil society) broadened out the concept of a 
Forum where civil society was intended to input (see Annex n in The European 
Convention, 2002c). Civil society could contribute through the following 
avenues:
• Internet Forum
• Civil society contact groups
• ECOSOC, CoR and European Social Partners
• Public hearings (Plenaries on the 24th and 25th of June 2002)
• National debates
• Conventioneers
• hi practice also Futurum
Each of these Convention avenues (bar the national debates) shall now be 
explored in turn to discuss their accessibility to civil society.
The ECOSOC early on was billed as having "a very important role in 
providing a bridge between the Convention and civil society" (ECOSOC, 
2002b:l). Indeed, from April 2002 onwards it carried out eight information and 
dialogue sessions with civil society that were attended by various key figures 
from the Praesidium as well as the occasional Conventioneer. However, these 
meetings were only "open to European civil society organisations and networks" 
(ECOSOC, 2002c:l). These CSOs came from a range of sectors and covered the 
pro-European to Euro-sceptic spectrum (see for example the speakers in 
ECOSOC, 2002d). The ECOSOC intended that national and grassroots CSOs 
should be engaged through ECOSOC contacts at the national level and notably 
National Economic Social Councils:
Various participants were worried that discussions of civil society at 
national level would be hampered by an approach that in some countries-
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would inevitably be too state-centred. On this point, Mr Goke Frerichs,
European ESC president and Observer, at the Convention, reassured 
those present that the national economic and social councils (existing in 
eleven Member States) had undertaken to contribute fully to the 
organisations of discussion forums. (ECOSOC, 2002e:l)
Unfortunately the UK does not possess a national Economic and Social 
Committee, thus rendering this link unusable to British CSOs. The CoR 
appeared concerned to engage with its constituents - local and regional authority, 
not non-state "civil society actors". Nevertheless, the social partners, individual 
CoR and ECOSOC members may have acted as intermediaries with the national 
and regional levels and this must be explored when analysing the interview 
material.
The Internet Forum was a message posting site where CSOs of any size, 
creed or colour could submit contributions of a "substantive contribution" 
addressing issues of concern and the issues raised by the Laeken Declaration. 
The Secretariat and the European Commission monitored the website 
throughout, with its findings summarised up to the 7th of June 2002 to feed into 
the civil society plenary debate.
The Forum has been praised for its openness. However, criticisms of it 
are plentiful. It has been lambasted for being a black hole, too unstructured, 
lacking effective advertisement with no feedback to CSOs, and participating 
CSOs being unrepresentative (Lombardo, 2003). Concerns were also flagged up 
as to whether adequate resources were available to monitor the Forum's 
contributions (Lombardo, 2003; Scott, 2002:2). Lombardo (2003:26) views the 
Internet Forum submissions as overwhelmingly being sent by ECSOs from a few 
Member States, and with some issues like asylum being under-represented. 
Finally, the Internet Forum created a barrier to those groups that did not have 
access to the Internet (Lombardo, 2003: 26). The Futurum website was designed 
for individual and group contributions on the more general debate on the future 
of Europe. Futurum suffered some of the Forum's criticisms over potential 
significance as it too was an Internet message posting site.
It was decided that eight civil society contact groups would be convened 
in advance of the civil society plenaries. These emerged out of Deheane's praise 
for CSOs who allied together to form groups like the Social Platform (see The
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European Convention, 2002c:5). Indeed, several European CSOs had already 
forged a civil society contact group in February 2002. Contact groups covered 
the following themes; social Europe, development, environment, regions and 
local authorities, culture, democracy, citizens and institutions, academic and 
human rights. The contact groups met prior to the plenary, with Praesidium 
members acting as their chairs. The civil society groups were left to organise 
their own affairs and to decide who should speak at the debate, as each contact 
group only had 25 minutes in which to speak (Spiteri, 2002), despite earlier plans 
suggesting that participants should be selected on the basis of how much they 
could contribute to the Convention (The European Convention, 2002c). 
Lombardo (2002:27) argues this self organisation led to a bias among those who 
spoke at the plenary debates and other commentators have questioned the 
representativeness of those organisations being largely European and possibly 
European Commission-sponsored (for example Heathcoat Amory in Bonde, 
2002):
It was a gathering of the Commission's payroll of funded lobby groups, 
the usual suspects saying the usual things. Naturally these represented 
'Euro' viewpoints rather than varied national voices. (Scott, 2002:2)
The limited time available to groups at the plenary sessions meant that 
participants spoke from scripts and there was no dialogue or debate (Scott, 
2002:2; Crossick, 2002:1). Commentators dispute whether this was a genuine 
attempt to involve civil society (Crossick, 2002:1) or was mere "window 
dressing" (Lombardo, 2003:36):
The actual official impact of this meeting was small, yet its symbolic 
character rather important. (Berger, 2004:8)
Issues raised by the CSOs were as scholars (Shaw, 2003a:65; Lombardo, 
2002:28) noted not focused around institutional issues but, rather on substantive 
issues about the nature of the EU project and policy, such as the social economy, 
CAP and services of general interest42 . However, institutional issues came up in 
terms of recognising the role of civil society and citizens in the EU, CFR and 
extending QMV (for example see The European Convention, 2002d). These 
issues were at odds with the issues raised by the institutions in the last section.
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There were also concerns aired by President Valery d'Estaing that this 
plenary had come fairly late in the listening stage. Groups were worried that this 
would be the only formal opportunity to speak to Conventioneers (Spiteri, 2002). 
However, in the plans for the Forum, civil society groups were also mentioned as 
a resource for Conventioneers to draw upon in their working groups, depending 
upon CSOs' expertise (thereby drawing upon practical substantive criteria to deal 
with groups). Nonetheless, Deheane stressed "that the Convention attached just 
as much importance to the pursuit of the dialogue with civil society throughout 
its deliberations" (ECOSOC, 2002f:l).
It appears that after the listening stage (and indeed to some extent it was 
already happening), that "lobbying was channelled in the usual way of personal 
contacts and the effect of NGO campaigns" (Berger, 2004:8) and it was 
"business as usual" (Shaw, Hoffman and Bausili, 2003:17) for CSOs. However, 
Borragan (2004) perceives that the cross-sectoral nature of the Convention 
resulted in business organisations handling the Convention differently. The 
focus on institutional issues, particularly in the Convention's latter stages, did act 
as a barrier to civil society who were at odds with such concerns (Lombardo, 
2003:27; Lord McLennan in Miller, 2003:14). Partly due to the institutional 
focus there was a large co-ordinated effort by civil society to get a working 
group on social Europe. Indeed, this was set up in November 2002, showing that 
the Convention was to some extent responsive to civil society concerns. 
However, this working group was not able to listen to civil society views because 
of its short time frame (Lombardo, 2003:17).
The Internet Forum remained open throughout the Convention. 
However, with escalating numbers of Forum submissions - there were 1264 at 
its close - led to doubts as to whether the European Commission and the 
Convention could synthesise and consider these submissions. Nonetheless, the 
civil society contact group viewed the Convention experience and the DCT as 
largely positive for civil society (Berger, 2004:8). Indeed, many academic 
assessments of the inclusion of civil society in this process appear to depend on 
how they view civil society and the importance and shape of civil society 
involvement. For instance, Lombardo (2003) appears to elevate the "dirty" civil 
society groups of the Social Forum and denigrate "clean" European Brussels 
civil society and therefore is critical towards civil society-Convention relations.
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In summary, the Convention process appeared to be open to civil society, 
especially to European civil society. Civil society's formal participation 
occurred during the listening stage, suggesting that this was the time when CSOs 
could have most influence. This suggestion is backed up as the Convention 
concentrated in the later stages on more institutional issues. In practice CSOs' 
influence occurred behind closed doors. Successful strategies by CSOs included 
proactive conventional lobbying, sending relevant materials to key individuals, 
and participating in the formal mechanisms. The Convention also appeared to 
place an onus on groups who could input into the Convention's work (in other 
words, those CSOs who had expertise). The desire for effective CSO input 
implicitly led to a focus on Brussels-based organisations who knew about EU 
politics and how to operate effectively in Brussels.
The role accorded to civil society by Conventioneers included acting as a 
relay between citizens and the EU, to aid national debate, transmit citizens' 
views and increase citizens' awareness. Civil society however appears to have 
been an actor on the inner margins of the Convention process. Civil society was 
consulted and arguably listened to, but in the presence of so many other actors, 
together with the nature of civil society's concerns and lack of formal 
mechanisms in the event inevitably placed limits on civil society's influence and 
ability to fulfil these roles. As civil society was not given a seat at the decision- 
making table, pluralist relations between civil society and the Convention are 
conjured up.
Nonetheless, the kind of civil society active at the European level does 
appear to be Brussels-based, European and the less radical. This suggests that 
this aspect of the EU's conception of civil society has some weight here, together 
with the more practical criteria of requiring expertise, constructive advice and 
past relations with EU institutions, and therefore some strands of corporatism are 
evident. Some Conventioneers did exhibit concerns about the lack of national 
civil society involvement (for example EP, 2002:7) yet, with hidden obstacles 
shaping European civil society's role, what hope is there for civil society at the 
national level?
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United Kingdom institutions' relations with interest groups and institutional 
discourses
There has been little research conducted on the national level of civil society (an 
exception is Will et al., 2005). However, most academics viewed civil society 
debate in the Member States as wanting (Lombardo, 2003; Shaw, Hoffinan and 
Bausili, 2003). This section will consider the effects of the British institutions' 
Convention role for structuring civil society's opportunities. Analysis of British 
CSOs' involvement in relation to Welsh CSOs will also be carried out in the 
empirical Chapter Six.
The national debates were intended to contribute to the Forum and these 
were placed in the hands of the Member States. Conventioneers and ECSOs 
were also charged with fostering the debate back home (ECOSOC, 2002g; The 
European Convention, 2002c:5). However, European CSOs, not national groups, 
dominated most of the activities at the European level as well as on the Forum. 
The lack of national civil society activity was compounded in the UK because 
there is no British Economic and Social Committee or comparable institution 
within which the views of civil society could be relayed back to the ECOSOC. 
Nonetheless, the Internet Forum was open to national civil society.
Opportunities were available to British CSOs through events, 
Westminster and the UK government. The UK government representative 
"spoke to trade unions, businesses, academics, students and other members of the 
public about the Future of Europe" (Regan et al., 2003:62). The FCO also had 
an on-line forum for people to submit their thoughts and detailed Convention 
information. However, this forum was subject to the same problems as the 
Convention's Internet Forum - that of access and awareness. Peter Hain came 
out in favour of the Social Europe contact group's statements at the civil society 
plenary, showing he was receptive to some of these concerns. Nonetheless, civil 
society's influence with the UK institutions would be expected to be limited 
because of the institutional nature of the UK's overall focus.
The House of Commons' and Lords' European Committees also sought, 
and received, advice from well-established civil society groups in Convention 
related inquiries. Wider debate was constrained by the euro-sceptic climate in 
Britain of the public and the media:
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[on the British public and Europe] They aren't interested. They aren't 
engaged. (MacShane, 2002:1)
Peter Hain told the ESC that stimulating public debate on the work of the 
Convention was "quite difficult", and that the subject becomes quite 
anoraky quite quickly. (Miller, 2003:13)
These supply side concerns may also have limited the UK's ability and 
willingness to broaden out the debate. Other obstacles to CSOs at the national 
level include the Convention's fast moving debates, the need for expertise and 
resources to monitor and feed into the process.
In summary, the opportunities for civil society to feed into British 
institutions were few. The UK government's EU machinery is difficult to access 
and the UK government's institutional focus did not lend themselves to 
conventional civil society concerns. The UK institutions did help to create 
debate and took some measures to engage the wider public although supply side 
issues may have limited this.
Welsh institutions' relations with interest groups and institutional discourses 
The role of the Assembly in the Convention suggests that the POS available to 
civil society would be relatively closed. The Assembly emphasised regional 
institutional issues, rather than typically civil society issues. Secondly, the 
Assembly's close nesting with other actors in the proceedings means that they 
would have been unable to forcefully press other issues that civil society may 
have brought to the table. This is further complicated by the fact that much of 
WAG's dealings were through the confidential UK line. Thus, there would have 
been little scope for manoeuvring and much of this is inaccessible to civil 
society. Indeed, Lombardo (2003) concurs with this bleak assessment as she 
views that grassroots groups were not engaged in the Convention.
In the places where institutional-interest group interaction can occur on 
EU policy issues - the partnership councils, the subject committees, WEC and 
the WEF - these were fairly quiet on the civil society-Convention front. WEC 
and the WEF did discuss the Convention a little. However, this must be placed 
in the context of WEC's uncertainty and restructuring following the Assembly 
pull-out and the WEF discussions focused primarily around the WPG. The
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Assembly did not organise another WEF, nor did the EEAC run any 
consultations (despite the arrangements for the WPG being suggested as a model 
for the Convention in May 2002 - see NAW, 2002e - although the WPG 
consultations with civil society did feed into the Assembly's Convention 
approach). Conceivably groups could have had informal discussions with the 
Assembly and this will be explored subsequently, as will the events in Wales that 
were run outside of the Assembly for the Convention. Indeed, one AM felt that 
further consultation was not needed as CSOs would concur with the Convention 
concerns taken forward by WAG:
I think the constitutional debate was largely about setting in place the 
structural building blocks which would allow civic society to contribute 
... there wouldn't be very much that civic society could say in respect of 
more powers for regions. (Interview, Assembly Member, 2003)
Moreover, the lack of information about civil society in Wales' interaction in the 
Convention means at this stage it is not possible to more definitive as to the 
nature and type of civil society-institutional relations. A degree of indirect 
exclusion suggests elements of corporatism, yet with the closure of the 
opportunity structure it is unlikely any group would have been involved beyond 
consultation in decision-making, also rendering full-scale corporatist relations 
unlikely.
Summary
The process of constitution-making, depending on the constitutional perspective, 
does implicitly accord civil society with a role in constitution-making, in aiding 
debate and in turn increasing the legitimacy of the constitutional document. The 
Convention was also labelled as unique in terms of its composition, mandate and 
process in comparison with the IGC model, EU policy-making and from the CFR 
Convention. There was however some crossover, particularly with the IGC 
model, given the high political nature of the concerns; cleavages emerging at the 
Convention's close and Member State governments being seen as the key
institutional actors.
To outline the institutional opportunity structure, the chapter elaborated 
upon relevant institutions' role in the Convention. This sojourn demonstrated
216
that the Welsh institutions had little formal role in the Convention at the outset. 
The presence of other concerns, namely WEC, and the continued focus on the 
WPG at the start of the Convention further diminished their limited role. The 
Assembly did however participate in the Convention, mainly via its Cabinet, in 
trans-national regional groups, through the UK government and its 
representatives. The Assembly's most significant Convention input was made 
together with the Scottish Executive. Channelled through the UK government, 
this submission contained WAG's concerns on regional power and institutional 
issues.
The British national parliamentarians and the national parliamentarians 
generally appeared to be constrained by their lack of Brussels' experience and of 
working together. One of the British national parliamentarians was, however, 
given a key role on the Praesidium; nonetheless she felt her role to be sidelined 
towards the end of the Convention and the real drivers to be the Presidency. The 
government representatives were given additional weight in the Convention 
process, given that they would sign or refuse any eventual proposals. Peter Main, 
backed by FCO civil servants in particular, appeared to be an effective player in 
the Convention. The significance of any one player was reduced however by the 
working methods of consensus. The government's main concerns regarding the 
Convention revolved around key institutional issues, whilst back in the UK 
Westminster kept under scrutiny the UK government, its national 
parliamentarian Conventioneers and conducted Convention related inquiries.
The EU institutions were active on the Convention. The EP was in 
particular seen to be effective and the European Commission had additional 
weight through both its representatives being part of the Praesidium, and in 
running the Forum. The Observers also tried their best to have their say in the 
Convention and the CoR and ECOSOC created their own internal working 
groups, participated in working groups and sent in amendments.
This institutional setting would appear to be beneficial for civil society, in 
that there were so many actors and therefore potential lobbying targets for CSOs. 
The lack of expertise of the national parliamentarians may also have given CSOs 
an edge when dealing with them. However, the nature of the Convention's 
concerns, together with the fact there were so many other actors, constrain the 
ability of civil society to get its views heard among the milieu. Indeed, among
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many observers the consensus seems to be whilst the Convention did broaden out 
elite discussion usually found in an IGC, this was not as open as it could have 
been (e.g. Wouters, 2003: 230-231). For civil society in Wales, the lack of 
power accorded to the Assembly would conceivably reduce civil society 
involvement and potential to influence. Moreover, the Assembly concentrated 
its activities in the last part of the Convention, being preoccupied with other 
concerns at the start of the Convention, when civil society's formal input in 
plenaries was occurring. Indeed, at the start of the Convention, civil society was 
in competition with the regions. It is therefore unlikely at this stage that the 
regions would be civil society's loudspeakers.
hi the UK, the preoccupations of the government, and to a lesser extent 
Westminster, on institutional issues would appear to have reduced opportunities 
for civil society on the Convention. Moreover, the euro-sceptic climate may 
have hindered rational discussion and the UK government's ability to broaden 
out the debate. National civil society across the EU was seen to have not been an 
active Convention player because the Convention was fast-moving, was 
preoccupied with institutional questions, and participating CSOs required 
considerable resources and information.
The Convention gave civil society a number of formal and informal 
avenues to contribute to the Convention. Civil society was charged with a 
number of functions: aiding the debate over the future of Europe and bringing to 
the Convention's attention citizens' views and later on with translating the 
Convention's work to the citizens. Indeed, the Convention did appear to be 
accessible to some civil society groups; particularly influential were those 
European groups already mobilised in Brussels with existing contacts and 
expertise. The formal consultation of civil society came early on in the 
Convention, suggesting that civil society should have inputted then, particularly 
as the more institutional issues, less associated with CSOs, were not wholly on 
the agenda until later. However, the Forum and other avenues were kept open to 
civil society throughout the Convention. The formal and informal structuring of 
civil society in the Convention does suggest that the EU's practical conception of 
civil society had some role; with constructive relations, conventional behaviour, 
expertise and European groups all being encouraged and sanctioned. Civil 
society nonetheless seems to have been a player at the margins of the
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Convention, suggesting that although its inclusion into treaty reform negotiations 
was revolutionary from IGCs, its actual role was not radically different.
The role of civil society did also seem to diverge from the interest group- 
institutional relations as described in Chapter Five. In general EU policy-making, 
civil society was involved much more explicitly and the location of civil society- 
institutional interaction also differed. However, there did seem to be crossover 
in the European nature of civil society involved, the success of conventional 
modes of lobbying and expertise, and the need for a multi-avenue strategy for 
CSOs to influence.
To conclude, although opportunities were available for civil society to 
input in the Convention, civil society groups in Wales faced considerable 
institutional and informal barriers. Does the experience of civil society groups in 
Wales confirm this negative conclusion? Are these institutional opportunities the 
most salient in structuring civil society in Wales' role? These questions will be 
wrestled with in the rest of the chapter.
UNSTABLE ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION'S POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
The chapter now turns to expound the assessment made in the last section that 
the Convention was unique, by comparing the experiences of CSOs in Wales in 
the Convention with the general EU policy-making experiences from the last 
chapter. This author will also further test the inference in that there were few 
opportunities for civil society in Wales to participate in the Convention. In order 
to explore these questions, the rest of the chapter consists of two main parts. The 
first section outlines the unstable aspects of the POS that may also structure civil 
society in Wales' Convention role. The unstable aspects consist of: Convention 
events in Wales and the UK, other salient issues at the time, media coverage, 
political alignments and UK civil society Forum involvement. The second 
section sets out the interviewed CSOs' Convention activities and the interviewed 
policy-makers' perceptions on the Convention and civil society.
Unstable Aspects of the Political Opportunity Structure
Gamson and Meyer (1996) identify the POS as comprising and volatile, as well 
as providing stable aspects. For instance, changes in political alliances constitute
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a volatile feature. This section seeks to give some background into the pertinent 
and unstable aspects of the POS, relevant to the Convention and civil society in 
Wales.
Convention-related events in Wales and the UK
Exploring Convention-related events in Wales and the UK will assist in shedding 
light on the opportunities available for civil society to contribute, on the kind of 
CSOs who attended events, and on the issues raised. The events discussed here 
are by no means exhaustive and the greatest effort was expended on gathering 
information about related events in Wales or run by Welsh organisations.43 Thus, 
there are greater numbers of events listed in Wales (see Annex Three).
It is notable that very few events in Wales were organised purely by the 
Assembly. MEPs, the Welsh Office MPs and the European Commission Office 
in Wales ran many events. Indeed, some related events were organised by civil 
society groups, such as the think tank (UK government sponsored) Institute for 
Citizenship and the European think tank Vision 2020. A considerable number of 
events were targeted at young people and the general public rather than 
specifically at CSOs. Further, many events did not coalesce around the 
Convention. Events covered a more general debate on the future of Europe and 
issues such as the Euro. Peter Hain attended many of these events and may have 
relayed views to the Convention from these fora. Finally, the majority of events 
were held after the Convention's listening stage, when civil society's formal 
input occurred.
There are difficulties in establishing the extent of CSOs' participation and 
concerns in these events, since attendance lists are not always available and event 
summaries sometimes do not distinguish between the voices of civil society and 
politicians. The Green/European Free Alliance (EFA) conference, and to a lesser 
extent the WPG Assembly consultation responses, the WEF accounts and Welsh 
Colloquium on Civil Society and Governance provide access to civil society 
groups in Wales' concerns and participation. These will all now be discussed in
turn.
The Green/EFA conference held in Cardiff in July 2002 was organised 
with civil society in mind and the speakers (mostly CSOs' representatives) 
discussed employment, gender equality, social inclusion, democracy and
220
participation and the environment. The following concerns/issues were 
mentioned: that the Convention was not engaging people, that people needed to 
feel they can have a say in the process, that the EU requires openness and 
subsidiarity (one speaker linked this to the GMO debate in Wales), and the 
abolition of the Euroatom treaty, workers' rights, and calls for a more social 
European perspective towards childcare. Participating groups were mainly large 
Wales-wide CSOs, who were offshoots of UK organisations (bar two). They 
represented women, trades unions, and international, environmental, disability 
and ethnic minority interests.
The WPG and its debates do deserve some attention because they were 
considered in WAG's Convention work (reinforced through interviews with civil 
servants). This is despite both the EEAC (NAW, 2002e: 4) and the WAG 
Cabinet (WAG, 2001: 1-2) receiving briefings stipulating that the governance 
debate was separate from the Convention.
Written responses on the WPG came from three quangos and from the 
WCVA and the WLGA. This is despite another twelve organisations being asked 
for their views (these comprised large Wales-wide farming, business and public 
sector bodies - NAW, 2002h). The written responses generally focused upon the 
bodies' experiences of the EU. The responses called for involvement of civil 
society in policy-making, protection of subsidiarity, and simplification, and also 
recognised the importance of WEC in aiding their EU policy-making 
involvement. The Wales Forum on European Affairs (in other words the WEF, 
see WAG, 2002b) also discussed civil society's role, calling for improved 
consultation of civil society on EU issues. The WEF conceded that civil society 
suffered from consultation fatigue and considered that Europe was a "turn off. 
The Convention appeared to be only discussed here in relation to the concern that 
there would not be a "Welsh" representative at the Convention.44
The WAG sponsored a WCVA-nm "Welsh Colloquium on Civil Society 
and Governance" in Brussels December 2002. This was organised in partnership 
with WEC and the Office of Eluned Morgan MEP "to ensure synergy with key 
developments in the EU surrounding the 'Convention on the Future of Europe'" 
(WCVA, 2002c: 1). Nonetheless, the fact that the Colloquium's proceedings 
were placed on the European Commission's Governance website, rather than on 
Futurum or the Forum, suggests it was aimed less at the Convention and was
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instead more orientated at the Governance debate and raising the profile of 
Wales' voluntary sector. The Colloquium raised the following issues: European 
Commission-civil society relations, how could civil society groups participate in 
EU policy-making, the effect of enlargement on new Member States, structural 
funds and creating trans-national partnerships. Fifteen representatives of 
"grassroot organisations" (WCVA, 2002c: 6) from Wales attended the 
Colloquium, which marks a widening-out of the Convention debate. The 
Colloquium's government sponsorship would limit the event's independence and 
ability to hold the government to account on this debate.
The Wales TUC European Conference in November 2002 revolved 
mainly around promoting the EU, business and the Euro, but not the Convention 
(for coverage see Hazelwood, 2002a:23; TUC, 2002:1). Once again, the sponsor 
was the European Commission Office in Wales thus reducing the CSOs' 
independence. What these events in Wales demonstrate is that political 
institutions did contribute, at least in kind, to encouraging debate on the 
Convention, rather than civil society alone promoting activity.
In terms of the UK events, many centred around politicians and 
academics. Government speeches are for the most part concerned with promoting 
the benefits of the EU and reassuring its Euro-sceptic public that it will not take 
Britain into an EU superstate, rather than generating debate among civil 
society.45 The FCO also ran an on-line forum providing information about the 
debate and the Convention. The European Convention's (2002e) paper detailing 
the UK national debate (written by the UK government's Conventioneers) 
equally stresses that the UK government has been active in trying to stimulate 
the debate, and civil society has been involved:
The British Government has sought both to promote and explain the work 
of the Convention and the issues involved in the Future of Europe 
through its public diplomacy activities. It has encouraged de-centralised 
participation from a variety of actors ... Civil society in the UK continues 
to be active in the Future of Europe debate. NGOs and think tanks hold 
regular public events. The Government also encourages business, trade 
unions and information providers to join the debate. (The European 
Convention, 2002e:2-3)
However, Miller (2003) puts in doubt the actual extent of the UK government's 
civil society-Convention activities:
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Participation in the debate has depended largely on having access on the 
Internet, however, and the British Government has not organised as many 
open discussions as some Member States (notably France, where the 
National Assembly organised a two day debate for civil society groups in 
2002). (Miller, 2003:13)
British organisations in the Convention's Forum
In Convention's Vice President Dehaene's arrangements to involve civil society 
in the Convention, the Forum provides one of the chief vehicles, together with 
meetings, the ECOSOC, the CoR and national debates:
It [the Forum] has been set up as an open network, with the principal 
objective being to enable civil society to provide input into the work of 
the Convention. (The European Convention, 2002c:5)
Thus, exploring British CSO's Forum contributions will help provide insight into 
the extent of participation, and concerns held by UK civil society on the 
Convention.46 The Forum contributions were gathered in February 2004, when 
no more contributions had been added following the Convention's close. 
However, the Forum website has subsequently changed, with some of the entries 
no longer appearing on the Forum website. In February 2004 the following 
organisations were identified as British and as Forum participants:
Figure 6.1: British organisations participating in the Forum (organised by the 
Forum's categories)
Category: Other, civil society. NGOs and other schools of thought (838 total 
contributions: 11 contributions from the UK)
• British Humanist Organisation -2 contributions
• British Overseas NGOs for Development - 2 contributions
• Confederation of British Industry (CBI) - 1 submission (and another issued 
under the socio-economic heading)
• Gay and Lesbian Humanist Association - 1 submission
• National Consumer Council - 1 submission
• National Secular Society - 1 submission
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• Respect for animals - 1 submission (this submission is the same as submitted 
by the following two organisations):
• Lord Downing Fund for Animal Research - 1 submission
• National Anti-Vivisection Society - 1 submission
Category: Political or Public Authority (137 total contributions: 10 contributions 
from the UK)
• Local Government International Bureau/Local Government Association - 1 
submission
• Greater London Authority on behalf of London European Forum - 4 
submissions
• Northern Ireland Executive - 1 submission
• Scottish Executive EU Office - 2 submissions
• Pro-European Welsh group -1 submission
• UK central-local government partnership - 1 submission
Category: Socio-Economic (93 total contributions: 5 contributions from the UK)
• British Bankers Association - 1 submission
• British Medical Association — 2 submissions (and another 1 with Association 
des Femmes De L'Europe Meridionale)
• CBI - 1 submission
Academic and Think tanks (196 total contributions: 8 contributions from the 
UK)
• Bow Group - 1 submission
• Federal Trust for Education and Research - 5 submissions
• Next Generation Democracy-Foreign Policy Centre and British Council in 
Brussels — 1 submission
• Right Now - 1 submission
There is a discernible difference between the different categories of 
organisations and their submissions. In the "other, civil society etc." category, 
submissions are focused much more specifically on policy areas and values. To
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illustrate, four of these submissions are opposed to a reference to religion in the 
preamble and/or special status for churches. Three of the submissions call for 
respect for sentiency of animals and promotion of animal welfare. Two 
submissions are on the topic of development, policy eradication and the EU's 
role as an external actor. One submission looks at increasing the role of the 
consumer and reforming the EU. The final "other, civil society" UK submission 
- discusses the reform of the EU's institutions and policies and at the same time 
focused on economic aspects. Thus, the concerns and topics raised by civil 
society - groups are concentrated in specific areas and suggest a range of 
normative stances from liberal egalitarianism to new left to libertarian views. A 
few submissions also refer to issues related to the EU's institutions and 
procedures matching the political institutions' focus.
The Scottish Executive's submission detailing the views of "Scottish 
Civic Society" is interesting because three out of the five CSOs' written 
responses contain responses that were similar to or written by their UK 
organisations (see Scottish Executive, 2003). This illustrates that devolved 
CSOs in Scotland may have let their British CSO parents take the lead on the 
Convention. Will this be the same in Wales?
The concerns voiced in the "Socio-Economic" category were mainly 
coalesced around specific policies; the Lamafalussy process (market securities 
regulation), public health and gender equality. One submission did discuss 
generally the DCT and its effects on socio-economic policies.
The "political and public authority" category is notable for the absence of 
any WAG submission. UK counterparts from local government, the Northern 
Ireland Executive and the Scottish Executive on the other hand all contributed 
submissions to this category. The "political and public authority" UK 
submissions are much more focused upon institutional concerns, such as how to 
simplify and democratise the EU. All of these contributions contain the notion 
that the EU should recognise and involve spheres of government below the 
Member State level in policy-making. Generally, these submissions advocated 
better application and definition of subsidiarity. What is also notable about the 
submissions from the Greater London Authority, the Scottish Executive and 
Northern Irish Executive is their intention and commitment to gather civil 
society's views through their submissions and activities. For example, the
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Greater London Authority submission is co-signed by the London European 
Forum. Likewise, the Northern Ireland Executive submission reflects their 
intention to create a European Forum47 and the Scottish Executive devotes one 
entire submission to the views gathered hi consulting Scottish Civic Society. 
Finally, UK submissions in the "think tank" category were concerned with 
broader institutional and procedural issues exploring how the Convention was 
progressing, offering innovative ideas and critiquing the EU.
In comparison to the total number of Forum contributions, the British 
submissions are small. Nonetheless, Lombardo (2003:26) found that some 
Member States, e.g. Greece, had not submitted any contributions. As a 
proportion of the total contributions, British input is greatest in the "political and 
public authority" category, with the smallest proportion occurring hi the "other, 
civil society etc." Forum (even when this is coupled with socio-economic). This 
suggests that the Convention engaged political and public authority interests 
more than CSOs hi the UK. It also demonstrates that the socio-economic 
components of civil society appear to have been more alert to the Convention 
than other parts of organised civil society. Perhaps this will be echoed in Wales?
Wales is the only UK region with a CSO that submitted its own 
contribution independent from its devolved/local authority. Thus, UK regional 
civil society inactivity appears to be widespread. However, the other UK 
devolved authorities linked civil society's contributions/future contributions to 
then- events and mechanisms. This may point to how sub-national civil society 
needed and expected Convention engagement to occur.
The CSO's concerns exhibited were largely sector specific and required 
some prior EU knowledge hi that area. This suggests that civil society 
engagement may be concentrated in specific sectors and that CSOs faced 
considerable start-up obstacles, needing to possess prior EU knowledge. 
Moreover, the groups involved concur with the practical part of the British 
conception of civil society, being large and mainly established bodies. The 
involvement of such groups contrasts with the British and Welsh institutional 
normative views of civil society being community groups, as found hi Chapter 
Five. Chapter Four also found that the practical component of institutional 
conceptions of civil society had more foundation in the views of individual 
British and Welsh policy-makers.
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Shifts in political alignments during the Convention
Shifts in political alignments can create new opportunities for groups, and allow 
new alliances to be formed and existing alliances to be capitalised upon or 
broken (see Kriesi et al. 1995:59-81; Joachim, 2003). In Wales, there were 
changes in political alignments over the Convention period, but these do not 
seem to have had significant implications for the Convention. The creation of a 
Labour Assembly government, accompanied by the end of the Labour/Liberal 
coalition after the Assembly election on the 1 st of May 2003, may be significant. 
However, this may have served to reduce allies of civil society by consolidating 
power in one governing party. The Assembly's election also occurred before its 
summer recess and in the closing stages of the Convention, which would suggest 
that this had limited effect. Not to be discounted is the First Minister's attempts 
to distance Welsh Labour from the UK Labour government, which occurred in 
2001 over the debate on Public Finance Initiatives/Public Private Partnerships 
and was symbolised in his speech at Swansea University in December 2002 (see 
Shipton 2002). This may have served to allow the Labour majority in WAG to 
take forward a more "Welsh" position in the Convention and at the same time 
may have distanced the ability of Welsh groups to proceed through UK 
institutions (serving to reinforce the informal norm encountered in the Chapter 
Five that Welsh CSOs, concerns should be dealt with in Wales).
Another important change was that Peter Hain in October 2002 was 
appointed to Secretary of State for Wales post, whilst he was continuing to act as 
the UK government's Conventioneer. At the Convention's outset, Hain, as a 
Welsh MP, stated he would listen to Welsh views. However, the concerns 
voiced about Hain simultaneously sharing two jobs and being able to defend 
Welsh interests may have made him more sympathetic to concerns from Wales 
following his appointment:
You can be sure Wales will get a first class service from me and the 
Welsh voice in Europe will get a very loud hearing from me as well. 
(Hain cited in South Wales Evening Post, 2002:11)
I will ensure Wales' voice is heard loud and clear in Brussels (Hain cited 
in Hazlewood, 2002b: 40)
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Further, some Member States' governments changed their Convention 
representatives at the decision-making stage and this may have altered political 
alignments. The UK's government representation was an exception to this, 
remaining the same throughout the process. The war on Iraq may have soured 
European relations with the UK, reducing the UK government's impact. 
Nonetheless, Convention cleavages occurred instead between large and small 
Member States at this stage.
Newspaper coverage of the Convention
The previous section highlighted that a draft constitutional treaty was by no
means a given outcome of the Convention, as evident in the Convention's remit:
The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final 
document which may comprise different options, indicating the degree of 
support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is 
achieved. (The European Council, 2001: 5)
Earlier in this chapter it was also demonstrated WAG's ambiguity over the status 
of the Convention. If Welsh Assembly Ministers were uncertain of the 
Convention's role, to what extent would civil society groups be encouraged and 
able to get involved? Given that the media plays an important part in spurring on 
collective action as it shapes the public sphere (Grimm, 2004), the media's 
Convention coverage must be attended to. An analysis of four Welsh 
newspapers will help to shed light on how the Convention was viewed and 
whether it encouraged participation.48
Figure 6.2 overleaf demonstrates the spread of newspaper articles over a 
three-year period. There are two clusters of articles that occur during the 
reflection and decision-making stages when the Convention was well underway, 
thus, it can be assumed that Welsh newspapers did not create much initial 
awareness. The two clusters are identified with three issues. The first cluster in 
October 2002 marks the time when Peter Hain became the Secretary of State for 
Wales (whilst remaining a Conventioneer). The second cluster in May/June 
2003 is associated with a) the UK debate beginning on the DCT referendum, and 
b) Peter Main's appointment to Leader of the House of Commons, whilst 
remaining a Conventioneer. These issues can be attributed to the article clusters
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over time because of the proportion of article content they receive, which will be 
discussed shortly.
Nonetheless, the concentration of news coverage in these two periods 
shows that Welsh newspapers did not pay as much attention to the future of 
Europe/Convention in the listening stage, when civil society formal input 
occurred. This suggests that this unstable aspect of the POS was relatively 
closed to the Convention, leading to an expectation that civil society involvement 
in the Convention would be small. Admittedly the UK media plays a significant 
role in the lives of the Welsh, and this may have created additional opportunities 
for CSOs.











Total number of articles=91
Did the articles' content aid or hinder civil society Convention action? 
Figure 6.3 (overleaf) maps the relative proportion of the articles' main issues. 
The largest topic covered is Peter Hain's appointment to Secretary of State for 
Wales while still retaining his Convention role, rather than on the Convention 
itself. The Euro, as well as the activities of British and Welsh representatives on 
the Convention, received substantial coverage. The continued salience of the 
Euro in the UK's debate before and during the Convention can be found in a 
range of sources (for example European Commission Representation in the UK,
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2003:1; Keohane, 2002; The European Convention, 2002c:3; European 
Commission, 2001b:5).
The articles' content also echoes the literature review's findings, with 
regional rights and EU institutional issues/powers accorded more coverage than 
the Convention's discussion of the EU's policies/values, where more "civil 
society" concerns may be expected. It is also important to note that many of the 
articles were either framed in Euro-sceptic language or defended Europe in the 
face of Euro-scepticism. This is epitomised in the following headlines: 
"Compromise set to bin idea of European superstate, says Hain" (Western Mail, 
2003:5) or "Goodway's warning to the Eurosceptics" (Hazlewood, 2002q:23). 
In consequence, much of the articles' language is very defensive or sceptical, 
which is not entirely helpful for rational argument on the Convention. This 
newspaper article content is not conducive to spurring on civil society in Wales' 
participation.
Figure 6.3: Content analysis of newspaper articles
• Peter Hain Secretary of State 
for Wales
• UK role








• Draft Constitutional Treaty
& Peter Hain Leader of the
House of Commpns
• Convention policies
• White Paper on Governance
• Enlargement
• Convention remit
Total number of articles=91
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Other issues at the time of the Convention. Were there more important issues on 
the agenda?
In Wales, a range of other issues were prominent during the Convention period. 
In particular, the forthcoming election in May 2003 encouraged concentration on 
core issues, such as health and education. There was a host of other EU issues 
debated by the Assembly during the Convention. In fact, a review of the NAW's 
record of proceedings during plenaries revealed that following issues were 
discussed: the fate of the structural funds post-enlargement, enlargement 
generally, monitoring structural funds, the reform of the CAP in 2003, Wales' 
ability to be GMO-free, European Governance, the role of the regions in Europe, 
the Euro and also the reform of WEC.
Iraq cast a large shadow over all levels of governance during this period. 
In Wales, Iraq was debated and for the UK government this comprised a chief 
tenet of their foreign policy. Since the middle of 2002, Iraq had attracted 
sustained attention before the outbreak of war in March 2003, thereby 
overlapping with the Convention. The UK's European debate throughout the 
Convention revolved around the Euro and a potential Euro referendum. The 
verdict on Britain's Euro entry was only announced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in June 2003. hi the EU, other issues included the launch of the Euro, 
the stability and growth pact, and the Seville 2002 summit focused on 
immigration. Thus salient issues at all levels were present during the Convention 
period.
Unstable Political Opportunity Structure summary
hi summary, by exploring some of the unstable aspects of the POS, Convention 
events, British involvement in the Forum, political alignments, media and salient 
other issues, we can see that the POS offered to civil society groups in Wales is 
fairly closed. There are opportunities for involvement but these are selective 
towards CSOs and many of the events where civil society could be involved are 
bound up with other European debates and are not specifically targeted at the 
Convention, with the notable exception of the Green/EFA seminar. This is 
reflected in the WAG's approach to the WPG, which had some limited 
Convention impact and coincided considerably with the Convention's time 
frame. Moreover, the UK government's public diplomacy exercises seem to be
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concerned with informing people of the debate, and not necessarily listening to 
people or groups views (Will et al., 2005).
The activity of UK civil society in the Convention Forum shows that 
specific sectors of civil society were involved in the Convention through this 
avenue. The groups engaged are also mainly large, UK-wide, established 
organisations, whose contributions focused on specific policy areas and who 
demonstrate specialist knowledge of the EU processes. This suggests the 
existence of some initial barriers to civil society's Convention participation. The 
Forum also received contributions from the Northern Msh and Scottish devolved 
authorities and the London Greater Authority. Such contributions demonstrated 
the governmental bodies' intention to bring in the views of their civil societies. 
The WAG is notable in its absence from the Forum submissions.
Welsh newspaper Convention coverage was not conducive to energising 
civil society Convention participation, particularly as newspaper coverage 
peaked after the listening stage and had a second peak right at its close. In terms 
of content, this too was not facilitative towards civil society participation. 
Typically, "civil society" concerns on EU policies and values were given less 
prominence than Peter Main's dual jobs, UK/Welsh activities, 
institutions/powers, the Euro and regional rights. Finally, political alignments 
and other salient issues may have had a bearing on civil society and the 
Convention, yet their effects are hard to fully discern. Changes in alignments 
from the end of the Welsh Labour/Liberal Democrat governing coalition, with 
Welsh Labour distancing itself from the Labour UK government, Hain becoming 
Secretary of State for Wales, and the Iraq war all created potential alliance shifts 
for civil society. It is also important to place the Convention within its issue 
contemporaries, as it is evident that in Wales, the UK and to a lesser extent in 
Europe, other salient issues prevailed, which may have reduced both government 
and civil society's energy for the Convention. To what extent can this discussion 
of the unstable aspects of the POS, combined with earlier discussions on the 
more stable aspects, bring dividends to understanding civil society in Wales' role 
in the Convention? It is to the accounts of the interviewees that the chapter now 
turns.
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CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS' IN WALES CONVENTION 
INVOLVEMENT
This section's findings are presented in the same manner as Chapter Five to 
situate the case study in respect of its context of EU policy-making. Thus, the 
experience of interviewed CSOs will be described in relation to the avenues used 
and their accessibility, the concerns held by the CSOs, the obstacles CSOs faced, 
the reasons for non-involvement and finally which CSOs did or did not 
participate. Comparison with the interviewed CSOs' activity in general EU 
policy-making will also be made throughout this section. This section will also 
outline CSOs' satisfaction with their non-involvement or involvement in the 
Convention. Finally, some conclusions on the POS and the democratic 
implications of CSOs in Wales' Convention role will be offered.
There is danger that the convention is only in touch with/listened to by 
NGOs at the European level. This is very important, but I think that we 
have to decentralise and have contacts with NGOs at the national level. 
To this end we have asked various members of the Convention to give us 
an outline of what is happening at the national level. (Translation; for the 
original French text see European Convention, 2002f:7)
The above quote confirms that Vice President Dehaene recognised the need to 
broaden the debate outside of ECSOs to CSOs in the Member States. This 
investigation provides insight into the extent to which the Convention debate did 
actually occur among national civil society in one Member State. Civil society 
was important in the Convention to transmit messages both to and from the 
citizens and the Convention, to discuss policies and create ownership over the 
process and thereby reduce disaffection with the EU. Among the groups 
interviewed, nine Welsh groups and one ECSO (this shall be used for 
comparison) had some tangible involvement. Their involvement ranged in their 
Convention relevancy from challenging specific clauses to attending an event on 
European issues with some crossover on to the Convention. The next section 
will look at where that input occurred. It should be noted that much of the 
CSOs' participation has been traced following interviews, therefore the extent of 
participation may be under-reported.
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Avenues for Civil Society Organisations' Convention participation
This section charts CSOs' Convention involvement through both political routes 
and via its civil society networks/parents. Table 6.3 (below) summarises the 
avenues in which CSOs participated.
Table 6.3: Summary of avenues used by engaged Civil Society Organisations
Avenue type Number of CSOs Total
Political
Civilsociety










Political avenues for Civil Society Organisations' Convention participation 
The political routes used by six CSOs varied, and many were informal. Three 
CSOs were more proactive than the rest. Among these three, the intermediary 
group had discussions with AMs, European Commission Officials and the 
Secretary of State for Wales. The women's group also had contact with AMs 
and the Conventioneers MPs. The final proactive group actually sent in a 
submission to the Internet Forum. Two additional CSOs both attended the 
Green/EFA event with one of these also attending the WEF. The religious 
group's staff member had some informal contact with the European Commission 
office in Wales on the topic. Thus, on the Convention, civil society activity was 
not solely gathered around the Assembly, and crosses tiers of governance, 
perhaps in response to the Assembly's limited role.
Compare this with the Convention avenues used by ECSOs, which 
included the ECOSOC, being part of a contact group and the Forum. A civil 
society contact group was also created specifically for the Convention, which 
aimed to create structured relations with the Praesidium and NGOs and targeted 
sympathetic Conventioneers on treaty amendments. Admittedly, not all of these 
were available to sub-national civil society groups but it does show that potential 
opportunities were not capitalised upon. However, a couple of Welsh groups do 
appear to have recognised the need to influence through all avenues.
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How open were avenues perceived to be and does this aid explanation of 
activity? Many of the policy-makers interviewed had no approaches from any 
CSOs on the Convention. Interviewees pointed out that this did not exclude the 
possibility of activity elsewhere with then- colleagues. However, the ECOSOC 
member did get involved in related events with some CSOs, as did the 
Conventioneer who participated and organised a number of countries, including 
events in the UK, Germany and Spain. One MEP suggested that groups 
should/would focus on Conventioneers; not on the EU representatives who had 
no direct Convention involvement, and the policy-maker interviews appear to 
back this up. The politicians were open to contact with civil society groups, 
notwithstanding their criteria revealed in Chapter Four. Further, the assumption 
that the legitimate place for civil society in Wales' involvement was in the 
Member State was re-visited.
Back in the Member State, for WAG the debate seemed to boil down the 
role of the regions in the EU architecture. This implicitly limits civil society's 
involvement through this avenue, in that "there wouldn't be very much that civic 
society could say in respect of more powers of the regions" (interview, AM, 
2003). Some policy-makers also recognised the Convention's comparative 
openness to other methods of treaty-making. There was disagreement over civil 
society success at utilising the Convention's openness and disagreement over 
where the responsibility lay to engage civil society.
Groups' access to the Convention depended in the first instance upon 
their awareness. Many of the interviewed groups were unaware of activities 
(events etc.) and the Convention Forum. The ECSOs perceived the Convention 
to be open because they could see what it was discussing, however as the ESCO 
interviewee noted, openness did not equate to real influence. The intermediary 
group discovered that "for us to feed directly into Europe was very difficult" 
because they were not a European group. The EU conception of civil society 
acted as a barrier to this CSO's participation, hi contradistinction, the pro- 
European group viewed the Convention as very accessible through the Forum:
... it was just so easy to make a submission to the Convention, and the 
Convention really laid over backwards, fell over backwards to encourage 
people to make a submission. (Interview, pro-European group, 2004)
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The women's group found the UK Parliamentarian Conventioneers easy to 
access through attending the EEAC meeting, which was open to anyone. The 
intermediary group also perceived that the Assembly, because of the WEF 
consultation, "was probably a bit more open in fairness, at least they [the 
Assembly] did make an attempt to consult" (interview, intermediary group, 
2003) in comparison to other instances of EU policy-making. This suggests that 
despite the negative political and media context, if CSOs in Wales were aware of 
the Convention, then the structures were not a barrier to collective action, 
although they may have limited participation, and obstacles may lie elsewhere.
Earlier in this chapter it was argued that ESCOs were dominant in some 
Convention activities, such as the civil society plenary sessions in June 2002. 
Were organisations able to feed into this and participate in this way? Did 
European civil society help trigger the national debate? The next section 
explores this civil society route of Convention involvement.
Civil society avenues for Civil Society Organisations' Convention participation 
Seven Welsh CSOs (four of which also participated in the political routes) had 
some Convention interaction through their parent groups/networks/civil society 
activities. Two of the groups were participants in the Welsh Colloquium on civil 
society, which has some very limited Convention relevance. One interviewee 
described it as where "[WCVA] were trying to establish how to involve 
themselves more directly in Europe" (interview, UK civil servant, 2004).
One CSO's initial awareness was triggered by such European networks 
and on then- own initiative went through European networks on the Convention. 
The business group's involvement with the Convention was via their British 
organisation contacting them and they were briefed on the issue by the British 
organisation's Brussels office. The religious group received communication 
from their British and European bodies on the Convention, with some members 
participating through other civil society avenues such as other umbrella 
organisations. An additional CSO also used WEC in their Convention activities. 
Finally, the International Development group became aware of the Convention 
through their British colleagues.
The other three remaining groups that had contact with the Convention 
via the civil society route were all the "European/International" Welsh
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organisations. The poverty group had very tangential involvement because they 
attended their European group's general meeting, which a Praesidium member 
attended. The poverty group may have fed into the Convention this way. The 
other European group was engaged in this issue through its AGM, with good 
levels of information flowing between the organisation's levels throughout the 
Convention. Finally, the Welsh group that was also part of an International 
group participated indirectly through this route: one of its committee members 
sat on the UK committee that submitted evidence to the House of Lords Select 
Committee. This is interesting for it means that the ECSOs did provide their 
regional bodies with the opportunity to participate, although these opportunities 
created by ECSOs were not uniform and in two cases fairly minor.
However, among some CSOs who had parent groups, and indirectly 
membership of European networks, there was little communication with those 
groups on the Convention. In consequence this limits the potential for civil 
society to play its democratic role as a communications bridge, although it may 
have been that information trickled down just to the UK group level. The 
situation is more precarious among the local groups who had 
Welsh/British/European arms, none of which reported any 
involvement/communication on the Convention via this avenue (although this 
was the case generally for three of the four local groups on other matters of EU 
policy).
To set the CSOs' activity via the civil society route in context, it is 
worthwhile to state their parent groups' stand-alone Convention participation. 
Indeed, when looked at in this light, twelve of the total Welsh CSOs did have 
British/European arms that were directly engaged in the Convention. This stands 
in comparison to the seven Welsh CSOs who participated via the civil society 
route. Thus, it appears that participation has perhaps bypassed, possibly 
willingly, some of the interviewed CSOs in Wales. A lack of participation via 
this route comes down again to organisational structures and communication, 
and about where it is appropriate to engage with the EU. Many responses 
reflected the idea that Welsh, British and even European/parent bodies and 
networks should, and would, deal with a European event like the Convention. 
Accordingly, groups felt that as long as some participation was occurring, even if
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it did largely bypass the regional level, this was more important than their group 
actually participating:
... we would probably tend to say that we would trust out partners to 
actually make our voice heard at that particular level. (Interview, 
religious group, 2003)
In terms of London, I would say definitely, in fact I am sure we did have 
an input on that level, because we have an European office there. 
(Interview, disability group, 2004)
Although groups did not discuss how they perceived the accessibility of 
the civil society route, a couple of observations can be gleaned. Access to the 
Convention via this route seemed largely, but not always, to depend upon the 
initiatives of the parent groups/network. Secondly, groups' communication 
structures did not seem to be as active as normal, which may be based on an 
assessment of the importance of the issues to the group. It must be remembered 
that the Forum brought in specific segments of British civil society. Finally, 
some groups seemed to acquiesce to with the idea that their parent 
bodies/networks should take on the subject of the Convention. This means that 
participation may well have been concentrated in upper echelons of organisations 
and would have hardly created a bridge with Europe's citizens. The lack of 
activities by the Assembly may have reinforced this, as the last chapter showed 
that the Assembly is where most organisations' EU policy-making contributions 
occurred. Cultural and pragmatic reasons seem to have narrowed the use of 
routes.
The Convention concerns held by Civil Society Organisations
Concerns among the interviewed CSOs differed to those articulated by UK 
Forum contributors, apart from the business group, and these concerns will now 
be outlined. The business group's concerns included the effects on the business 
environment and over-government. The trades unions' and women's group's 
concerns similarly discussed the effect/influence/discussions of the Convention 
on a policy area. The trades union promoted the social model and the women's 
group wanted gender equality to be part of the constitution. The intermediary 
and pro-European groups focused more on institutional/power issues. The
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intermediary group wanted to secure provisions for regional civil society to input 
into EU policy-making processes. In the same vein, the pro-European group 
wanted the EU to be more transparent and accountable, to define competencies, 
improve the definition of the role of regions, address questions of legitimacy at 
sub-national level, allow for secession of regions and give EP a permanent home. 
This latter CSO's emphasis on institutions may be down to the nature of the 
group, which positioned itself on the Forum as a political interest, not as a civil 
society group. The other groups' interests cannot be defined given that their 
participation was only traced post-interview. Nonetheless, the concerns raised 
by the interviewed CSOs do appear to be appropriate to the Convention 
discussions.
The issues raised by CSOs on the Convention are a departure from CSOs' 
concerns in general EU policy-making hi Chapter Five. The main concerns of 
CSOs in general EU policy-making consisted of regional policy, agriculture and 
employment. Thus, the failure of the Convention to engage in these issues of 
substance, excepting employment, may explain why there was less involvement 
among the interviewed CSOs in the Convention as opposed to general EU 
policy-making. The next section focuses more fully upon the role that civil 
society played, by looking at their strategies for the Convention and at what 
stages they tried to get involved, and whether they were reactive or proactive.
Strategies, timing and influence
Strategies and timing
As some of the civil society groups' involvement has only been gathered through 
secondary literature, it is hard to specify these groups' strategies. However, 
where groups have been involved via events such as conferences, this must be 
seen as a fairly reactive involvement. Indeed, there is a notable difference 
between the reactive and proactive interviewed CSOs. Among the participants 
with passive or indirect involvement, there are two who attended events (the 
Green/EFA conference and the Wales European Colloquium) related to the 
Convention. Two were marginally involved at the initiative of their CSO and 
one additional CSO participated via staff members' informal discussions with 
policy-makers (and information from its British/European parent groups). The
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final group with indirect involvement attended the WEF and was more active, 
speaking at the Green/EFA conference. Thus, these strategies consist of usually 
one-off, informal and conventional methods of influencing the Convention. 
Moreover, it is debatable that they were trying to influence the Convention by 
attending these events.
Among the three proactive CSOs, actions were not purely strategic. One 
CSO sent a submission to the Forum simply because they felt compelled to and 
composed a document through the UK group because it needed doing. Both of 
these activities were written submissions to political institutions and are one-off, 
formal and conventional strategies. The fact that the group produced the Forum 
contribution out of a sense of duty demonstrates the role of norms in shaping 
CSOs' policy behaviour. The second group spoke to a range of policy-makers 
across levels, and held an event. Thus, this group had a multi-avenue strategy 
with more informal lobbying methods, recognising that:
... when it comes to policy things like that, it's more about influencing 
policy behind the scenes. (Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
Their lobbying content used information and clarity (and thus conforms to 
expectations raised in Chapter Five).
Finally, the last group engaged through lobbying calls from its ECSO, 
enabling co-ordinated action. This group focused on lobbying AMs, MPs and 
MEPs through email. They also made independent moves to lobby UK 
Conventioneers, following the EEAC meeting in May 2002. They argued their 
case by presenting both legal and rational arguments. Thus, they too had a more 
sustained involvement.
It is hard to discern the time-frame and any changes that groups 
experienced or underwent in their strategies following the different stages of the 
Convention, as no CSO referred to any of the different Convention stages, and 
CSOs' actions were largely not sustained. In comparison, the different 
Convention stages did alter ECSOs' tactics. The possibility cannot be discluded 
that some strategies may have changed, as one group was particularly active up 
until the draft constitution's publication. Nonetheless, the CSOs' participation in 
events (with the exception of the WEF) occurred during the debating phase and 
the Forum submission was sent at the end of 2002. Thus, many of the groups'
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involvement happened after the listening phase, when civil society's formal input 
arose. These strategies also suggest that civil society in Wales' role in the 
process was in the main passive, involved as part of public debate and 
"consulted". The more active groups may have encouraged and facilitated public 
debate and contributed by bringing issues to the agenda. They also kept 
government in check and acted as lobbyists.
Influence49
There seems to be agreement that using the Forum alone could yield little 
influence and with the large numbers of contributions it became an "intellectual 
dumping ground" (interview, UK civil servant, 2004; interview, ECSO, 2004). 
This was recognised by a WAG European Official and that is the reason offered 
as to why WAG did not submit a document to the Forum. This obviously limits 
any influence that the Welsh group had through their submission. A European 
Commission Official discussed the Forum's use in the Convention, describing 
how all the documents were read and summarised, common points identified and 
the representativeness of the organisations were considered. However, this did 
not equate to influence. Instead, as authors Berger (2004:8), and Shaw, Hoffman 
and Bausili (2003:17) concurred, civil society depended upon the more familiar 
strategies of personalities and contacts to influence:
It seems like the real influence taking or the activities of the NGOs 
happened like always and this means lobbying, having the right contacts 
and speaking to the right people. (Interview, ECSO, 2004)
... the council of European regions and Municipalities, well the President 
was Valery Giscard D'Estaing, so you can imagine they had privileged 
access to the Convention as such or their input. (Interview, European 
Commission Official, 2004)
Thus, for the groups who spoke to the key UK Conventioneers - Gisela Stuart 
and Peter Main - their activities could have had real influence. Such influence is 
obviously constrained by each Conventioneer's role, political preferences and the 
criteria discussed in Chapter Four for dealing with civil society. The women's 
group did partake in a large successful, lobbying action, started by its European 
group, and together with their European national and regional counterparts, "all
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160 [Convention] members had emails from I don't know how many individual 
women and women's organisations all over Europe you know. Seven hundred 
all together, they have to take note then" (interview, women's group, 2004). 
Groups did however admit their involvement was constrained because Wales has 
a limited role in the EU.
The Convention concerns held by the participating CSOs were also partly 
met by the Convention; for example, the DCT kept the Member State veto in key 
business areas such as tax. Gender equality is also included in the DCT. The 
Convention did not secure provisions for regional civil society but instead the 
regional tier of government in the EU system is recognised in the DCT, together 
with a vague commitment to "maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue 
with representative associations and civil society" (The European Convention, 
Art 46, (2), p 41). The pro-European group's concerns are partly met. TheEUis 
made more transparent and open, and competencies spelled out, regional and 
local authorities are to be considered in applying subsidiarity in pre legislative 
and legislative acts (protocol para 2 and 4). The dual home of the European 
Parliament is not resolved and neither is the provision given to allow states to 
secede. This is to be expected given that Member States are the key players in 
the Union and want to remain as Member States. Thus, the Convention was only 
in part receptive to the interviewed CSOs' concerns.
Generally, it does seem that the influence that Welsh organisations did 
bring to bear on the Convention was slight and was limited by a relatively small 
degree of involvement. However, sections of European civil society did have 
some success in getting the Convention to take on board their concerns. For 
example, the setting up of a social working group occurred after massive NGO 
lobbying. In addition, some groups feel that these concerns have not been 
reflected in the draft, with the DCT taking on board and leaving out some of the 
NGOs proposals (Berger, 2004).
Which Civil Society Organisations were involved?
This section will analyse the kind of CSOs involved in the Convention and 
whether the CSOs from Chapter Five are the more active Convention CSOs? It 
will also further discuss groups' involvement both externally and within the 
organisation to ascertain the democratic roles groups played and to compare the
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democratic characteristics from Chapter Four of the groups involved/not 
involved. The role of mobilisation structures will also be explored. This part 
shall conclude with a comparison with involvement in European policy-making 
generally to see how far the Convention reached out beyond the already engaged 
sections of civil society.
External involvement50 and democratic role
The organisations in Wales that had external involvement were Wales-wide, with 
the more active participants representing pro-European, women and voluntary 
sector concerns, based for the most part in South Wales. The organisations less 
involved were similarly Wales-wide and based in South Wales, comprising the 
trade union, and disability, religious and international development groups. The 
less-committed groups provided some democratic functions: contributing to 
public debate, articulating the views of the marginalised (such as employees, the 
disabled and less developed countries) and mediating public opinion. The more- 
involved groups contributed ideas and notably in the case of women, articulated 
the views of the marginalised, mediated public opinion to political institutions 
and to European networks. One group who participated heavily in a Convention 
related event with policy-makers developed a communications interface, created 
a deliberative setting and encouraged public debate. Again, most of these actions 
were periodic, although the women's group's actions appeared to be more 
sustained. Perhaps more importantly, despite some elements of deliberative 
democracy being present, civil society appears to have acted mostly as a 
consultee or listener, concurring with a state of representative democracy.
Internal involvement51 and democratic role
The poverty and business groups were only involved in the Convention through 
their organisation's debates. The business group's UK branch required debate 
among the committee and feedback on the debate. This meant that the 
organisation facilitated debate and tried to gain views before creating policy. 
However, this was confined to the general council who represented members and 
groups. Another group's committee member's presence at a General Meeting, 
when a Conventioneer was also present, meant that there was an opportunity for
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the group to get involved. These two groups were Wales-wide groups with one 
based in South Wales and the other having no fixed abode.
Amongst the groups additionally with external Convention participation, 
the more-involved three and the less-involved one mentioned their efforts to 
engage their members. The pro-European group had a discussion on their Forum 
contribution among the executive committee. The women's group also 
disseminated statements from their European branch to their members (who as 
groups were expected to pass the information on to their members). Finally the 
intermediary group ran related events and advertised an event through their 
publications, although it recognised that this had limitations due to members' 
resources:
Therefore you will get a certain percentage who recognise the need to be 
involved. There will be another percentage that whilst recognising the 
need to be involved, do not physically have the time or the resources. 
(Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
The religious group was aware of their European branch's Convention activities 
and some members were involved in the higher branches than the Welsh tier. 
Similarly one umbrella group and one charity, which were involved externally, 
reiterated this idea that consultation may have bypassed them and that activity 
had been concentrated higher up in their organisations.
Thus the level of internal involvement appears to have been mostly 
confined to one or two individuals attending events and committees, although 
members in one instance received information and in another, a group tried to 
discuss with members their European policy and events, with some limited 
Convention content. Therefore, in the Convention, it is questionable as to what 
extent these groups acted as a communications interface or as a marker of public 
opinion when grassroots activity was weak. Indeed, an MEP Conventioneer 
recognised the limitations of some civil society involvement in the Convention:
Small numbers of influential people within big organisations can you 
know be in a position where their organisation is to some extent a 
megaphone for maybe a quite particular standpoint or view. But it will all 
vary. It will all depend. (Interview, MEP/Conventioneer, 2003)
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Democratic characteristics of Civil Society Organisations involved 
In terms of democratic characteristics, the most active groups were two umbrella 
groups and one membership group and the least active were two charities and 
two umbrella groups. In the main, this demonstrates that umbrella groups were 
the most active in the Convention. They are also the groups who are more 
hierarchical and who have less volunteers and member/stakeholder participation 
than membership groups. Out of the charities involved, one possessed a problem 
with member/stakeholder participation their limited involvement consisting of 
staff members attending events, which suggests that it would not have had 
further participation in this instance. There was one actively involved 
membership group that was both voluntary and participatory.
Mobilisation structures
As mentioned above, when one of the groups tried to engage its members, it was 
hindered by a lack of resources. The level of CSOs' resources does capture part 
of the explanation behind groups' involvement as all involved interviewed 
CSOs, bar three, had staff. Those without staff either had other resources 
(entrepreneurial/expertise), or the lack of staff severely constricted their 
involvement. For example, one group without staff had a European expert as a 
member who found in his work that "there was quite a lot of activity going on in 
regard to the Convention, in various fora that I attended" (interview, pro- 
European group, 2004).
Comparison with general European Union policy-making 
Were all the same CSOs engaged in the Convention engaged in general EU 
policy-making? All these groups, bar one, were engaged in European policy- 
making outside of the Convention. The one that was not usually involved did 
however, have very marginal involvement with staff attending the Green/EFA 
event on their Cardiff doorstep. This suggests that the Convention did not 
particularly reach out. Indeed, as will be discussed shortly, some of the normally 
EU-active groups were not participants in the Convention.
The CSOs involved in the partnership councils were also engaged, 
although one not directly through political means. The land of groups active in 
this instance are again reflected in the practical conceptions of civil society held
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by political institutions at all levels. For example, a CSO from Wales 
encountered difficulties in participating at the EU level precisely because it was 
not "European".
Non-involvement and obstacles
Which Civil Society Organisations were not involved?
Most of the organisations that were not involved in EU policy-making are 
similarly not engaged in the Convention. In demographic terms this includes all 
of the local and regional groups, most of the groups outside of South Wales and 
all of the "Welsh" groups. Many of the involved groups did not perceive 
themselves to be engaged, thus demonstrating the frailty of then- Convention 
connections. Of most interest are two groups who participate in EU policy- 
making but not in the Convention. They comprise one large Wales-wide group 
and one regional group and their reasons for not being involved will be explored 
next. The democratic characteristics of these non-involved organisations were 
also the strongest. They included five of the six total membership groups, who 
were particularly strong in membership participation and in being voluntary. 
Equally, given the local nature of most of these groups, they can be expected to 
be closer to the "ordinary" citizen. Thus, the non-involvement of these CSOs 
demonstrates that the Convention-civil society relations bypassed the grassroots 
and membership groups (who were more likely to be able to politically socialise 
members and involve them in their activities). However, the non-involved also 
included one charity, one umbrella and the statutory body, whom were less 
robust in membership participation.
Reasons for non-involvement and obstacles
CSOs' reasons for non-involvement in the Convention overlap with the obstacles 
that they face generally in participating in EU policy-making. A fairly 
straightforward reason for non-involvement, which was also cited by some of the 
involved groups, was that they were not aware of the Convention. Indeed four of 
the Welsh interviewees had no awareness of the Convention prior to interview. 
Many of these groups were aware of the Convention via the media and had rather 
shaky knowledge of it:
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But much of the information we have got hasn't risen above the tabloid 
level of Britain in Europe and Britain out of Europe; all that fairly sort of 
superficial rubbish on both sides. (Interview, trade union, 2004)
As many more organisations were aware than participants, it is evident that being 
aware did not result in CSOs internalising the Convention's work to their 
mission. Moreover, those groups who were aware of the issue via organisations 
were much more likely to participate than those who were made aware of the 
Convention through the media. Equally, no one mentioned the Convention's 
special mechanisms for engaging civil society bar the group that used the Forum. 
This suggests, as found by Lombardo (2003:33), that the Forum had not done 
much to advertise itself. It also points to the idea that the Convention's new 
mechanisms to engage civil society may have stalled civil society involvement 
by their novelty and some structural barriers.
Aside from awareness, some common themes developed among the non- 
participants, including structures and actor-specific reasons; namely the concern 
that groups wouldn't make much of a difference, a lack of previous experience 
and the broad nature of the issue which was outside their organisation's core 
remit:
I think you would like to see such and such and you know you've got as 
much chance as a snowflake in the equator. (Interview, 
community/heritage group, 2004)
A statutory body which might be interested in that trend, but for whom 
that trend is not really vital, is probably going to shy away from taking 
that up. (Interview, statutory body, 2004)
I don't think I have the experience and the language to have had a valid 
input. (Interview, environment group, 2003)
Warleigh's (2001) research echoes these sentiments, finding that NGOs 
"concentrate on dossiers which are crucial to their interests or to which they feel 
able to make a difference" (Warleigh, 2001:63). Groups also cited resources, 
such as personnel, money and time, as reasons for not getting involved. One 
group had only been created at the Convention's concluding stages. Finally, it 
must not be overlooked that the levels of devolution within organisations and
247
their identities may have had an impact. Indeed, amid both involved and non- 
involved groups, some CSOs articulated the idea that higher echelons of their 
organisation would deal with the Convention (three involved, two non-involved). 
There are two deviant cases from general EU policy-making: one group 
who is more active in EU policy - the farming group and another much less 
involved - the language/community group. The farming group's reasons for not 
participating follow the same pattern as above, with concerns about resources 
and the nature of the issue (not being entirely relevant to their members). The 
farming group demonstrated a sense that they ought to have contributed:
... because you're focusing you know on trying to influence what you 
can today, it is difficult to find the time to deal with issues such as these 
which are important and you know have a much sorter of broader 
dimension than that which we are probably dealing with on a day to day 
basis. (Interview, farming group, 2003)
The language/community group brought up the idea that they couldn't make a 
difference. This last reason shows that for many of these groups, the EU is not 
seen as receptive to their views. In response to the reasons cited about the lack 
of relevancy of the Convention, non-involved groups did not seem to be aware 
that the Convention would discuss policies and also values (as well as 
constructing the EU's political environment) which would have relevance for all 
of them. This again reinforces the idea that coverage of the Convention did 
focus on the institutional issues, as identified by the analysis of Welsh 
newspapers. Finally, none of these groups shared the concerns raised by British 
groups in the Forum, suggesting that this might be another implicit reason for 
their non-participation. It may also be that groups who are engaged in Wales on 
European issues, but do not conceive of them as European issues, may have not 
got involved in the Convention because of its explicitly European character.
Obstacles facing engaged Civil Society Organisations
Among the involved groups, similar obstacles were encountered as to with the 
non-involved groups, thus constraining their participation. Internal material 
concerns such as time and resources (people and financial) were present and one 
organisation actually folded during this period. External structural concerns 
such as how could groups in Wales have an influence, lack of awareness of
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events/Convention activities and recognition of the limited role of the Assembly 
as opposed to the UK government in the EU and how the perceived barriers 
towards regional civil society groups in the EU were also again mentioned. The 
perception of the Convention itself, together with how the media and the 
government presented it, and the more broad conceptions of Europe in the UK, 
were most commonly cited as barriers for civil society generally to participate:
It goes back to the way that government treated it ... I mean part of the 
issue for me is the way the government treats Europe, it turns people off. 
We have a right wing media who are so anti-Europe, it's unbelievable, 
yet the government do not do anything to counteract that really. 
(Interview, intermediary group, 2003)
... [On the Convention] too dull. (Interview, international development 
group, 2003)
I must admit we almost see Europe as a means to an end in Wales, 
because we can get the funding because we qualify for it. (Interview, 
disability group, 2003)
Well I think they [other civil society groups in Wales] ... don't think it 
concerns them, I think they are conservative with a small c and defensive. 
But primarily they don't see the relevance of it. They would see the 
Convention as something which is remote and distant and not something 
really for them. (Interview, pro-European group, 2004)
The constitution is totally stratospheric stuff as far as these people [WEC 
members] are concerned. (Interview, WEC Official, 2004)
Policy-makers articulated similar views regarding obstacles to CSOs 
participation in general EU policy-making. Three policy-makers pointed to the 
internal resources of organisations as important in constraining CSO's 
participation but policy-makers placed a greater emphasis on time, money and 
expertise. The Convention's nature was also seen as a constraint: "people are 
bored by it; it's not a sexy subject" (interview, European Commission Official, 
2004). The cultural tide of Euro-scepticism also may have restricted 
participation, as well as reducing government activity. One policy-maker 
reintroduced the informal norm that civil society should be engaged in the UK, 
not in the EU. The European Commission Official also mentioned that 
administrations needed resources to enable civil society participation and that
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one can never have perfect consultation. This was coupled with recognition of 
unstable temporal factors that may have impeded the structures for CSO to input: 
that the European Commission Office in Wales was without a Head during most 
of the Convention period and Wales's European arrangements were still bedding 
down following the WEC dispute.
The general lack of structures for civil society to input, particularly in 
Wales and the UK, may have also acted as an obstacle. However, the recent 
WEF did provide an avenue for influence and the AM and WAG Officials 
interviewed stressed that the lack of structures was not intentional. Instead they 
concentrated on the regional issue to have an input, with a lack of opportunities 
for regions in the Convention generally:
I think in the circumstances you probably could have been seen as a bit 
fatuous of us to have organised, to have taken the debate to the people of 
Wales when the basis of our own contribution was quite a while, not 
clear. (Interview, WAG Official, 2004)
Power vis a vis the UK government may be a reason why the Scottish Executive 
and the Scottish Parliament did consult with its civil society on the Convention. 
The Scottish Executive has greater powers and thus is in a stronger bargaining 
position than Wales with the UK government. Since its act of union with 
England, Scottish institutional autonomy in Scotland has helped to maintain a 
Scottish civil society, unlike in Wales. Scotland also has a different legal system 
and as an MEP pointed out, this gives Scotland its own "internal legal 
constitutional dialogue" (interview, MEP 2003) on which things like the 
European constitution would impinge.
Satisfaction with outcome and involvement
Among the groups who were not involved, six groups when asked, would have 
desired participation. Only one non-involved group did explicitly not want to get 
involved, with another two of the involved (whose involvement was only 
discerned posthumously) did not desire any engagement. However, this does 
suggest more could have been done to engage civil society in the Convention. 
One recurring theme here was that groups expected such issues should, and
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would, be dealt with higher up within their organisation, and this was also 
articulated by the involved groups:
If the [European and International branches of the organisation] had any 
input into it then really whatever we would have said would have just 
been repeating it ... if you have too much consultation then I think you 
can't see the woods from the trees and you know if people are merely 
repeating the points that other people made more succinctly then all you 
are doing is clogging up the system. (Interview, environmental group, 
2003)
This was mainly the view of those CSOs with British parent bodies.
A couple of the groups also shared and approved of the concerns taken to 
the Convention by the WAG, concerning the improvement of the status of 
regions in EU policy-making. This showed that the WAG approach carried the 
approval of some of the groups but, as many of the other non-involved groups 
would have been concerned with specific clauses or policy areas, these concerns 
were not addressed by WAG's approach.
Policy-makers had mixed reactions to the Convention depending on how 
they viewed its purpose, and there was disagreement over where the 
responsibility lay to engage civil society: with the onus passed to and from the 
Member State to the Convention. However, there was a sense among many that 
the Convention was better than an IGC. In the end, there is no disputing that 
civil society's constituents - the general public - were not reconnected to the EU 
as a result of the Convention. The results of Eurobarometer survey, conducted 
just after the Convention ended in 2003, demonstrate this well.
Immediately following the Convention, Eurobarometer found that the UK 
had the lowest awareness of the Convention among the old and new Member 
States, with 75% never having heard of it (EOS Gallup Europe and 
Eurobarometer, 2003:7). hi contrast, 55% of the fifteen old Member States of 
the European Union were unaware of the Convention (EOS Gallup Europe and 
Eurobarometer, 2003:7). Initial awareness did not mean, as in the case of some 
of the CSOs, that they fully comprehended what the Convention entailed, with 
only 50% of those aware of the Convention actually knowing that the 
Convention produced a DCT (EOS Gallup Europe and Eurobarometer, 2003: 
10). In the UK, 26% were not satisfied with the work of the Convention and
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32% satisfied (EOS Gallup Europe and Eurobarometer, 2003:32). The 
Eurobarometer also concludes that awareness is a positive factor influencing 
satisfaction. However a follow-up survey shows that UK awareness decreased to 
17% in October 2003 (Taylor Nelson Sofres 2003:4).
CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRACY
Large Wales-wide and umbrella organisations were dominant in both the 
Convention events detailed and among the interviewed CSOs who participated hi 
the Convention. This is slightly problematic some notions of democracy and 
bringing input legitimacy to the EU, given that such organisations have the 
weakest member/stakeholder participation and are more likely to be 
bureaucratised and have staff members. The involvement of these umbrella 
organisations evokes corporatist relations. Yet policy-makers may need to 
reduce the numbers of CSOs involved in policy activities to create a "simplified 
external environment" (Dunleavy, 1982: 185, cited in Lewis 1990:65) and 
simply get things done. Moreover, large CSOs are more likely to have the 
necessary resources, knowledge and specialisation to be able to engage in EU 
affairs. Thus, although the participation of large umbrella groups is problematic 
in one democratic sense, at least there was some participation by groups which 
could possibly lend democratic legitimacy to the Convention.
The kind of involvement that CSOs had in the Convention illustrates that 
groups did carry out a range of tasks that aided democracy. CSOs were able to 
contribute to public debate, articulate the views of the marginalised, mediate 
public opinion and keep government in check, organise public debate, be a 
communications interface, bring issues to the agenda and suggest ideas. 
However, these tasks must be qualified in that involvement was mostly passive 
or reactive, with many of these functions conjectures from groups' attendance at 
Convention-related events. Secondly, even among the more actively involved, 
only one group had a more sustained involvement.
The internal discussions of groups with their members and staff on the 
Convention were limited, as they were confined to committees or to one or two 
individuals. There were two exceptions where CSOs passed information to their 
members and one of these tried to actively engage them. This limited internal 
participation on the one hand reduces CSOs' ability to articulate the views of
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their members or indeed the public to the Convention. On the other hand, CSOs 
allotted role to describe and translate the Convention's work back to the citizens 
is similarly curtailed by a lack of member involvement.
The lack of involvement by CSOs may best be described as a reflection 
of public opinion. Groups, like the general public, were not sufficiently aware or 
interested in the Convention to take it to heart. The Convention did not reach 
very far out beyond the CSOs already engaged, with only one additional CSO 
who did not normally engage in EU policy-making participating in the 
Convention and two CSOs engaged in EU policy-making not taking part. 
Perhaps most disconcerting is that many of the non-involved groups would have 
liked to be participants, notwithstanding the obstacles. Thus, the Convention 
may have missed out on potential alternative sources of legitimisation. The 
limited level of CSO participation does reduce the prospect of the Convention 
having corporatist relations with CSOs from Wales. In other words, in the face 
of the empirical evidence it would appear to be highly unlikely that any CSOs 
from Wales were involved in the thick of the Convention's decision-making 
(although this may have been the case among a few ECSOs). Muted corporatism 
instead rears its head due to CSOs being unaware of the Convention and 
consequently indirectly excluded from it.
The democratic concerns discussed thus far generally focus upon the 
supply-side potential of civil society. What about the demand-side - that of 
government structures; were they open to civil society? CSOs' opinions as to 
whether the Convention was accessible or not were divergent, which again seems 
related to levels of knowledge about the Convention's special mechanisms in the 
first instance. However, for one group, the conception of civil society articulated 
by the EU of "European" groups, acted as an obstacle impeding their Convention 
involvement. In terms of receptiveness to groups' concerns thereby creating 
ownership over the constitutional document and fostering satisfaction, it appears 
that only some of the concerns articulated by the civil society groups in Wales 
actually made it through to the draft. Obviously not all of civil society's 
concerns could be taken on board but the tremendous effort, described by the 
women's group, of getting one clause into the treaty demonstrates the CSOs' 
difficulties.
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In terms of the kind of democracy that civil society's involvement 
conjures up, it creates a picture of representative democracy. Although the 
Convention was more transparent and also more accountable than its IGC 
counterpart, the Conventioneers were very much in the driving seat of the 
Convention (who were all elected politicians/or European bureaucrats), with 
some measure of participatory democracy via the Forum. Civil society's 
participation instead appears largely confined to a consultee. However, at the 
European level the participation of ECSOs - many of whom were licensed and 
sponsored by the European Commission - does suggest some measure of 
corporatist relations. Nonetheless, without such local and broad participation by 
civil society in the EU's constitution-making process, the legitimacy of the 
Convention's draft constitutional treaty is compromised.
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIQUENESS OF THE 
CASE STUDY AND THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
The Convention illustrates the importance of the Assembly and its government in 
generating policy discussion on things European amongst civil society. The 
Assembly's role in the POS appears to have shaped civil society's participation. 
This is demonstrated by the cluster of civil society activity at this level in the last 
chapter and by the comparative lack of civil society activity around the 
Assembly on the Convention. This suggests that the Assembly has been 
successful to some extent in generating a civic society around its structures and 
partly confirms Osmond's (2003) views. It further suggests that the Assembly 
has been successful in mainstreaming much of EU policy. However, in issues of 
high politics, with little legal/procedural remit for the regional assemblies, the 
POS was closed to the National Assembly of Wales. In consequence, one of 
CSOs in Wales' staple EU avenues was closed.
In terms of the impact of the unstable POS, some aspects seem more 
relevant than others do. Political alignments are hard to pin down as regards 
groups' activity. The media coverage and concentration of specific sectors and 
knowledgeable groups in the Forum may partly explain the lack of involvement 
of the interviewed groups. Other issues, particularly continued debate around the 
Euro, might also explain limited participation, as it continued to dominate the 
UK's European agenda.
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Groups were divided among the Convention's access and openness, 
reflecting their limited involvement in the first place. Amongst those who did 
have dealings with the Assembly, the Assembly was recognised as accessible. 
The EU institutions were viewed by the one group who went to those institutions 
as difficult to access. This negative view stands in opposition to the favourable 
opinion articulated by the pro-European group towards the Convention Forum as 
being extremely accessible. The policy-makers' view that civil society activity 
should occur hi the Member State was again re-encountered in the context of the 
Convention. This is part explains the underused parts of the institutional POS - 
such as the Forum by Welsh CSOs. These statements also partly demonstrate the 
importance of both formal and informal aspects of the POS in structuring CSOs' 
activity in the Convention.
Cultural- and actor-specific concerns also appear important in explaining 
activity. This is evident in that some CSOs were able to participate at all levels, 
demonstrating that these CSOs were not entirely constrained by structures. 
Therefore, actor specific factors such as CSOs' conceptions of the Convention 
and Europe, together with CSOs' identities, mobilisation, communication and 
devolution structures provide, part of the explanation behind the CSOs in Wales' 
role in the Convention.
The nature of the Convention, its broad remit, novel procedure and its 
structures do seem to have set it outside of the general set of EU policy-making. 
In particular, many groups do not seem to have understood the relevance of the 
Convention, as is the case in EU policy-making more generally. In the case of
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the Convention, its broadness, coupled with media coverage and perhaps with 
how the Convention ran and its focus, may have resulted in a lack of 
engagement. In terms of continuity with other EU policy-making, groups did 
acquiesce here that their networks/parent groups should and would be engaged at 
the Convention Brussels' level. However, engagement was much weaker by 
groups on the Convention than general EU policy-making and coalesced around 
the more informal side of events. CSOs' repertoire of strategies was less diverse 
and less pre-divined, but did all remain with the confines of conventional 
acceptability.
In sum, the Convention represented a departure from other methods of 
EU policy-making at both the EU level and at the sub-national level of civil 
society in Wales. Exploration into this case study illustrates that Political 
Opportunity Structures alone do not shape CSOs' activities, but that CSOs' 
actor-specific factors also play a role. When exploring CSOs in Wales' 
engagement in EU policy-making, attention must be focussed on CSOs' 
organisational structures and cultures as regards where it is appropriate to engage 
in EU issues, in order to understand CSOs' behaviour.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has sought to explore civil society in Wales' role in post-devolution 
EU policy-making processes through the case study of the Convention and 
within the context of general EU policy-making. The previous chapters discussed 
the nature of civil society's role, the factors conditioning civil society's EU 
policy-making role and the consequential democratic implications of this role. 
Previous chapters have analysed both the primary empirical evidence conducted 
for this study and also documentary and academic literature. In these chapters it 
was demonstrated that further research was needed into sub-national civil 
society's role in EU policy-making and the Convention, together with analysis of 
the democratic contributions of civil society's role, warranting this thesis' 
research. This concluding chapter firstly synthesises previous individual chapter 
conclusions to answer the key research questions and situate the findings within 
the literature. Secondly it reflects on how the research could have been 
improved, and indicates areas for future research.
ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
For analytical clarity the research questions are broken into three parts and each 
part will be addressed in turn:
a) What role does civil society in Wales play in EU policy-making?
b) What factors shape civil society in Wales' role in EU policy-making?
c) Is civil society's role in EU policy-making democratic? Does it aid the EU's 
democracy?
What role does civil society in Wales play in European Union policy-making
processes?
This question addresses the key research question and also the following
secondary research questions:
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• How do the post-devolution Welsh, British and European institutions that are 
involved in EU policy-making compare in their relations with civil society?
• How, why, where, when and which civil society in Wales does and does not 
engage in EU policy-making?
Where is civil society involved in European Union policy-making? 
In Chapters Five and Six it was shown that CSOs participated in EU policy- 
making through both political and civil society avenues. The findings show that 
in general EU policy-making, some CSOs did participate across multiple Welsh, 
British and European political avenues, thus demonstrating the presence of some 
MLG, and that some CSOs recognised the need to influence multiple avenues 
(acknowledged at the beginning of Chapter Five). However, CSOs' interaction 
in general EU policy-making, is concentrated around the Assembly and in Wales. 
This lends some weight to Osmond's (2003) argument of a post-devolution 
Welsh civic society being formed and centred on the Assembly. Equally, the 
concentration of activity at the Assembly demonstrates the importance of the 
Assembly in structuring Welsh-EU relations.
Much of civil society's interaction in the EU policy process at the Welsh 
level consisted of formal relations, such as contributing to consultations. 
However, informal activities were also important, with the some interviewees 
drawing a picture of a close-knit Welsh political community and personal 
contacts being important in Welsh politics (Berts, Borland and Chaney, 2001:65- 
66). CSOs recognised the necessity of speaking to key Assembly actors, the 
importance of which was also demonstrated in the POS described earlier in this 
chapter. Moreover, CSOs' activities in general EU policy-making were not 
necessarily embarked upon with a concern to shape "EU" policy, but to engage 
with what is going on in Wales, thus giving rise to the notion that EU policy- 
making is subsumed in everyday work with the Assembly.
CSO links with European representatives in Wales were mostly with 
MEPs and the European Commission Office in Wales. There was a widespread 
lack of awareness of other European representatives in Wales, such as 
representatives of CoR and ECOSOC. This suggests that opportunities in the 
policy chain were underused. Groups had fewer interactions with MPs and
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Whitehall departments than with AMs. This matches the findings from the 
interviews with policy-makers, as the AMs and MEPs had the most dealings with 
CSOs.
The political routes used by CSOs in the Convention did differ from 
general EU policy-making. A lack of Assembly opportunities for CSOs (as 
described at the start of Chapter Six) resulted in a CSO activity being less 
concentrated around the Assembly. Also, six CSOs engaged across different 
political avenues, which comprised the better-known paths of MEPs, the 
European Commission Office in Wales and MPs. Thus, CSOs' Convention 
activities indicate the existence of some MLG. However, it is important to stress 
that much of the Convention participation of CSOs' and more so with general 
EU policy-making participation was informal.
In terms of participation via the civil society route, it was demonstrated in 
Chapter Five that this participation was far from uniform, and was partly related 
to the degree of devolution and the identity of an organisation. Moreover, CSOs 
had different relations with parent groups and networks depending upon the level 
at which their parent group and/or chief network resided and whether their parent 
group was at the Welsh, British or European level. This route was used more 
heavily by the CSOs with European and International parent groups/networks 
and to some extent by Wales-wide CSOs with British parents, with only one 
local CSO was involved in this process. Again this route has potential for further 
use by the CSOs. Instead, most Wales-wide groups with British partners and the 
local/regional CSOs were largely content to contract out the bulk, if not all, of 
EU policy-making and to leave the liaison with European networks to their 
British partners. Such findings concur with Warleigh's (2001) and Fairbrass 
and Jordan (2002)'s research where the smaller groups contract out EU 
participation to their higher organisational branches. Finally, two groups were 
members of WEC and this seemed to be an important avenue for being alerted to 
EU policy-making and providing capacity to engage in the process.
In the case of the Convention, CSOs did participate in the Convention via 
parent groups and networks. Indeed, some of the CSOs' initial awareness of the 
Convention was triggered by their networks, and in particular, the CSOs with 
International and European parent groups engaged in this way. Again, this route 
seemed to bypass the Welsh groups in the Convention, with twelve of the CSOs
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having parent groups that did participate in the Convention, with only seven 
CSOs in Wales participating via their parent groups/networks. Many responses 
reflected the idea that Welsh, British and even European/parent bodies and 
networks should and would deal with a European event like the Convention.
When do Civil Society Organisations engage in European Union policy-making? 
As Chapter Five outlined, the stage that the EU policy process is at, determines 
when the different political actors are involved and the nature of their 
involvement. Thus it could be expected that the previous discussion about where 
CSOs engage in EU policy-making would lend itself to the stage at which they 
engage. There is some overlap, for in general EU policy-making CSOs were 
mainly engaged when the Assembly was discussing EU Directives. Involvement 
at this stage limits CSOs' influence over the shape of policy, as Chapter Five 
revealed; the stage with the potential for most impact is early in the policy- 
making process. Some policy-makers also viewed CSOs' participation as 
occurring too late. However, regional policy was an exception with groups being 
drawn into WAG consultations before the policy has been decided. Outside of 
regional policy, four groups mentioned their involvement in decision-making and 
formulation stages. Some groups also had informal longer-term relations with 
EU players.
The Convention, as described by Chapter Six, had neither the same 
players nor process as in general EU policy-making. Much of the CSO's 
participation through events and forum submissions largely occurred after the 
intended stage for civil society formal input, during the debating phase. 
However, civil society participation in the Assembly's deliberations on European 
Governance did occur before the Convention's listening stage.
Why and with what policy issues are Civil Society Organisations concerned, and 
are these raised at the appropriate political levels?
The kinds of EU policy issues with which groups are concerned, cover a range of 
areas, as Chapter Five describes. The political levels at which issues are raised 
generally are appropriate, although there are some issues raised at the Welsh 
level which would be better raised at the UK or European levels. Significantly, 
some of the non-involved groups are concerned about issues that do have some
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EU substance, suggesting there is a need for these groups to engage in EU 
policy-making. Most groups did not perceive that the issues they were dealing 
with were specifically Welsh but rather that the issues were local, although there 
were some issues that had a more distinctly Welsh dimension. However, the 
conceptualisation of such issues may be down to how CSOs are structured and 
the degree of organisational devolution and political affiliations. This finding 
does however question the need for CSO involvement in EU policy-making 
purely on a Welsh platform, and instead points to the need for local involvement. 
The concerns articulated by the CSOs in the Convention partly deviate 
from the broad issues raised in EU policy-making, with notably, regional policy 
and agriculture off their agenda. Moreover, unsurprisingly for a case study, the 
CSO's Convention concerns are more specific. Three groups discussed the 
effect/influence/discussions of the Convention on a policy area (business, 
employment, women and social policy) and two more focused upon institutional 
power/issues (European governance). Thus, the issues raised by the groups do 
have some crossover with the ones raised in Chapter Five.
How? What strategies do Civil Society Organisations use to engage in European 
Union policy-making? Are these the strategies that Civil Society Organisations 
should use?
Once more the strategies for participation are part and parcel of when and where, 
CSOs are involved in the EU policy-making process. However, in general EU 
policy-making, the involved CSOs stressed that the strategies they used 
depended on the issue at hand. Nonetheless, the more actively involved groups 
did acknowledge the need to influence a range of actors across governance 
levels. There was also recognition of different methods for different institutions, 
for example email was appropriate to contact AMs but inappropriate for MPs. 
Longer-term relationship building with policy-makers complemented issue- 
specific strategies. Both policy-makers and CSOs called for framing CSOs' 
issues in policy-makers' language and interests and for precision and provision 
of information and options, as Ruzza (2002) suggested. In line with this, groups 
outlined a range of acceptable methods that they used to influence policy- 
making. Only one non-involved group engaged in any non-violent direct action; 
however this CSO did not see any use in engaging in EU policy-making.
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For the Convention, some of the CSOs' strategies are hard to discern, but 
the reactive and proactive CSOs differ. The reactive CSOs' participation 
occurred through indirect involvement, usually through attending an event. 
These strategies were normally singular, informal and conventional methods of 
influencing the Convention (although it is debatable that this participation was 
initially designed to influence the Convention). The proactive CSOs all had a 
multi avenue strategy. Therefore, the Convention strategies did differ in that 
activities were not clustered around the Assembly. However, the conventional 
use of strategies did not differ.
Are Civil Society Organisations' strategies influential in European Union policy- 
making?
Influence of CSOs in EU policy-making generally hinged upon which policy- 
makers they spoke to, the policy-makers' views and criteria towards groups. The 
policy-makers also preferred conventional strategies and could point to instances 
where CSOs had influence. The CSOs felt that their influence varied with the 
issue and that they had most influence with the Assembly.
In the Convention, the CSOs' interviewed influence was limited, given 
their small level of activity on the Convention. Instead, influence seemed to 
hinge upon the right personal contacts. Some of the proactive CSOs could have 
had influence as they conjoined with European networks and spoke to UK 
Conventioneers. Nonetheless, civil society as a whole in the Convention did 
have some instances of influence. Yet as Chapter Six described, there was a 
range of other players at work influencing the Convention's course, with civil 
society on the margins of the Convention.
Which Civil Society Organisations are engaged in European Union policy- 
making?
In terms of sectors of CSOs, the policy-makers engaged with a host of CSOs in 
the broad swathe of EU policy-making. Notably, several policy-makers 
mentioned representations from the voluntary sector. Farmers, women's groups 
and social partners were given as examples of effective CSOs in EU policy- 
making. These sectors matched largely with the CSOs who were involved in EU 
policy-making in the research sample. The CSOs who were not mentioned
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comprise those for the most part less involved in EU policy-making: the 
cultural/linguistic, international development, poverty and religious groups. 
However, the most involved groups did not see EU policy-making as taking up 
much of their overall time, showing the limited amount of involvement in 
relation to their general work.
In terms of the geographic base of groups, all of the engaged CSOs were 
Wales-wide groups, bar one that had the least amount of involvement with EU 
policy-making (being fairly intermittent and also mediated). All the Welsh 
CSOs with European/International parents were also involved. The geographical 
base may play an important role since only two of the involved CSOs' were not 
based in South Wales.
Did the CSOs engaged in EU policy-making concur with the civil society 
discourses entertained by the political institutions involved in EU policy- 
making? The normative and to a lesser extent functional conceptions of civil 
society held by the Assembly and the UK policy-maker do not fully correspond 
to the CSOs actually engaged. Instead, the practical criteria held by the political 
institutions have more weight with established, large and representative bodies 
comprising largely the CSOs engaged in EU policy-making.
The CSOs engaged in the Convention for the most part share the 
characteristics of those engaged in EU policy-making, with only one additional 
CSO engaged in the Convention and two who participate in EU policy-making in 
general not engaging. All the CSOs involved in the Convention were Wales- 
wide and mostly based in South Wales, and comprised the following sectors: 
pro-European, intermediary, women, trade union, business, disability, religious, 
international development and poverty. The marginal involvement of only one 
CSO not involved in general EU policy-making suggests that the Convention did 
not particularly reach out to wider civil society.
The groups not involved in general EU policy-making comprised the 
entire small, local and regional groups, bar one. Again, most were not based in 
South Wales, indicating that geography plays a role in shaping participation. 
Three Wales-wide groups were also not involved. The non-involved CSOs were 
for the most part the same CSOs that did not participate in the Convention. The 
CSOs which were involved in EU policy-making generally, but not the 
Convention, included one regional group and one Wales-wide group.
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Obstacles and reasons for Civil Society Organisations' non-involvement 
Reasons for non-engagement largely revolved around obstacles, with five of the 
seven non-involved CSOs in general EU policy-making and six of the non- 
involved CSOs in the Convention wishing they could have participated. This 
section will focus largely upon obstacles. This section may also demonstrate 
some of the salient factors shaping participation.
The POS in Chapter Five demonstrated that there were a number of 
barriers facing civil society groups as regards engaging in general EU policy- 
making. These included a number of structural barriers, such as the Assembly 
being closely nested with the UK government, the closure of much of the UK- 
EU machinery to the public, UK closed policy communities around departments 
and no formal UK arrangements for Welsh voluntary groups to input into policy. 
Secondly, the political institutions articulated different discourses of civil 
society, but across the board there was a practical preference for established 
groups with expertise. In particular, the EU conception of civil society as 
"European" would be expected to constrain CSOs in Wales.
Both policy-makers and CSOs flagged up some of these external 
obstacles. For example, the limited role and place of Wales in EU policy-making 
made groups question whether they could make a difference. There was a lack 
of awareness about the complex EU policy-making process, as outlined in an 
entire chapter in this thesis. Similarly, some CSOs pointed to a lack of structures 
in place to gather or take forward the CSOs' views. One group and one policy- 
maker moreover mentioned the EU conception of civil society as European, as 
being a constraining factor. The general cultural climate in the UK towards 
Europe also mitigated participation together, with the fact that "Europe" is 
physically far away. Another CSO mentioned how the way that EU Structural 
Funds had been dealt with in Wales had further hindered participation.
Both CSOs and policy-makers most readily identified the internal 
obstacles of CSOs' material and human resources. The kind of organisation, its 
identity and role in some instances also acted as an obstacle, with other higher 
branches of the organisation intended to deal with EU issues or EU issues not 
seen as relevant to a CSO's work. Moreover, one CSO also felt the lack of direct 
experience and links with Europe among its staff acted as obstacles.
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The Convention on the other hand did have relatively open structures at 
the EU level. However, as Chapter Six described, at the Welsh level the 
Convention was not very open to regional input, resulting in the Assembly 
focusing on regional power concerns and being very tightly nested to the UK 
government, thus limiting civil society's usual avenue into Europe. The UK 
government similarly focused on institutional concerns had no economic and 
social committee and Euro-scepticism may have curtailed widespread debate. At 
the European level the EU discourse of civil society came back to haunt the 
Convention both in terms of practicalities and the ECOSOC's civil society 
meetings. Similarly the European level structured civil society's formal input so 
that it came late in the listening stage, only once appearing relatively early on in 
the Convention.
The unstable POS discussed in Chapter Six showed that event 
opportunities as selective regards to civil society and not necessarily focused on 
the Convention. The UK forum contributions demonstrated that specific sectors 
of civil society were involved and they had used expertise to contribute to the 
debate. Similarly, the forum contributions identified other UK devolved 
administrations intending to bring in civil society views through their regional 
government representation. There was also a range of other issues with which 
institutions were dealing at the time, thus curtailing their Convention 
involvement.
The CSOs' obstacles included a lack of awareness about the Convention, 
a limited knowledge of the Convention (many did not internalise it to the work of 
their organisation), implications of unfavourable media coverage and a cultural 
Euro-sceptic climate. There was no mention of the Convention's special 
participation mechanisms, bar the CSO who used one of them. Concerns that 
CSOs could not make much difference and the limited role of the Assembly were 
expressed, as were internal limitation such as personnel, money and time. The 
broad range of the issue of obstacles was however distinctly mentioned by both 
policy-makers and CSOs as a constraint, as it was outside of CSO's remit. This 
shows perhaps how "European" the Convention was and how other European 
issues become domesticated when placed in their specific sector. These reasons 
did appear to be the case for the strongest anomaly - a CSO actively involved in 
EU policy-making generally, but not with the Convention, who saw the
265
Convention as outside of their core work. The other anomaly - the 
language/cultural group - questioned how they could make a difference to the 
process. Other obstacles that interviewees highlighted were actor-specific 
temporal factors.
What factors shape civil society in Wales' role in European Union policy- 
making?
Chapters Two and Three showed how institutions and actors 
understand/articulate civil society and how democracy partly shapes civil 
society's role hi policy-making. Chapter Two built this assertion upon the trend 
in civil society theory that recognises the role of the state in organising civil 
society. Moreover, since there are different ideal types or perspectives on both 
civil society and democracy which have different implications for the role and 
shape of civil society in policy-making, Chapter Two argued for the essential 
exploration of institutions' and actors' conceptions of democracy and civil 
society. These institutional and actors' conceptions were framed as the 
discursive component of the political opportunity Structure in Chapter Three.
Chapter Three also argued that the POS alone cannot shape civil society's 
role but that groups must realise the POS. Therefore, the rest of the thesis 
explored actor-specific variables of which mobilisation structures are a part, as 
well as the POS, when describing civil society's role. Chapter Three expanded 
upon traditional approaches to POS, by introducing the concept of nesting and 
proposed that the POS consisted of stable and unstable components, institutional 
structures, and informal procedures and prevailing strategies. Also demonstrated 
was the applicability of the POS to the research area, which crosses policy 
domains, is contextual and can be used in relation to the EU.
The literature and documentary analysis at the start of Chapters Five and 
Six demonstrated the structural barriers facing civil society in Wales' 
involvement and where civil society should input in the face of this POS. It also 
demonstrated that it was a multi-level POS, rendering some MLG possible. The 
Convention was fairly open to European civil society; however, the POS 
available to CSOs in Wales was fairly closed.
Chapter Four explored the discursive aspect of the POS in more detail, 
analysing to what extent institutional discourses are shared by individual policy-
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makers and in turn providing some estimation of the extent to which institutional 
discourse can structure civil society's role in EU policy-making. The civil 
servants in particular appeared to share their institutional views on democracy 
and civil society; thus some structuring along institutional discourse lines can be 
expected. Moreover, it highlighted that representative democracy was prime 
among civil society and that there were different views held by policy-makers at 
different levels. Notably, among the Welsh and UK policy-makers there was a 
lack of mention of community. Generally, policy-makers more frequently 
mentioned the practical criteria placed upon civil society in institutional 
discourses. The chapter also demonstrated the role of political alignments in 
shaping politicians' conceptions and suggested that institutional analysis might 
be less appropriately applied to parliaments than to bureaucracies.
Did the POS affect the behaviour of the groups in general EU policy- 
making and in the Convention? Did the discursive part of the POS aid 
explanation? Chapter Four exposed the practical component of the institutional 
discourse appeared to be more salient in general EU policy-making, with the 
focus by Wales and the UK on large groups with established relations. Indeed, 
the normative and to a lesser extent the functional conceptions of civil society, in 
particular at the UK and Welsh levels, did not fully correspond to the groups that 
are actually engaged in EU policy-making. However, there is some crossover, 
with the functional and normative conception of the civil society at the EU level 
in representative bodies being involved. Some crossover with the wide 
functional definition of the Assembly, applies to civil society, comprising of 
public, private and voluntary groups. Similarly, the groups engaged in 
Convention, more strongly matched the practical criteria than 
normative/functional conception of civil society in institutional discourses. This 
was suggested in the literature analysed in the beginning of Chapter Six and was 
evident in the empirical analysis with the large, established groups, with some 
European knowledge in the interviewed sample generally participating. In 
particular, the "European" aspect of the EU's practical civil society discourse 
raised its head. This presented a barrier to one of the CSOs, to conclude their 
Convention activities with political institutions at the European Union level. The 
broad gambit of CSOs included in the EU's functional definition means that 
there is a match between these kinds of CSOs involved in the Convention.
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However, the UK and Welsh emphasis in particular on community groups does 
not correspond with the kinds of groups involved. It may be that normative 
aspects of civil society are harder to trace. Nonetheless, aspects of civil society 
discourses do appear to have affected behaviour as outlined above. It may be the 
case that the British and Welsh normative conceptions of civil society do not 
extend to issues of high politics. Moreover, the fact that civil society is largely 
envisaged by policy-makers as working within a representative democracy may 
help explain the limited extent of most CSOs' participation in EU policy-making
Specific sectors of groups were also mentioned by the policy-makers as 
being more successful, and this seems to be backed up by the idea that different 
sectors have different levels of EU competency and devolved content. However, 
as the POS suggested, access was most readily found in the decentralised 
structures of Wales, with many European issues being subsumed into the 
Assembly's general sectoral work and consequently most activity is found 
around here. As expected by the institutional POS, the UK institutions were less 
easy to access and fewer groups tried to engage here. This was backed up by 
some policy-makers' informal norm that civil society from Wales should be dealt 
with in Wales. Still fewer groups went directly to the EU level and the fact that 
civil society groups in Wales were not European groups limited these groups' 
influence. The cited obstacles of a lack of Welsh power vis a vis the UK 
government in EU policy-making also lend themselves to the POS structuring 
civil society's role. Moreover, simple geography may act as a barrier, with most 
of the involved groups being based in South Wales.
In the Convention, the avenues diverged from general EU policy-making. 
Chapter Six described how the Assembly was closely nested to the UK in the 
Convention, limiting civil society's participation. This did seem to have some 
validity, with much of the CSOs under study instead not going through the 
Assembly in comparison to general EU policy-making. The CSOs who 
discussed their Convention activity with other political actors did find most of 
these to be accessible. However, the hurdle of not being a European actor was 
re-encountered when accessing the EU level, and policy-makers believed civil 
society groups in Wales activity should once more be concentrated in the 
Member State, thereby constraining its role, given the lack of opportunities at the 
UK and Welsh level for CSOs. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether
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CSOs' access reflected the POS, given that this activity was not widespread and 
sometimes not articulated by CSOs. Instead, a lack of awareness about the 
structures and novel Convention avenues implicitly reduced activity. Here the 
cultural climate as referred to in the unstable aspects of the POS in the form of 
media newspaper coverage would appear to provide a better explanation of civil 
society's non-activity, particularly since more CSOs would have liked to have 
been involved. However, the presence of similar structural obstacles in general 
EU policy-making was raised, showing that structures did constrain action.
Mobilisation structures in particular have a lot of weight in explaining 
civil society's involvement, and this was frequently cited as an obstacle in 
general EU policy-making. Indeed only three of the engaged did not have any 
staff, two of these three could deploy other resources, and for one group it meant 
their demise. Engaged CSOs frequently had entrepreneurs who were connected 
to other organisations. This was also the case among the CSOs involved in the 
Convention. The non-engaged CSO in the Convention which participated in 
general EU policy-making provided anomalies, and here structural concerns 
about the perceived inability to influence as well as the broad nature of the 
Convention placing it outside of the CSO's core remit were raised. The nature of 
the Convention was raised as an obstacle among groups not participating, thus 
setting the Convention outside the box of general EU policy-making. The non- 
engaged staffed CSOs who were organised at a Wales level were anomalies and 
here actor-specific reasons related to internal cultures around the degree of 
devolution, and agreement over where the European agenda should be pursued. 
These actor-specific reasons were also important in explaining the extent to 
which groups were able to engage in EU policy-making and the Convention via 
other civil society actors. Policy-makers also stressed it was up to CSOs to make 
the most of structures in general EU policy-making.
This thesis instead highlights a host of factors, demonstrating the 
importance of understanding the structural POS context, and in agreement with 
Marks and McAdam (1996) recognises that CSOs also have to realise 
opportunities whilst actor-specific variables affect participation. Similarly, the 
importance of the cultural context in terms of media coverage and views toward 
the UK, Wales and Europe, in shaping participation has been demonstrated. 
Thus Wallace's (1997:13) assertion that: "Opportunities to participate are not so
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much determined by the structures of the policy process as by the information, 
resources and credibility of particular groups or actors," would only appear to be 
partly true, as this author has found that structures are also significantly involved 
in shaping action. Moreover, in the case of Wales, consideration of actor- 
specific factors needs to taken with an appreciation of any CSO's devolved status 
and also where EU issues are dealt with internally. The POS would appear to be 
a useful tool for identifying key factors, and moreover alerted the study to the 
significant informal aspects that govern behaviour - notably that policy-makers 
believe civil society in Wales should engage with EU policy in the Member State 
or in Wales.
Is civil society's role in European Union policy-making democratic? Does it 
aid the European Union's democracy?
Chapter Two described the EU's democratic deficit, of which civil society is 
particularly important to the participatory democracy perspective. This Chapter 
also noted the importance of regional civil society to a bottom-up approach to 
participatory democracy, rationalising the need for this study. In Chapter Two 
this author also argued that there were different perspectives on civil society and 
democracy and that these accorded different space to civil society in policy- 
making. Therefore it was stipulated that attention must be paid to the different 
concepts of democracy and civil society held by political institutions. Similarly 
in Chapter Two it was argued that civil society's democratic role must be looked 
at in terms of the democratic functions civil society plays in relation to policy- 
making and also whether corporatist-pluralist relations are in ascendance. 
Finally, Chapter Two demonstrated that the different CSOs must be explored for 
their democratic contributions.
Chapter Four explored individual CSOs' democratic contributions and 
analysed each group in relation to the Chapter Two's indicators. Groups were 
also labelled according to their membership, given that most of the indicators 
were dependent upon the different kinds of CSO membership. This section 
found that the CSOs involved are largely very democratic and contribute 
similarly to democracy as the non-involved. Nonetheless, in general EU policy- 
making and in the Convention (see Chapter Six), umbrella groups were the most 
active in EU policy-making, with some limited participation by charities and the
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majority of membership groups not involved. The involved umbrella groups 
were strong in terms of resources and independence however their biggest 
democratic problems were membership participation and voluntarism. These 
latter two problems raise questions concerning their ability to reconnect citizens 
with the EU via participatory democracy, if they are hierarchical and member 
participation is less evident. Umbrella groups can however act as government 
scrutinisers and thus provide interest representation. The charities were weak in 
terms of independence and resources, although they were stronger in deliberation 
and internal decision-making structures. The membership groups were the least 
involved yet fared best across the democratic indicators. Indeed, the presence of 
Wales-wide groups being active in EU policy-making suggests that participation 
among CSOs in Wales may be very small. WCVA reported that only 3% of 
organisations in the All Wales Database of Voluntary Organisations were 
national organisations (Collis, 2003:23).
It is appropriate to ask at this point does this situation evoke corporatism 
or pluralism? First is clear that corporatism is present in the kind of 
organisations engaged. Corporatism is prevalent in that umbrella groups are 
mostly engaged in EU policy and have the least membership participation, as 
well as in the muted participation of charities that are dependent on government 
funds. However, there was pluralism in all CSOs with some basic internal 
democracy and membership participation, and umbrella groups generally being 
independent from government. In general EU policy-making, the POS did 
structure CSOs' participation, and the complexity of the POS may have 
inadvertently excluded them, thus making corporatism more prominent. 
Nonetheless, Michalowitz's (2002) observation that corporatist/pluralist relations 
vary at different points of the EU process is astute, with the Assembly offering 
more open and accessible structures than the UK institutions, and the EU 
institutions being fairly open to those CSOs who did try to engage there. 
Moreover, the extent of CSO participation was limited and CSOs were not 
involved in decision-making, particularly outside of Wales, indicating pluralism.
In terms of civil society's external democratic role, in general EU policy- 
making CSOs in Wales' participation does bring some check on government 
expansion, although they have rather little influence. Some CSOs also raise the 
concerns of the represented and excluded. Additionally some CSOs deliver
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service/policy as valorised by associative democracy. It does not appear that the 
CSOs bring an intensity of public opinion to bear on EU issues for the most part, 
since EU issues are generally specialised. The way that CSOs are involved is 
largely at the margins, and they need to be proactive, evoking a state of 
representative democracy.
In the Convention, the majority of interviewed CSOs were for the most 
part passive, but did take on a number of democratic tasks, which included: 
contributing to public debate, articulating the views of the marginalised, 
mediating public opinion, keeping government in check, organising public 
debate, being a communications interface, bringing issues to the agenda and 
suggesting ideas. Internal discussion/participation by engaged CSOs did appear 
to be limited, mostly confined to a few individuals or committees, a lack of 
involvement may be a reflection of public indifference and makes it hard to 
pinpoint corporatist or pluralist relations. There was also divergence over 
whether the Convention was open or not, although the participation at the EU 
level of licensed ECSOs smacks of corporatism.
Civil society's limited overall participation whilst an improvement on 
other EU treaty reform, indicates that the Convention did not encourage mass 
participatory democracy. Moreover, as shown in Chapter Four, both policy- 
makers and CSOs reasserted the primacy of representative democracy. This 
reinforces limits on civil society's role in a democracy and decreases the space 
for civil society's role in the policy-making process to be able to dramatically 
change.
To conclude, the effect on democracy is not uniform, with shades of 
corporatism evident both in the kind of organisations involved and in how the 
POS structures access. This is problematic if the EU's democratic deficit is to be 
reconciled through participatory democracy, since participation is limited. The 
space for a more participatory democracy is also limited as representative 
democracy uppermost in the minds of CSOs and policy-makers. Nonetheless, 
there is some civil society participation in Wales, indicating some connection 
with the EU its regions and that these CSOs in their participation are able to play 
some democratic functions. It must also be borne in mind that Chapter Two 
described the role of civil society in participatory democracy as only one 
conception and prescription to the EU's democratic deficit. Thus, the solution
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may be found in other more traditional quarters such as improving accountability 
and representation.
SITUATING THE FINDINGS
This thesis provides an insight into civil society's in Wales' role in European 
Union policy-making and the Convention. As such it fills a knowledge gap 
regarding sub-national civil society's actual experience of the Convention and a 
horizontal inquiry into European Union policy-making. With other empirical 
investigations into the Convention largely focusing on the role of the European 
civil society and largely ignoring the national (for exception Will et al., 2005) 
and the sub-national level. This level is important because of the proximity to 
citizens and their lives. It largely confirms assessments that national civil society 
activity was weak (Lombardo, 2003; Shaw, Hoffinan and Bausili, 2003) and 
other empirical investigations of policy-making that smaller groups contract out 
EU policy-making to higher branches (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2002; Warleigh, 
2001).
This research project's use of the POS can be linked to part of a trend, 
which recognises the role of the state in shaping civil society. The adaptation of 
the POS to CSOs and across different levels of governance builds upon work 
which has used the POS at the EU level (Marks and McAdam, 1996; Nentwich, 
1996) and CSOs at the national level (Malonely, Smith and Stoker, 2000). hi this 
thesis it provided a useful organising concept across different levels of 
governance and method for identifying the role of different structural and non- 
structural factors. Further with its emphasis on the context shaping non­ 
governmental activity it is very compatible with case study research designs 
where the context is integral to understanding the case. Combining the discursive 
aspect of the POS (as advocated by Koopmans, 2004) also gave the framework 
more utility and ties it to other trends in EU studies such as the deliberative 
institutionalism turn (for example, Smismans, 2003; Schmidt and Radelli, 2004). 
It also takes forward deliberative institutional applications by exploring not only 
the understanding of "civil society" held by institutions but by actors themselves 
- CSOs and policy-makers. The importance of organisations themselves in 
recognising the POS which has been previously identified (for example, Marks
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and McAdam, 1996) was also similarly found within this study, particularly their 
mobilisation structures.
Finally, by exploring the democratic role of civil society organisations in 
EU policy-making this thesis provides an empirical investigation to what is 
sometimes an overtly theoretical examination (for exception - Michalowitz, 
2004; Warleigh, 2001). Moreover, it confirms sentiments offered that both the 
CSOs current capacity and environment to provide a participatory democracy 
and aid the EU's democratic deficit this way is limited (Michalowitz, 2004; 
Warleigh, 2001).
WIDER REFLECTIONS ON THE CONVENTION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Given that the Member States did not accept the DCT how useful was the 
mobilisation of civil society at the Convention? The answer to the question 
depends on how one understands the purpose of civil society participation at the 
Convention. Nonetheless, it was the first time that civil society was accorded a 
formal role in treaty reform and the number of submissions to the forum etc. 
demonstrate to EU institutional actors that there is a real appetite amongst some 
segments of civil society to get involved in such activities. Moreover, the fact 
that some CSOs were able to influence the proceedings demonstrates that they 
had a voice. Conversely the lack of feedback from the Forum and the lack of 
results may have served to make some CSOs feel their contributions were 
pointless. Civil society's views following their mobilisation in the light of the 
DCT failure as such require further investigation.
What can be learnt by/for CSOs and EU democracy as a result of the 
Convention? There are a number of lessons for CSOs as a result of the 
Convention namely that CSOs require information and resources to a) follow the 
debate and b) influence proceedings. Moreover, CSOs should participate in both 
formal and informal activities (such as utilising contacts). In particular, CSOs in 
Wales with parents bodies and those which have membership of European 
umbrella groups should utilise these contacts as these are more likely to have the 
expertise and resources to follow and contribute to the EU debate effectively. 
Moreover, CSOs in Wales should utilise these contacts as Chapter Six found that 
CSOs engaged this way largely on the request of their parent groups. This is 
particularly pivotal as the UK and Welsh institutions took forward their
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institutional concerns, rather than "civil society" concerns, thus European 
partners may provide the solution.
In terms of EU democracy, the lack of receptiveness to the DCT may 
reflect the wide scale lack of civil society participation in Member States and 
civil society's ability to act as communication interface. Thus, arguably it could 
demonstrate the need for the EU to engage civil society even more. However, it 
may demonstrate the problems of a top-down debate (the Convention and 
discussion about a constitutional course for the EU did not emulate from civil 
society) and that the EU needs to listen to all of civil society not just Brussels 
based civil society. Simply put - perhaps the general public did not want a 
constitutional debate. The Convention result also points to the role of the 
Member State in harnessing civil society's views. Paradoxically however, 
Member States interests are different to civil society, thus Member States have to 
be either committed to garnering civil society's views or the EU institutions have 
to go beyond the Brussels elite.
REFLECTION UPON THE RESEARCH PROCESS
In retrospect there would be aspects of this thesis, which this author would 
change. In particular, there are aspects of the empirical work that the author 
would alter. A fortnight's internship either with the European Commission, 
ECOSOC, CoR or the WAG's European Office, or in Wales/UK with the FCO 
or WAG's BEAD may have been advantageous. This would have given a 
further realistic insight into the kind of groups from Wales, (if any), that 
institutions deal with on EU issues, and would have provided additional contacts 
for interview. Similarly, time spent working in a Civil Society Organisation in 
Wales may have enhanced this author's understanding of their working and 
participation in the EU policy process. However, access to these settings via 
internships etc. is far from assured and spending time in one institution/CSO 
would have skewed this thesis' focus towards that one institution/CSO and its 
civil society relations at the expense of the other institutions/CSOs. Nonetheless, 
research focusing on the relations of one institution with other CSOs may help 
better define whether corporatist/pluralist relations are in ascendance at 
individual points of the EU policy process, and is one potential area for further 
research.
275
A Welsh interpreter should have been taken to the interview with a native 
Welsh speaker. Although the individual was fluent in English, this author felt 
that it was difficult for them to fully express themselves in English. Other areas 
for change largely lend themselves to areas for future research. There is a need 
for good quantitative data on the institutions (EU, British, Welsh and local) with 
which CSOs in Wales are involved on a policy level to accompany qualitative 
research. The Scottish Civic Forum (2002) has conducted such research in 
Scotland. However, such quantitative work would not have been possible in this 
PhD research project, given that some groups needed explanation of what 
constituted participation in EU policy-making, that was only possible on contact. 
Furthermore, given the difficulties of accessing groups via interview, the success 
of a questionnaire when some CSOs have "consultation fatigue" (Jones 
Commission, 2004) is arguable. Nonetheless, a few questions on this topic are 
something that organisations with a Wales-wide hold, like the WCVA, could 
readily encompass into their questionnaires on the status of the voluntary sector.
This author would also have liked to conduct cross-national research 
between two or more different devolved administrations (one weaker, one 
stronger) to explore the effect of the devolved administration on civil society's 
EU participation more fully. The attempt to conduct some comparison with 
Scotland should have been outlined and planned at the start of the investigation. 
Again, this provides an area for future research. The paucity of research in 
Wales on the general EU policy process and civil society post-devolution, as 
well as the process's complexity, merited this thesis' focus solely on Wales. 
Nonetheless these caveats, the thesis' research design, which was the result of 
informed theoretical and empirical investigations, is strong (see Chapter One).
Further lessons this author learned include interviewing skills and the 
importance of timing when conducting empirical research. Chapter One details 
how the author's interviewing technique became more flexible with experience. 
Regarding the latter lesson, interviewing following the Convention's conclusion 
and up to one year later meant that interviewees were available and that the event 
was sufficiently recent enough to be remembered (in most instances) and was far 
enough in the past for interviewees to reflect upon their experiences.
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AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis has encountered many avenues for future social research, such as the 
effect of different devolved administrations on regional civil society's 
involvement in EU policy-making. This presents a particularly interesting area, 
given the need for the EU to reach out and work from the bottom-up following 
the negative constitutional referendum results in France and the Netherlands', in 
2005. Similarly, it would be interesting to compare Wales with a Scandinavian 
region (traditionally perceived to be corporatist) with some autonomy, such as 
Skane, to compare the scope and shape of corporatism between their regional 
governments and civil society. Moreover, through interviews it was evident that 
CSOs had broader connections with Europe and the European Union outside of 
EU policy-making, such as using EU Directives and meeting European 
representatives. It would be interesting to explore how such activities affect 
CSOs decisions to participate or not in EU policy-making and their perspective 
towards the EU.
Good quantitative data on civil society in Wales' level of political 
involvement and its democratic credentials would be valuable thus meriting 
overcoming the earlier mentioned problems as regards access. Further 
quantitative work may also build upon the explanations of CSOs' participation; 
and by accessing a larger sample the relative significance of factors could more 
concretely be tested and derived. Similarly, the democratic framework applied to 
individual CSOs derived in the study would benefit from further application to 
test and refine it. A network analysis of AMs and their relations with the key 
partnership council organisations may also help further identify the extent to 
which corporatist relations exist within the devolved administration generally 
and either prove or disprove the idea that everybody knows each other in the 
Welsh policy/political community.
Changes at the Welsh, British and the EU levels will ensure that this 
subject remains of interest for researchers. The gradual further deepening of 
devolution in Wales will impact on civil society, following proposals currently in 
the House of Commons to reform the Government of Wales Act. Moreover, 
research will be needed to assess whether devolution within organisations in 
Wales with ties to the UK, Europe and further afield is increasing and whether a 
Welsh agenda for these CSOs is emerging. Similarly, changes at the EU level
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regarding regional policy, the search for an identity following the temporary 
death of the Constitutional treaty, the European Commission's plan D and the 
introduction of a possible code for non-profit organisations will create changes in 
EU-Wales-civil society relations. Shifts in the UK's political alignments may 
alter the UK government's relations with the EU and Wales, impacting upon 
civil society in Wales. Finally, changes in the use and salience of the term civil 





1 Results of the 1997 referendum on devolution were 50.3% voted for 
devolution, 49.7% voted against, with a turnout of 50.1%. 
(www.bbc.co.uk/politics97/devolution/wales') [Accessed 8th of August 
2005]
2 Wales is traditionally a Labour stronghold. During the last period of UK 
Conservative government, the numbers of Conservative MPs in Wales 
dwindled, leaving six MPs after the 1992 election. This left the 
Conservative government with little legitimacy and many of the measures 
they carried out in Wales were met with hostility, as well as limiting the 
influence that the majority Labour Welsh MPs could have in the running 
of Wales and the UK.
3 Hereafter referred to as the Convention.
4 It was unable to resolve key issues such as the weighting of members' 
votes in the Council of Ministers.
5 "F" being Federalism.
Chapter One:
6 This refers mainly to the large Devolution and Constitutional Change 
programme initiated by the ESRC www.devolution.ac.uk.
7 This is not exhaustive of case types.
8 This is a revelatory case in that it explores something new.
9 WEC is set to close following an announcement by the First Minister in 
December 2004.
10 The researcher effect is whereby the researcher adversely impacts upon 
data collection for discussion see Denscombe, 1998.
11 Dunleavy and Husbands (1985: 11 cited in Denver, 1994:118) found that 
63% of their sample in 1983 viewed television as their most important 
source of political information (in comparison to 29% on newspapers, 4% 
on radio and 3% on personal contacts). A Flash Eurobarometer (2003:6- 
7) survey also found that 78% of British people interviewed use TV when
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looking for information about the EU as well as 72% also using daily 
newspapers.
Chapter Two:
Galston (2000) points out this argument.
i.e. mediating between civil society and the economy. This line of
reasoning follows in the footsteps of Cohen and Arato (1994:ix).
i.e. justification and support from the people.
15 Although in practice all these deficits can co-exist.
16 For a broader definition see Wiarda (2003:28).
17 Warren (2001) views radical democracy as self-governance.
Chapter Three:
1 8 Movement Advocacy Coalitions. Includes sympathisers and activists 
outside a given social movement as well as the social movement itself 
and can be individuals or organisations. Ruzza (2004:14-5) gives the 
example of Labour Party MEPs supporting Green issues.
Chapter Four:
19 These subjective ratings were allocated to each group on each indicator. 
Each indicator had a baseline of poor being equated with CSOs not being 
in possession of any of that particular variable. Groups were also 
compared in relation to each other. As such, another research project 
may throw up more or less variation. Each CSO indicator rating was then 
equated to a number (Extremely 5, Very 4, Fairly 3, Slightly 2, Poor 1, 
split ratings were labelled .3 or .7 depending which rating was more 
prominent), added up, then divided by the number of indicators. In the 
rare case where that CSOs' indicator was not known, an average rating of 
"Fairly" was given. Whilst discussed, the functions of CSOs are not 
included in the indicator numerical assessment because it is hard to 
stipulate that one function is more necessary for democracy than another.
20 The statutory body has made similar recent moves to involve their 
stakeholders.
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The need for face to face communication may lessen, as electronic and 
other simultaneous forms of communication become available.
22 Internalisation in this context means the extent to which interviewees 
internalised their answers by reference to their organisation and/or 
institutional view, rather than offering a view as a private citizen.
Chapter Five:
23 The boundaries of where "policy-making" ends and another stage in the 
policy cycle begins is not clear cut. The different stages of the policy 
process; formulation, decision-making and implementation - are all part 
of a policy cycle (Wurzel, 2002: 50-51). For the sake of clarity the thesis 
concentrates upon policy-making at the agenda, formulation and 
decision-making stages (this is what Greenwood, 2003a:32 terms as 
policy-making). Where policy is being negotiated, decided upon and 
made through secondary legislation to implement policy (which some 
authors would class as formal implementation stage separate from policy- 
making - for example Bulmer et al., 2002:116), this is classed as part of 
the policy-making process. Thereafter groups' involvement in 
administration and physically carrying out EU policies is not included in 
policy-making and whether they are engaged or not engaged in EU 
policy-making. Nonetheless, this stage may be reflected upon when 
appropriate.
24 The thesis will use the term Assembly to refer to both the NAW and the 
Welsh Assembly Government.
25 This committee formerly comprised two committees during 1999-2003: 
agriculture and rural development committee and the environment, 
planning and transport committee.
26 Twenty-one Assembly Ministers have attended these meetings from 
March 2000 to October 2003, see EEAC 2003.
27 The passed bills (subsequently Acts) are the Health (Wales) Act 2003, 
Children's Commissioner for Wales Act 2001, Public Audit (Wales) Act 
2004, Public Services Ombudsman Wales Act 2005. The bills currently 
(as at 4th of January 2006) being considered by Parliament include the 
Commissioner for older people Wales bill, Transport (Wales) bill,
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Government of Wales bill, Smoking in Public Places (Wales) bill. These 
were identified on:
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills.htoffw [Accessed 4th of 
January 2006]
•\Q
Westminster's scrutiny capacity has been "beefed up" following the 
Foreign Minister's announcement in January 2004 to the House of 
Commons that a yearly White Paper of the UK government's objectives 
in Europe would be made available and delivered to the House of 
Commons. This move surely must be seen in the light of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty's Protocol on National Parliaments, where National 
Parliaments gain a role in the legislative process.
These sectoral networks correspond to the twenty-one voluntary 
organisations representatives on the VSPC.
30 After a long break the WEF was reconvened in September 2004 to 
discuss the future of EU structural funds post 2006.
31 hi reality there is also a third option to get involved with a Welsh network 
to take its views to the British sphere however this will be subsumed 
under option b).
32 The directness of "policy-making" activities with these political avenues 
varied among the CSOs.
33 CSOs who were engaged with the Assembly on non-EU policy-making 
also recognised this point.
34 Where organisations only discussed their involvement with European 
representatives in Wales along these lines, they were left out of the 
diagram, but they include the disability, international and language 
groups.
35 Parent group refers to the level at which group organisation is most 
important and to which child groups belong to. For example, Greenpeace 
is an International organisation, but its Member State organisations are 
autonomous, therefore the main parent group would be Greenpeace UK. 
Greenpeace also has regional branches, and for these Greenpeace UK 
would be their parent group.
36 Using lobbying agencies or companies is technically not "civil society". 
Yet as these provide intermediate structures between the state, economic
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and civil society realm, discussion of these is included under the loose 
heading "civil society avenues".
This review was conducted in January 2005. The Wales Legislation 
Online portal can be accessed at: http://www.wales-legislation.org.uk/
-JO
Pulls to greater devolution and unionism are related to party politics as 
Plaid Cymru advocates Welsh independence and autonomy and 
Conservatives are traditionally Unionists.
Chapter Six:
39 European civil society as understood by the European Commission is a 
Civil Society Organisation that has a presence in three or more Member 
States.
40 At the start of the Convention the Assembly pulled out from WEC, 
leading to debate about its future.
41 In other words France had the largest number of Conventioneers from the 
EU institutions and appointed to the Convention's Presidency.
42 Services of general interest are public services such as health etc., which 
are often provided by the state and civil society groups. Some CSOs 
were keen to get a special status for services of general interest, to 
exempt the services and public subsidies of the services from competition 
laws and to allow for differences among and in the Member States.
43 More effort was expended on gathering information about Convention- 
related events in Wales, because it is assumed that civil society groups in 
Wales are more likely to come into contact with the Convention this way 
than through events in London or Scotland.
44 Wales had no Convention representative representing the interest of 
Wales. In other words, Wales had no nationalist politicians at the 
Convention, nor did it have a representative from the Committee of the 
Regions. Peter Main, whilst being a Welsh MP, was ultimately 
responsible for promoting the interests of the UK government.
45 Although conceivably such speeches could trigger debate in civil society.
46 It must be conceded that UK civil society could also have fed their 
concerns also through their European and International networks.
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The Northern Irish Executive could not fulfil this intention as the 
Stormont Assembly was suspended in October 2002, following a break­ 
down in relations over accusations of IRA spying. 
See Chapter One for methods.
49 Influence can be defined and measured in various ways, for this section it 
is defined as the ability to create desired change via action/activity.
50 External involvement refers to those CSOs involved with political
institutions and outside of their parent groups and/or European networks.
51 Internal involvement refers to involvement inside the organisations with 
its members and staff.
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ANNEX 1
ELABORATION OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES ON 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
DISCOURSES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
This section will concentrate upon the discourses of the supra-national 
institutions: the EP, ECOSOC and the European Commission. The ECOSOC 
and the European Commission are the most active EU institutions in bringing 
civil society into the EU (Smismans, 2003) and the EP is one of the traditional 
sources of the EU's democratic legitimacy. Further, the ECOSOC is the self- 
styled "home of civil society" and the European Commission has given the 
concept of "civil society" ideational currency within the EU, being both an 
ideational entrepreneur and the defender of the community interest (hence in 
Chapter Four the institutional discourse on civil society only comprises the views 
of the ECOSOC and European Commission). The discussion on the role of civil 
society in a democracy overlaps with the normative discourse on civil society.
European Union's discourse on civil society
The EU literature identifies and exemplifies the difficulties involved in defining 
civil society. Civil society, CSOs and NGOs seem to be used interchangeably 
and on the surface, civil society seems to be open and inclusive of anything that 
is non-state (the European Commission similarly advocates):
Civil society is a collective term for all types of collective actions, by 
individuals and groups that do not emanate from the state and are not run 
by it. (ECOSOC, 1999:5).
The ECOSOC (1999:8) goes on to define the players of civil society in terms of 
their functions with labour-market players, organisations that are representative 
of economic and social players, NGOs, Community Based Organisations and 
religious communities. Thus it defines civil society in terms of groups (bar 
Patten, 2000:3 on networks) and their functions (Curtin, 2003:59). The economy
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is implicitly left in civil society, suggesting that this is founded upon a libertarian 
understanding of civil society.
Curtin (2003:59) decries this understanding of civil society as ignoring 
the substantive criteria for what should be included. There is some substantive 
criteria in the notion that civil society should further "well-being" (ECOSOC 
2000:5) and the "general interest" (ECOSOC 1999: 7), both of which are largely 
liberal notions of the good. However, the ECOSOC (2000:4) supplements this 
by emphasising that organisations should be representative, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. A radical conception of "civil society" is not evident; Curtin 
(2003:70) argues that the EU puts anti-globalisation protestors in the same 
bracket as terrorists, and groups who want to take over government are excluded 
from the EU (ECOSOC, 1999:7). Instead, the liberal voice is in ascendance, 
stressing tolerance of civil society, the rule of law and equality, thereby depicting 
a liberal egalitarian understanding of civil society and emulating Tocqueville, 
Durkheim and Weber:
In a pluralist society, all individuals recognise each other as having equal 
rights and engage with each other in a public debate. All this takes place 
on the basis of tolerance and free will. (ECOSOC, 1999:5)
In practice there are institutional guidelines for dealing with civil society, as the 
European Commission has set up consultation guidelines (European 
Commission, 2002a), a database of European civil society and a database of the 
European Commission's consultative bodies. European civil society, which is 
defined as groups having a presence in at least three Member States, is notably 
elevated (European Commission, 200la: 15). Good governance principles such 
as institutional accountability are also expected of civil society groups. Groups 
need to have "specialist knowledge" (ECOSOC, 2000:4) and to make 
"constructive proposals" (ECOSOC, 2000:4) and their past consultation record is 
also taken into consideration (European Commission, 2002b). This means civil 
society needs to have bargaining chips (Karlsson, 2001:85-6) of both time and 
expertise, be fairly computer literate and have a large-scale European presence. 
Nentwich (1996) backs this conclusion in his findings that the opportunity 
structures for interest groups is limited to those of a large size and finance base.
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The European Commission also sponsors a number of NGOs (Warleigh, 
2001:622) and can direct then1 mandate:
Certain NGOs and networks, especially those at the European level have 
been established or selected in order to provide information, experience 
and experimentation. (Prodi and Kinnock, 2000: 6)
In terms of sectors, trade unions and employers' organisations are particularly 
applauded for their representativeness (European Commission, 2002c). This is 
backed up by the home of civil society being found in the ECOSOC where 
economic and social interests were initially represented. The EP believes civil 
society should be supported in articulating their views and "encouragement 
should be given, for example, to the establishment of networks of services in the 
public interest, local projects or co-operation at local level" (EP, 1999:5-5), 
reifying the local and general good of civil society.
The criteria added to civil society make the EUs understanding of it much 
more like an "institutional straitjacket" (Curtin, 2003:57). This institutional 
straitjacket predominately has liberal egalitarian undertones of civil society, 
being seen as tolerant, and indeed a realm of equality pursuing a general interest. 
Libertarianism is present in the stress on freedom; however, when placing 
emphasis on social partners rather than purely economic interests, libertarianism 
recedes. Latent communitarianism is embedded in the recognition of cultural 
specificity but the idea that civil society is to be free and voluntary implies a 
measure of detachment not usually found in strong communitarian accounts. 
New left ideas are also evident in tolerance, but the lack of emphasis on 
deliberation and also the idea of general interest rather than emancipation means 
this account is not as strong. Radical approaches are discarded on the grounds 
that there is little role for antagonism or deviant views here.
Civil society is given a range of tasks: to deliver services, mobilise 
people, support excluded sections of the population, alert institutions to the 
direction of debate, broaden the European debate out to the citizens, facilitate 
enlargement and European integration, stimulate collective learning, represent 
groups on specific issues, aid the acceptance of policy, further policy-making and 
good governance and provide technical knowledge (European Commission, 
200la, 2002b, 2002c; ECOSOC, 1999; Prodi and Kinnock, 2000). There seems
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to be a wide range of purposes accorded to civil society that encompass all the 
civil society perspectives. Even the radical aspect of civil society is adhered to in 
the existing civil dialogue where radical groups can choose to meet outside the 
institution to air their views (Goehring, 2002:136). The EU is more restrictive in 
policy-making:
Both mainstream and divergent views should be considered. However, it 
is important to distinguish proponents of theories that have been 
comprehensively discredited from those whose ideas appear to be 
supported by plausible evidence. (European Commission, 2002d:12)
Civil society is ultimately a body for the EU to consult, but not all of civil 
society is consulted and there is no guarantee that its ideas will be taken on 
board. Even if "the role allotted to civil society is to mediate between the 
national and the supranational" (Rumford, 2003:32), only part of society can be 
reconciled, given the EU's selective definition of civil society.
European Union's discourse on democracy
Concerns about popular legitimacy and democracy as the means to secure this 
have only come latterly and reached the ears of the European structures in the 
last decade or so. Thus, democracy was not always at the core of the European 
project. It is embraced in Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union, but 
without any real definition:
The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member States. (Treaty of European Union, 
2002:11)
Moreover the Member States only desire to enhance democracy and efficiency in 
the working of the EU, as opposed to stronger language used in economic 
integration that of confirm or determine (Preamble in Treaty of European Union, 
2002). As such this represents no steadfast commitment to a process of 
democratisation of the EU's institutions. Such footloose commitment is further 
evident in that some of the most innovative documents on this matter, such as the 
WPG, do not have legal status per se; they can only work within the confines of
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the existing legal agreements of the EU. Thus, the language of democracy has 
reached a primarily economic entity but seemingly without any real meaning.
Such ambiguity is evident upon among the European supra-national 
institutions. The ECOSOC (2000) reiterates support for participatory 
democracy, described "as a model for co-operation and allows room to formulate 
new types of participation, while retaining many elements of representative 
democracy" (ECOSOC, 2001:119). However, participatory democracy is to 
function alongside the current institutions and community methods. Greater 
participation is envisaged for civil society hi opinion-forming and decision- 
making, with the ECOSOC as the representative body of civil society. Much of 
the ECOSOC's fervour for "participatory democracy", with representative 
democracy appears as a means to legitimise the ECOSOC's own role.
For the EP representative, democracy holds the day. hi this respect 
parliamentary deliberation creates democratic legitimacy, and this has a 
procedural element in that democratic aspects like scrutiny have to be conducted 
in a certain manner (EP, 2001a:9). The emphasis on consensus, rather than the 
recognition of difference, again implies some kind of EU unity to allow a 
representative system to function as opposed to a radical one (EP, 200la: 10). 
The EP also calls for decentralisation and institutional reform such as the need to 
reform the European Commission's dual bureaucratic and executive functions 
(EP, 2001b).
The European Commission on other hand seems concerned with 
democracy as a means for buoying up legitimacy, reinvigorated by the recent 
discovery that people "nowadays take an interest in the effectiveness of the rules 
handed down 'from Brussels' and the way they are drawn up" (European 
Commission, 2002d:2). In this respect the democratic deficit is a lack of 
information combined with implied ignorance of the populace, a problem of 
public relations.
However, the European Commission (2002c), along with the EP (1999), 
has realised that the European citizen needs to benefit from European integration 
and therefore outlines the EU project and model of society, rejuvenating the 
liberal social contract, at the heart of more procedural, representative democracy. 
The European Commission in the WPG (200la) also argues for the inclusion of 
civil society, regional and local associations, and more participation by
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individuals. Participation is framed as consultation, helping community policies 
through expertise. Again inclusion in the Report on European Governance 
(2002d) is couched in terms of institutional strategic interests, rather than the 
common good as such, reifying representative, procedural and even elite 
methods of governance. There is also a concern to preserve the status quo in the 
Report on European Governance (European Commission 2002b) with no real 
institutional innovation envisaged. Demarcation, openness and accountability 
are cited as aspects to be unproved.
The WPG (European Commission, 2001a:7) however sees Europe as 
having been integrated through democratic means; i.e. democracy is therefore 
conceived hi representative, procedural terms based on the EU's existing 
institutional design. Similarly the WPG raises five principles of good 
governance: openness, participation, effectiveness, accountability and coherence. 
Yet as Follesdal (2003: 75) questions, why those five? Arguably, "each principle 
is important for establishing more democratic governance"(European 
Commission, 2001 a: 10), but the European Commission back-tracks later on this 
statement, seeing the above as mere principles of good governance:
There is broad recognition that the principles of good governance should 
not be equated to democratic government, ... In this respect, it is 
accepted that governance mechanisms seeking to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the decision-making system and ensure 
better involvement of more players will make the institutions more open, 
leading to increased responsiveness and accountability of institutions. 
(European Commission, 2002b: 28)
In essence it appears that the EU's institutional perspectives on what 
constitutes democracy are not uniform. There does seem to be a link with the 
kind of organisation and each institution and the type of democracy each 
institution embraces, in that the democracy they advocate tends to promote their 
role in Europe (this is the view that Smismans, 2003 takes of institutions and 
civil society). However, it is notable that democracy is largely conceptualised as 
procedural rather than normative and that participatory democracy is meant to 
occur within the confines of representative democracy.
In this respect democracy is a tool, a means to secure legitimacy, preserve 
status and further institutional ends. Equally "democracy" is not an open-ended
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concept in these perspectives. It is delimited, moulded with various emphases on 
particularly liberal conceptions of democracy. Radical and deliberative, 
properties of democracy, along with the reasons for supporting democracy are 
left out of the picture. As for more participatory democracy, from analysis of EU 
institutional documents, is evident that the EU does not rely on this alone, with 
parliamentary representation still at the heart of its democratic thinking.
The role envisaged for civil society is complementary to representative 
democracy, as civil society is to be given a "voice not a vote" (European 
Commission, 2002c:5) so as not to undermine the role of elected representatives, 
because as the EP notes CSOs "cannot be voted out by the people" (EP, 200la: 
10). Civil society is deemed to help democracy because organisations further 
representation, help the provision of services, bring in the citizen, trigger public 
debate, act as an early warning system, develop an European identity, and help 
the reception, creation, effectiveness and expertise of policy. From this it is 
evident heed has been paid to the deliberative and associative strands of 
democracy.
Thus, at the outset the rationale for including civil society is dominated 
by the wish to increase the EU's democratic legitimacy. This is not to state that 
civil society has never had a role in the EU, but that its current manifestation as 
"civil society" and its purpose is rather novel. Civil society is envisaged to 
bolster democracy in a number of ways which fall across a range of democratic 
perspectives. Moreover, some of the functions attributed to civil society are 
arguably unsuitable to its nature (for more on the representation debate of civil 
society in the EU see Curtin, 2003).
United Kingdom government's discourse on civil society
The UK executive's view on civil society is difficult to discern, being bound up 
in third way rhetoric. Civil society in this perspective is central in creating active 
citizens, bolstering communities voluntarily and entrenching citizens' 
responsibilities as well as rights (Hall, Williamson and Coffey, 2000). This has 
strong communitarian roots, as it is in the community and civil society that the 
good citizen is created (Goes, 2004:110).
In terms of what kind of civil society, the British executive conceives this 
is hard to locate functionally, particularly as the term seems to be used to cover
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community and is used less in concrete policies and plans. In this broad view, 
family and community associations appear to be key. Yet the closest the UK has 
come to articulating its concrete views on the role of "civil society" is in its 
compact with the voluntary and community sector in England (Straw and Stowe, 
1998:5). Here this grouping is called the third sector, resting between the state 
and the market, and thus must be viewed as a central tenet of the UK's civil 
society. Driver and Martell (2002:91) give further recognition to the voluntary 
sector's importance in Blair's view on civil society and at the same time 
highlights this is not a radical conception of civil society:
When Blair discusses the need for 'a strong civil society' and 'civic 
activism', it is not social movement politics he has in mind. His concern 
is with individuals fulfilling their responsibilities of the voluntary sector 
and the family rather than radical informal social movements. (Driver and 
Martell, 2002:91)
Normatively, in The Compact (1998:9,12) special recognition is given to 
furthering equal opportunities in the sector by giving a voice to marginalised 
views (black and minority ethnic groups together with community groups), 
which has some traces of liberal egalitarianism. Civil society is meant to be a 
partner of government and the private sector. However, again communitarian 
elements are prevalent as civil society sustains community:
... [voluntary and community groups] enable individuals to contribute to 
the development of their communities. By so doing, they promote 
citizenship, help to re-establish a sense of community and make a crucial 
contribution to our shared aim of a just and inclusive society. (Blair, 
1998:3)
These views are placed in comparison with the UK's practical 
involvement of groups in policy-making, the roles accorded to civil society and 
with respect to the EU. Although The Compact does include the third sector in 
policy-making, it is evident that policy-making is only part of the third sector's 
role with service delivery particularly key. Indeed, the communitarian view of 
civil society portrayed by the UK executive seems to be a local one and that 
consultation of civil society should instead be carried out at the local level, 
explained by the presence of local compacts.
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Nonetheless, The Compact does outline codes of conduct for consultation 
with central government departments. It is recognised that gathering community 
and voluntary groups' views is key to obtaining opinions, knowledge strength of 
feeling and, increasing community ownership and responsibility in policy (The 
Compact, 2000a:13, 2000b:2). More practically, knowledge and an 
organisation's accountability and representativeness are also important tenets:
They should be willing to offer their advice to Government based on 
objective experience and appropriate consultation with those they work 
with. This helps to establish and maintain the credibility of voluntary and 
community organisations as valuable sources of informed opinion. (The 
Compact, 2000b:3)
Moreover, although the code suggests consultations should be open it advises 
that they "should include those with which a department has regular contact or 
which are likely to have views on the issue in question" (The Compact, 
2000b:9).
In regards to the EU, as this code of conduct and compact applies to all 
central government departments it would be fair to expect this would also cover 
EU issues. In the UK government's (2002) response to the WPG, where in the 
WPG civil society was given a pivotal governing component, civil society as, 
Reilly (2004:143) notes, receives short shrift. The only reference to civil society 
in the UK government's response concerns economic governance and businesses 
and consumer organisations - suggesting that these are pivotal to the UK 
government's conception of civil society. Such sentiments are partly echoed by 
how civil society fares in policy-making with central government. For although 
the compact harbours ambitions to bring in community groups, Beetham et al., 
(2002b: 237) sees consultation is often directed at large interest groups, and big 
business has more access. Grant (2000) also views building reputation and 
constructive input as key.
United Kingdom government's discourse on democracy
In terms of democracy, the Blair government has made efforts to foster 
democratic renewal through participatory democracy, of which active citizens in 
communities and civil society are a key part (Ravenscroft, Curry and Markwell, 
2002:717). However, these measures seem largely oriented towards the local
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level and studies have questioned to what extent power has actually been shared 
(Lovan, Murray and Schaffer, 2004:16). The measures to involve civil society in 
service delivery evoke notions of associational democracy. However, there have 
been some efforts to further deliberative democracy through citizen panels etc. 
At the same time it is evident that Blair believes elected mandates and 
representative democracy are the cornerstones of democracy, as devolution 
increases democracy with "power to be exercised closer to the people" (Blair, 
200la: 4), not by the people themselves. This is in contradiction to the 
government's continued centralisation (Driver and Martell, 2002). The UK 
government's view of democracy within the EU further serves to reinforce 
representative democracy. Blair (200la) perceives European democracy to be 
contained within both national and parliamentary democracy. And in particular 
"democratic accountability is fundamentally and ultimately rooted in the 
Member State" (Blair, 2001b: 2).
The National Assembly for Wales' discourse on civil society
It must be remembered that civil society was meant to be one of the key 
beneficiaries of devolution, and the Assembly's ability to reach out to sectors of 
the population would partly determine its democratic legitimacy, following a 
narrow vote in favour of the institution. Again, civil society here is related to the 
third way vision of partnership between the public, private and voluntary sectors 
(for example Labour Party, 1999).
How does the Assembly view civil society? The Assembly on the one 
hand defines civil society as compromising "public, private and voluntary 
sectors, which complement each other and seek to tackle social issues in a spirit 
of partnership between them" (NAW, 2000:8), in a scheme with the voluntary 
sector. On the other hand, it is only in its dealings with the voluntary sector that 
civil society is referred to. The other founding documents of the local 
government and business partnerships do not define or speak of civil society. 
This is further evident as in the First Minister's response on behalf of the NAW 
on the WPG he speaks of "civil society, including the voluntary sector" (WAG, 
2002a:l) and civil society representation "through the voluntary and NGO 
sectors" (WAG, 2002a:2). Thus it appears the voluntary and community sector 
is at the heart of this conception of civil society. Nonetheless, a broader
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definition is present in the same response; civil society again encompasses local 
government, business and voluntary sector:
The Welsh Assembly sees local government, the business sector, the 
voluntary sector and civil society more widely as its partners in the 
European Union. (WAG, 2002a: 1)
Normatively in this view of civil society, volunteerism is given special 
recognition for its contribution to democracy, as it is without financial gam. 
Other values raised are to "offer equality of opportunity" (NAW, 2000:8), be 
participative, inclusive, build up communities and to empower communities. 
Therefore, there is the similar third way emphasis on civil society being 
communitarian and creating partnership as the UK government, similarly the 
equality of opportunity (which is also a statutory requirement of the Assembly to 
promote) hints at liberal egalitarianism and new left ideas.
Civil society, or more appropriately the partners through the partnership 
councils, is expected to input into policy-making, as well as deliver services. In 
relation to the voluntary sector, umbrella bodies and intermediaries are meant to 
aid consultation. As Chapter Five discusses, in practice sections of civil society 
are not fully taken into the policy process. Betts, Borland and Chaney's study 
(2001) into the experience of disabled and women groups and the NAW 
identified personal contacts, networks of smaller groups and large groups as key 
in gaining influence.
The National Assembly for Wales' discourse on democracy
Democracy was another key component behind devolution, with civil society 
participation in the new devolved institutions a pivotal part. Thus, participatory 
democracy would appear to be in evidence, particularly with the stress on 
inclusivity, transparency and consensus. Yet representative democracy remains 
at the heart of the Assembly with AMs pulling most of the strings, hi practice, 
moves are evident towards a more Westminster mode of government, with a 
stronger and separated cabinet establishing the supremacy of representative 
democracy. Government partnership with civil society in the delivery of 
policies such as EU structural funds lends itself towards associative democracy. 
In respect to the EU, the First Minister argues the EU should solve its democratic
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deficit of citizen disconnection through involvement with regional and local 
governments, again reinforcing representative democracy:
The European Union and its 15 Member State Governments must involve 
regional governments in shaping the Europe of the future if it is sincere 
about engaging people at local level. This was the message from Wales' 
First Minister. (NAW, 2002d
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ANNEX 2
THE AREAS OF EUROPEAN UNION POLICY
INVOLVEMENT AND DEVOLVED AREAS TO THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES
DEVOLVED AREAS TO NAW
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food











DOES THE EU HAVE POLICY 
INVOLVEMENT IN THIS
AREA ? (Derived from Nugent 
2002: 327-328)
Extensive EU policy involvement in 
agriculture and fisheries.
Very limited involvement.
None. However economic cohesion 
is a shared competency and the EU 
has considerable involvement on 
market regulation. The EU also has 
shared responsibility with the 
Member State for regional 
competition.
Limited policy involvement. 
Shared policy.
Limited policy involvement, 
(see transport). 
Virtually none.
Shared policy responsibility of the 
EU and Member States.
None (although local governments 
are involved in the EU institutions 
themselves).
None. Although the EU has limited 




Town and country planning
Transport
Water and flood defence 
Welsh language
None.
None, although the environment is a 
shared policy between the EU and 
Member States.
Shared policy responsibility 
between the EU and the Member 
States.
See environment.




CONVENTION RELATED EVENTS IN THE UK
NOTE: This list is not exhaustive of events.
1. UK GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE UK 
A. Some UK government speeches and visits
• Foreign Secretary speaks at the Hague in 2002.
• Peter Hain made visits around the UK in October 2001 to promote the 
benefits of the EU.
• "Europe's Political Future", Prime Minister's speech, given at the Polish 
Stock Exchange, Warsaw, 6th of October 2000.
• "A Strong and Successful Europe'" Prime Minister's speech at the European 
Research Institute in Birmingham, 23rd of November 2001.
• "The Challenge", Prime Minister's speech in Cardiff 28th of November 2002.
• Prime Minister made a speech in Warsaw on the 30th of May 2003.
B. UK government activities with local government
• Centre-Local Partnership Conference on the Future of Europe organised by 
UK government and LGA 28th of November 2002 at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
C. Other conferences/mechanisms
• "UK- Espana Looking to the Future. Europe: Perceptions, Reality, the 
Future" Conference held at Wilton Park UK, 18th -20th of July 2003, led by 
the British Council and the British Embassy in Madrid.
• On-line forum this gave information about the debate and the Convention. 
Enabled public participation as people could send comments directly to the 
Minister for Europe.
• Leaflets and newsletters sent to MPs, MEPs, libraries, academics and 
European Resource Centres
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2. UK CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVITIES IN THE UK 
A. The Institute for Citizenship activities
• 5 discussions across business "Introductory Discussion" at the British 
Academy, London 26th of November 2001; "Business: Social Leadership in 
Europe?" in Birmingham 29th of January 2002; "Living Together: Towards a 
Tolerant Europe", in Leeds 23rd of April 2002; "Concluding Discussion and 
Action Session" in London July 2002; (1 event was also held in Scotland - 
see later).
• Ran a nationwide round table discussion series called "Europe and its 
Citizens - the Future" which sought to raise awareness of, and the level of 
debate about, Europe amongst the British public with young people; 
Liverpool - Hope at Everton, Liverpool Hope University, Friday 28th of 
February 2003. London - Imperial College, South Kensington Friday 21 st of 
March 2003.
• Had a on line discussion on Convention of Europe as part of the above 
project.
B. Events run by British Universities
• Universities - Birmingham, Sussex. Cambridge and Oxford held seminar 
series.
• UCL held a related conference in April 2002.
C. The Federal Trust for Education and Research (Think tank)
• Federal Trust ran a project entitled: "From the European Convention to 
Public Discourse: Debating our Common European Future". This 
collaborative project was intended to faciliate transnational debate on the 
main issues concerning the future of the European Union, by arranging a 
series of eight lectures and debates and publishing four specially 
commissioned pamphlets as part its series of "European Essays".
• The Trust also contributes annual papers to "Convention Watch", a tool for 
ensuring an in-depth knowledge of the positions being taken by governments,
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Parliaments and the political forces of Europe on the main questions being 
discussed in the European Convention.
3. ACTIVITIES IN SCOTLAND 
A. The Scottish Executive activities
• The Scottish Executive's website had a forum devoted to collecting and 
exhibiting views on the future of Europe. Such comments were then taken 
forward to the Convention's Forum itself.
• The Scottish Executive ran three information sessions with small and 
medium civil society groups through Scottish Civic Forum.
• The Scottish Executive invited contributions on the future of Europe from 
larger civil society groups.
B. Other Politicians'/political institutions activities
• Catherine Stilher MEP held six seminars in Scotland.
• The Scottish Parliament held a conference on the 16th of September 2002 
with interested parties.
• Catherine Rainer MEP also held events inviting the public's views and the 
Conventioneer Neil MacCormick also held public events across the country.
C. Civil society activities in Scotland
• Institute for citizenship ran a discussion across business, called "Managing 
the Demographic Deficit" at Glasgow City Council on the 14th of March 
2002
• University of Edinburgh ran a related seminar in early autumn 2002.
• Institute for citizenship - ran events to increase awareness of EU issues 
called 'speak out'. Groups of students spoke out about European citizenship 
and its future in Edinburgh's City Chambers, on the 7th of February 2003.
• Strathclyde University held discussions and seminars on the future of 
Europe.
• Conference on the future of Europe organised by Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence with Royal Society of Edinburgh.
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• SCVO 'Future of Europe' 26th of August 2002 Neil MacCormick led 
discussions with Scottish voluntary organisations.
4. ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
• Northern Irelands's Assembly debated the Future of Europe in 2002
• Institute for Citizenship - ran an event where young people discussed the 
future of European citizenship in Belfast, the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
Stormont on the 7th of March 2003.
5. ACTIVITIES IN WALES (The Assembly's activities are documented in
Chapters Four and Nine)
A. Activities organised by politicians/political institutions
• 26th of October 2001 conference 'Wales, the Euro and Jobs' at Cardiff 
County Hall. John Monks and Peter Hain attended. This was part of a 
campaign to raise awareness of British membership of the European Union, 
(organised by Eluned Morgan and Glennys Kinnock-GK speaks). There was 
some debate on the of future of Europe.
• 26th of October 2001 - Peter Hain was involved in a radio phone in
• 26th of October 2001 there was a "Question and Answer Session" with young 
people. The following attended: Don Touhig (MP), Peter Hain (MP), 
Jonathan Evans (MEP), Mike German (AM) and Paul Willey
• 20th of November 2001 there was a Forum of the European Youth Parliament 
where students from South Wales debated the future of Europe.
• 27th of November 2001 Don Touhig (MP) attended a seminar at Cardiff 
University on Europe.
• In February 2002 - a conference was sponsored by European Commission 
Wales office and Neath and Port Talbot Council. Here the future of Europe 
was discussed at Margam County Park. Glennys Kinnock (MEP), Peter Hain 
(MP) and Catherine Eva in attendance.
• Conference held by the Green/EFA Group of MEPs (Jill Evans and Jean 
Lambert) with civil society in Cardiff. "The future of the European Union. 
The European Convention Rebalancing the Treaty Towards a Sustainable 
Europe", at the Marriott Hotel on the 24th of July 2002.
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• British Embassy in Spain and British Council ran a conference on the 16th- 
18th of October 2002 on the "Future of Europe: The Convention and the 
regions". Peter Main (MP) and Rhodri Morgan (AM) attend. The final report 
was presented to European Convention in Brussels.
fh
• 28 of November 2002 Tony Blair gave a speech to an invited audience hi 
Cardiff on the UK's position in relation to the Convention on future of 
Europe with Peter Hain.
• 29th of November 2002 - Tony Blair spoke at Cardiff s Old library setting out 
his vision for Europe.
• 21 st March 2003 - Jill Evans went to Ysgol Glantaf, Llandaff North, Spring 
day hi Europe, to tell pupils about Convention and relay their views back.
• 28th of July 2003 "Question and Answer" event hosted by the European 
Commission Office in Wales with Peter Hain.
B. Civil society activities
• 1 st of November 2002 - WTUC European Conference at Cardiff City Hall. - 
Keynote speakers Neil Kinnock, John Monks. Organised with the European 
Commission Office in Wales.
• 13th of December 2002, Institute for Citizenship event 'Speak out'. Where 
young people discussed European citizenship and its future in Cardiff at the 
Temple of Peace in Cardiff. Panellists included: Helen Conway - Cardiff 
Chamber of Commerce, Jonathan Evans (MEP), Eluned Morgan (MEP), 
Dafydd Trystan - Chief Executive, Plaid Cymru. Discussed enlargement, the 
single currency and the opportunities and threats posed by the EU for Wales.
• 28th of April 2003 Cardiff Business Club - Sir Rocco Forte spoke about the 
perils of the European Convention
• 3rd of June 2003 "where is Europe going?" New democracy marathon/ Vision 
2020 conference at Cardiff s temple of peace.
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